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 This dissertation examines the role of the press in constitutional litigation before 
the United States Supreme Court to shape the First Amendment doctrine that forms the 
legal environment in which journalists operate.  Although the journalism and legal 
academies produce a significant body of scholarship analyzing First Amendment octrine 
generally, and a growing body of work discussing the role of the press in individual 
cases, relatively little scholarship focuses on the way the press has contributed to the 
evolution of constitutional doctrine through the litigation process. 
 This dissertation demonstrates that the Court has consistently ruled in favor of the 
press’s interpretation of the First Amendment on publishing issues such as prior 
restraints, libel, and privacy.  But the press has failed to persuade the Court that the First 
Amendment protects newsgathering, as in reporters’ privilege, cameras in courtrooms, 
and ride-along cases.  While the reasons for these outcomes are many and varied, this 
dissertation argues that the press itself played a significant, if not necessarily decisive role 
in the process. 
 Three cases most clearly illustrate how the development of First Amendment 
doctrine intersects the evolution of the press as a constitutional litigator.  Near v. 
Minnesota marks the first great Supreme Court victory for the press in a publishing case, 
as well as the emergence of the press as a force to be reckoned with in constitutional 
litigation.  Forty years later, Branzburg v. Hayes established a disastrous precedent for 
newsgathering cases, but spurred a press divided by that case to professionalize its 
litigation efforts.  And after another thirty years, Bartnicki v. Vopper implicated both 
publishing and newsgathering doctrine, testing one against the other, with a positive 
outcome for today’s highly organized media defense bar. 
 This dissertation focuses on these three cases, using archival research, interviews 
with some of the principal actors, and traditional legal analysis.  It also surveys the 
evolution of constitutional press law before and between these case studies, with special 
emphasis on the participation of litigators representing the mainstream press. Finally, it 
concludes with some observations that can be drawn from this study, including statistical 
analyses of press participation in First Amendment litigation before the Supr me Court,  
and recommendations for future research.   
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…[In] substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this in a deeper 
sense than that what the courts declare to have always been the law is in 
fact new.  It is legislative in its grounds.  The very considerations which 
judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret 
root from which the law draws all the juices of life.  I mean, of course, 
considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned.  Every 
important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at 
bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public 
policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the 
unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, 
but none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis. 
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
THE COMMON LAW  
  
 
It is doubtful if the press itself regards judges as so insulated from 
public opinion. In this very case the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association filed a brief amicus curiae on the merits after we granted 
certiorari. Of course, it does not cite a single authority that was not 
available to counsel for the publisher involved, and does not tell us a 
single new fact except this one: “This membership embraces more than 
700 newspaper publishers whose publications represent in excess of eighty 
per cent of the total daily and Sunday circulation of newspapers published 
in this country. The Association is vitally interested in the issue presented 
in this case, namely, the right of newspapers to publish news stories and 
editorials on cases pending in the courts.” 
 
 This might be a good occasion to demonstrate the fortitude of the 
judiciary.     
 Associate Justice Robert Jackson, dissenting  
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 397 (1947) 
 
 
 The dissertation usually marks the formal beginning of one’s scholarly career.  As 
the vital requirement for earning a Ph.D. and, thus, entrée to the academy, the dissertation 
is often the wellspring for scholarly work spanning the formative years in the life of a 
young scholar.  The articles and books that flow from the dissertation and related studi s
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are the scholar’s ticket to tenure and the freedom thereafter to reach higher and further, 
ever adding to the discipline’s body of knowledge. 
 With the greatest respect for that tradition, I submit this dissertation from a 
different place.  Following a 20-year career as reporter, editor, and publisher, I was 
invited to join the legal academy because of the skills I had developed as a journalist.  For 
the past two decades, I have been teaching prospective lawyers to write clealy, 
concisely, and accurately.  And my reward for those labors, aside from a tenured 
professorship, has been the opportunity to study, teach, and write about media law.   
 A few years ago, with retirement looming not too far away, I felt the need for a 
capstone project that would allow me to join my two great loves – journalism and law – 
in a useful way.  The Philip Merrill College gave me that opportunity, and this 
dissertation is the culmination, not only of my graduate study there, but also of my entire 
academic career.  For that reason, I ask the reader to indulge the presumptuous sweep of 
this study. 
 I must also beg my readers’ forbearance with a style of attribution that will seem 
quite alien to all but the legal scholars among them.  As I will explain further in the 
Introduction, my use of the style manual known as The Bluebook seems most appropriate 
to deal with the great volume of legal documentation required for this study, but its 
idiosyncrasies with respect to books and articles will doubtless be disconcerting to 
journalism and social science scholars.  Table 1, which appears at the end of this Preface, 
points out the most commonly used conventions of Bluebook style. 
 That said, I ask no further indulgence.  The dissertation must stand on its own as 
original, insightful, and significant.  I hope it will do that and more.  I hope it will show 
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that the press has participated constructively, if not always decisively, in shapig First 
Amendment doctrine.  I hope it will engender a new appreciation for a little-studied, but 
important function of the press in our democracy.  And I hope it will stimulate other 
journalism and media law scholars to probe even more deeply into the process by which 
the press defends and tries to advance its First Amendment values through litigation. 
Table 1 – Bluebook Footnote Style 
 Legal scholarship generally conforms to citation standards prescribed by The 
Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation.  The Bluebook is compiled by the editors of the 
principal law reviews of Columbia, Harvard, Pennsylvania, and Yale law schools and i 
now in its 19th edition.  Below are some of the most common footnote styles the reader 
will encounter in this dissertation. 
 
 1.  Cases.  The first time a published opinion appears in a footnote, it will be cited 
in full as follows:  Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).  The elements of the citation 
include the party names; the abbreviation of the reporter in which the case appears (here, 
United States Reports), preceded by the volume number and followed by the beginning 
page number; and the date of decision.  Where the citation is to a specific page within the 
opinion, that page number will follow the beginning page number.   
 
 On second and subsequent reference, the citation may be shortened in a number of 
ways, most commonly: Near, 283 U.S. at 702. Party names are italicized whenever a 
short-form citation is used, or when the case name appears in the text or a textual 
footnote.  Where the citation is the same as the immediately preceding citation, the short 
form Id. may be used.  The case citation, as well as a docket number, are generally used 
in referring to supporting litigation documents, such as briefs, orders, motions, etc.   
 
 2.  Statutes.  Statutory citations may appear in several forms, depending upon 
source of the citation and the statute’s progress though the legislative process when the 
citation is captured.  A fully codified statute might appear as follows:   Federal Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(2010).  Here, 18 is the 
title number of the United States Code; the date following the section number refers to 
the most recent source of the statute, here advising the reader that the source is cur ent 
through 2010.  Legislation may also appear as bills (not yet enacted) or session law  
(enacted, but not yet codified). 
 
 3.  Books.  Books are generally cited by author, title, and date of publication, 
without reference to publisher, as follows:  LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE 
PRESS (1985).  Both the author(s) and the title are in large and small capitals, a format 
also used for the names of journals and statutory compilations. Up to three authors may 
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be listed; otherwise, the phrase et al. is used. In multivolume works, the volume number 
appears before the title; page numbers follow the title.   
 
 Editors and edition numbers are included in ordinary roman type within the 
parentheses before the date.  Historical works may also cite a modern publisher, with the  
date of first publication included in separate parentheses at the end of the citation.  The 
short form Id. may be used for consecutive footnotes citing the same source; s pra may 
also be used for short form citations to works appearing earlier in the dissertaton, e.g., 
LEVY, supra note 28.  (Infra may be used to refer the reader to sections of the dissertation 
that appear after the citation.)   
 
 4.  Articles.  The author, if known, is listed in ordinary roman type, followed by 
the title in italics and the name of the journal in large and small capitals.  The format for 
dates and page numbers will vary depending upon whether the journal is consecutively 
paginated or not.  For example,  Paul L. Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of 
Historical Developments, 66 MINN. L. REV. 95, 135-36 (1980), cites an article in a 
consecutively paginated journal; Earl Caldwell, Angry Panthers Talk of War and Unwrap 
Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 10, 1968, at 30, cites an article in a non-consecutively 
paginated journal (usually newspapers and magazines). 
 
 5.  Electronic Sources.  Many of the litigation documents used in this dissertation 
are conveniently available only through electronic databases, principally LEXIS and 
Westlaw (WL).  A typical citation might look like this: Brief for Respondents Cable 
News Network, Inc., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., Robert Rainey, Donald Hooper, and Jack 
Hamann in Support of Petitioners, Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (No. 97-1927), 1998 
WL 901783. Other materials may cited directly to a web site, e.g. Levine, Sullivan, Koch 
& Schultz, L.L.P., http://www.lskslaw.com/bios/llevine.htm. 
 
 6.  Signals.  Bluebook format calls for the use of a variety of “signals” preceding 
the citations.  I have largely avoided the use of signals in this dissertation, but will 
occasionally preface a citation with “see” or “see, e.g.”  These signals tell the reader that 
the citation is not direct authority for the point made in the text, but may provide 
examples, illustrations, or other information related to that point. 
 
 7.  Abbreviations.  The reader will note many and varied abbreviations used in 
citations throughout this dissertation.  All abbreviations used in the footnotes are 
prescribed by The Bluebook, but the reader is cautioned that the rules for using them vary 
according to purpose or position in the citation.  For example, the abbreviation “U.S.” is 
used to cite to the United States Reports, or when United States is used as an adjective, as 
in U.S. Dept. of State.  United States is spelled out in full when the federal government is 
a party litigant.   
 
 8.  Bibliographies.  Law review articles and other legal scholarship typically do 
not provide separate bibliographies.  With the understanding that bibliographies are de 
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The Press as Constitutional Litigator 




Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
A.  May It Please the Court1    
 
 The essential role of the press in American politics has been the subject of  
extensive study since Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that the press “makes political life 
circulate in every corner of this vast land.”2  Tocqueville also wrote about the “vital 
connection between [political] associations and newspapers,”3 but never saw the 
institutional press emerge as a political association in its own right.4  
 By the early Twentieth Century, however, the press had begun to organize itself 
for its own political ends,5 and by the end of that century the organizations that represent 
the news media were fully engaged in political action.  In a 1947 case, for exampl , the 
Supreme Court  absolved a journalist of criminal contempt for criticizing a Texs county 
judge, partly on the ground that judicial officers are insulated from public opinion.  In a 
rather bitter dissent, Justice Jackson referred to the growing power of the press: 
It is doubtful if the press itself regards judges as so insulated from public 
opinion. In this very case the American Newspaper Publishers Association 
filed a brief amicus curiae on the merits after we granted certiorari. Of 
                                                
1 This is the traditional opening of an attorney who is about to present an oral argument to 
an appellate tribunal.  It seemed most appropriate here. 
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 217 (Gerald E. Bavan trans., 
2003)(1835).     
3 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 602.    
4 See DAVID BICKNELL TRUMAN, THE GOVERNING PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 55 (1951). 




course, it does not cite a single authority that was not available to counsel 
for the publisher involved, and does not tell us a single new fact except 
this one: “This membership embraces  more than 700 newspaper 
publishers whose publications represent in excess of eighty per cent of the 
total daily and Sunday circulation of newspapers published in this country. 
The Association is vitally interested in the issue presented in this case, 
namely, the right of newspapers to publish news stories and editorials on 
cases pending in the courts.”6  
   
 Yet the press as player for its own account has hardly been studied at all.7 One 
might suggest several interrelated reasons for this relative obscurity:  
 1.  The essence of the press’s self-image is public service.8 Th  press does not 
think of itself, nor does it care to be known, as a political actor.  Indeed, such a role 
would strike most working journalists as a conflict of interest: how can the press cover 
political institutions with detached objectivity while it seeks favor from those same 
institutions? 
                                                
6 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 397 (1947). 
7 One notable exception is TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT: THE PRESS 
AND THE COURTS IN NINTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990).  Gleason writes that his 
study “is an attempt to examine the influence of the institutional press on the 
development of free-press case law and doctrine.” Id. at 111.  This study attempts to do 
the same, but focusing on constitutional law and doctrine in the 20th Century.  
8 The preamble to the Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional Journalists reads as 
follows: 
 
Members of the Society of Professional Journalists believe that public 
enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of 
democracy. The duty of the journalist is to further those ends by seeking 
truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues. 
Conscientious journalists from all media and specialties strive to serve the 
public with thoroughness and honesty. Professional integrity is the 
cornerstone of a journalist’s credibility. Members of the Society share a 
dedication to ethical behavior and adopt this code to declare the Society’s 
principles and standards of practice.   
 
SPJ Code of Ethics, 1996. 
3
 
 2.  Accordingly, the press does not generally interact with either the executive or 
legislative branches in the same way that other interest groups do.  While the prss is not 
above lobbying Congress for legislation it wants – copyright protection, favorable postal 
rates, open meetings and records laws, and so on – it is not especially comfortable doing 
so.   “As a general rule,” wrote Newsweek’s Jonathan Alter to begin a recent column 
arguing for a federal shield law, “journalists shouldn't be in the business of lobbying 
Congress.”9  
 3.  By contrast, the press campaigns vigorously in the courts for its most 
important institutional interests, but the scholars that one might expect to monitor the r 
efforts are AWOL.  Media law specialists in law and journalism schools are usually 
focused on substantive law (outputs), rather than political action (inputs), and many 
political scientists who study the courts have apparently been distracted by theories that 
ignore institutional dynamics altogether. 
 How does one explain the active role of the press in court?  The simple answer is 
that the press is often, perhaps usually, the defendant in a lawsuit and has no other choice.  
Allegations of libel or invasion of privacy, for example, bring publishers and broadcasters 
to court quite against their will.  Even when the press brings a lawsuit seeking access to 
courtrooms, meetings, and records, for example, the reason is arguably necessity, since 
the alternative is abdication of journalistic responsibility.   
 But that theory loses much of its explanatory power beyond the trial or 
intermediate appellate stage.  The exigencies of daily or, now, hourly journalism will 
rarely justify filing a petition for review by the United States Supreme Court years after 
                                                
9 Jonathan Alter, You Shield Us, We’ll Shield You, NEWSWEEK, July 11, 2005, at 55.   
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the fact.  Moreover, it is never “necessary” to spend time and money to file a friend of the 
court brief.  A much more compelling explanation for that kind of activity lies in the 
press’s largely hidden role as “lobbyist” for its own regulatory interests. 
 Conventional wisdom holds that the press in the United States is  not regulated at 
all; that is, with a few notable exceptions,10 American journalism is largely free from 
government supervision.  Credit for this remarkable state of affairs goes to the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and its brief, but clarion press clause:  
“Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of… the press….”11  
 Although the amendment’s language appears to be anything but regulatory in 
nature, the meaning of constitutional language is not to be found in the words alone, but 
in the interpretive decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  Justices Hugo Black 
and William O. Douglas notwithstanding,12 those interpretive opinions “regulate” press 
behavior just as surely – if far more benignly – as the tax code or environmental laws 
regulate other business behaviors. 
 For over two centuries, no more than nine men and women, and often far fewer, 
have told us what laws of Congress and the states may inhibit the press from gatherin  
and publishing the news without unconstitutionally “abridging” its freedom.  Their 
                                                
10 Broadcasting, for example, is heavily regulated in many respects, although the 
government exercises no significant control over the content of broadcast news exc pt 
with respect to political campaigns. 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
12 Both justices were widely considered First Amendment “absolutists.” See, e.g., N.Y. 
Times v. United States (The Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1971)(Black, J., 
concurring, joined by Douglas, J.). Black quoted Solicitor General Erwin Griswold at ral 
argument:  “Now, Mr. Justice [BLACK], your construction of . . . [the First Amendment] 
is well known, and I certainly respect it. You say that no law means no law, and that 
should be obvious.  I can only  say, Mr. Justice, that to me it is equally obvious that ‘no 
law’ does not mean ‘no law,’ and I would seek to persuade the Court that that is true. . . . 
5
 
decisions were not reached in a vacuum, of course; constitutional doctrine must be 
created in the context of a real case.13  Two or more interested and antagonistic parties 
present a set of facts that raises an unanswered legal question.  Each party tries to obtain 
the most favorable outcome, as do others with more abstract or remote interests.14  And 
all are represented by counsel well schooled in the ambiguities of existing doctrine and 
the techniques of judicial persuasion.  
 The decisions that emerge from the Court typically comprise simple outcomes  
accompanied by complex rationales.  Together, these set the boundaries within whic the 
press may operate.  So it is reasonable to think of the press as subject, for better or worse, 
to the regulatory environment created by the Supreme Court.   
 This dissertation argues that we must also think of the press as a participant in the 
process, influencing the creation of constitutional doctrine by initiating, defending, or 
otherwise joining cases that raise First Amendment questions.  It may be difficult to think 
of the press as an interest group, “lobbying” to influence regulatory decisions.  The press 
reports on interest groups; to be an interest group seems at odds with its fundamental 
purpose.  Yet in more than 100 Supreme Court cases that have reached a decision, the 
press has played an active role, as party litigant or friend of the court, in the process of 
shaping First Amendment doctrine. This dissertation aims to explore how this proces 
came about, how it operates in practice, and what that has meant for journalism, media 
law, and the First Amendment. 
 Specifically, this dissertation poses four research questions: 
                                                
13 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (the “case or controversies” clause). 




 1.  How, when, and why did the press emerge as a constitutional litigator? 
 2.  How has the press’s approach to constitutional litigation evolved from 
emergence to the present? 
 3.  How successful has the press been in persuading the Court to its own view of 
the First Amendment? 
 4.  What accounts for the disparity between publishing and newsgathering cases 
in terms of outcomes favorable to the press? 
 
B.  Plan of this Dissertation 
 At the core of this story are three detailed case studies.  The first of these 
discusses the 1931 case of Near v. Minnesota,15 which represents the first, halting efforts 
of the institutional press to mobilize in support of a First Amendment principle: the 
freedom to publish without answering in advance to censors, even judicial censors.16   
Success in Near paved the way for many more publishing cases to come, including both 
prior restraint and subsequent punishment cases.17  Causation is always elusive, but there 
is no doubt that Near would never have reached the Supreme Court without the single-
minded efforts of Col. Robert McCormick and his Chicago Tribune lawyers, Weymouth 
Kirkland and Howard Ellis.  
 Unfortunately, the legacy of Near did not extend to newsgathering cases.  
Accordingly, the second case study discusses the seminal newsgathering case of 
                                                
15 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
16 An earlier version of this case study, which appears inf a in Chapter 4 of the 
dissertation, was previously published as Eric B. Easton, The Colonel’s Finest 
Campaign: Robert R. McCormick and Near v. Minnesota, 60 Fed. Comm. L.J. 183 
(2008).  Copyright is held by the author. 
17 The legacy of Near v. Minnesota is detailed infra in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
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Branzburg v. Hayes,18 some 40 years after Near.19  This case shows the institutional press 
far better organized for litigation than it had been in Col. McCormick’s time, although 
still far from unified as to the issue before the Court:  a testimonial privilege for 
journalists.  How much the division within the press contributed to the adverse outcome 
in Branzburg is debatable, although it may be telling that Branzburg catalyzed the 
formation of one of the press’s most vigorous litigators: the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press.  Nevertheless, the result in that case unquestionably stunted any  
First Amendment protection for gathering the news that later courts might have found..20   
 The third case study brings together aspects of both the restrictive constitutional 
doctrine of newsgathering and the expansive constitutional doctrine of publishing.  
Another 30 years after Branzburg, Bartnicki v. Vopper21 challenged the Supreme Court to 
determine whether broadcasting the content of an illegally intercepted telephone 
conversation could be punished by federal and state law.22  What began as a local labor 
dispute, with local lawyers representing both parties, attracted the support of a highly 
organized press bar, with nationally known media attorneys representing the defendant 
broadcaster and friends of the court that supported him.  Again, one cannot know for 
                                                
18 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
19 An earlier version of this case study, which appears inf a in Chapter 6 of the 
dissertation, was previously published as Eric B. Easton, A House Divided: Earl 
Caldwell, The New York Times, and the Quest for a Testimonial Privilege, 2009 Utah L. 
Rev. 1293. Copyright is held by the author. 
20 Despite the best efforts of the Reporter’s Committee and others, the statistical summary 
that appears infra in Chapter 9 shows that newsgathering remains the press’s greatest 
failure as constitutional litigator. 
21 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
22 Another version of this case study, which appears inf a in Chapter 8 of this dissertation 
will be published separately by the University of Louisville Law Review under the title 




certain whether that representation accounted for the press’s victory, but the outcome 
would seem to bode well for the future.23 
 To set the stage for these three case studies, the dissertation first surveys the state 
of American media law and advocacy in the 18th Century,24 the 19th Century, and 20th 
Century before Near.25  Following the case study of Near, the dissertation surveys the 
prior restraint cases that flowed directly from Near. After looking a bit more closely at 
Grosjean v. American Press, in which the same Court expanded the principles articulated 
in Near to apply to subsequent punishment cases as well, the dissertation continues its 
survey of publishing cases to include contempt, libel, and privacy cases.   
 Similarly, the dissertation examines the legacy of Branzburg in newsgathering 
cases involving access to judicial and executive branch processes and information, as 
well as other newsgathering cases not so easily categorized, except that they bear the 
burden imposed by Branzburg, each in their own way.26  Bartnicki, as yet, has left no 
legacy to speak of, but the final section of that case study reflects on its impact over the 
past decade and speculates as to how the Court might answer some of the questions that 
case leaves unresolved. 
 In each of the principal case studies and, insofar as practical, in the hundred or so 
cases surveyed in the other chapters, the dissertation examines the role of the press as 
party litigant or amicus with a view toward responding to one or more of the research 
questions asked above.  The dissertation takes on those questions more directly in the 
                                                
23 See infra, Chapter 8. 
24 See infra, Chapter 2. 
25 See infra, Chapter 3. 
26 See infra, Chapter 7. 
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statistical analyses and conclusions chapter that completes the narrative.27 A bibliography 
concludes the dissertation. 
  
C.  The Literature 
 
Although there is no comprehensive study of the press either as a political 
interest group or as a constitutional litigator, this dissertation is informed by a 
wealth of legal-historical and legal-political science literature that ouches on the 
subject in one way or another.  The following sections highlight the portion of 
that literature on which this dissertation relies most heavily.   
 
1.  The Legal-Historical Literature 
 
 The historical literature that undergirds this dissertation comprises primarily a 
body of work that chronicles the development of the American press at moments in 
history when free press principles were evolving, supplemented by biographies and 
constitutional histories.  Additionally, the histories of three critically important press 
organizations were used extensively in this study. 
 For the pre-constitutional era, Leonard Levy’s Emergence of a Free Press28 has 
been enormously influential, not only for its historical coverage but also for the author’s 
remarkable concession that the seeds of a broadly conceived press freedom in America 
can indeed be found in the colonial press period – a stark reversal of his previous 
published opinion in Legacy of Suppression29 that the 18th Century American experience 
                                                
27 See infra, Chapter 9. 
28 LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985). 
29 LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960). 
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with freedom of expression was “slight.”30 Jeffrey Smith’s Printers and Press Freedom31 
elaborates on that revised view, pointing out that “libertarian press ideology was 
remarkably lucid and dynamic in the eighteenth century.” And Isaiah Thomas’s 
legendary The History of Printing in America32 offers several examples of the legal 
difficulties that printers encountered in the 18th Century. 
 For the ratification and immediate post-constitutional periods, including coverage 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, this dissertation relied on several excellent 
sources.  Jeffrey Pasley’s The Tyranny of Printers33 is penetrating study of a very narrow, 
but critical, period in the history of American press law, from the rise of newspaper 
politics to the election of Andrew Jackson.  Richard Rosenfeld’s American Aurora,34 a 
compendium of items from the Aurora and its rivals, almost created a sense of being 
there during the period, as did three important biographies:  David McCullough’s John 
Adams,35 Ron Chernow’s Alexander Hamilton,36 and Jean Edward Smith’s John 
Marshall.37 
 Three other studies treat the Sedition Act period at some length, then go on to 
cover several other important historical moments for the press and the law in the 19th and 
                                                
30 LEVY, supra note 28, at ix.  
31 JEFFREY A. SMITH , PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY 
AMERICAN JOURNALISM viii (1988). 
32 ISAIAH THOMAS, THE HISTORY OF PRINTING IN AMERICA, WITH A BIOGRAPHY OF 
PRINTERS &  AN ACCOUNT OF NEWSPAPERS (Marcus A. McCorison, ed., Weathervane 
Books 1970) (1810). 
33 JEFFREY L. PASLEY, “THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS”:  NEWSPAPER POLITICS IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2001). 
34 RICHARD N. ROSENFIELD, AMERICAN AURORA: A DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN RETURNS: 
THE SUPPRESSED HISTORY OF OUR NATION’S BEGINNINGS AND THE HEROIC NEWSPAPER 
THAT TRIED TO REPORT IT (1997). 
35 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS (2001). 
36 RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON  (2004). 
37 JEAN EDWARD SMITH , JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1996). 
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20th Centuries.  Geoffrey Stone’s Perilous Times38 focuses on freedom of speech and 
press during wartime.  John Lofton’s The Press as Guardian of the First Amendment39 
and Paul Starr’s The Creation of the Media40 offer a much broader perspective on the 
legal and political history, respectively, of the media into the present day.  
 These three books also cover the 19th Century, but two important works 
concentrate on that period.  Timothy Gleason’s The Watchdog Concept41 is an in-depth 
study of contempt and libel cases in state courts throughout the country and, in so doing, 
achieves with respect to the common law of the press what this dissertation tries to
regarding the constitutional law of the press.  David Rabban’s Free Speech in Its 
Forgotten Years42 sweeps more broadly from a civil liberties perspective.   
 Margaret Blanchard’s Revolutionary Sparks43 takes the civil liberties approach 
deep into the 20th Century.  In her study, as well as Rabban’s, the mainstream press is 
conspicuous by its absence from the First Amendment battles over union organizing ad 
World War I.  Harry Kalven, Jr.’s A Worthy Tradition44 covers similar ground, but from 
the perspective of a legal scholar, rather than journalism historian.  Finally, J. Edward 
Gerald’s slim study of The Press and the Constitution 1931-194745 brings that story from 
Near v. Minnesota through World War II. 
                                                
38 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION 
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004). 
39 JOHN LOFTON, THE PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1980). 
40 PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS (2004). 
41 GLEASON, supra note 7. 
42 DAVID M. RABBAN , FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997). 
43 MARGARET A. BLANCHARD, REVOLUTIONARY SPARKS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN 
MODERN AMERICA (1992). 
44 HARRY KALVEN , JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988). 
45 J. EDWARD GERALD, THE PRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1931-1947 (1948). 
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 From Near forward, this dissertation relies far more on primary than secondary 
sources.  That material, derived primarily from archived letters, legal filings and court 
opinions, and personal interviews, is treated more fully in the section on Sources and 
Methods.  There is, however, a growing body of what I will call “case biographies” 
which were invaluable to this dissertation.  
 The earliest and perhaps most famous “case biography” used here is James 
Alexander’s The Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger.46  Of course, Alexander’s 
recounting of the case is the antithesis of disinterested reporting.  As Zenger’s principal 
backer and ghost writer, Alexander had as much at stake in the outcome of the trial as 
Zenger himself.  The consummate propagandist, Alexander used the book to make the 
most of his courtroom victory, and the Zenger legend survives today because of 
Alexander’s talent.  Fact or fiction, the Zenger story is a fair represntation of the 
colonial law of seditious libel and its spirit, at least, is supported by the historical record. 
Burton Konkle’s worshipful The Life of Andrew Hamilton,47 Zenger’s lawyer, offered yet 
another account to be taken with a substantial grain of salt.    
 In the modern era, Fred Friendly’s Minnesota Rag48 is the one of the most popular 
“case biographies” in the literature, and no study of Near v. Minnesota could be complete 
without going to that well again and again.  The study of Near also benefited from The 
                                                
46 JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER 
ZENGER (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 1963) (1736). 
47 BURTON ALVA KONKLE, THE LIFE OF ANDREW HAMILTON , 1676-1741: “THE DAY-
STAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION” (1941). 
48 FRED W. FRIENDLY, M INNESOTA RAG: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE LANDMARK 
SUPREME COURT CASE THAT GAVE NEW MEANING TO FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1981). 
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Colonel,49 Richard Norton Smith’s definitive biography of Robert R. McCormick.  
Richard Cortner’s The Kingfish and the Constitution50 is hardly known at all, but elevates 
Grosjean v. American Press51 from a slap on the wrist of a populist demagogue to an 
important link in the evolution of First Amendment doctrine.  It also illuminates the post-
Near activism of the ANPA.  Of course, Anthony Lewis’s Make No Law52 remains the 
model for all such “case biographies,” even as New York Times v. Sullivan53 was the 
fount of so much important First Amendment doctrine. 
 The Pentagon Papers Case, N w York Times v. United States,54 inspired two 
excellent “biographies”: Sanford Ungar’s The Papers and the Papers55 and David 
Rudenstine’s The Day the Presses Stopped.56 Although there is no book-length study of 
Branzburg v. Hayes, Anthony Fargo’s new monograph, What They Meant to Say,57 is the 
best treatment by far of that case’s ambiguities.  Mark Scherer’s Rights in the Balance58 
devotes considerable attention to the role of the national press in Nebraska Press 
                                                
49 RICHARD NORTON SMITH , THE COLONEL: THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF ROBERT R. 
MCCORMICK 1880-1955 (1997). 
50 RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE KINGFISH AND THE CONSTITUTION: HUEY LONG, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PRESS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1996). 
51 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
52 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
(1991). 
53 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
54 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
55 SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE PENTAGON PAPERS (1989). 
56 DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON 
PAPERS CASE (1996). 
57 Anthony L. Fargo, What They Meant to Say: The Courts Try to Explain Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 12 JOURNALISM &  COMM. MONOGRAPHS 65 (2010).  
58 MARK R. SCHERER, RIGHTS IN THE BALANCE: FREE PRESS, FAIR TRIAL &  NEBRASKA 
PRESS ASSOCIATION V. STUART (2008). 
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Association v. Stuart.59  And Elliot Rothenberg, who represented Dan Cohen, reveals 
much about big-time media lawyers in The Taming of the Press,60 even as he gloats over 
their defeat in Cohen v. Cowles Media.61 
 Finally, this survey of the legal-historical literature would not be complete 
without mentioning studies of the three leading litigators among media organizatio s:  
Edwin Emery’s History of the American Newspaper Publishers Association;62 Paul 
Alfred Pratte’s Gods Within the Machine: A History of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, 1923-1993;63 and Floyd McKay’s First Amendment Guerillas: 
Formative Years of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.64     
 
2.  The Legal-Political Science Literature 
 Although this dissertation is not theory-driven, it has been informed by the 
political science literature on interest-group theory, including the purposes and value of 
amicus briefs, as well as various more general studies of Supreme Court decision-
making.  Unlike the previous section on Legal-Historical Literature, this section is not 
about the literature consulted directly to contextualize the primary legal r search.  Rather, 
the body of literature discussed below has directly or indirectly influenced the author’s 
                                                
59 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
60 ELLIOT C. ROTHENBERG, THE TAMING OF THE PRESS: COHEN V. COWLES MEDIA 
COMPANY (1999). 
61 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
62 EDWIN EMERY, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION 
(1950). 
63 PAUL ALFRED PRATTE’S GODS WITHIN THE MACHINE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, 1923-1993 (1995). 
64 Floyd J. McKay, First Amendment Guerillas: Formative Years of the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 6 JOURNALISM &  COMM. MONOGRAPHS 105 (2004). 
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thinking about the press as an interest group and how it might have affected the Supreme 
Court’s decision-making in First Amendment cases.       
 The notion of interest groups as a political force is older than the republic itself. 
In Federalist No. 10, James Madison warned of the dangers of faction: “a number of 
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and 
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”65 G. David 
Garson discusses John C. Calhoun’s theory of the state as “‘regard[ing] interests as well 
as numbers, considering the community as made up of different and conflicting interests, 
as far as the government is concerned, and takes the sense of each through its appropriate 
organ, and the united sense of all as the sense of the entire community.’”66  
 Tocqueville defines one form of political association as consisting “simply in the 
public assent which a number of individuals give to certain doctrines and in the 
engagement which they contract to promote in a certain manner the spread of those 
doctrines.”  Suggesting that “the right of associating in this fashion almost merges with 
freedom of the press,” he asserts that associations so formed are more powerful than the 
press, attracting more like-minded members and increasing in zeal as they do.67   
                                                
65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
66 G. David Garson, On the Origins of Interest-Group Theory: A Critique of Process, 68 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1505, 1507 (1974)(quoting John C. Calhoun from ELISHA MULFORD, 
THE NATION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL ORDER AND POLITICAL LIFE IN THE UNITED 
STATES (Houghton-Mifflin, 1881)(1870)). 
67 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 220-21. 
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 Modern interest group theory is generally traced to Arthur Bentley, whose The 
Process of Government68  is credited with “developing a theory of government as ‘a 
process in which interest groups are the players and protagonists.’”69  In fact, Garson 
cites a number of possibly more deserving progenitors, including Bentley’s own teacher, 
Albion Small, whose writings “contain many of the central points of interest group 
theory:  (1) society conceived as composed of a large number of groups; (2) no one of 
which can claim to represent the general will; hence (3) the need for elections to 
determine a rough approximation of the collective volition; (4) determined by group 
forces at various stages of the political process....”70  
 Wherever the credit or blame may lie, the interest group theory languished for 
decades before being “resurrected”71 in mid-century by, among others, David Truman, 
whose The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion72 provides both 
“a theoretical framework for analyzing group behavior, and the application of  group 
influence in the political process.”73  Importantly for our purposes, Truman includes a 
chapter on the role of groups in the judicial process, pointing out that governmental 
choices are “no less important to interest groups when they are announced from the bench 
than when they are made in legislative halls and executive chambers.”74  Truman points 
                                                
68 See ARTHUR BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Odegard ed., 
1967)(1908). 
69 Garson, supra note 66, at 1512 (quoting Peter Odegard, Introduction to Bentley, supra 
note 68, xiii-xix.)  
70 Id. at 1511. 
71 Id. at 1514. 
72 DAVID TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC 
OPINION (1951). 
73 Roland Young, Review, of TRUMAN, supra note 72, 278 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &  
SOC. SCI. 200, 201 (Nov. 1951). 
74 TRUMAN, supra note 72, at 480. 
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out that group interests are “particularly close to the surface” when constitutional 
questions are resolved,75 which characterizes the great majority of cases involving the 
media.   
 Like Truman, Martin Shapiro sees the Supreme Court as something of a protector 
for groups who may be under-represented in the legislative or executive branches, either 
because they are still inchoate as interest groups or because they have lost their political 
battle in those arenas.76  Shapiro’s major work on the freedom of speech and the First 
Amendment, however, barely mentions the institutional press in either category; indeed, 
the relatively heavy use of the Court by the media might be seen as an example of a third 
category of “clientele”: groups that are institutionally unsuited to lobbying the political 
branches.  Twenty years later, however, Shapiro had no difficulty analyzing the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional libel doctrine in terms of government regulation of an industry – 
the press.77 
 Interest group theory rejects the presumption that government tries to advance the 
public interest, and rather asserts with Madison that “all participants in the political 
process act to further their self-interest.”78 While the institutional press most assuredly 
sees its self-interest as co-extensive with the public interest, at least with respect to First 
Amendment issues, that hardly negates the application of the theory to this multibillion-
dollar enterprise.  The theory, moreover, sees government regulation as a commodity, to 
                                                
75 Id. at 494. 
76 Id. at 487; MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 36-37 (1966). 
77 Martin M. Shapiro, Libel Regulatory Analysis, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 883, 883 (1986). 
78 Einer R. Elhauge, Interest Group Theory, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 35 (1991).   
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be “purchased” by interest groups who stand to benefit from favorable regulatory terms,79 
typically by expending resources on lobbying, campaign contributions and, presumably, 
litigating. 
 Gleason has studied the efforts of the institutional press as a “special interest 
group” to secure common law privileges through litigation.80  Blanchard has examined 
the unsuccessful efforts of the institutional press, through the 1977 term, to gain special 
constitutional privileges under the First Amendment beyond those accorded the public 
generally.81 Steven Helle has looked at the newsgathering/publication dichotomy through 
an interest group lens,82 and Joseph Kobylka has studied interest group litigation 
regarding obscenity. 83 This study has been informed by each of these works, as well as  
Marc Galanter’s concept of “repeat players”84 and various works on the effectiveness of 
amicus briefs.85   
                                                
79 Id. 
80 GLEASON, supra note 7.  Gleason characterizes his study of the watchdog concept as 
“an attempt to examine the influence of the institutional press on the development of fr e-
press case law and doctrine.” Id. at 111.  He argues that “The development and use of the 
watchdog was not a result of doctrinal or theoretical changes in the law.  It was the 
response of a special interest litigant to the demands of the common law.” Id. at 13. 
81 Margaret Blanchard, The Institutional Press and its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 
SUP. CT. R. 225. 
82 Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government 
Expression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1. 
83 JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA , THE POLITICS OF OBSCENITY: GROUP LITIGATION IN A TIME OF 
LEGAL CHANGE (1991).  See also Joseph F. Kobylka, A Court-Created Context for Group 
Litigation: Libertarian Groups and Obscenity, 49 J. Pol. 1061 (1987). 
84 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 L. &  SOC. R. 95 (1974). 
85 See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda 
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. R. 1109 (1988), and Amici Curiae 
before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 
(1990); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae B efs 
on the Supreme Court, 148 U.PA. L. REV. 743 (2000); Minjeong Kim & Lenae Vinson, 
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    Incorporating Galanter’s “repeat player” concept, interest group theory would 
predict that the media would be highly successful in influencing the courts to “regulat ” 
favorably.  The press is readily recognizable as an interest group “which has had and 
anticipates repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the adjudication of any one case, 
and which has the resources to pursue its long-run interests.”86 The press certainly has 
“ready access to specialists,” given the experience and prestige of the media defense bar, 
and, for the most part, the press is free to choose whether or not to seek review of an 
adverse decision in the lower courts. Accordingly, we would expect “a body of 
‘precedent’ cases – that is, cases capable of influencing the outcome of future cases – to 
be relatively skewed toward those favorable” to the press.87  Indeed, Loffredo points out 
that the Court has “displayed exceptional sensitivity toward elite communicative modes,” 
including, “to a lesser extent, the prerogatives of the mass media.”88  
 The overall success of the press in these cases would also seem to comport with 
findings that “amicus briefs filed by institutional litigants and by experienced lawyers … 
are generally more successful than are briefs filed by irregular litigants and less 
                                                                                                                                                 
Friends of the First Amendment? Amicus Curiae Briefs in Free Speech/Press Cass 
During the Warren and Burger Courts, 1 J. MEDIA L. &  ETHICS 83 (2009). 
86 Galanter, supra note 84, at 98.   
87 Id. at 98-102; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Martin Shapiro: Anticipating the New 
Institutionalism, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 387, 400 (Nancy Maveety ed. 
2003); see generally HERBERT M. KRITZER &  SUSAN S. SILBEY , IN LITIGATION : DO THE 
“HAVES”  STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (2003).  
88 Howard Gillman, Reconnecting the Modern Court to the Historical Evolution of 
Capitalism, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST 
INTERPRETATIONS 235, 251 (Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton eds. 1999) (citing 
Mark Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare,and Liberal 
Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (1997)).  Graber is quoting Steven Loffredo, 
Poverty, Democracy, and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1364  (1993). 
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experienced lawyers,”89 although the authors “cautiously” interpret their findings as more 
supportive of what they call the “legal model” of judicial decision-making than te 
interest group model.  Of the three models they considered – legal, attitudinal, and 
interest group – only the legal model would favor “filers who have a better idea of what 
kind of information is useful to the Court”;90 the interest group model, as they conceive 
it, would give the edge to the side that generates the greater number of briefs, regardless 
of the quality of the information.   
 Finally, the broader literature on Supreme Court decision-making, both anecdotal 
and scientific, contributed significantly to this dissertation.   By far the best known of the 
anecdotal books is Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong’s The Brethren,91 which covers 
the first seven years of the Burger Court, from 1969 to 1975.   A more scholarly 
treatment of the Burger Court – which decided far more press-related First Amendment 
cases than any other – is  Bernard Schwartz’s The Ascent of Pragmatism.92  Schwartz 
gives a much broader view of the workings of the Court in his Decision: How the 
Supreme Court Decides Cases,93 as does H.W. Perry’s Deciding to Decide: Agenda 
Setting in the United States Supreme Court.94   
 While Schwartz comes to the topic as a professor of law, Perry brings the 
sensibilities of a political scientist.  The political science literature in this field is divided 
                                                
89 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on 
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 750 (2000). 
90 Id.  
91 BOB WOODWARD &  SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). 
92 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 
(1990). 
93 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES (1997). 




roughly into three camps, based on behavioral models for explaining Supreme Court 
decisions: the attitudinal model, which holds that Supreme Court decisions are 
fundamentally determined by the ideology of the justices; the strategic model, which 
allows some deviation from ideology in individual cases where compromise may advance 
a justice’s long-term interests (e.g., selecting a majority author); and the historical- 
institutional model, which – like more traditional models – also credits the value of 
precedent, legislative history, and other contextual factors in the decision-maki g 
process.95 
 It will become abundantly clear that this author is more comfortable with the 
latter model, and so, to whatever extent this dissertation is informed by the political 
science literature, it is more heavily influenced by the traditional and historical-
institutional schools  than any other.  That is not to say that pure ideology and strategic 
considerations do not help explain the decisions discussed here; only that this author 
believes they are rarely the sole factors.        
 In her collection The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior, Nancy Maveety begins the 
discussion of the new institutionalists with pre-behavioralists or “old institutionalists” 
Edward Corwin and Alpheus Thomas Mason.96  Corwin was actually trained as a 
historian and retained a sense that political science is a normative science, th  purpose of 
which is to educate “judges and other policymakers about what law in a democracy ought 
to be.”97 Corwin’s primary contribution to the “new institutionalist” approach was his 
development of the first “truly postrealist constitutional theory,” which tied 
                                                
95 See generally Maveety, supra note 87. 
96 Id. at 285-86. 
97 Cornell W. Clayton, Edward S. Corwin as Public Scholar, in Maveety, supra note 87, 
289, 290.  
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“developments in constitutional law to evolutions in social-political thought,” rather than 
any notion of the framers’ intentions.98 Mason’s political biographies of Brandeis, Stone, 
and Taft added yet another dimension to the linkage of judicial decision-making and 
American political ideas.99 
 Howard Gillman finds four themes in the work of Robert G. McClosky that 
qualify him for inclusion in Maveety’s collection of historical-institutionalist Pioneers: 
“(1) institutions should be understood in terms of the distinctive ‘roles’ they play within 
the larger structure of governance and authority; (2) those roles are normative (and must 
be engaged as such), but also reflect constellations of power and interest within changing 
historical contexts; (3) the Supreme Court’s institutional characteristics shape the 
distinctive way in which justices attempt to exercise power and maintain their authority 
and legitimacy; and (4) the Court’s capacity to exercise power depends on its ability to 
generate sufficient support for its role from powerful interests and constituencies.”100 
 Robert Dahl is included in the collection largely because of a single work in the
Journal of Public Law, “Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker” (1957), which David Adamany and Stephen Meinhold consider 
“one of the most influential and enduring contributions to the modern study of law and 
courts.”101 Dahl’s study of judicial review conceded that the justices “exercise discretion, 
                                                
98 Id. at 300. 
99 Sue Davis, Alpheus Thomas Mason: Piercing the Judicial Veil, in Maveety, supra note 
87, 316, 316. 
100 Howard Gillman, Robert G. McClosky, Historical Institutionalism, and the Arts of 
Judicial Governance, in Maveety, supra note 87, at 336, 338. 
101 David Adamany & Stephen Meinhold, Robert Dahl: Democracy, Judicial Review and 
the Study of Law and Courts, in Maveety, supra n. 87, at 361, 361. 
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make policy choices, and therefore engage in the national political process.”102 But he 
sought to demonstrate empirically that the Court’s policy-making is “largely democratic 
in nature, rarely obstructing the important policies of national lawmaking majorities,” and 
that, in fact, “the Court advances majoritarian policies by endowing them with an aur  of 
legitimacy.”103 
 Finally, among the new institutionalist Pioneers, is, once again, Martin Shapiro, 
whose Law and Politics in the Supreme Court (1964) is called the “key bridge” between 
the traditionalists and new institutionalists.104 The structure of the book tells the story: the 
chapter titles characterize the Supreme Court as political agency, political scientist, 
lawmaker, policy-maker, lawyer, political theorist, and political economist.105  Herbert 
Kritzer explains the extent to which Shapiro’s political jurisprudence constituted a 
dramatic break from the notions of  “judicial modesty” espoused by McCloskey and 
Wallace Mendelson (and the flak directed his way for that reason).106 
 Kritzer also points out that, while “Shapiro acknowledges attitudinalists’ 
argument that the Court’s opinions are rationalizations,”107 he goes on to recognize that 
those opinions serve many other functions in the political process, not least of which is 
guiding the lower courts.  Herein lies the promise that Maveety discusses of 
“reintegrating law and legal academics with the political science of ourts.”108  She points 
to one attempt at such a reintegration – Gibson’s assertion that “judges’ decisions are a 
                                                
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Kritzer, supra note 87, at 387. 
105 MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO 
POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE xi (1964). 
106 Kritzer, supra note 87, at 389. 
107 Id. at 390. 
108 Maveety, supra note 87, at 28. 
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function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but 
constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do”109 – but surely others lie in the work 
of non-Pioneers, but exciting younger scholars like Gillman, Clayton and the authors they 
have collected in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches110 
and The Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations.111 
 One other scholar whose work has contributed to the thinking behind this 
dissertation is Lawrence Baum.  Baum’s The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior112 is an 
extremely accessible overview of the entire science of judicial behavior, while his Judges 
and Their Audiences113 includes a specific chapter on judicial relationships with interest 
groups and the press – although not about press in its capacity as an interest group.  
     
D.  Sources and Methods 
 In each of the three case studies that comprise the core of this dissertation, I have 
generally combined historical research and legal analysis, informed to some extent by 
political science theory.  In two of the three, I also interviewed some of the prominent 
actors in the story. The survey Chapters 2 and 3 rely more on secondary materials than on 
legal texts, while survey Chapters 5 and 7 focus on legal texts, supplemented by 
secondary sources.  Finally, the statistical summary that concludes the disertat on was 
                                                
109 Id. at 29 (quoting James L. Gibson, The Social Science of Judicial Politics, in 
POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS (Herbert F. Weisberg ed. 1986)). 
110 SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING : NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell 
W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds. 1999). 
111 Gillman & Clayton, supra note 88.  
112 LAWRENCE BAUM , THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997). 




produced by constructing a database of Supreme Court media law decisions and 
performing a few simple correlations. 
1. The Case Studies 
 Selection of the case studies seemed to flow naturally from the principal finding 
of the statistical summary that appears in Chapter 9:  that the press had been most 
successful in publishing cases and least successful in newsgathering cases.  I decided to 
look for the seminal cases in each of these two categories, and I found them in N ar and 
Branzburg.  The fact that these cases were some 40 years apart also permitted me to 
examine the growth of the institutional press as a litigator.  That, in turn, prompted me to 
find a contemporary case that might bring the story up to date.  Bartnicki was the natural 
choice, as it brings together both publishing and newsgathering issues and reveals how 
the litigation process stands today. 
 All three of these case studies rely heavily on close textual analysis of Supreme 
Court and lower court opinions, briefs of the parties and amici throughout the litigation, 
and early court filings such as pleadings and motions.  Much of this information was 
readily available through LEXIS and WESTLAW databases, but some of the more 
obscure documents had to be tracked down in the Library of Congress’s Law Library and 
even in the individual court records.   
 In every case, the Supreme Court opinion and typically two lower court opinions 
were readily available in the databases.  Their collection of Supreme Court briefs is 
almost complete, but acquiring the lower court briefs sometimes required contacting he 
courts or the law firms involved.  Pleadings, motions and other minor documents were 
the hardest to obtain; fortunately, much of that material was available in the 
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comprehensive appendices and record extracts the parties were required to file with the 
Supreme Court.     
 For the study of Near v. Minnesota, textual analysis was supplemented 
considerably by archival research at the Tribune Archives at Cantigny, where Col. 
McCormick’s business papers are maintained.  With the assistance of Research Director 
Eric Gillespie, I was able to reconstruct almost every day in McCormick’s campaign to 
enlist the support of his fellow publishers in support of the Near litigation through 
McCormick’s letters to them and theirs to him.   
 Of course, McCormick’s interest in the case was reflected in Ch cago Tribune 
articles and editorials, all readily available through the ProQuest data base, which I used 
extensively.  It was also possible to see the effects of McCormick’s efforts in other 
newspapers around the country, which were also available in ProQuest.   
 The only other archival research done for this case study was a brief sojourn in 
the papers of Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who took a great interest in the Near case, in the 
Library of Congress.  Brandeis’s notes to his clerk in the case reinforce the widely held 
understanding that Brandeis never felt bound by the narrow legal record of the case, but 
sought out evidence of his own through published sources. 
 As to secondary sources, McCormick’s own 1936 book, The Freedom of the 
Press,114 and Philip Kinsley’s Liberty of the Press:  A History of the Chicago Tribune’s 
Fight to Preserve a Free Press for the American People,115 provided a nearly 
contemporaneous account of McCormick’s campaign.  Smith’s biography of McCormick 
                                                
114 ROBERT R. MCCORMICK, THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Arno Press 1970)(1936). 
115 PHILIP KINSLEY, LIBERTY OF THE PRESS:  A HISTORY OF THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE’S 
FIGHT TO PRESERVE A FREE PRESS FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1944). 
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and Friendly’s “case biography” of Near were certainly helpful in filling gaps or 
explaining relationships left unclear by the letters.  Joseph Geis’s biography of 
McCormick116 and Lloyd Wendt’s study of the Tribune117 were more useful in fact-
checking that in supplying additional information.  Two biographies of Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes by Merlo Pusey118 and Samuel Hendel119 were also helpful in 
sorting out the politics of the Hughes Court. 
 Branzburg v. Hayes, the subject of the second case study, was actually a 
consolidation of three cases, so the legal documentation generated by the case was 
unusually extensive.  Moreover, as a result of the consolidation, many of the lower court 
documents in the two other cases, Pappas and Caldwell, are not readily available through 
electronic databases.  I was fortunate to have the services of a dedicated research 
assistant, Hae-In Lee, who located those documents in the Library of Congress and spent 
more than a few hours photocopying them.   
 Of the three cases consolidated under the caption Bra zburg v. Hayes, the most 
important by far was Caldwell v. United States.  But for Earl Caldwell’s insistence on 
challenging a federal subpoena requiring him to testify before a grand jury – even at the 
cost of his relations with his employer, The New York Times – this case might never have 
reached the Supreme Court.  The High Court could have ignored the state cases in 
Branzburg and Pappas finding no testimonial privilege for reporters under the First 
Amendment; it could not ignore Caldwell’s success in winning such a privilege from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
                                                
116 JOSEPH GEIS, THE COLONEL OF CHICAGO (1979). 
117 LLOYD WENDT, CHICAGO TRIBUNE: THE RISE OF A GREAT NEWSPAPER (1979). 
118 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951). 
119 SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1951). 
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 Thus, it was my great good fortune that Earl Caldwell generously granted me 
several wonderful hours in which he recreated his saga.  Caldwell was one of the Times’s 
original “riot reporters,” hired because the all-white news staffs at the time were unable 
to cover the race riots of the 1960s properly.  I was able to tell some of his story in this 
case study, but there is much that was not especially relevant to the subject at hand.  As 
enlightening and inspiring as Caldwell’s story is, however, it cannot be disputed that his 
persistence – however justified on grounds of personal safety and deeply held principle – 
had a disastrous effect on the law of newsgathering that remains to this day.   
 I regret that I was unable to interview the two lawyers so important to this case, 
Anthony Amsterdam, who declined on the ground that the case was too old and his 
memory too weak, and James Goodale, who gave no reason for not responding to my 
inquiries.  Fortunately, Goodale has written about this case, although not so much at the 
tactical level I was hoping for.  Another principal player, not in the litigat on itself, but in 
the legislative aftermath, was Sen. Sam Ervin, who chaired the Judiciary Committee 
hearings on a statutory privilege.120  His insights regarding the divisions within the press, 
also documented in McKay’s history of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press,121 were invaluable in preparing this dissertation.      
 Finally, the Bartnicki v. Vopper case study brings the two disparate arcs in this 
dissertation together to complete the project.  The first – the evolution of the press as 
constitutional litigator – is brought up to date with the generous assistance of Lucy 
Dalglish, executive director of Reporters Committee, and her predecessor, Jane Kirtley, 
now director of the Silha Center for Media Ethics and Law at the University of 
                                                
120 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. LEGIS. 233 (1973-74). 
121 MCKAY , supra note 64. 
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Minnesota.  Both of these talented lawyers were in the thick of the fight over the last 20 
years, and both provided invaluable insights.   
 I was also able to interview Donald Brobst, the first lawyer who represented Fred 
Vopper at the district and intermediate appellate court levels.  Brobst, a veryskilled and 
prominent, but regional, media lawyer, did not represent Vopper before the Supreme 
Court, and I had hoped there might be an enlightening, or at least interesting story, as t  
why the nationally prominent Lee Levine took over the case at the High Court level.  In 
fact, Brobst and Vopper’s employer, Sinclair Broadcasting, merely had a falling out over 
other issues, and Sinclair retained new counsel.  I did not think Levine could add 
anything to that aspect of the story and did not interview him. 
 The second arc – the divergent evolution of publishing and newsgathering 
doctrine – is also featured prominently in the Bartnicki case, albeit more in the lawyers’ 
arguments than in the Supreme Court opinion. 
 Because the vast majority of  primary sources on which I rely are court 
documents, I have used the citation format prescribed by The Bluebook: A Uniform 
System of Citation122 throughout this dissertation.  As noted in the Preface and Table 1, 
The Bluebook is designed to handle an abundance of legal documentation efficiently and 
in a reasonably unobtrusive manner.  Using a citation manual appropriate to the subject 
matter is consistent with the dissertation rules of the Graduate School of the University of 
Maryland, and use of The Bluebook for legal citation is authorized by the Chicago Style 
Manual123 commonly used in the College of Journalism.   
                                                
122 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION  (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et 
al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). 
123 THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE (16th ed. 2010).   
30
 
2.  The Survey Chapters 
 Little need be said about the sources and methodology of the survey chapters that 
link the three case studies.  As noted above, the early chapters are largely dependent on 
secondary sources; the Supreme Court played a very small role in the evolution of 
constitutional press law before 1930, although the case could be made that the free 
speech law arising from the World War I period was vital to that evolution.   
 The chapters that attempt to demonstrate the legacy of Near and Branzburg, 
respectively, are far more dependent upon the case law itself.  Where scholars, 
journalists, and lawyers have studied some of these cases in depth, I have probed those 
studies for evidence of press participation as litigants and amici.  From a research 
perspective, I view these chapters as interstitial; from an analytical perspective, however, 
they are crucial to contextualizing and understanding the significance of the three case 
studies selected for closer scrutiny.  
    
3. The Statistical Summaries 
 For the statistical overview that appears in Chapter 9, I created my own database 
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that directly implicated the press clause.  To create that 
database, I examined every case that appeared in Congressional Quarterly’s CQ Supreme 
Court Collection, Cases-in-Context: Speech, Press, and Assembly,124 supplemented by 
the tables of cases in two leading media law texts.125  
                                                
124 Supreme Court Collection, http://library.cqpress.com/ssc. 
125 DWIGHT L. TEETER, JR. &  BILL LOVING, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM 
AND CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA  (12th ed. 2008); MARC A. FRANKLIN , ET 
AL., MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS  (7th ed. 2005) 
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 The first step in constructing the database was to identify participation in the case 
by mass circulation news media – primarily newspapers, magazines, broadcast outlet , 
and cable television services – as well as their corporate owners and associations formed 
by those corporations and the principal actors within them.  I refer to this group as the 
“institutional press” or “mainstream media” throughout this dissertation.  Where such 
actors were parties to the litigation, as in New York Times v. Sullivan,126 the cases were 
automatically included.  Otherwise, both LEXIS and Westlaw databases wer consulted 
to determine whether mainstream media actors filed or signed onto amicus briefs.  
 Cases in which the only media actors could not fairly be described as mainstream 
or institutional, such as the World War I sedition cases or most obscenity cases, were 
excluded from the database.  Some very important media law cases, such as Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,127 were excluded under this criterion. Also excluded were cases in 
which members of the press appear (or are likely to appear) as both plaintiff and 
defendant, particularly copyright and unfair competition cases.  And where different 
cases were consolidated into a single opinion, they were generally treated as separate 
cases for purposes of this study.   
 Among the media players that feature prominently in this study are The New York 
Times, The Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, and a few other active newspapers; 
Time Magazine and occasionally a few other magazines; broadcast television networks, 
including ABC, NBC, CBS, and PBS; and cable outlets such as Turner Broadcasting 
(also part of Time-Warner); and a number of organizational players.  Although civil 
liberties groups such as the America Civil Liberties Union often represent similar 
                                                
126 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
127 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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positions in media-related litigation, they are not the primary focus of this dissertation. 
Organizations like the Practising Law Institute and the bar committees that facilitate the 
conversation among media lawyers, but do not litigate themselves, are discussed more 
fully in Chapter 8, Part D2.  Table 2 below lists the sixteen leading litigators in order of 
frequency of appearance in court documents. 
 
Table 2 – Leading Press Participants 
 
      As      As 
Participant     Party  Amicus 
 
Newspaper Ass’n of America/ANPA  0 35  (1887; newspaper publishers) 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom/Press  3 31  (1970; reporters)  
American Society of Newspaper Editors 0 29  (1923; newspaper editors) 
Radio Television News Directors Assn. 2 23  (1946; electr. media news dirs.) 
National Association of Broadcasters  0 25  (1922; radio, TV broadcasters) 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) 5 18  (1927; radio, TV network) 
National Broadcasting Company (NBC) 3 20  (1926; radio, TV network) 
Society of Prof. Journalists/SDX  0 22  (1909; professional journalists) 
New York Times    2 18  (1851; newspaper, other media) 
Chicago Tribune    1 18  (1847; newspaper, other media) 
Washington Post    3 15  (1877; newspaper, other media) 
Los Angeles Times    1 15  (1881; newspaper, other media) 
National Newspaper Association  0 14  (1885; community newspapers) 
Magazine Publishers Association  0 11  (1919; magazine publishers) 
Associated Press,            (1846; wire service) 
AP Managing Editors    0 12  (1933; newspaper editors)* 
Time, Inc.     4            5  (1922; magazine publisher) 
 
* The legal documents did not always clearly distinguish AP from APME. 
 Once the cases were selected, they were divided into three categories: cases 
involving publishing (prior restraint, libel, privacy, etc.), cases involving newsgathering 
(access to records, open courtrooms, testimonial privilege, etc.), and cases involving 
simple business regulation (tax, antitrust, subscription sales, etc.).  For each case, the 
principal opponent of the media’s position was classified, using a variation on Galanter’s 
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scheme, as the federal government, other governmental entities, other “repeat play rs,” 
and “one-shotters,” that is, companies or individuals who litigate regularly or rarely.   
 Other independent variables included whether the media actor was a party, an 
amicus, or both; how many amicus briefs were filed on each side of the case; and which 
of the leading media actors participated in the each case.  The outcome of the case, 
whether the press won or lost, was treated as the dependent variable for most 
calculations. 
 It is worth pointing out that this study might have been broadened significantly by 
including Supreme Court decisions that did nothing but grant or deny certiorari, that is
decide whether or not to review a case; the decisions of lower federal or even state courts; 
or decisions that shaped First Amendment doctrine whether the media were involved or 
not.  In the end, I decided that this work, worthwhile as it is, would have to wait for 
another time and perhaps another researcher.  I am happy to say that, since an early 
version of this research was published as a law review article, other research rs have 
taken up the challenge.128  Perhaps as more political scientists of the “new 
institutionalists” persuasion focus on interest groups in the courts, the press qua interest 
group will receive even greater scrutiny.   
                                                
128 See, e.g., Minjeong Kim and Lenae Vinson, Friends of the First Amendment? Amicus 
Curiae Briefs in Free Speech/Free Press Cases During the Warren and Burger Courts, 1 
J. Media L. & Ethics 83 (2009). 
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Chapter 2: Press Law and Advocacy in the 18th Century  
A.  Andrew Hamilton: The First Media Lawyer? 
 Andrew Hamilton might justifiably be called the first American media defense 
lawyer by virtue of his 1735 representation of John Peter Zenger, the iconic hero of pre-
Revolutionary War notions of press freedom.129  The Zenger case was far from typical.  
There were relatively few seditious libel cases in the colonies,  perhaps not more han 
half a dozen, and the Zenger case was the last of its kind under the royal judges.130  
Arguably, its very uniqueness accounts for the extraordinary publicity given the case 
throughout the period;131 today, it appears in virtually every media law textbook or 
casebook used in journalism and law schools.132  Still, it seems an appropriate place to 
begin any story about the use of litigation to shape the law affecting the press, not 
because Hamilton was successful in changing the law – he was not – but because he tried. 
 Zenger was a German immigrant who came to America as a teenager.133  He was 
apprenticed to New York City's leading printer, William Bradford, then struck out on his 
                                                
129 Then again, it would probably be wrong to push that image too far; as Attorney 
General of Pennsylvania, a member of the Provincial Council, and Speaker of the 
Assembly, Hamilton actively participated in the seditious libel prosecution of Adrew 
Bradford, publisher of Philadelphia’s American Mercury for criticizing the colonial 
government.  See Stanley Nider Katz, Introduction, in ALEXANDER, supra note 46, at 22; 
LEVY, supra note 28, at 49.  
130 LEVY, supra note 28, at 17.  
131 Katz, supra note 129, at 36-38; KONKLE, supra note 47, at 108-109. 
132 See, e.g., TEETER &   LOVING, supra note 125, at 35; FRANKLIN , ET AL., supra note 125, 
at 3; DAVID KOHLER &  LEE LEVINE, MEDIA AND THE LAW 4-5 (2009); T. BARTON 
CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: THE LAW OF MASS 
MEDIA, 30-31 (8th ed. 2001); DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL ., COMMUNICATIONS LAW: MEDIA, 
ENTERTAINMENT, AND REGULATION 3 (1997). The list could go on and on.  This version 
of the story is based principally on Katz, supra note 129, but to a lesser extent on the 
worshipful biography of Hamilton by KONKLE, supra note 47, and the eyewitness 
account of the far-from-disinterested ALEXANDER, supra note 46. 
133 Katz, supra note 129, at 8. 
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own at age 21.  After working in Maryland for a few years, he returned to New York as 
Bradford’s partner then went out on his own in 1726.134  In 1732, the colony received a 
new royal governor, William Cosby, whose principal purpose in the colonies was to 
make his fortune.135  In pursuit of that aim through the courts, Cosby sacked Lewis 
Morris, Sr., chief justice of the colony, and appointed his own man, young James De 
Lancey, as chief justice.136 
 Morris did not take all of this lying down, and, with his son Lewis Morris, Jr., and 
a very bright lawyer named James Alexander, started his own virulently anti-Cosby 
political faction.137  They wanted an outlet for their own political ideas, and Bradford was 
too afraid of losing his government contracts to print them.  So they financed Zenger, 
who had previously left Bradford and set up shop on his own.138 
 Zenger became the chief propagandist for a new anti-Cosby, Morrisite party. 
Alexander became the behind-the-scenes editor of Zenger's newspaper, the Journal,
which competed with Bradford's pro-Cosby Gazette.139  De Lancey tried and failed to get 
an indictment against Zenger and offered rewards for proof that Alexander, Morrisand 
the others (who wrote anonymously) were responsible for the attacks on Cosby in the 
Journal… all to no avail.140  Finally, Zenger was arrested and prosecuted on a criminal 
information, i.e., without a grand jury indictment.141 
                                                
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 2. 
136 Id. at 4. 
137 Id. at 4-6. 
138 Id. at 8. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 17-18. 
141 Id. at 19. 
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 Zenger would be prosecuted by the attorney general of New York, Richard 
Bradley, who had sworn out the information against him.  Morrisite lawyers James 
Alexander and William Smith launched their defense of Zenger by objecting to De 
Lancey’s presiding at the trial. De Lancy’s response was to disbar the two lawyers and 
appoint John Chambers as Zenger’s defense counsel.142  A exander retaliated by engaging 
Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia, perhaps the best trial lawyer in the colonies.  Hamilton 
and Alexander had worked together before,143 and Hamilton had had a long-standing feud 
with Andrew Bradford, whose father, William Bradford, had become Zenger’s princi al 
rival.144 
 Bradley opened with the charge that Zenger “did  falsely, seditiously and 
scandalously print and publish... a certain false, malicious, seditious, scandalous libel, 
entitled The New York Weekly Journal, containing the Freshest Advices, Foreign and 
Domestic; in which libel (of and concerning His Excellency the said Governor, and the 
ministers and officers of our said lord the King, of and for the said Province) among other 
things herein contained are these words (two articles): 
[The people of New York] think as matters now stand that their 
liberties and properties are precarious, and that slavery is like to be 
entailed on them and their posterity if some past things be not 
amended....  
 
I think the law itself is at an end:  We... see men's deeds destroyed, 
judges arbitrarily displaced, new courts erected without consent of 
the legislature... by which, it seems to me, trials by juries are taken 
away when a governor pleases, men of known estates denied their 
votes contrary to the received practice....145 
 
                                                
142 Id. at 20. 
143 KONKLE, supra note 47, at 69, n. 1. 
144 Katz, supra note 129, at 22. 
145 ALEXANDER, supra note 46, at 59. 
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 Hamilton replied with a bombshell:  “I cannot think it proper for me (without 
doing violence to my own principles) to deny the publication of a complaint which I 
think is the right of every free-born subject to make when the matters so published can be 
supported with truth; and therefore, I'll save Mr. Attorney the trouble of examining his 
witnesses to that point; and I do (for my client) confess that he both printed and published 
the two newspapers set forth in the information, and I hope in so doing he has committed 
no crime.”146 
 As far as Bradley, De Lancey, and  English law at the time were concerned, 
Hamilton’s admission was the end of the matter.  Hamilton had confessed to the only 
question of fact that the jury was supposed to decide.  Truth was not relevant under the 
prevailing law,147 and Bradley was quick to point that out:  “Indeed sir, as Mr. Hamilton 
has confessed the printing and publishing these libels, I think the jury must find a verdict
for the King; for supposing they were true, the law says that they are not the less libelous 
for that; nay indeed the law says their being true is an aggravation of the crime.”148   
 Hamilton condemned the Star Chamber proceedings on which Bradley relied for 
his statement of the law and urged the court not to consider those doctrines as binding in 
the colonies.  He also argued that the jury was entitled to decide, not merely the factual 
question of publication, but also the legal question of whether the writings were seditious.  
                                                
146 Id. at 62. 
147 See Stanley Nider Katz, Notes, to ALEXANDER, supra note 46, at 216 n. 22; see also 
De Libellis Famosis, 5 Coke Reps. 125a (1605), in 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (Steve Sheppard ed. 2003), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile= 
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 Bradley called Hamilton's arguments irrelevant, which they were; but Hamilton 
wasn’t finished.  He pointed out that the charges under which Zenger was being tried 
specifically called the alleged libels “false” and offered to confess to edition if Bradley 
could prove the attacks on Cosby were false.  Bradley asked how he could prove a 
negative, so Hamilton offered to prove them true.149  That was too much for De Lancey, 
who could not let Hamilton parade forth witness after witness attesting to Cosby's (his 
patron's) misdeeds.  “You cannot be admitted, Mr. Hamilton, to give the truth of a libel in 
evidence.  A libel is not to be justified; for it is nevertheless a libel that it is rue.”150 
 Hamilton tried one more argument.  If a true libel is worse than a false one, he 
said, then the punishment must be more severe.  If that were the case, evidence pertaining 
to truth or falsity must be admissible, or else how could a judge render a just sentence.151  
De Lancey did not buy that for a minute,152 so Hamilton turned to the jury.  Calling on 
them to use their own knowledge of the situation, urged that  
the facts which we offer to prove were not committed in a corner; 
they are notoriously known to be true; and therefore in your justice 
lies our safety.  And as we are denied the liberty of giving evidence 
to prove the truth of what we have published, I will beg leave to 
lay it down as a standing rule in such cases, that the suppressing of 
evidence ought always to be taken for the strongest evidence....153 
 
[T]he question before the Court and you gentlemen of the jury is 
not of small nor private concern, it is not the cause of a poor 
printer, nor of New York alone, which you are now trying:  No!  It 
may in its consequence affect every freeman that lives under a 
British government on the main of America.  It is the best cause.  It 
is the cause of liberty; and I make no doubt but your upright 
conduct this day will not only entitle you to the love and esteem of 
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your fellow citizens; but every man who prefers freedom to a life 
of slavery will bless and honor you as men who have baffled the 
attempt of tyranny; and by an impartial and uncorrupt verdict, have 
laid a noble foundation for securing to ourselves, our posterity, and 
our neighbors that to which nature and the laws of our country 
have given us a right – the liberty – both of exposing and opposing 
arbitrary power (in these parts of the world at least) by speaking 
and writing truth.154 
 
The jury’s acquittal was greeted with “three huzzas in the hall,” and Hamilton 
would be honored by the Common Council of New York City.155  He would later be 
called “The Day-Star of the American Revolution” by Gouverneur Morris for his 
triumph.156    
Significantly, the law did not change.  In law, if not necessarily in practice,157 the 
prevailing rule remained the Blackstonian precept that “liberty of the press, properly 
understood, … consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in 
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”158  On the very eve of the 
American Revolution, the formal law of England and the colonies was little different 
from that enforced by the Court of Star Chamber.159  It was not until 1792 (nearly 60 
years after the Zenger trial) that English law changed to allow juries to consider both fact 
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and law in libel cases,160 and it was 1843, some 50 years later still, that truth became a 
defense in a criminal libel case.161   
 The Zenger case was as pure an example of jury nullification as one can find.  
The law of the day was clear:  Zenger was guilty, and Hamilton’s arguments w re 
irrelevant.  That Zenger won was attributable, not to any change in the prevailing law, but 
to dissatisfaction with the nature of Cosby’s governance and Hamilton’s clever 
exploitation of it.   But if it is wrong to attribute any dramatic legal breakthrough to 
Zenger and Hamilton, it is equally wrong to dismiss the case as meaningless.  As one 
historian put it, “Hamilton may be said to have conducted the case according to the law
of the future, and thus to have helped to make that law.”162   
 For the rest of the 18th Century, however, the press was no more successful in 
changing the immediate regulatory environment through the courts than Hamilton and 
Zenger had been.  Levy points out that, prior to the Revolutionary War, the most 
aggressive antagonists of the press were not the courts at all, but colonial legisltures, 
which needed neither judges nor juries to fine and imprison printers who criticized 
them.163  The last prosecution of a colonial printer, Alexander McDougall, was thwarted 
in 1770 when the key witness against him died before trial; according to Levy, 
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McDougall’s imprisonment “did more to publicize the cause of liberty of the press than 
any event since Zenger’s trial.”164  
B.  From Revolution to Constitution 
 That is not to say that the press did nothing to bring about the legal regime that 
would ultimately govern its operations.  Indeed, Parliament’s Stamp Tax Act of 1765, 
“towards defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and securing, the British 
colonies and plantations in America,”165 and subsequent Townshend Revenue Act of 
1767,166 galvanized the colonial press behind the coming American Revolution.167  
Opposition to the stamp tax was so severe that the Act was repealed within a year,168 but 
the damage had been done.  Newspapers all over the colonies (there were 24 at the time)
went to press with heavy black mourning rules or skulls and crossbones to symbolize the 
death of the free press.169  Many defied the law outright, and many lined up behind the 
Sons of Liberty and other radicals to spread the revolutionary fever.170 
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After the Revolution, the memory of the stamp taxes lingered, and fear that the 
new central government might try to impose a tax on newspapers was a cornerstone of 
the anti-federalists' arguments for a bill of rights in general and a clause guaranteeing 
freedom of the press in particular.  The Federal Farmer’s famous aphorism, “a power to 
tax the press at discretion is a power to destroy or restrain the freedom of it,” c mes from 
this period.171 
Another anti-federalist pamphlet declared that  “Congress have power to lay all 
duties of whatever kind, and although they could not perhaps directly bar the freedom of 
the Press, yet they can do it in the exercise of the powers that are expressly decreed to 
them.  Remember there are such things as stamp duties and that these will effectually 
abolish the freedom of the press as any express declaration.”172  To be sure, the anti-
federalists may have been more interested in defeating the Constitution itself, or at least 
the federal taxing power, than in freedom of the press.  But the result was the same. 
The federalists won that battle, arguing that the new Constitution would not give 
Congress the right to restrain the press; as a result, the document contained no bill of 
rights.173  During the ratification struggle, federalist leader Alexander Hamilton argued 
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forcefully, in Federalist 84, that a bill of rights would be even be dangerous because it 
would lead people to believe that the new government did indeed have the power to 
invade individual liberties not specifically protected.174  As for taxing newspapers, 
Hamilton said, freedom of the press clauses in nine of the thirteen state constituti  
could not stop the legislatures from imposing taxes; why should a federal press clause be 
any different.175 
At the height of the ratification campaign, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
handed down an opinion that demonstrated how little the prevailing view of the law had 
changed in the half-century since the Zenger trial, the Revolutionary War and the 
Constitution notwithstanding.  One Andrew Browne had sued Eleazer Oswald, printer 
and publisher of the anti-federalist Independent Gazateeer. When a dispute regarding bail 
arose, Oswald published an extended diatribe against Browne and the court, which found 
Oswald in contempt.  Jonathan D. Sergeant, a former attorney general of Pennsylvania, 
unsuccessfully defended Oswald; from the court’s decision, it appears that the defense 
was based at least partly on press freedom clauses in the British Declaration of Rights 
(“That the freedom of the press shall not be restrained”)176 and the Pennsylvania 
Constitution (“that the printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 “Mr. Sherman – It is unnecessary – The power of Congress does not extend to the 
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JAMES MADISON,  NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, available at 
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examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any part of the government”).177  The 
court’s response was remarkably hostile: 
However ingenuity may torture the expressions, there can be little 
doubt of the just sense of these sections; they give to every citizen 
a right of investigating the conduct of those who are entrusted with 
the public business, and they effectually preclude any attempt to 
fetter the press by the institution of a licenser. … But is there 
anything in the language of the constitution (much less in its spirit 
and intention) which authorizes one man to impute crimes to 
another…?  Can it be presumed that the slanderous words, which, 
when spoken to a few individuals, would expose the speaker to 
punishment, become sacred, by authority of the constitution when 
delivered to the public in the more permanent and diffusive 
medium of the press? … The futility of any attempt to establish a 
construction of this sort, must be obvious to every intelligent 
mind.178 
  
In any event, when several state ratifying conventions adopted recommendations 
for a bill of rights in order to obtain the necessary votes for ratification, the first Congress 
obliged.  Surely now, with a Constitution and a Bill of Rights that explicitly guaranteed 
freedom of the press, that freedom could be deemed secure. Yet, within the decade, 
prompted by a viciously partisan newspaper press,  Congress would enact the most 
onerous incursion on press freedoms in American history.  The 1790s saw the Federalist 
press, such as John Fenno's Gazette of the United States and William Cobbett’s 
Porcupine’s Gazette, virtually at war with the Republican press, such as Philip Freneau's 
National Gazette and Benjamin Franklin Bache's Aurora. 179   
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C.  A Failure of Constitutional Consciousness 
When the Federalist John Adams was elected president in 1796, the two parties 
were divided over whom to favor in the continuing wars between France and England.  
The Republicans sentimentally favored the French, while the Federalists had a much 
closer affinity with the British.  The Federalists gained the upper hand, partly because of 
clumsy French intrigues, and  there was a real, if unfounded, fear of war with France.180 
In the wake of that fear, Congress enacted four statutes known collectively today 
as the Alien and Sedition Acts.181  The Sedition Act levied a fine of up to $2,000 and 
imprisonment for as long as two years on anyone convicted of writing, publishing, or 
speaking anything “false, scandalous, and malicious” against the U.S. government, the 
president or either house of Congress, or “to excite against them the hatred of the good 
people of the United States... ”;  or of entering into unlawful combinations to oppose the 
execution of national laws, or aiding or attempting “any insurrection, riot, unlawful 
assembly, or combination.”182 
The Act was vigorously enforced under the leadership of Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering.183 Authorities differ slightly on the statistics, presumably because 
some actions were also brought under other federal acts or the common law, but at least 
twenty-five persons, including the editors of leading Republican newspapers, were 
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arrested; from fourteen or fifteen indictments, ten Republicans were convicted and jailed.  
Eight of the convictions involved newspapers. There were also several convictions for 
seditious libel under common law in state courts.184   
Bache was the first casualty of the Federalists’ animus toward Republican editors; 
even before the Sedition Act was enacted, Bache was arrested and charged with libeling 
President Adams and the government but died of yellow fever before he could be tried.185
Other notable Republicans who were victimized by the act were Matthew Lyon, John 
Daly Burk, Thomas Cooper, James Thomson Callender, Anthony Haswell, David Brown, 
William Duane, Charles Holt, Abijah Adams, and Luther Baldwin.186  Not a single 
Federalist editor was indicted under the act.187 
Our 21st Century sensibilities might lead us to think of these convictions as 
opportunities to ask a Supreme Court to strike down the Sedition Act as a flagrantly 
unconstitutional violation of the recently adopted First Amendment.  We might also be 
tempted to think of the newspaper press, Federalist or Republican, rising as one to 
support this assault on  freedom of speech and press that threatens their very existence.  
But this was the 18th Century, not the 21st.   
Most of the Sedition Act trials did not even take place until 1800;188 by the time 
any appeal could have been heard, Republican Thomas Jefferson would be president and 
the Act would have expired by its own terms.  Even if that had not been the case, the 
Supreme Court and the entire judiciary were dominated by Federalists, most of whom 
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firmly believed that the kind of robust debate that has come to be associated with the Firs  
Amendment was useful only to incite the masses.189  Indeed, Supreme Court Justices like 
Samuel Chase and William Paterson presided over Sedition Act trials while riding c rcuit; 
John Marshall’s biographer called Chase a “holy terror” as a trial judge.190 
And the United States Supreme Court would not assert the authority to strike 
down federal laws as unconstitutional, which Republicans had urged at the various 
Sedition Act trials,191 until 1803, when the Court under Marshall decided Marbury v. 
Madison.192 Instead, the Republican reaction was to take the Federalist “reign of terror”
into the political arena, with Madison and Jefferson leading Virginia and Kentucky, 
respectively, to issue resolutions asserting the power of the states to nullify 
unconstitutional laws.193  Congressional Republicans also made futile attempts to repeal 
the Sedition Act, but it expired by its own terms in 1801, and newly elected President 
Jefferson pardoned all those imprisoned under the statute and cancelled all remaining 
trials.  Forty years later, Congress repaid all the fines levied under the ac .194  
Finally, there was no question of Federalist newspapers joining their Republican 
counterparts to fight the Act.  Stone points out that “Federalist newspapers pressed for 
vigorous enforcement of the Sedition Act, evincing no inkling of understanding that in 
the long run they might be placing their own liberties in jeopardy.”195  The press would 
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exhibit the same myopia in sedition cases after 1918.196  While the early 20th Century 
press would mobilize to lobby or litigate for pocket-book issues197 – an aspect of interest-
group behavior that can probably be traced back to unity in opposition to Stamp Act taxes 
– unity on other press freedom issues would only begin to emerge with Near v. 
Minnesota.198   
If the Sedition Act had one saving grace, it was the insight provided by the 
congressional debates as to the meaning of the First Amendment, at least according to the 
Act’s Federalist proponents and their Republican antagonists.  The Federalists offered a 
Blackstonian view of liberty of the press guaranteed by First Amendment, arguing that no 
one could assume the amendment was meant to do away with seditious libel.  The 
Republicans argued that such legislation could only be justified if necessary to save the 
country from a President paralyzed by the abuse of the press – a kind of early “clear and 
present danger” theory – to which the Federalists replied that it was indeed ec ssary 
under the present circumstances.199     
Federalists also argued that the Sedition Act was consistent with state law, which 
generally permitted prosecution for seditious libel despite constitutional guarantees of a 
free press.  Republicans answered that the ratification debates in the states revealed an 
understanding  that the power to prosecute for seditious libel resided exclusively in state 
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courts and that the Constitution did not give Congress the power to enact any laws on the 
subject.200 
In the end, of course, the “meaning” of the First Amendment was not resolved by 
the debates in Congress.  But some important doctrinal details were.  As Geoffrey Ston  
points out, the act provided that malicious intent was a necessary element of seditiu  
libel, that truth was a defense, and that juries could decide not only the factual question of 
publication, but also the legal question of whether the speech or writing was seditious – 
all in contrast to the common law of the time.201  Thus, the very doctrine urged by 
Andrew Hamilton in the Zenger case was finally embodied in the Sedition Act that the 
Federalists pushed through Congress. 
                                                
200 Id. at 40-41. 





Chapter 3 – Press Law and Advocacy from 1800 to Near 
A. From Politics to Commerce 
To think of Zenger’s counsel Andrew Hamilton as a “media lawyer” requires a bit 
of imagination and a lot of historical flexibility.  To think of founding father Alexander 
Hamilton as a “media lawyer” invites psychotherapy.  And yet, the beginning of the 19th 
Century finds Alexander Hamilton – former aide to General Washington, Secretary of he 
Treasury, and Major General of the Army – defending a Federalist editorin a New York 
state court against a charge of seditious libel sanctioned by President Thomas 
Jefferson.202 
Harry Croswell, editor of The Wasp in Hudson, N.Y., had accused Jefferson of, 
among other things, paying Republican propagandist James T. Callender to slander 
Washington, Adams, and other prominent Federalists.203 New York Attorney General 
Ambrose Spencer secured an indictment for seditious libel under the common law, and 
the case was tried before Chief Justice Morgan Lewis in the Columbia County Circuit
Court.  Hamilton, who had argued for liberalizing the Sedition Act, but supported it as 
amended,204 joined the defense pro bono and argued that the trial be postponed until 
Callender could be brought to New York to testify as to the truth of the matter.205 Lewis 
refused to postpone the trial, which proceeded on the documentary evidence.206 
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At the close of the case, Lewis charged the jury that “it was no part of the 
province of a jury to inquire or decide on the intent of the defendant; or whether the 
publication in question was true, or false, or malicious; that the only questions for their 
consideration and decision were, first, whether the defendant was the publisher of the 
piece charged in the indictment; and, second, as to the truth of the innuendoes….”207  The 
jury found Croswell guilty as charged.208           
On appeal, seeking a new trial, Hamilton argued that the trial should have been 
postponed, that the articles were not libelous, and, most importantly, that the jury 
instructions were wrong.  Asserting that “the liberty of the press consists in the right to 
publish, with impunity, truth, with good motives, for justifiable ends, though reflecting 
on government, magistracy, or individuals,”209 Hamilton argued that truth was 
admissible, though not dispositive, and that the jury was the arbiter of both law and fact, 
including the defendant’s intent and the tendency of the article.   
  Federalist Judge James Kent wrote an opinion in support of Hamilton’s argument, 
which Republican Judge Smith Thompson joined; Republican Chief Judge Morgan 
Lewis, who presided at trial, wrote against Hamilton and was joined by Republican Judge 
Brockholst Livingston.  The evenly divided court meant that Hamilton and Croswell lost 
their bid for a new trial on Feb. 13, 1804, but the following year, the New York 
legislature enshrined Hamilton’s arguments in statute210 and the court ordered a new trial 
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on its own initiative.211  Hamilton never lived to see the victory; on July 12, 1804, he died 
of wounds suffered in a duel with Aaron Burr.212   
 In his opinion, Kent mentioned the Federal constitutional guarantee of a free press 
as authority for the proposition that American law was not English law, but not much 
more than that.213 More particularly, he pointed out that both the Sedition Act and the 
constitutions of Pennsylvania and Ohio provided that truth could be admitted as evidence 
in seditious libel prosecutions.214 No one else even alluded to the First Amendment, a fact 
that presaged the dominant role that state common law, rather than Federal constitutional 
law, would play in 19th Century press cases.  Freedom of the press was simply not treated 
as a constitutional question in the 19th Century, and there are no United States Supreme 
Court decisions on press freedom issues.  
 That is not to say that freedom of the press was not an issue in 19th Century cases; 
newspaper publishers raised it – as Kent had suggested – as a “barrier against unfavorable 
common-law doctrines.”215 As Gleason points out in his survey of 19th Century libel and 
contempt by publication cases, “nineteenth-century freedom of the press case were 
resolved in common law.”216 To defend against common law libel suits, publishers 
argued for expansive interpretations of common law privileges.  They grounded their 
arguments in a theory of press freedom based on the value of the press to society – the 
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“watchdog” concept that drove Gleason’s research – rather  than based on the inherent
right of the speaker to speak.217  
 The Croswell case also marked the beginning of a gradual, century-long decline 
in the number of  seditious or criminal libel prosecutions as the principal focus of press-
related litigation.218 No federal sedition legislation was sought or enacted during the War 
of 1812,219 despite widespread hostility to the war, although some dissident newspapers 
were famously suppressed by violence or martial law.220  Like Madison in 1812, Lincoln 
eschewed resort to a federal sedition act during the Civil War,221 lthough both 
abolitionist and Copperhead newspapers felt the wrath of the mob and anti-Union editors 
were subject to military arrest.  The law, however, remained unchanged. By the end of 
the century, the operational definition of freedom of the press remained much as 
Hamilton formulated it in Croswell.   
 Sedition would rear its ugly head again in the 20th Century, once in the years 
surrounding World War I and again in the Red Scare years of the 1920s and 1950s.  The 
great dissents of Holmes and Brandeis in the early cases222 and of Black and Douglas in 
the later ones223 ultimately transformed the doctrine from “bad tendency”224 to “clear and 
present danger”225 and finally to “incitement.”226  Vital as this body of law is to our 
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notion of free speech and First Amendment jurisprudence, it plays only a marginal role in 
the story of the mainstream media’s role in shaping First Amendment doctrine.  To the 
extent that the press was involved at all, it was the German language press, the labor 
press, the dissident press, the minority press.227 The mainstream, institutional press buried 
its head in the sand and, if anything, had a negative influence on the evolution of First 
Amendment law.  As Margaret Blanchard pointed out in the introduction to her detaile 
study of dissident speech, 
most studies of press freedom ignore the somewhat contradictory 
role that the press has played in terms of overall freedom of 
expression.  Evidence suggests that the institutional press 
frequently has aligned itself with the forces seeking to suppress 
dissident speech in this country.  As the press became a larger, 
more institutionalized force in American society, its leaders have 
had a greater vested interest in preserving the status quo.  Thus 
journalistic opposition to the rights of workers to organize or 
anarchists to plead for their cause, for instance, dot the pages that 
follow.  Much more research into this particular subject is needed, 
but press antagonism toward the expressive activities of dissidents 
historically has led to substantial problems for the development of 
divergent opinions on the United States.228  
 
 By contrast, members of the mainstream press were principal actors in the legal 
conflicts that arose throughout the Civil War period.  Nevertheless, their influence on th  
evolution of First Amendment law was minimal in this period as well.  As indicated 
above, issues involving free speech and free press were generally resolved on comm 
law principles, without resort to the Constitution,229 and, during wartime, at least, by 
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martial law.230  Moreover, political differences among newspapers remained stronger 
than any institutional affinity they might have had for each other, further weakening any 
influence they might have had on the law.  As in the previous century, when Federalist 
newspapers encouraged the prosecution of Republican editors under the Sedition Act 
with little thought to their own free press interests, few mainstream newspaper  
condemned the confiscation of abolitionist literature by the Post Office231 and Republican 
newspapers demanded that the government suppress the “organs of treason” with 
Southern sympathies.232 
 Those attitudes began to change after the Civil War, as commercial interests 
displaced partisan ones, and the press began to see itself more as an institution unto itself.  
The dramatic post-war industrialization affected the newspaper industry much as it did 
the entire economy,233 and publishers began to see themselves more as captains of 
commercial enterprises than as spokesmen for political causes.   
 The emergence of the press as a self-conscious, self-interested political 
association is closely tied to the demise of the partisan press, the rise of the c mm rcial 
press, the adoption of an objectivity norm in American journalism, and incorporation of 
the First Amendment into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Scholars who have looked at these phenomena have not 
always agreed on when they occurred or why.  
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 The standard date given for the birth of the penny press is September 3, 1833, 
with the founding of Benjamin Day’s New York Sun.234 To be sure, the partisan press was 
still around then,235 but putting newspapers on a sound commercial footing would have 
been a prerequisite for establishing a presence independent of financial support from 
political parties.  Scholars may disagree as to how fast or completely the transition 
occurred,236 but there is little doubt that the trend through the  rest of the 19th Century and 
into the 20th Century was away from partisanship and toward commercialization.  This 
process would have been critical to the press’s emergence as an interest group, because 
no common ideology among newspapers could emerge as long as their first ideological 
allegiance was to their party sponsors.  Schudson notes that the transitional period was 
accompanied by the evolution of a common culture among working reporters.237   
 The ideology that ultimately emerged, objectivity, may have come about because 
of changes in the technology – specifically the use of telegraphy in the transmission of 
news – that occurred during the 19th Century.  The Emerys attribute the acceptance of an 
“‘objective’ method of reporting” to the “terse style dictated by high transmis ion costs” 
and the need to “keep their personal values out of stories and to stick to verifiable 
facts.”238  
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 Schudson rejects the idea that objectivity was economically motivated, that the 
“appearance of fairness was important to owners and editors trying to gain their share of 
a growing readership and the resulting advertising revenues.”239  Instead, he asserts that 
“professional allegiance to a separation of facts and values awaited, first, the rising status 
and independence of reporters relative to their employers, a change in journalism th t 
developed gradually between the 1870s and the First World War, and second, the 
emergence of serious professional discussion about ‘objectivity,’ which came only after 
the First World War.” Schudson also attributes the “eventual triumph of professional 
journalism” to Progressive political reforms of the 1920s, which included a decline in 
party influence generally.240   
 The significance of this unifying ideology for this study is clear. Five of the nine 
journalism-related associations most active in litigating First Amendment claims were 
formed during this period:  the American Newspaper Publishers Association (now the 
Newspaper Association of America) in 1887, the Magazine Publishers of America in 
1919, the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1922, the National Association of 
Broadcasters in 1923, and the Associated Press Managing Editors Association in 1931.  
 ANPA was formed to bring the daily newspaper publishers together to confront 
the many and varied problems the new post-Civil War economic order would bring.  
Most of its early legal interests were strongly business related, involving such matters as 
labor relations, taxes, postal rates, and copyright,241 and it was “largely oblivious to free 
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press issues prior to the 1920s.”242  ANPA was not above raising press freedom as a 
justification for favorable treatment.243  Some issues – advertising regulation and libel 
law – were even more directly tied to free press ideas, although they too had concrete 
business implications.  For example, at ANPA’s 1895 convention, K.G. Cooper, manager 
of the Denver Republican, complained that his paper had been sued for $1.2 million over 
the past 14 years and had paid out $650 in damages and $25,000 in lawyers’ fees.244  
 ANPA’s founder, William H. Brearley of the Detroit Evening News, had urged 
the association to lobby for uniform state libel laws at the 1890 annual meeting, and a 
committee on libel law formed in 1893 was charged with drafting a model state libel law 
patterned on Minnesota’s statute.245  But the 1895 convention resolved that this was a 
matter for the various state editorial associations that had formed in the post-war years, 
rather than for ANPA itself, because libel was a state law issue.246   
 That would change dramatically in about 60 years,247 facilitated by the most 
important 19th Century development in the law of the press:  the 14th Amendment to the 
Constitution.  For the first time, the press could challenge state laws on First Amendment 
grounds, culminating in the landmark prior restraint case of Near v. Minnesota in 1931. 
 
B.  Incorporation of the First Amendment 
Most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were “incorporated” by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, that is, made enforceable the states, through the Due Process Clause of 
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14th Amendment, a direct consequence of the Civil War.  Until the First Amendment’s 
incorporation, usually attributed to Gitlow v. New York248 in 1925, it could not be invoked 
against state libel or other press laws; only Congress was precluded from abridging 
freedom of the press under the federal Constitution.249  
Madison’s proposed draft of the First Amendment had not been so constrained on 
that point: “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, 
or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks 
of liberty, shall be inviolable.”250 That language appears to have passed in the House, but 
the Senate changed the subject of the sentence to “Congress.” Paul Starr points out, 
however, that without a record of the discussion, there is no way to know whether the 
change was meant to be substantive.251 
Madison had even proposed another amendment explicitly prohibiting the states 
from abridging freedom of speech. “[I]f there was any reason to restrain the government 
of the United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary 
they should be secured against the state governments.”252 That, too, passed the House, but 
not the Senate. As adopted, the First Amendment protected freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press from encroachment only by the new national government.253  
Other provisions of the Bill of Rights were not so clearly drawn; the “takings 
clause” of the Fifth Amendment, for example, never mentions Congress. Using the 
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passive voice, it says only, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”254 So when a Baltimore wharf owner sued the city for destroying the 
value of his property, he not unreasonably claimed just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment.255 But when Barron v. Baltimore reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1833, 
Chief Justice Marshall found the question presented “of great importance, but not of 
much difficulty.” 
The constitution was ordained and established by the 
people of the United States for themselves, for their own 
government, and not for the government of the individual states. 
Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that 
constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the 
powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. The 
people of the United States framed such a government for the 
United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation, and 
best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they 
conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and 
the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are 
naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government 
created by the instrument. . . .  
  
If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must 
be understood as restraining the power of the general government, 
not as applicable to the states.256  
 
Marshall reinforced the logical argument with a reference to the prohibiti ns on 
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws imposed on Congress in Article I, Section 9, and 
expressly imposed on the states in Section 10.  
If the original constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the first 
article, draws this plain and marked line of discrimination between the 
limitations it imposes on the powers of the general government, and on those 
of the states; if in every inhibition intended to act on state power, words are 
employed which directly express that intent; some strong reason must be 
assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course in framing the 
                                                
254 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
255 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1832). 
256 Id. at 247. 
61
 
amendments, before that departure can be assumed. 
  
We search in vain for that reason.257  
 
Finally, Marshall turned to constitutional history. It was “universally understood,” 
he said, that the constitution was not ratified without “immense opposition.”258 He noted 
that nearly every ratifying convention recommended amendments against abuse of 
power, against “encroachments of the general government—not against those of the local 
governments.” 
In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus 
extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority 
in congress, and adopted by the states. These amendments contain no 
expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. 
This court cannot so apply them.259  
 
Although some constitutional thinkers, particularly more radical abolitionists, 
would express the view that states were nevertheless required to guarantee some or all of 
the rights enumerated in the first eight amendments, particularly freedom of speech and 
of the press, they justified their arguments on grounds other than direct application of the 
amendments.260 Barron v. Baltimore was never seriously challenged.261 
Thus, even had the press been ready to emerge as a constitutional litigator in its 
own interest – which it decidedly was not – it would have had no First Amendment shield 
against most of the regulations to which it was susceptible. Between the expiration of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and the Civil War, the most onerous of these would have 
been the laws enacted by slaveholding states criminalizing the expression of abolitionist 
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views, as well as unsuccessful attempts to enact similar statutes in the Nor.262 The 
extent to which the Republican reaction against those laws influenced the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment after the war is a matter of considerable debate. 
With the First Amendment now securely incorporated, it is easy enough to look 
back on that debate as a historical curiosity with little practical relevanc  today. Still, no 
understanding of incorporation can be complete without appreciating why that 
constitutional “work-around” was necessary. At the very least, it may explain why the 
Supreme Court seems to have incorporated the First Amendment so casually, without the 
detailed explication one would expect to accompany such an important shift in 
constitutional doctrine. 
The Fourteenth Amendment says, in pertinent part, “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law… .” 263 The plain language of the first clause, the “privileges or 
immunities clause,” seems more than adequate to deny to states the right to abridge the 
freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment.  
Was the Fourteenth Amendment designed by its framers and understood by its 
ratifiers to enable the national government to enforce the rights enumerated in th  first 
eight amendments against the states through the privileges or immunities clause?264 The 
leading advocate for the affirmative position was Justice Hugo Black: 
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My study of the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the expressions of those who sponsored and 
favored, as well as those who opposed its submission and passage, 
persuades me that one of the chief objects that the provisions of the 
Amendment’s first section, separately, and as a whole, were 
intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable 
to the states. With full knowledge of the import of the Barron 
decision, the framers and backers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
proclaimed its purpose to be to overturn the constitutional rule that 
case had announced. This historical purpose has never received full 
consideration or exposition in any opinion of this Court 
interpreting the Amendment.265  
 
In his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, Justice Black proffered a 
scathing indictment of the failure of the Court in the Slaughter-House cases266 and their 
progeny to consider the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Slaughter-
House, the first cases on point to reach the Supreme Court after ratification, the Court 
effectively made a constitutional nullity of the privileges or immunities clause. A 
contemporary historian restates that view more emphatically with respect to the First 
Amendment. 
Justice Miller [who wrote the majority opinion in Slaughter-
House] leaves out the entire history of suppression of civil liberties 
of white opponents of slavery, including Republicans, in the South 
before the Civil War. He is silent about the suppression of free 
speech in the South for Republicans as well as abolitionist. . . . He 
fails to note that Black Codes abridged privileges including free 
speech . . . . The struggles for free speech about slavery before the 
Civil War show that Justice Miller’s constricted reading of the 
privileges-or-immunities of citizens of the United States secured 
by the Fourteenth Amendment was seriously mistaken.267  
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On the other side of the issue, writing two years after Justice Black’s Adamson 
dissent, Stanley Morrison called Black’s position “fatally weak” and based on flawed 
historical research.268 “In the absence of any adequate support for the incorporation 
theory, the effort of the dissenting judges in Adamson v. California to read the Bill of 
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment amounts simply to an effort to put into the 
Constitution what the framers failed to put there.”269 Morrison’s position is supported by 
his Stanford colleague Charles Fairman in a companion article laying out a detailed 
legislative history of the Amendment.270 
There is no need to resolve this debate here, even if that were possible, but even 
Morrison suggests that Black and his fellow dissenters in Adamson may have been 
logically correct with respect to the First Amendment. “Once the basic prin i le of 
substantive due process had been established, there was no reason why liberty of speech 
and religion should not be protected by that doctrine against arbitrary legislation, just as 
economic liberty was protected.”271  Still, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
famously said, “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”272 And it 
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would be more than a half century after ratification before the Supreme Court would 
apply the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down a state law censoring the press. 
In the relevant cases that followed Slaughter-House, the Court consistently 
rejected any contention that specific rights enumerated in the first eight amendments 
could be enforced against contrary state law.273 The “first intimation from any justice of 
the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth Amendment might be considered to incorporate 
the Bill of Rights”274 came in Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in O’Neil v. Vermont,275 
an 1892 cruel and unusual punishment case: 
[S]ince the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, no one of the 
fundamental rights of life, liberty or property, recognized and 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, can be denied 
or abridged by a State in respect to any person within its 
jurisdiction. These rights are, principally, enumerated in the earlier 
Amendments of the Constitution.276 
 
Five years later, Harlan wrote a majority opinion stating in dicta that due process 
required just compensation in a state takings case, although Morrison calls Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago277 a substantive due process case, rather than an 
incorporation case.278  The incorporation argument was rejected again in 1900279 and 
1908.280 
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Notwithstanding the failure of the general incorporation doctrine to win Supreme 
Court approval, the idea that substantive due process might provide the rationale for 
enforcing the First Amendment guarantees against the states was beginning to capture 
some legal and scholarly imaginations. The radical International Workers of the World or 
Wobblies advanced that argument during the early years of the century when their 
legendary “free speech fights” provoked arrest and trial.281 That, in turn, evoked a 
backlash from the press itself. One editorial referred to “the arrogant assumption of the 
street orators that they were ‘exercising a constitutional privilege’ – a deliberate 
misinterpretation” of the First Amendment, which leaves the states the power “t  abridge 
the right of free speech” as they see fit.282  
But one chronicler of the period, B.F. Moore, a staff member of the Commission 
on Industrial Relations, was not so sure. Writing in 1915, Moore noted that the Supreme 
Court had interpreted the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting 
state “infringement of property rights rather than personal rights” but indicated the 
possibility that the Amendment extended to guarantees of free speech and press as w ll. 
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280 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (self-incrimination). In Twining, Harlan 
dissented on the grounds that compelled self-incrimination violated both the privil ges or 
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I am of opinion that as immunity from self-incrimination was recognized 
in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and placed beyond violation 
by any Federal agency, it should be deemed one of the immunities of 
citizens of the United States which the Fourteenth Amendment in express 
terms forbids any State from abridging—as much so, for instance, s the 
right of free speech….  
 
It is my opinion also that the right to immunity from self-incrimination 
cannot be taken away by any State consistently with the clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that relates to the deprivation by the Statof life 
or liberty without due process of law. 
  
Id. at 124-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
281 RABBAN , supra note 42, 125.  
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“[I]t is not positively known at present just what protection is given to certain personal 
rights by certain clauses of the U.S. Constitution, especially the 14th amendment.”283  
Although the notion gained no traction whatsoever in the Supreme Court, 
prominent scholars of the pre-World War I era, whom Mark Graber has called “the 
conservative libertarians,”284 continued to move the idea forward even as they began to 
discard the laissez-faire economics supported by substantive due process. Thomas 
Cooley, for example, considered both freedom of speech and freedom of contract among 
the fundamental rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.285 Theodore Schroeder and Ernst Freund, on the other hand, believed that 
speech rights were protected by the due process clause, but that freedom of contract st od 
on a different (and lesser) footing.286 Henry Schofield maintained the view that First 
Amendment freedoms should apply to the states through the privileges or immunities 
clause.287 
Thus, on the eve of World War I, a growing body of scholarly literature favored 
enforcing the First Amendment guarantees against the states. And although t e Supreme 
Court had effectively eliminated the privileges or immunities clause as a mechanism for 
such enforcement, the logic of substantive due process provided a promising alternative. 
It would be some years, though, before the issue again reached the Court; the earliest 
wartime cases dealt with violations of the new federal Espionage and Sedition Ac s288 
and thus raised no challenge to state law.  
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In the first case that arguably raised the issue, Gilbert v. Minnesota,289 the Court 
upheld a conviction under a state law against discouraging enlistments without “deciding 
or considering” it.290 In his dissenting opinion in Gilbert, Justice Brandeis also saw “no 
occasion to consider whether [the Minnesota law] violate[d] also the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” but, in an obvious attack on substantive due process, said he could not 
believe that “the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty 
to acquire and to enjoy property.”291 Two years later though, Justice Brandeis joined a 
majority opinion that asserted “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other 
provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restriction  
about ‘freedom of speech’. . . .”292 
In 1923, the Court struck down a state statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign 
languages in school on due process grounds, citing the acquisition of useful knowledge as 
a protected liberty interest.293 In 1925, the Court inched even closer to resolving the issue, 
assuming if not quite deciding, “that freedom of speech and of the press – which are 
protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress – are amongthe 
fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”294 The Court brushed off its 
1922 dictum in Prudential and cryptically cited several authorities, only some of which 
tended to support its proposition.295 
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Notwithstanding its now famous assumption in Gitlow v. New York, the Court 
affirmed Gitlow’s conviction under New York’s criminal anarchy statute over th  dissent 
of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, who also acknowledged the application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.296 It may be that the Court made its assumption solely in order 
to acquire jurisdiction over the case and uphold the New York statute,297 but the Court 
never looked back on that question again. Two years later, in Wh tney v. California,298 the 
Court upheld a similar statute that had been challenged on the same ground. In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis wrote: 
[I]t is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to 
matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised 
within the term liberty are protected by the federal Constitution 
from invasion by the states. The right of free speech, the right to 
teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental 
rights.299 
 
In Fiske v. Kansas,300 also in 1927, the Court reversed a conviction under a similar 
Kansas statute for insufficient evidence, holding the particular application of the statute 
unconstitutional. 
Finally, in 1931, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting the display of an 
anarchist red flag. In Stromberg v. California, Chief Justice Hughes cited Gitlow, 
Whitney, and Fiske for the proposition “that the conception of liberty under the due 
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process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech.”301 
Incorporation was complete, providing the indispensable condition for Nea v. Minnesota 
later that same term. 
                                                
301 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931). 
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Chapter 4 – Near v. Minnesota: Mobilizing the Press 
“The mere statement of the case makes my blood boil.” 
So wrote Weymouth Kirkland to his most illustrious client, Col. Robert R. 
McCormick of The Chicago Tribune (“Tribune”) on Sept. 14, 1928.302 The prominent 
Chicago attorney was writing about a case then styled Minnesota ex rel. Olson v. 
Guilford,303 but which would make history as Near v. Minnesota304 when it reached its 
conclusion in the United States Supreme Court nearly three years later. Both McCormick 
and Kirkland were to become principal players in Near, and together they created a role 
for the institutional press as constitutional litigator shaping the First Amend nt 
doctrine.  
As noted in the previous chapter, the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association had routinely lobbied and litigated on behalf of their members’ business 
interests.305 But constitutional litigation by the institutional press to avoid or create 
doctrinal precedent under the First Amendment really began with the appointment of Col. 
Robert R. McCormick to head the ANPA’s Committee on Freedom of the Press in the 
spring of 1928 and his involvement in Near v. Minnesota beginning that fall.306  
A. The Press as Public Nuisance 
The story of Near v. Minnesota begins, not with Jay Near and Howard Guilford, 
Near’s partner in sleaze, but with John L. Morrison, a highly religious, crusading prude 
                                                
302 Letter from Weymouth Kirkland, Partner, Kirkland, Fleming, Green & Martin, 
Chicago, to Col. Robert R. McCormick, Publisher, The Chicago Tribune (Sept. 14, 1928) 
(on file with Series I-60, Business Correspondence, 1927-1955, Tribune Archives at 
Cantigny, Wheaton, Ill. [hereinafter Tribune Archives]).  
303 219 N.W. 770 (Minn. 1928). 
304 283 U.S. 697 (1931).  
305 See EMERY, supra note 62, at 49.  
306 Id. at 138.  See also PRATTE, supra note 63, at 28 (“Involvement in the Minnesota case 
also marks the formal entrance of ASNE into the fight for freedom of information, which 
had been cited as a major reason for founding the society [in 1922]). 
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with a venomous pen who waged a one-man crusade against the purveyors of booze and 
prostitutes in the wild and wooly iron mining town of Duluth, Minnesota, in the mid-
1920s.307  
Morrison’s muck-raking newspaper, the Duluth Rip-saw, also went after the 
politicians who protected Duluth’s rather crude entertainment industry. They were not 
amused and took their pique to the state legislature. In 1925, the Minnesota legislature – 
with some drafting help by Minneapolis newspapers, no less308 – enacted a Public 
Nuisance Law, or “gag” law, that provided for abatement as a public nuisance of any 
“malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.”309  
University of Minnesota historian Paul L. Murphy attributes enactment of the gag 
law to “public exasperation” with the yellow journalism of the time and the “emergence 
of a number of cheap, ephemeral scandal sheets, which were used for extortion, 
                                                
307 FRIENDLY, supra note 48, at 3-28. Fred Friendly was always a great story teller, and 
his love of the Constitution and its First Amendment made him the perfect author to 
capture this story. McCormick’s biographer calls it “the definitive history” f this 
episode. SMITH , supra note 49, at 280. It is certainly more definitive than “the Colonel’s” 
own version, which makes Near and Guilford seem like candidates for sainthood. See 
MCCORMICK, supra note 114, at 46-52; see also KINSLEY, supra note 115. 
308 FRIENDLY, supra note 48, at 21.  
309 Id. at 22. Section 1 of the Act provided:  
Section 1. Any person who, as an individual, or as a member or employee of a 
firm, or association or organization, or as an officer, director, member or 
employee of a corporation, shall be engaged in the business of regularly or 
customarily producing, publishing or circulating, having in possession, selling or 
giving away.  
  (a) an obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, 
or  
  (b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other 
periodical,  
  is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be enjoined, 
as hereinafter provided. 
  Participation in such business shall constitute a commission of such nuisance 
and render the participant liable and subject to the proceedings, orders and 
judgments provided for in this Act. Ownership, in whole or in part, directly or 
indirectly, of any such periodical, or of any stock or interest in any corporation or 
organization which owns the same in whole or in part, or which publishes the 
same, shall constitute such participation. 
  In actions brought under (b) above, there shall be available the defense that th
truth was published with good motives and for justifiable ends and in such actions 
the plaintiff shall not have the right to report (sic) to issues or editions of 
periodicals taking place more than three months before the commencement of the 
action.  
Near, 283 U.S. at 702 (quoting 1925 Minn. Laws 358 § 1). 
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blackmailing petty crooks, or pressuring concessions from venal public officials.” 310  
Murphy points out that “Minnesota’s experiment quickly drew warm national approval” 
as a practical alternative to censorship by an administrative agency, whi h ould have 
been too costly, or civil or criminal libel actions, which had proved ineffective.311  
Although Murphy does not discuss the importance of the Rip-saw to its adoption, 
a target of that paper, then-State Sen. Michael J. Boylan, came to be known as the 
“father” of the gag law.312 In any event, Publisher Morrison died of a blood clot in the 
brain before he could be prosecuted under the law. Of course, there was no shortage of 
scandalous newspapers in that era;313 Near and Guilford were ready targets down in 
Minneapolis.314 Near was not nearly as self-righteous (or righteous at all, for that matter) 
as Morrison but was a complete scoundrel and bigot: anti-Semitic, anti-black, anti-
labor,315 and unfailingly hostile to Minneapolis area officials.  
In 1927, Near and Guilford launched The Saturday Press, a scurrilous rag that, 
among other things, alleged that Jewish gangsters were responsible for bootlegging, 
gambling, and racketeering in Minneapolis (which probably didn't bother anyone), and 
                                                
310 Paul L. Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historical Developments, 66 
MINN. L. REV. 95, 135-36 (1980). Murphy notes without comment that the legislative 
history of the act is described in John E. Hartmann, The Minnesota Gag Law and the 
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311 Murphy, supra note 310, at 137. Of that so-called “efficiency,” McCormick writes, 
“The statute was cunningly devised not only to avoid the necessity of indictment by the 
grand jury, as had been done in the Zenger case, but to avoid a jury trial also and leave 
the newspaper at the mercy of a corrupt or politically controlled court.” MCCORMICK, 
supra note 114, at 46.  
312 Newspaper ‘Gag’ Law is Assailed as ‘Dangerous,’ CHI. TRIB., Mar. 26, 1929, at 17.  
313 Indeed, it seems they have been with us always. See, e.g., Ralph Frasca, The 
Helderberg Advocate: A Public-Nuisance Prosecution a Century before Near v. 
Minnesota, 26 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215 (2001).  
314 FRIENDLY, supra note 48, at 31.  
315 Id. at 32.  
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that certain law enforcement officials – especially Hennepin County Prosecut r Floyd B. 
Olson – were letting the gangsters run amok (which surely bothered those so accu ed).316  
Olson undertook to put Near out of business and filed a complaint on November 
21, 1927, alleging multiple instances of defamation.317 Describing the newspaper as 
“malicious, scandalous, and defamatory,” the “magic words” of the Public Nuisance 
Law, Olson sought an injunction under that act.318 A temporary restraining order was 
issued the same day, enjoining Near and Guilford from publishing The Saturday Press or 
anything like it.319 The Saturday Press never recovered, but that order, which lasted more 
than a year,320 became the predicate for the most important press freedom case in 
American history up to that date.  
At first, Near was represented only by local counsel, Thomas Latimer, a 
prominent Minneapolis attorney and, in Fred Friendly’s words, a “self-appointed Legal
Aid Society.”321 When Near finally got to court in December 1927, Latimer argued that 
the Public Nuisance Law was a “subterfuge” to avoid the state constitution and the 
requirements of its libel law.322 Although he compared it to laws in fascist Italy and 
communist Russia, his argument fell on deaf ears. Judge Mathias Baldwin, who had 
                                                
316 Id. at 45-49. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 114, at 47. McCormick’s “spin” on 
Olson’s decision to invoke the gag law is that “he would not risk” a libel action, implying 
that Near was telling the truth.  
317 MCCORMICK, supra note 114, at 47; FRIENDLY, supra note 48, at 50. Friendly called 
the filing a “complaint,” as does Hughes, but McCormick characterizes it as an
“information,” the kind of charging document used in the Zenger case to which 
McCormick had referred earlier. Near, 283 U.S. at 704. 
318 FRIENDLY, supra note 48, at 50.  
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320 Id. at 53. But see MCCORMICK, supra note 114, at 47. The timeline here is somewhat 
unclear. Friendly says the TRO remained in force for twenty-six months but dates the 
permanent injunction at three months after an Oct. 10, 1928, hearing. That would make 
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321 FRIENDLY, supra note 48, at 51.  
322 Id. at 51-52.  
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himself been a target of The Saturday Press, refused to lift the restraining order but did 
certify the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court.323 
On May 25, 1928, the Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously upheld the validity 
of the statute as an exercise of the state’s police powers.324 “A business that depends 
largely for its success upon malice, scandal and defamation can be of no real service to 
society,” wrote Chief Justice Samuel Bailey Wilson for a unanimous court. “It is not a 
violation of the liberty of the press or of the freedom of speech for the Legislature to 
provide a remedy for their abuse.”325 Four and a half months later, Judge Baldwin made 
the temporary restraining order a permanent injunction,326 prohibiting Near and Guilford 
from publishing until they agreed to publish only the truth, “with good motives and for 
justifiable ends.”327 
As outrageous as the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion might seem today, the 
journalism of the day may have been even more outrageous. Murphy points out that, 
“with the rise of the tabloid, 1920’s journalism offended many older, more serious 
Americans, who were still guided by a vigorous Victorian-Progressive morality and 
decorum.”328 Indeed, “[t]he national student debate topic for 1930 was: Resolved: That 
the Minnesota Nuisance Law should be adopted by every state in the Union.”329 
                                                
323 Id. at 53.  
324 Minnesota ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770, (Minn. 1928). Elsie Latimer is 
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325 Id. at 773.  
326 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.  
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By then, however, word of the case had reached New York and the American 
Civil Liberties Union, which had been formed in 1920.330 Although the ACLU 
announced that it would take the case to the United States Supreme Court, there were 
doubts about the group’s financial wherewithal, and its involvement in the case was 
ultimately minimal.331 Word also reached Chicago and Col. McCormick, who sent the 
case file on to Weymouth Kirkland. 
B.  The Colonel Takes Command 
When Kirkland received the Near file from McCormick, his response was 
unequivocal:  
I think the decision in this case is utterly at variance with 
all of our Institutions . . . and most certainly establishes a 
dangerous precedent to a free press. Whether the articles are true or 
not, for a judge, without a jury, to suppress a newspaper by writ of 
injunction is unthinkable, and is just another step, along with the 
Volstead Injunction, to do away with jury trials. The remedies of 
civil action and criminal action were open to the State’s Attorney 
and if the Jewish race or the grand jury was slandered, criminal 
libel could be invoked. If this decision stands, any newspaper in 
Minnesota which starts a crusade against gambling, vice, or other 
evils may be closed down, all of which without a trial by jury. Of 
course, newspapers which are habitually slanderous and 
defamatory should not be allowed to run, but they should be 
stopped only in accordance with law. We should not have 
criminals running the streets at large, but they are, nevertheless, 
entitled to a jury trial.332 
 
 Kirkland noted that the ACLU planned to carry the case up to the Supreme Court 
and expressed the hope that the decision would be reversed there. If not, Kirkland mused, 
it would be easy for a governor in Illinois or some other state to push a similar statute 
                                                
330 FRIENDLY, supra note 48, at 63.  
331 Id. at 63-65. McCormick’s version of the tale, at least in its published version, avoids 
any mention of the gangsters’ religious affiliation or Near’s anti-Semitis . MCCORMICK, 
supra note 114, at 45-52. 
332 Letter from Kirkland to McCormick (Sept. 14, 1928). 
77
 
through the legislature. “I wonder if there is some way we could get in touch with the 
people appealing to see that their briefs are properly prepared,” he mused.333 McCormick 
seemed to have something more in mind. 
McCormick was no stranger to hardball litigation. Early in his career, the Tribune 
had successfully defended a series of libel suits by Mayor William “Big Bill” Thompson 
in 1917 and 1918 seeking $1.3 million for criticizing Thompson’s pro-German attitude 
during the war.334 The first major libel case that involved McCormick directly arose from 
an editorial that he did not write, but approved, in 1916, titled “Henry Ford is an 
Anarchist.” The editorial took Ford to task for criticizing the Mexican “troubles” and 
threatening the jobs of any Ford worker who volunteered for service when the National 
Guard was called out.335  
Weymouth Kirkland defended the Ford case; Philip Kinsley, who later wrote 
Liberty and the Press hailing the Tribune’s role,336 covered for the Tribune. The trial was 
vicious, with Ford portraying McCormick as having a corrupt interest in the Mexican 
war, and McCormick making Ford out to be something close to a traitor.337 The trial went 
from mid-May to mid-August, with Ford ultimately winning six cents in damages. 
McCormick refused to pay, and Ford never collected.338 
By December 1920, the animosity between McCormick and Thompson had 
reached the breaking point. Thompson sued the Tribune (and the Daily News) for $10 
million, claiming his administration had been libeled by exposés of municipal corruptin. 
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334 See FRIENDLY, supra note 48, at 73. 
335 SMITH , supra note 49, at 175.  
336 See KINSLEY, supra note 115, at 28-34. 
337 See FRIENDLY, supra note 48, at 70-73. 
338 Id. at 72. 
78
 
It was the largest libel action ever filed in the U.S. at that time.339 The suit was ultimately 
dismissed in October 1921: 
[W]ith a ringing affirmation of a free press as ‘the eyes and ears of the world. . .the 
advocate constantly pleading before the alter of public opinion. It holds up for 
review the acts of our officials and those men in high places who have it in their 
power to advance peace or endanger it.’340  
 
McCormick had been named chairman of the ANPA Committee on Freedom of 
the Press shortly after the association’s 1928 annual meeting in April341 by ANPA 
President Edward H. Butler of the Buffalo Evening News.342 So, the day after Kirkland 
opined on the Near file, McCormick wrote his old friend Samuel Emory Thomason of the 
Tampa Morning Tribune and Chicago Journal and Daily Times. Thomason was a former 
law partner of McCormick’s, one-time business manager of the Tribune, and a member 
of McCormick’s committee.343 “I have written to the editors of several of the largest 
newspapers in the state of Minnesota and asked their opinion on [the case],” wrote 
McCormick.  
I have referred the records in the case to my own lawyer. It may be 
that we should intervene in the appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. If the freedom of the press is in jeopardy I don’t 
think we should leave it to any outside organization to fight our 
battle.344 
 
Thomason readily agreed that the ANPA should intervene in the Minnesota case 
and offered to bring the matter up at a board of directors meeting in New York. “It migh
                                                
339 SMITH , supra note 49, at 241-44.  
340 Id. at 243  
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 AM. NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASS’N (ANPA), REPORT OF THE FORTY-SECOND 
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342 Letter from Lincoln B. Palmer [hereinafter Palmer], ANPA General Manager, to 
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343 The committee also included Harry Chandler of the Los Angeles Times, William T. 
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be a good idea if you would write a note to the Board and suggest, as chairman of the 
committee on the Freedom of the Press, that this step be taken, and then I’ll follow it 
through.”345 McCormick did write the directors on September 21, warning that “there is 
but little chance of there being a reversal of the case unless the ANPA or some other 
similar public-spirited association takes over the litigation.”346 According to Friendly, 
however, their response was minimal. 
Nevertheless, when Judge Baldwin reconvened the trial court on October 10, 
Tribune lawyers William Symes and Charles Rathbun had joined Latimer at Near’s 
table.347 As it happened, the additional firepower was useless. Following a largely 
perfunctory hearing, Olson asked Baldwin to issue a permanent injunction, and Baldwin 
told him to prepare the order.348 Three months later, Baldwin signed the order for a 
permanent injunction: “Let said nuisance be abated.”349 
That final order set the stage for a new appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
but it also seemed to embarrass the Minnesota legislature, and the Tribune’s coverage 
shifted from the court battle to an effort to repeal the gag law. On February 27, 1929, the 
Tribune reported that State Representative R. R. Davis had introduced a bill in the House 
to repeal the law.350 The article reported that the Tribune had criticized the gag law since 
it was first enacted but made no mention of any involvement in the litigation. In fact, it 
incorrectly reported that the “[American] Civil Liberties [U]nion has entered the fight and 
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has taken the case of the Saturday Press to the United States Supreme [C]ourt in an effort 
to prove the law unconstitutional.”351  
The role of the press generally remained tepid. “I have written to approximately 
ten publishers of leading newspapers and magazines in the United States,” the Tribun
quotes Davis. “The replies, which are beginning to come back to me, are almost
unanimous for repeal of the law.”352 The Tribune, however, kept up the drumbeat. On 
March 5, it covered a speech Davis made before a House legislative committee 
condemning the gag law. Davis noted that, in addition to the Tribune, the St. Paul 
Pioneer Press, and Editor & Publisher had editorialized against the law.353 
The Tribune continued its thorough coverage of the Minnesota hearings 
throughout March, at one point partially correcting the record regarding the pending 
litigation. “Now an appeal to the United States Supreme [C]ourt from this decision is 
being undertaken by the publisher of The Chicago Tribune. The American Civil Liberties 
league also has interested itself in repeal of the law.”354 The article also noted that the 
ANPA had taken the position that the Minnesota law “is a dangerous precedent to permit 
on court records in a nation which has prided itself on its freedom of press and 
speech.”355 But most Minnesota editors, the article said, had “failed to take a serious 
interest in the law, contenting themselves with the idea that ‘decent newspaper  will not 
be affected by the law.’”356 
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The next day, the Tribune editorialized against the gag law under the headline “A 
Monkey State Candidate” – an unstated reference to the Scopes evolution trial in 
Tennessee.357 In the editorial, the Tribune formally announced that it “will challenge the 
law in behalf of the Saturday Press before the United States Supreme [C]ourt.”358 That 
editorial, and others, were quoted extensively by Rep. Davis when the hearings continued 
on March 25.359 Also testifying against the gag law then were S.M. Williams, editor of 
the St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch; Sam Haislett, secretary of the Minnesota 
Editorial Association; and Prof. Bruce McCoy of the University of Minnesota Journalism 
School.360 
It was all to no avail, however, as the committee voted 11-3 to recommend 
postponing action on the repeal bill indefinitely, and the House adopted the committee 
report, 86-30.361 Opposition to the bill was led by Rep. C.A. Peterson, who said 
supporters of repeal suffered from “hallucinations” with regard to threats to freedom of 
the press.362 “If you repeal this bill,” Peterson said, “there is an army of persons waiting 
to begin publication of scandal sheets.”363 The Tribune’s editorial response was scathing 
and classic McCormick. In “Minnesota Joins the Monkey States,” the Tribune declared: 
The defeat of the repeal bill is a disgrace to the state of Minnesota. 
When the law was enacted in 1925 it had attracted relatively little 
attention, and its passage could be interpreted charitably as an 
oversight. Today the significance of the law is plain and the refusal 
to repeal it indicates beyond all question that the enactment of the 
law was a deliberate attempt to strangle criticism in a way which 
enlightened men have rejected as unsound politically and morally 
for nearly 300 years. 
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Minnesota joins hands with Tennessee, and of the two 
Minnesota may justly claim to be the more ridiculous. After all, it 
is less than a hundred years since intelligent men discarded the 
traditional biological notions found in the Bible.364 
  
 The day that editorial appeared, the Tribune legal team submitted a voluminous 
377-page brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court surveying 2,300 years of censorship, 
from Socrates to the present, mentioning such exemplary “critics of government” as 
Christ and Savonarola, Zenger and Vallandigham.365 The brief was signed by Weymouth 
Kirkland, Louis Caldwell, Charles Rathbun, and Edward Caldwell of the Kirkland firm. 
The Latimers were listed as associate counsel. The brief argued that affirming the gag 
law  
would put a precedent on the books which hereafter would be used 
by an entrenched minority to escape ouster from office and 
opprobrium. 
  
It is unconstitutional to issue an injunction stifling a 
newspaper even after hearing and trial; to issue a temporary 
injunction before hearing and without any trial whatsoever is a 
despotic act which the American people always have thought could 
be characteristic only of a czar or the inquisition, and 
inconceivable in a democracy.366 
  
 On this trip to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Near had not only the full attention of 
McCormick, his Tribune, and its law firm, but also, at long last, the organized support of 
the publishers. When L.B. Palmer asked McCormick on March 6 for a report of his 
Freedom of the Press Committee for the ANPA annual meeting,367 set for April 24, in 
New York City, McCormick had the law firm prepare a summary of the Minnesota case.
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Kirkland’s associate, Howard Ellis, sent a draft to McCormick on March 19. Ellis 
summarized the case through May 25, 1928, when the Minnesota Supreme Court 
affirmed the restraining order and remanded the case: 
It was at this point that The Chicago Tribune became aware 
of the revolutionary effect of this decision upon the liberties of the 
people and of the press. By agreement with the defendants, the 
attorneys for the Chicago Tribune became additional council (sic) 
in the case with instructions to present, if possible, the illegality of 
the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution. 368 
 
Ellis went on to discuss the trial and expressed the hope that, if the Minnesota 
Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holding, “the Supreme Court of the United States 
can review the whole matter; and a sincere effort will be made to obtain a reviewby the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”369 Under the heading, “Some Objections to the 
Statute,” Ellis outlined the substantive case in detail, then appealing to the publishers 
through their wallets, considered “The Effect of the Statute on Newspaper V lues”: 
Needless to say, if this statute is held valid, the value of 
newspaper properties throughout the country will be greatly 
diminished. If the law is valid in Minnesota it is valid in other 
states. There is always the possibility of similar legislation being 
adopted elsewhere. Newspapers can be suppressed at the will of 
the legislature and a single judge sitting without a jury and, if a 
preliminary injunction is granted, before notice to the newspaper or 
hearing. No legitimate business can stand up under such a load. No 
legitimate business has ever been subjected to such a burden . . . . 
 
The possibility that such a law could legally be adopted and 
enforced would cause newspaper properties everywhere to decline 
in value.370 
 
                                                
368 Howard Ellis, Resume of the Case of State versus Guildford (Mar. 19, 1929) 
(transmitted to the Committee on Freedom of the Press of the American Newspaper 
Publishers Association). 
369 Id. 
370 Id. at 6. 
84
 
The report seems to have had the desired effect. On the opening day of the ANPA 
convention, the publishers accepted the report that Ellis prepared for McCormick and 
adopted a resolution pledging a united front against the Minnesota law.371 The following 
day, New York City’s three leading dailies lent their editorial support to the fight. The 
World said the law was “the most extreme attempt to fetter journalism made anywhere in 
the country since civil war days,” while the Herald-Tribune said the law “authorize[s] 
capital punishment of a newspaper by the fiat of a single judge.”372 The Times praised 
McCormick’s “effective struggle against the statute” and said publishers who heard his 
committee report “were amazed that any state legislature in the Union could have passed 
such a law.”373 A few days later, the Herald-Tribune editorial was reprinted in full in 
McCormick’s Tribune as its “Editorial of the Day.”374 
McCormick had also garnered the moral support of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, which met in Washington on April 18 shortly before the ANPA 
convention in New York City. President Walter M. Harrison, editor of the Daily 
Oklahoman and the Oklahoma City Times, urged ASNE to “lend every assistance 
possible” to support McCormick’s campaign to overturn the Minnesota statute. 375  
No larger club could be held over the newspaper profession 
by the judiciary. Under such a tyrannical statute a corrupt judge 
might silence any fair comment about his derelictions and kill a 
newspaper by a temporary writ that would ruin a going business 
before the editor might have an opportunity to prove his case 
during his day in court.376 
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Harrison praised McCormick effusively as “the first to raise his voice” against 
what Harrison called “a medieval invasion of the freedom of the press guaranteed i  our 
bill of rights.”377 McCormick was a member of ASNE as well as ANPA and served on 
ASNE’s committee on legislation and freedom of the press, along with Edward S. Beck 
of his own Chicago Tribune and Samuel Williams and R. J. Dunlap of the St. Paul 
Pioneer Press and Dispatch.378 Notwithstanding Harrison’s call, there is no indication 
that ASNE ever contributed any money to the litigation campaign.379 
Oral arguments before the Minnesota Supreme Court were scheduled for May 23, 
but were postponed until October 1, at Kirkland’s request, then postponed again until 
December 2. When the court finally heard the case, Friendly writes, the event “more 
resembled a procedural ceremony than a legitimate clash of arguments.”380 Having found 
the gag law constitutional once, there was little chance the court would change its mind 
and nothing the Tribune’s “dream team” did seemed to have any contrary influence. 
Near’s frustration boiled over, and on December 14, even before the Supreme Court 
decision came down, he wrote a truly grotesque letter to McCormick, complaining bout 
Ellis’s handling of the case, including delays since the spring and his attraction to 
“Minnesota moonshine.”381 
This case means everything to me. It is I who am deprived of a 
chance to make a living, of my property. True, I am defying court 
orders and inviting a jail sentence for writing for the Beacon, but I 
have got to live and Mr. McCormick, if I’m going to be made an 
ass of by Mr. Ellis and the laughing stock of the city because of his 
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actions while here – I’m not and I don’t believe you expect me to. 
382 
 
In all likelihood, nothing Ellis could have done would have affected the outcome 
of the case. As expected, the Minnesota Supreme Court once again upheld the gag law in 
a perfunctory opinion. “The record presents the same questions upon which we have 
already passed. . . . Upon authority [of the earlier opinion], wherein our views have been 
more fully expressed, the judgment herein is affirmed.”383 But the decision touched off a 
flurry of activity from McCormick and Kirkland to enlist support from the publishers to 
take the case to the United States Supreme Court.384  
A draft letter from McCormick to Harry Chandler, president of the Los Angeles 
Times, dated December 23, 1929, served as the model.385 “The question now arises, – 
shall the case be taken to the United States Supreme Court? It may be taken on thre
grounds, – violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution, violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and violation of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of Minnesota.”386  
McCormick then reiterated the appeal Ellis had made to the publishers’ financial 
interests and offered the best- and worst-case scenarios: 
 It is obvious that if we appeal the case and win it, such 
cloud as has been placed upon our titles will have been removed. 
The chances appear to be very much in favor of our winning the 
case, but in the event of our failure to win the case, I imagine we 
might expect the legislatures of the various States to enact similar 
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legislations, which then would be probably held up by the Supreme 
Courts of most, if not all, the States. Free press in this country 
would disappear. 
 
 The other alternative is to wait quietly and trust that the 
Minnesota case with the Minnesota statute will not be copied in 
other jurisdictions, or if it is copied in other States and upheld by 
the other Supreme Courts, then take the fight to Washington. I 
think it is obvious that the Supreme Court of the United States 
would be less likely to reverse two or more States (sic) Supreme 
Courts than to reverse one.387 
 
Finally, McCormick makes a plea for solidarity among the publishers, presumably ore 
for symbolic than financial purposes. 
This matter is of vital interest to all of us. I do not feel that I should 
definitely take action which will be binding upon all the 
newspapers of the country. I am writing this letter to all the 
members of the Committee on the Freedom of the Press, soliciting 
their views. It may be that they will be sufficiently unanimous and 
positive to enable us without a further meeting to make a 
recommendation to the Directors. If not, I will endeavor to obtain a 
meeting of the Committee, as time will not permit our awaiting the 
annual Convention without losing our right of appeal.388 
   
McCormick sent this draft to Kirkland, who suggested a change in the paragraph 
that involved grounds for taking the case to the United States Supreme Court.390 
McCormick changed the letter the same day and sent it off via teletype to Chandler. The 
paragraph now read: “It may be taken on two grounds. Does the statute violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or does it violate the Free 
Speech Amendment to the Constitution of Minnesota, which is virtually the same as the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution?”391 




390 Letter from Kirkland to McCormick (Dec. 24, 1929) (punctuation added).  
391 Letter from McCormick to Chandler (Dec. 24, 1929). It is not clear why Kirkland 
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Kirkland also advised McCormick that, after a long talk with Ellis, he and Ellis 
were both “quite confident . . . that the Supreme Court of the United States will not 
uphold this statute.”392 But he warned that waiting to see if other states might enact 
similar legislation could have a negative influence on the High Court.393 
McCormick added Kirkland’s observations to the committee letter and, on 
December 26, asked his secretary, Genevieve Burke, to remove any remarks specific to 
Chandler and prepare the letter for all committee members and ANPA President 
Butler.394 The letters went out on December 27.395  
Butler wrote back on December 30, 1929, agreeing with McCormick’s proposal 
to take the matter to the United States Supreme Court “along the grounds outlined in your 
letter.”396 But Butler said he did not think he had authority, as ANPA president, to “direct 
this action without the consent of the Board.”397 Butler asked McCormick to send him 
copies of the responses he received from the committee members, “and I, in turn, will 
immediately take a mail vote on the proposition from the members of the Board in order 
that this matter will not be delayed unduly, for, as you say, there is danger in delay.”398   
Dewart also wrote back on December 30, recommending the case be taken up on state 
constitutional grounds.399 Thomason agreed.  
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Because I can not imagine that the United States Supreme Court 
would sustain the opinion of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and 
because I think it is wise to get this matter settled while we know 
that the preparation of the briefs and arguments is in the hands of 
capable lawyers, I am for taking the case to the United States 
Supreme Court now.400 
  
 Chandler’s response was dated January 1, 1930,401 and he 
counseled wait[ing] a little before proceeding . . . and see[ing] in 
the interval if any disposition manifests itself on the part of other 
states to enact similar legislation. 
  
 I have heard of none and I should say the chances are 
somewhat against any considerable movement in this direction. In 
many, in fact most states, I am inclined to believe that the 
combined influence of the newspapers would prevent such 
enactments, if attempted. 
 
The policy is frankly that of letting sleeping dogs lie. If we 
go to the Supreme Court now and that tribunal upholds the 
Minnesota court, we will have stirred up the matter to a point 
strongly conducive to similar legislation in other states. If so 
formidable a movement develops as to make it necessary 
ultimately to go before the Supreme Court, I do not believe we will 
be any worse off than we are now. I note the objection of Mr. 
Kirkland to this delay. While I am not a lawyer, it seems to me 
likely that if the Supreme Court should knock out the Minnesota 
statute because of its faulty wording, as Mr. Kirkland suggests, this 
would not prevent another state from drawing a similar law but 
avoiding the errors made in Minnesota. 
 
 This is merely an offhand opinion. The matter is certainly 
worthy of the very best consideration we can give it.402 
 
There is a pencil annotation on Thomason’s letter, “send copy of each to each,” 
and a follow-up letter to each member dated January 16, 1929, confirms that the Dewart, 
Thomason, and Chandler letters were sent to each of them.403 In that follow-up letter, 
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McCormick noted that he had also received many newspaper clippings and found them to 
be “practically unanimous” in their strong opposition to the Minnesota decision.404 
It seems to me desirable that we take the appeal at this time both 
because we will lose our rights if we delay and because this is the 
most advantageous way in which to mobilize the press of the 
country in defense of its rights. 
 
 Acting in unison, I strongly believe we can defend this 
essential principle of our form of government. Without united 
action I am afraid that we will be destroyed piecemeal, and with us 
the Republican form of government.405 
 
On January 18, McCormick wrote Butler suggesting that the ANPA Board of 
Directors recommend taking the case to the Supreme Court and asking for approval of the 
entire membership by mail ballot: 
In this way, I think you will put practically every newspaper in 
America actively behind our movement. At the same time you will 
have aroused the newspapers of the country to such an extent that 
wherever similar legislation is proposed the newspapers of the 
state will be ready to organize against it.406 
 
James Kerney finally responded on January 21. “On the whole, while there is 
some force in Mr. Chandler’s arguments, I agree with you that the considerations on the 
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other side of the question are much more important, and that an immediate appeal should 
be taken to the United States Supreme Court.”407  
McCormick then turned his attention to Near’s frustration. He sent some of 
Near’s correspondence to Kirkland on January 23, including a letter asking for money to 
expand and promote a new Saturday Press.408 “I take it that this Johnny is trying to shake 
us down,” McCormick told Kirkland.409 “I think you draw the right conclusion,” replied 
Kirkland.410 “You will remember that some time last fall I told you we had a request from 
him for money which you very properly refused to grant. Ellis transmitted this 
information to him and since then he has had no use for Ellis.”411  
Kirkland asked to see McCormick as soon as possible – McCormick was 
wintering in Florida412 – “because I am under the impression that whether we take up the 
case or not, Near will have someone do it and with his lack of means it will probably be 
very poorly briefed.”413 Later, Kirkland condemned the Minnesota gag law in a speech to 
the Legal Club.414 
Meanwhile, McCormick’s efforts to enlist the support of the other publishers was 
having mixed results, receiving praise for his efforts but no financial backing.415 The 
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ANPA board met on February 8, 1930, and, according to Lincoln Palmer, was “in full 
accord with Colonel McCormick’s suggestion that [taking the case to the Supreme Court] 
was the proper course to follow.”416 In a letter to Thomason, however, Palmer pointed out 
that the association had been “under unusually heavy expense during the past year.”417
In view of these heavy expenses already incurred the Board 
naturally hesitates to incur additional heavy expense, and so I have 
been asked to write to you to express the hope of the Board that 
you will discuss the matter with Colonel McCormick who is, I 
understand, in Florida at this time, with a view toward learning in 
what manner the expense of carrying this case through to a 
conclusion may be met.418 
 
Thomason forwarded Palmer’s letter to McCormick, along with his own summary 
of the Board’s position.  
They did not feel that they had any right to ask you to bear the 
expense of the Freedom of the Press case any further, but they 
assigned to me the delicate task of saying to you that the 
Association would be glad to cooperate in every way if the Tribune 
would bear the legal burden.419 
 
McCormick was more interested in polling the ANPA membership than in any 
financial contribution, telling his secretary to inform committee members he would be 
glad to bear the expense if a substantial majority favored the appeal.420 He wired 
Thomason especially to explain that the poll would “have the effect of thoroughly 
arousing the membership which is just as important as the appeal itself.”421 He asked 
Thomason whether he thought he could get the idea adopted, and Thomason wired back 
to say he would try and believed he could succeed.422  
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The next day, McCormick wrote Thomason that he had instructed Kirkland to 
“perfect the appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.”423 He also provided a 
longer, more detailed explanation of his overall strategy. 
 It seems to me highly desirable that the members of the 
A.N.P.A. should be polled as to their favoring this procedure. In 
this manner we will arouse them to the peril of the situation as we 
cannot in any other way, and will have them prepared to resist any 
injunction laws proposed in other States or in Washington. Unless 
we do arouse the Publishers in time, I am afraid that the politicians 
will begin knocking them off State by State until they have shown 
they can get away with it and then will pass injunction laws 
throughout the Union. 
 
 It is to be borne in mind that the Courts were never 
favorable to the Freedom of the Press. The press attained its 
freedom by legislative action. On the other hand, our Supreme 
Court is more favorable to Constitutional rights than it was when 
Taft was Chief Justice, and may be more favorable now than it will 
be when some of the present Judges, notably Brandeis and Holmes, 
have passed on. 
 
 I hope the Board of Directors will act before the next 
meeting of the Association in New York.424 
 
Thomason wrote back to tell McCormick that he had written to Butler to ask for 
an immediate poll, but that Butler had gone south for the winter. So he wired Palmer 
asking for a telegraphic vote of the directors authorizing the referendum. “I think you are 
entirely right in your conclusion,” he told McCormick, “and I will keep after Palmer and 
the directors with a view to getting a referendum before the New York meetings.”425 
Having received assurances from Kirkland that there was time to conduct the 
referendum before the right of appeal expired,426 Palmer sent McCormick a draft of the 
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referendum letter. The letter hailed McCormick as an “ardent champion” of freedom of 
the press, “so seriously challenged” by the Minnesota law. The letter said McCormi k 
had retained counsel and perfected an appeal in the case and  
is prepared to continue this fight through to a United States 
Supreme Court decision to the end that newspapers may be 
protected from suppression by injunction, provided the 
membership is in accord with such action. A referendum vote has 
been ordered by President Butler and you are requested to record 
your vote.427  
 
McCormick found the letter “entirely satisfactory.”428 
In March, McCormick stepped up the campaign to bring the publishers on board 
in anticipation of the ANPA annual convention the following month. He wrote to M.V. 
Atwood, secretary of the New York State Society of Newspaper Editors, asking him to 
“suggest to the members of your State Association that they vote in the affirmative” on 
the referendum.429 He also reported the ANPA referendum in the Tribune, summarizing 
the case “[f]or the information of editors and other readers who have not had the [case] 
brought to their attention.”430 And he wired Palmer suggesting the press be given results 
of the referendum on a weekly basis, mailed out as “news matter,” not merely put in the 
ANPA Bulletin as Palmer had suggested.431 At the time, the vote was 275-5 in favor of 
the appeal.432 
McCormick was very eager for the annual convention, as well as for a meeting of 
his Freedom of the Press committee. Palmer wrote McCormick, noting the difficulty in 
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scheduling a meeting the previous year and asking whether he wanted one this year.433 
“Of course we will have a meeting . . .,” McCormick replied. “As far as I am concerned, I 
will put it ahead of any other meeting.”434 McCormick also asked Palmer for fifteen 
minutes “to put my views before the convention. I don’t care when.”435 Palmer wrote 
back to say he had arranged for McCormick to address the convention during the first 
session and had scheduled a meeting of the committee.436 H  also told McCormick that 
the poll stood at 331-6 in favor of intervention.  
That eagerness, however, did not extend to preparing a committee report. Palmer 
had asked for a report by April 10 so that it could be published in the preconvention 
Bulletin. He told McCormick the report would be of “outstanding interest to our 
Convention.”437 McCormick replied that he couldn’t make a report “until the vote of the 
members is in and until the Board of Directors has taken some action upon our 
recommendation.” He suggested Palmer “might phrase a report of the situation o date” 
and he would “be glad to sign it.”438 
Before receiving McCormick’s response, Palmer again asked for the report in 
another letter.439 Noting that their correspondence was crossing, McCormick repeated his 
unwillingness to submit a report, this time telling Palmer that the editorial assistant he 
had assigned to collect material for the report had left the Tribune. “I believe you could 
write a report on this one subject, the Minnesota case, which we could submit to our 
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committee . . . . Next year I will have somebody on [t]he Tribune compile a 
comprehensive report on the subject for the following meeting.” 440 
Palmer sent a draft report to McCormick’s secretary on April 11, suggestin that 
she forward one copy to Kirkland.441 The report, which was to be signed by the 
committee members, found “no attempts to abridge [freedom of the press] by state or 
federal legislation, and . . . few attempts on the part of the courts.”442 One of those 
attempts involved an Ohio court that sentenced two editors to thirty days and $500 in 
fines for publishing editorials criticizing a judge for sitting on a trial in acase in which 
the judge had an interest.443 The convictions were overturned on appeal to the Ohio 
Appeals Court,444 and Palmer quoted from the opinion of Judge Willis Vickery: 
 We live in an age of pitiless publicity! We live in an age 
when freedom of speech and freedom of press are paramount 
issues. People should be allowed to say what they please, and 
newspapers to print what they please, always making themselves 
liable under the laws of slander or the laws of libel . . . .445 
 
 In other words, it is better that the press be free, that speech 
be free . . . [and] that the right to air our views be free, than it is 
that they be uttered in fear and trembling . . . . 
 
 A free people must have a free press and they must have 
the right to speak freely their thoughts.446 
 
Palmer also reported on the Minnesota case referendum, which now stood at 375-
8. “The Chicago Tribune’s attorneys, therefore, are perfecting the appeal to the Uni ed 
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States Supreme Court, and your Committee feels that there is every indicatio  of a 
successful termination of the issue involved.”447  
McCormick forwarded the draft to all of the members of the committee.448 
Kerney sent back a lengthy letter, thanking McCormick and congratulating him on his
vigilance. “It is fine and I am proud to have my name signed to it, although I have 
contributed nothing. You are doing a great job.”449  
As I see it, the biggest danger to American institutions comes from 
the arrogance of the courts, which undertake to assume all the 
functions of the three departments of government. Perhaps a large 
part of the blame rests with the press, which has been too 
indulgent, or too timid, in pointing out the infringement on liberty 
by stupid judges.450 
 
Kerney added that the quotation from Judge Vickery “should be pasted in the hat of every 
editor and every judge in America.”451 Dewart wrote the same day, “It suits me.”452  
Meanwhile, a formal resolution had been drafted for adoption by the ANPA 
convention. McCormick sent a copy to Kirkland, and Ellis suggested revised language: 
Be it resolved that Chapter 285, Session Laws of 1925 of 
the State of Minnesota, popularly known as the ‘Gag Law’, (sic) is 
a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States, a peril to the right of property 
and a menace to republican institutions; 
 
 Be it further resolved that this association condemn this 
statute as a dangerous and vicious invasion of personal liberties; 
 
 Be it further resolved that this association and its members 
cooperate to cause its annullment (sic) and to prevent the 
enactment of similar legislation.453 
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The 1930 ANPA convention saw Harry Chandler replace Edward Butler as 
president and also, apparently, experience a change of heart regarding the financing. 
Chandler had written to McCormick back in March suggesting the membership “share 
expenses pro rata with [t]he Chicago Tribune.”454 On April 19, the ANPA directors 
actually voted to “meet the cost incurred in connection with taking an appeal.”455 
Chandler had told the directors immediately after the convention that he would 
communicate with McCormick to get some idea of the costs involved, but illness 
prevented Chandler from following through until late May. “If you have any approximate 
idea of what the appeal cost will be I should like to have it in order to make Mr. Palmer’s 
records as complete as possible,” Chandler wrote.456  
McCormick asked Kirkland to “kindly supply the important and interesting 
information” that Chandler had requested.457 Kirkland estimated the total cost, including 
oral argument, at $25,000.458 McCormick forwarded the information to Chandler, adding, 
“[a]ny sum that the A.N.P.A. sees fit to pay will be satisfactory to me.”459 In the end, 
ANPA contributed $5,000 to the appeal.460 
Meanwhile, Kirkland’s legal team had been working on a brief for the Supreme 
Court. McCormick monitored the process closely and freely offered his advice. At one 
point, for example, he advised Kirkland that Justice Louis D. Brandeis was “a fairly 
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orthodox Jew, and it may not be wise to greatly emphasize the crucifixion in the appeal . . 
. .”461 Later, he advised Kirkland, “I think we should point out that the Government in 
Washington is the outcome of a fight for free government of which freedom of the press 
was an integral part.”462 That advice came in a cover letter for a document McCormick 
entitled “Comments on the Minnesota Brief,” which contained sixteen suggestions for 
changes in the draft: 
1. I have never read JUNIUS. I understand it was very 
bitter and was anonymous. Can’t you argue that if anonymous 
publications are forced by law, they will be much more bitter and 
defamatory than established publications? . . . .  
 
3. Page 55: It seems as though it might be more convincing 
to present an instance or two of the prosecutions instituted after the 
expiration of licensing: were they not against political opponents 
rather than against scandalous, lewd, or malicious publications? 
…. 
5. Page 74: It appears you might profitably continue the 
quotation from Madison where he shows how the executive, 
judiciary and legislature are curtailed by the first amendment. 
 
6. Page 87: Might we comment that the Minnesota statute 
does not give the defendant even such protection as the sedition act 
was supposed to afford through a jury and therefore is much worse 
than this greatly reprobated statute? …. 
 
10. Page 175: Of course the decision that the jury and not 
the judge should decide the libelous nature of a writing is a 
precedent against letting a judge make the decision through the 
expedient of an injunction.463 
 
McCormick’s suggestions continued in letter after letter to Kirkland. “I wonder if 
the old laws against scolds are in any way relevant to the injunction case,” he wrote in 
                                                
461 Letter from McCormick to Kirkland (May 12, 1930). 
462 Letter from McCormick to Kirkland (May 26, 1930). 
463 Robert R. McCormick, Comments on the Minnesota Brief, May 27, 1930. 
100
 
one.464 Kirkland assured McCormick that “most of your ideas can and will be 
incorporated in the brief,” but cautioned that, “while the brief in the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota was 377 pages in length, the brief in the Supreme Court of the United States 
cannot be permitted to run over 75 pages.” Pointing out that the Court had “recently 
dismissed several briefs merely on account of the length,” Kirkland told McCormick that 
“[s]uch of your suggestions that cannot be incorporated in the brief can undoubtedly be 
worked into oral argument.”465 
That admonition seemed to have little or no effect on McCormick. “Would the 
best way to fix the court’s mind upon the essential issue be – to start off with a quotation 
of the First amendment to the Constitution?” he asked in another letter, which he drafted
at least twice.466 In that letter, he urged Kirkland to use an extended quotation from 
Richard Brinsley Sheridan on the power of the press to overcome even the most corrupt 
government that is now carved in the entry hall of the Tribune building in Chicago.467  
McCormick’s attention during the summer of 1930 was necessarily focused on 
the murder of Tribune crime reporter Jake Lingle and revelation of Lingle’s all-too-close 
relationship with the Capone gang.468 Still, McCormick and the Tribune remained active 
                                                
464 Letter from McCormick to Kirkland (May 28, 1930).  “‘When a woman is habitually 
addicted to scolding at and before persons in general, on the highway, or in a populous 
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Cmmw. v. Hamilton, 45 Pa. D. & C. 485, 489-90 (1945) (quoting Francis Wharton, 
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in the Near case and other press freedom issues.469 Among the more interesting issues to 
surface that summer was the fifteen percent annual tax on newspaper advertising 
proposed by Louisiana Gov. Huey P. Long, which would later become the central issue in 
another landmark Supreme Court decision, Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc.470 
McCormick had received a letter from Philip Schuyler of Publishers’ Service Semi-
Monthly in New York “wondering” what his committee was going to do about the tax.471 
McCormick said the committee had “asked all the newspapers of America to oppose the 
newspaper tax bill in Louisiana” and had been advised by the Item-Tribune in New 
Orleans “that the opposition is proving effective.”472 
By the fall of 1930, the Near case was back in the news as the gag law’s initial 
sponsor, Minnesota State Sen. George Lommen, announced that he would support repeal 
in the Minnesota legislature.473 Soon thereafter, Floyd B. Olson, the former district 
attorney who had filed for the injunction against Near’s Saturday Press, was elected 
governor of Minnesota and, in his inaugural address in January 1931, expressed support 
for the repeal. Olson explained that, although he remained convinced of the statute’s 
constitutionality, he now believed “that the possibilities for abuse make it an unwise 
law,” a position he could not take as prosecutor.474 The Tribune’s editorial in support of 
repeal fell far short of embracing Olson, claiming credit instead for having initiated the 
                                                
469 By this time, McCormick had been asked to chair the freedom of the press committees 
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court challenge.475 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch was more charitable toward Olson, and 
the Tribune duly carried its editorial the following day.476  
Bills to repeal the gag law were introduced in both the Minnesota House and 
Senate on January 15477 and approved by the House on February 4 by a vote of 68-58 
after two days of intense debate.478 Perhaps anticipating the demise of the gag law one 
way or the other,479 one Minnesota state senator began drafting a draconian new criminal 
libel law that provided prison terms of one to three years.480 But prospects for the 
legislation’s clearing the Senate had begun to dim,481 and, at one point, its chief sponsor, 
Sen. Lommen, agreed to allow the bill to lie dormant in committee pending a “speedy” 
decision by the United States Supreme Court.482 In the end, the bill died in the crush of 
other legislative business when sponsors failed to win a special order giving it priority 
consideration.483 
But the machinations of the Minnesota legislature had no effect on the legal 
process through which Near v. Minnesota finally reached the United States Supreme 
Court. Near’s jurisdictional statement had reached the Court on May 17, 1930,484 and the 
Court had noted probable jurisdiction on October 20.485 Kirkland filed Near’s brief on 
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December 12,486 and Minnesota Attorney General Henry N. Benson filed the state’s reply 
brief on January 19, 1931.487 Oral arguments were scheduled for January 30. 
C. Before the Supreme Court 
After describing the statute as interpreted and applied by the Minnesota courts,
Kirkland’s seventy-page brief defined “freedom of the press” as broader than Supreme 
Court “precedents passing upon that right under the First Amendment.”488 Rather, 
Kirkland asserted that precedents defining the right under state constitutions and the 
common law are also apposite.489 Averring that all such authorities, from Blackstone to 
the present, agree with the proposition that freedom of the press prohibits prior 
restraints,490 Kirkland proceeded to offer the court a veritable library of precedents 
supporting that position.491 He acknowledged a handful of cases where an injunction had 
been granted affecting freedom of speech or of the press but distinguished the lot as 
aimed at preventing unlawful conduct and having only an incidental effect on the right of 
free speech and press.492  
Having established that the statute violated freedom of the press, Kirkland next 
set out to show that freedom of the press is protected by both the due process and 
privileges or immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.493 For the former 
                                                
486 Press Gag Law is Attacked in Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1930, at 6; 
Appellant’s Brief, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)(No. 91), 1930 WL 30038. 
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proposition, Kirkland pointed to Gitlow v. New York494 and subsequent cases; by 1930, 
that issue had been all but conclusively decided,495 and Kirkland’s case was strong and 
focused. Precedents for the latter proposition were more general, with only a te uous link 
to freedom of the press; the Slaughter-House Cases496 had gutted the privileges or 
immunities clause, and Kirkland could not resurrect it here.497 No matter, he concluded; 
freedom of the press “is probably a right of such magnitude that it would exist even in the 
absence of the Fourteenth Amendment.”498  
Minnesota’s brief began by limiting the issue to the due process clause, which the 
state conceded arguendo might protect Near’s liberty interest in freedom of the press 
(although not without a skeptical footnote).499 But that freedom, the brief asserted, “does 
not include the free and unrestricted right to publish obscene, scandalous or defamatory 
matter.”500 Minnesota relied heavily on the World War I Espionage and Sedition Act 
cases for the proposition that freedom of speech is not absolute, then concentrated on 
showing that the injunction against Near was a valid exercise of the state’s police power 
to abate a real nuisance, not an injunction against mere libel as Kirkland had 
characterized it.501 
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There is no transcript of the oral argument, but Friendly reconstructs it from 
newspaper accounts.502 “The words were delivered by counsel,” Friendly says, “but the 
rhetoric was vintage McCormick.”503 Kirkland spoke for fifty-four minutes, interrupted 
by Justice Pierce Butler’s reminders that “the Saturday Press was a hate sheet which 
regularly published defamatory articles . . . ”504 Butler asked “if it wasn’t ‘fanciful’ to 
prevent a state such as Minnesota from enforcing a decree to prevent further publication 
of malicious articles.”505 Friendly reports Kirkland responding that “the proper remedy 
for persons feeling themselves defamed was to seek indictments and criminal trials before 
juries . . . . The Minnesota gag law [was] a remedy worse than the evil it attempted to 
cure . . . .”506 
Deputy Attorney General James E. Markham argued for the state that the statut  
did not violate the federal Constitution “because it provided for due process of law as 
commanded by the Fourteenth Amendment.”507 Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes 
interrupted to steer Markham away from any Fourteenth Amendment argument, citing 
Gitlow to establish conclusively that freedom of the press is a fundamental right. He then 
asked Markham to address the prior restraint question. Markham denied that the 
injunction amounted to a prior restraint, calling it a “punishment for an earlier wrong.”508 
He also defended the statute as “beneficial to newspapers because it would ‘have the 
effect of purifying the press.’”509 
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Both Friendly’s account and the Tribune’s coverage emphasize the questioning of 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis. It is evident from Brandeis’s own papers that he had been 
preparing for this case for some time. One note to a clerk, H. Thomas Austern, dad 
October 14, 1930, for example, says “let me know as early as possible” whether the case 
has been discussed in any newspapers, trade magazines, or law reviews.510 Two days 
later, Brandeis asked Austern to check the house organs and annual reports of the ANPA 
and ASNE for anything they might have said about the case.511 Other notes showed that 
Austern tracked coverage of the case in Editor & Publisher, Printers Ink, the 
Minneapolis Journal, and the Minnesota Law Review, among others.512 
Brandeis’s papers also contain handwritten and typed copies of a Minneapolis 
Journal editorial supporting the gag law and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s second 
affirmation of it.513 Some segments of the press had supported the law, and Min eapolis 
Journal editors had even helped draft it.514 Brandeis also collected clips from The 
Washington Post and the newspaper Labor on efforts to repeal the gag law.515  
At oral argument, Brandeis told Markham that it was “difficult to see how one is 
to have a free press and the protection it affords a democratic community without the 
privilege this act seems to limit.”516 He led Markham like an experienced cross-examiner 
to admit that the kind of collusion between gangsters and public officials reported in the 
Saturday Press was “privileged” as “‘a matter of prime interest to every American 
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citizen.’”517 When Markham replied, “‘[a]ssuming it to be true,’” Brandeis “snapped 
back: ‘No. A newspaper cannot always wait until it gets the judgment of a court.’”518 
According to Friendly, Markham looked to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to 
rescue him from Brandeis’s embrace, noting Holmes’s majority opinion in Patterson v. 
Colorado,519 which upheld a contempt charge against a newspaper publisher. Friendly 
quotes Holmes as replying, “I was much younger when I wrote that opinion than I am 
now, Mr. Markham. If I did make such a holding, I now have a different view.”520  
Near, at least, reacted favorably to the oral arguments. On February 4, 1931, he 
wrote to McCormick expressing the view that the case seemed to be won but also 
complaining that, for him, the victory would be a Pyrrhic one because he was joblessand 
broke.521 Near had been working off and on for a paper called the Beacon and, in April 
1930, was acquitted of criminal libel charges stemming from his reporting there.522 Now, 
he wanted McCormick to “underwrite the Saturday Press for a few months” and help 
Near turn it into a “national publication with wide influence and certain financial 
success.”523 McCormick apparently ignored him.  
It is far from clear, however, why Near was so confident that the case would be 
won. From the oral arguments, he could be reasonably certain of support from Justices 
Brandeis and Holmes and probably Harlan Fiske Stone. He could also be sure that Justice 
Butler would vote the other way, and probably carry the other three conservatives: W llis 
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Van Devanter, James McReynolds, and George Sutherland – who came to be known as 
the “four horsemen.”524 The other votes, however, were not so easily predicted.  
Less than a year earlier, on March 8, 1930, then-Chief Justice (and former 
president) William Howard Taft (who had resigned a month earlier) and Associate Justice 
Edward T. Sanford died within five hours of each other. Had they not left the Court when 
they did, Near v. Minnesota might well have gone the other way.525 As it was, the new 
appointees, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Owen J. Roberts, were no sure bets, 
but both were more liberal than the men they replaced, and Roberts would eventually 
provide “the switch in time that saved nine” – putting an end to President Roosevelt’s so-
called “court-packing” scheme.526  
Taft had led a solid six-vote conservative bloc consisting of Butler, Van Devanter, 
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Sanford. The dissenters were typically Holmes, Brandeis, 
and Stone.527 With a few personnel changes, this was essentially the ultra-conservative 
Court that ruthlessly enforced sedition laws against WWI dissenters and would go on to 
block Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms.  
Hughes had been nearing the end of his second term as governor of New York in 
1910 when then-President Taft offered him a seat on the Supreme Court upon the death 
of Justice David J. Brewer.528 Hughes accepted and served as associate justice until 1916, 
when he accepted the Republican nomination for the presidency.529 While on the bench, 
Hughes earned a reputation as a great liberal, supporting (usually in dissent) the use of 
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state police powers to protect the public health and welfare against the conservative 
juggernaut that was substantive due process and liberty of contract, and use of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause to protect blacks and aliens insofar as 
the times permitted.530 
Hughes lost the election of 1916 to Woodrow Wilson531 and practiced law – 
including  waging a campaign in support of five Socialists who had been expelled from 
the New York State Assembly.532 In 1918, Hughes was a featured speaker at the ANPA 
annual banquet.533  When the Harding administration came into power in 1921, Hughes 
became Secretary of State, but he resigned from the Cabinet in 1925.  Returning to the 
practice of law, Hughes also served on international tribunals from 1926 to 1930.534 
When Taft retired as Chief Justice because of ill health, President Hoover imm d ately 
nominated Hughes to succeed him.535 Despite his liberal record on the Court, Hughes was 
vigorously opposed by Senate progressives and populists, but in the end, Hoover’s allies 
prevailed 52-26.536 Hughes assumed the office of Chief Justice on February 24, 1930, and 
retained the position until his retirement in 1941.537 
Roberts had been a successful corporate lawyer and taught at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. He had not been very active politically, although he had 
served the government in the Teapot Dome cases, and his views were not very well 
known. He was not, in fact, Hoover’s first choice to succeed Sanford. But Judge John J. 
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Parker, whose name was first submitted, was rejected by the Senate for his having voted 
to uphold “yellow dog” contracts while a U.S. Circuit Court judge.538 Roberts joined the 
Court in June 1930, and the Near v. Minnesota Court was complete.  
D. “The Essence of Censorship” 
The decision was announced on June 1, 1931, with Hughes, Roberts, Holmes 
(who would retire the following year), Brandeis, and Stone in the majority, and the “four 
horsemen” – Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter – in dissent. 
Hughes began his opinion with an unadorned description of the state nuisance 
statute under which Near was enjoined and which, by the end of the opinion, Hughes 
would declare unconstitutional.539 Hughes quoted directly from the first section of the act, 
which provides for the abatement of “obscene, lewd and lascivious” or “malicious, 
scandalous and defamatory” publications and establishes the defense of “truth . . . 
published with good motives and for justifiable ends.”540 He paraphrased the second and 
third sections, which outline the act’s enforcement procedures and the penalty for 
violation of not more than $1,000 or one year in the county jail.541 
Hughes next began a chronology of the case against Near with a description of the 
complaint and its principal allegations.542 His recitation was remarkably dry, considering 
that it encompassed a number of very colorful articles, which are extensively quoted in 
the dissenting opinion. Drier still were the procedural details that followed, ev n though 
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the route from temporary injunction to final appeal included two trips to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, which twice affirmed the statute’s constitutionality. Nothing in the early 
paragraphs of the opinion betrayed the direction Hughes’s opinion would take, unless it is 
the absence of any reaction whatsoever to Near’s outrageous brand of journalism.  
Quite the contrary, Hughes all but ignored the Saturday Press as he proceeded to 
take aim at the Minnesota nuisance act. Calling it “unusual, if not unique,” Hughes found 
that it raised questions of “grave importance” that transcended local concerns.543 
Awkwardly, with a pair of double negatives, he reminded the reader that liberty of the 
press is safeguarded against infringement by state laws and that state police powers are 
limited. Noting that liberty of the press is also limited and that states can punish abuses, 
Hughes finally revealed his analytical direction: “[T]he inquiry is as to the historic 
conception of the liberty of the press and whether the statute under review violates the 
essential attributes of that liberty.”544 
Hughes seemed to digress from his historical course to consider assertions from 
both parties that Near’s constitutional challenge was facial, that is, focused on the statute 
itself, not on its application to the Saturday Press. Hughes ignores the fact that this was a 
peculiar stance for an aggrieved party – though a rational strategic choice where the goal 
is to shape doctrine – and  agreed that the Court’s proper concern went beyond any errors 
of the trial court to the “purpose and effect” of the statute as construed by the state’s
highest court.545 Accordingly, he launched into a four-part description of purpose and 
effect that reads more like an indictment. 
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First, Hughes wrote, the statute does not redress private wrongs but aims to 
protect public welfare.546 Second, the statute targets not merely private libels but also 
publication of “charges against public officers of corruption, malfeasance in office, or 
serious neglect of duty.”547 Third, the object of the statute is not punishment, but 
suppression.548 And fourth, the statute operates not only to suppress the offending 
newspaper, but “to put the publisher under an effect of censorship.”549 The words of the 
statute evoke, not “the historic conception of the liberty of the press,” Hughes wrote, but 
the very conditions that liberty was supposed to ameliorate.550  
“If we cut through mere details of procedure,”551 Hughes concluded, public 
authorities may bring a publisher before a judge for exposing their own dereliction and, 
unless the publisher proves truth published with good motives and justifiable ends, the 
newspaper is suppressed and further publication is punishable as contempt. “This is the 
essence of censorship.”552 
Then, as abruptly as he digressed, Hughes returned to the historical inquiry with 
Blackstone’s classic definition: “The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature 
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not 
in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”553 Quoting Madison and 
citing an 1825 Massachusetts case, he asserted that the historical immunity from previous 
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restraints applies to legislative as well as executive action, and to false st tements as well 
as true.554 
Acknowledging that Blackstone had been criticized, Hughes pointed out that the 
critics did not object to the prohibition on previous restraints but rejected the presumtion 
that liberty of the press stands for that and nothing more. Defending both civil and 
criminal libel laws, Hughes brought the analysis back to Jay Near: “For whatever wrong 
the appellant has committed or may commit, by his publications, the state appropriately 
affords both public and private redress by its libel laws.”555 
Other critics, Hughes noted, believe the prohibition on previous restraints has 
been stated too broadly.556 Hughes agreed, excluding “actual obstruction to its recruiting 
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location f 
troops,” obscenity, incitement, and speech acts from its purview.557 But “these limitations 
are not applicable here,” Hughes continued.558 To the contrary, “[t]he exceptional nature 
of its limitations places in a strong light the general conception that liberty of the press, 
historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally 
although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.”559 
Hughes reinforced the message with additional quotations from Madison and the 
Massachusetts case, this time emphasizing the value of prior restraints in stifling criticism 
of public officials.560 The conviction that such restraints would violate constitutional 
rights, he said, is evinced by the almost complete absence of any attempts to res rain 
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“publications relating to the malfeasance of public officers” in 150 years.561 Even where 
honorable officers are recklessly assaulted, subsequent punishment is the “appropri te 
remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege.”562  
Turning finally to Minnesota’s arguments, Hughes rejected the state’s assertion 
that the statute dealt not with publications per se but rather with the business of 
publishing defamation. “Characterizing the publication as a business, and the business as 
a nuisance,” he wrote, “does not permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity 
against restraint.”563 Nor is that immunity lost, he continued, when the alleged official 
malfeasance would be punishable as crimes.564 
Hughes found the defense of truth, “published with good motives and for 
justifiable ends,” inadequate to justify the Minnesota statute.565 Finding such a law 
constitutionally valid would be to recognize “the authority of the censor against which 
the constitutional barrier was erected.”566 Equally unavailing is the state’s insistence that 
the statute was designed to preserve the public peace, he wrote, citing an early 
condemnation of what would come to be called the “heckler’s veto” by a New Jersey 
court.567 “If the township may prevent the circulation of a newspaper for no reason other 
than that some of its inhabitants may violently disagree with it . . . there is no limit to 
what may be prohibited,” that court had opined.568 For all of these reasons, Hughes 
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concluded, the Minnesota statute infringed the liberty of the press guaranteed by th  
Fourteenth Amendment.569 
Writing for the four dissenting justices, Associate Justice Pierce Butlr accused 
the majority of giving press freedom “a meaning and a scope not heretofore rec gnized . . 
. .”570 Conceding that the Court had previously interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to 
protect press freedom from abridgment by the states, Butler asserted that the Near 
decision imposed an unprecedented restriction on the states.571 
In contrast to Hughes and both litigants, Butler insisted that the record required 
the Court to consider the statute, not facially, but as applied to Near’s “malicious, 
scandalous and defamatory” articles.572 And, in contrast to Hughes’s restrained 
description of the Saturday Press, Butler reprinted its virulently anti-Semitic articles 
verbatim, presumably to facilitate the as-applied analysis.573  
After retracing the procedural history of the case against Near, Butler began his 
analysis with the assertion that the statute at issue was enacted as an exercise of the 
state’s police power, that is, for the preserving of the peace and good order. “The 
publications themselves disclose the need and propriety of the legislation,” he wrote, 
relating some of the unsavory history of Near and Guilford and their criminal 
journalism.574 States must be free to “employ all just and appropriate measures” to 
prevent such abuses, Butler insisted.575 
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570 Id. at 723 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
571 Id. at 723-24. 
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573 See id. at 724 n.1. 
574 Id. at 731. 
575 Id. at 732. 
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Butler quoted Justice Joseph Story’s famous treatise on the Constitution for the 
proposition that the First Amendment is not absolute.576 Such a supposition, Story had 
said, is “too wild to be indulged by any rational man.”577 Butler rebutted Hughes’s 
reliance on Blackstone by arguing that the previous restraints against which Blackstone 
railed were those that “subjected the press to the arbitrary will of an administrat ve 
officer,” not a judge acting pursuant to duly enacted legislation as the Minnesota statute 
provides.578 
Asserting that the existing libel laws were “inadequate effectively to suppress 
evils resulting from the kind of business” in which Near engaged, Butler concluded that 
the doctrine against previous restraints, if imposed in cases like Near’s, would 
expose[] the peace and good order of every community and the 
business and private affairs of every individual to the constant and 
protracted false and malicious assaults of any insolvent publisher 
who may have purpose and sufficient capacity to contrive and put 
into effect a scheme or program for oppression, blackmail or 
extortion.579  
E. Denouement 
By a single vote, Butler’s limited view of freedom of the press was relegatd to an 
historical footnote, and the principle that prior restraints are anathema to the C nstitution 
has been a bulwark of the legal system ever since. McCormick was jubilant: 
 The decision of Chief Justice Hughes will go down in 
history as one of the greatest triumphs of free thought. The 
Minnesota gag law was passed by a crooked legislature to protect 
criminals in office and supported by a state court as feeble in 
public spirit as it was weak in legal acumen. 
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 We must not blind ourselves to the fact that subversive 
forces have gone far in this country when such a statute could be 
passed by any legislature and upheld by any court, and must be on 
guard against further encroachments. 
 
 The newspapers of America will realize the responsibilities 
devolving upon them under this decision and will maintain and 
increase the high principles which have guided them since the 
inception of a free press.580 
 
The June 2 Tribune carried a full banner headline, DECISION ENDS GAG ON 
PRESS, with a full column on the front page and nearly two full pages inside.581 The 
story included the full text of the opinion and dissent, the full text of ANPA’s resolution, 
and an individual photograph of every Supreme Court justice.582 Favorable reaction was 
reported from Minnesota Governor Floyd B. Olson583 and the National Editorial 
Association, meeting in convention in Atlanta.584 And, of course, McCormick’s statement 
was run in full, although modestly positioned between the Olson and NEA reaction 
stories.585  
Coverage continued on June 3 with the favorable reaction of various members of 
Congress,586 an analysis of the recent “liberalization” of the Supreme Court by 
Washington correspondent Arthur Sears Henning,587 and an editorial expressing the hope 
                                                
580 Decision a Triumph for Free Thought, M’Cormick Says, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1931, § 1, 
at 7. 
581 Arthur Sears Henning, Minnesota Act Quashed by U.S. Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., 
June 2, 1931, § 1, at 1. 
582 Id. 
583 Governor Pleased by Decision Killing Minnesota Gag Law, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1931, 
§ 1, at 7. 
584 Editors Hail Gag Ruling as Press Victory, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1931, § 1 at 7. 
585 Decision a Triumph for Free Thought, M’Cormick Says, supra note 580. 
586 Press Gag Decision Praised by Washington Officialdom, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1931, § 
1, at 4. 
587 Arthur Sears Henning, Supreme Court ‘Liberalized’ in Recent Months, CHI. TRIB., 
June 3, 1931, § 1, at 4. 
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that the decision would “arrest, if it does not end, the efforts to cripple the guarantee of a 
free press . . . .”588 More editorials followed.589 
So did the congratulatory messages. Dewart wired McCormick the day after the 
decision came down: “Congratulations on the decision of the Supreme Court upholding 
your contention that the freedom of the press is not a political plaything. Since you did all 
the work, you deserve all the credit.”590 To Seattle Times publisher Col. C.B. Blethen, 
who had also sent a congratulatory wire on June 2, McCormick wrote: “As a five to four 
decision, we just squeezed through. If Taft were still occupying Hughes’ place, we would 
have been beaten.”591  
Perhaps the most important message came from ACLU president Roger Baldwin. 
The ACLU had been an early supporter of the Near litigation and, shortly before the 
decision came down, circulated a pamphlet declaring: “Scandal and Defamation! The 
Right of Newspapers to Defame/Unique Minnesota law empowers judges to suppres 
papers by injunction/First such use of judicial power in American history/Chicago 
Tribune takes the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it awaits decision.”592 Baldwin 
sent the pamphlet “To the Editor” with a cover letter urging editors to comment on the 
case and “the larger issues of freedom of speech and of the press on which the American 
Civil Liberties Union bases its activity.”593  
                                                
588 Editorial, The Background of the Gag Law, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1931, § 1, at 14. 
589 See Editorial of the Day, Another Liberal Victory [St. Louis Star], CHI. TRIB., June 4, 
1931, § 1, at 14; Editorial, Freedom of the Press, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1931, § 1, at 14. 
590 Telegram from Dewart to McCormick (June 2, 1931). 
591 Letter from McCormick to C.B. Blethen (June 1931) (date obscured).  
592 This pamphlet was in the McCormick archives. 
593 Letter from Roger Baldwin [hereinafter Baldwin] “To the Editor” (April 4, 1931). 
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Now Baldwin reminded McCormick of ACLU’s early role in the case and 
expressed “delight[] with the outcome in the Supreme Court, even by so narrow a 
margin.”594 
 On behalf of our entire Board, our liveliest appreciation of 
the service you have rendered the cause of a ‘free press’ in this 
country by thus backing the appeal. It was a victory by a 
dangerously narrow margin, but, I have no doubt, a victory that is 
decisive against the abuse of the injunctive process.595 
 
McCormick wrote back thanking Baldwin for the letter and condemning the 
Minnesota legislation as “merely another step in the demolition of private rights. . .”596  
 If the press had not acted when it did and with substantial 
unanimity, I am afraid the law would have been enacted in one 
State after the other and would probably have been held 
Constitutional first by the State Supreme Courts and afterwards 
when the law seemed so well established, by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
 
 Let us hope that the Supreme Court decision in this case 
marks the turning of the tide.597 
 
Perhaps McCormick’s worst fears were exaggerated, but Near v. Minnesota still 
stands as one of the great landmarks of First Amendment law to this day. Few people – 
journalists or lawyers – are aware of the vital role that Col. Robert R. McCormick played 
in shaping the prior restraint doctrine established by that opinion. And fewer still realize 
that he was instrumental in mobilizing the mainstream press to litigate, not only in their 
narrow commercial interests, but also in pursuit of their most fundamental rights to gather 
and publish the news.   
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Chapter 5 – Near’s Legacy: The Publishing Cases 
The press wasted little time in consolidating the gains of Near.  If there were any 
remaining doubts about the incorporation of the First Amendment, the commitment of the 
national press to constitutional litigation, and the application of free press protection 
beyond prior restraints, they were quickly put to rest by the unanimous decision in 
Grosjean v. American Press Co.598 Although Grosjean raised a constitutional challenge 
to a punitive tax on newspapers, its importance extended far beyond mere business 
matters or even the prior restraint issue in Near.   
This chapter examines the legacy of Near, beginning with a wide variety of prior 
restraint cases. Then, following a more detailed summary of Grosjean, we will survey 
two other lines of cases – libel and privacy – that demonstrate the overwhelming success 
of the institutional press in shaping First Amendment doctrine through constitutional 
litigation – but only with respect to the right to publish without censorship or fear of 
abusive punishment.  The chapter concludes with a preview of the newsgathering cases, 
which more often than not ended in failure. 
A.  The Prior Restraint Cases 
For the first 35 years after Near v. Minnesota, no prior restraint cases related to 
the news media reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The press had played no role, as litigant 
or amicus, in prior restraint cases like Lovell v. City of Griffin599 in 1938, in which the 
Court struck down a local Georgia ordinance prohibiting pamphleteering without a 
permit, or Freedman v. Maryland600 in 1965, in which the Court so burdened the 
                                                
598 297 U.S. 233 (1936).  See supra text accompanying notes 471-72. 
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Maryland State Board of [Motion Picture] Censors that it was effectively eliminated.  The 
year after Freedman, however, the first press-related case that did reach the Court was – 
in form, if not in substance – a subsequent punishment case.  The offending material had 
already been published and the editor arrested.  Neither the Court nor amici made a prior 
restraint argument, and neither even mentioned N ar v. Minnesota.  But for all that, the 
true gravamen of Mills v. Alabama601 was prior restraint: a state anti-corruption statute 
that was held to forbid a newspaper, on pain of criminal punishment, from publishing an 
editorial on election day that advocated a particular outcome, one way or the other.  
Perhaps the case was so clear to Justice Black, who wrote the opinion for a Court that 
was unanimous as to the judgment, that no parsing of constitutional doctrine was 
necessary.  “It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgment of the 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press,” Black wrote.602  But throughout the 
opinion, Black characterized the act as suppressing the press, muzzling the press, 
silencing the press, and restricting a newspaper editor’s freedom to publish.  And if the 
act had not stopped the Post-Herald from publishing an election day editorial, it had 
stopped others.  In a separate opinion, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan, noted 
that, according to amici Alabama Press Association and Southern Newspaper Publishers 
Association, editorial comment on election day had been nonexistent in Alabama since 
enactment.603  Prior restraint or not, the Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court and 
held the act – at least as applied in this case – unconstitutional.       
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Today, Mills might be called a “no brainer”; the next prior restraint case to reach 
the Supreme Court was anything but.  In New York Times v. United States, 604 better 
known as The Pentagon Papers case, the Court was called upon to prevent the Times and  
The Washington Post from publishing an analysis of America’s involvement in the 
Vietnam War commissioned by then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. 605  The 
Pentagon Papers, which were classified “top secret,” had been leaked to the newspapers 
by Daniel Ellsberg, a Rand Corp. analyst who worked on the project before his change of 
heart regarding the war.606 
Ellsberg delivered a copy of the secret “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process 
on Vietnam Policy” to Times reporter Neil Sheehan, who spent three months editing 
documents and writing accompanying stories under highly secret conditions.607  When 
first published on June 13, 1971, the Justice Department asked William Rehnquist, the 
newly appointed assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, to 
evaluate the Nixon administration’s options.  According to David Rudenstine, Rehnquist, 
who would later become Chief Justice of the United States, was principally guided by 
Near v. Minnesota nd the limited exceptions to its prohibition of prior restraints.608  
Rehnquist advised that the administration could stop the Tim s from publishing 
additional articles if it could persuade the courts that continued publication threatened 
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national security in the same way that publishing battlefield information – one of N ar’s 
explicit exceptions – would do.609  
When Justice notified the Times that it would take legal action if the paper did not 
suspend publication, Times executives, editors, and in-house counsel met to decide 
whether to comply or not.610 As soon as the decision was made to proceed with 
publication, the Times’s in-house counsel, James Goodale, began assembling a legal 
team:  Yale law professor Alexander Bickel and Wall Street lawyer Floyd Abrams.611  
Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael D. Hess was tapped to present the government’s case in 
the U.S. District Court in Manhattan before Judge Murray Gurfein, an experienced 
attorney, newly appointed to the bench, hearing his very first case as a judge.612  
Gurfein granted the government a temporary restraining order on Tuesday, June 
15,613 and scheduled a public hearing for Friday, June 18.614 In the meantime, The 
Washington Post had obtained a copy of the documents from Ellsburg and published its 
first story on that same Friday morning.615 That afternoon, the government asked the U.S. 
District Court in Washington, D.C., to restrain the Post from further publication, but 
Judge Gerhard A. Gesell refused.616 Later that night, Gesell was reversed by a panel of 
three judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  The court remanded the 
case to Gesell to give the government an opportunity to substantiate its claim that 
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publication would threaten national security.617  Judge J. Skelly Wright dissented.  “This 
is a sad day for America,” Wright wrote. “Today, for the first time in the 200 years of  
our history, the executive department has succeeded in stopping the presses.  It has 
enlisted the judiciary in the suppression of our most precious freedom.”618   
In New York, however, Gurfein would reach the opposite conclusion.  On 
Saturday, June 19, he dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied the 
government’s motion for an injunction.  Relying heavily on Near for his First 
Amendment rationale, Gurfein wrote:  
The security of the nation is not at the ramparts alone.  
Security also lies in the value of our free institutions.  A 
cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press must be 
suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the even greater 
values of freedom of expression and the right of the people to 
know.619 
 
The government appealed immediately to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which stayed Gurfein’s order until June 21, then reversed on a 5-3 vote on 
Tuesday, June 22. 620 The Second Circuit continued the restraining order and remanded 
the case to Gurfein to determine whether any of the documents “pose such grave and 
immediate danger to the security of the United States as to warrant their publication being 
enjoined.”621   
In Washington, Gesell had convened a second hearing on June 21 and announced 
his decision later that afternoon.  Declaring that the government had failed to prove that 
publication would harm national security in any of the particulars that the government 
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had claimed, Gesell denied injunctive relief.622  This time, Gesell’s decision was affirmed 
on a 7-2 vote by the D.C. Circuit in a per curiam opinion on June 23.623 The case was 
ready to proceed to the United States Supreme Court. 
The Times petitioned for a writ of certiorari on Thursday, June 24, as well as an 
emergency petition with Justice John M. Harlan, who was circuit justice for the second 
circuit, both seeking to reverse the court of appeals’ order for a new hearing before Judge 
Gurfein.  The government also sought Supreme Court review to reverse the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in favor of the Post. The following day, the Supreme Court granted 
both petitions and set oral argument for Saturday, but barred both newspapers from 
publishing any further material from the Papers.624    
In the Supreme Court, Bickel argued the case for the Tim s, William Glendon of 
Royall, Koegell, and Wells, for the Post, and Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold for the 
United States.  Amicus briefs were filed by the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, and First Amendment Scholar Thomas I. 
Emerson for 27 members of Congress who supported the Tim s.  There were no briefs 
from other members of the press or its associations, although the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press – which would become one of the industry’s principal litigators 
in years to come – had been organized the previous year.625   
 Citing Near and two other cases, the Supreme Court issued a brief pe  curiam 
opinion, holding that  
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‘Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this 
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity.’  The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of 
showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.’ The 
District Court for the Southern District of New York in the N w 
York Times case and the District Court for the District of Columbia 
and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the 
Washington Post case held that the Government had not met that 
burden. We agree.626 
 
Six justices joined the opinion; three dissented.  Astoundingly, the justices wrote 
nine separate opinions in the case, ranging from the absolutist positions of Justices Hugo 
Black and William Douglas – who declared that “[e]very moment’s continuance of the
injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing 
violation of the First Amendment”627 – to the outrage of Justice Harry A. Blackmun – 
who warned the newspapers that “the nation’s people will know where the 
responsibility… rests” for the dire consequences predicted by the government if 
publication were allowed to continue.628 
Near v. Minnesota was cited in every significant argument and every significant 
opinion in the Pentagon Papers case.  Most of the judges who heard the case agreed that 
the government had failed to meet the standard for prior restraint established by N ar, but 
none could say exactly what that standard was.  How close to “actual obstruction to its 
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or thenumber and 
location of troops” does classified, national security information have to come before 
falling within the Near exception? After the Pentagon Papers case, we know only that 
historical analysis is not close enough. 
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Throughout his chronicle of the case, Rudenstine faults the government for 
seeking to resolve the case on the broadest possible terms, that is, as near as possible to a 
blanket proscription against publishing classified information – regardless of the true 
dimensions of the threat.629 The government got nothing for its efforts; the press won a 
smashing reaffirmation of the constitution’s disapproval of prior restraints, with the bar 
now set at a very high level: classified government secrets, leaked to the press in 
colorable violation of federal law,630 could not, without more particularized evidence of 
the threat, be suppressed by injunction. 
The case also made bona fide media defense bar stars of James Goodale and 
Floyd Abrams, both of whom would continue to influence cases for decades.631  By the 
time the next important prior restraint case reached the Supreme Court five years after the 
Pentagon Papers case, the media defense bar would be well prepared to participate.  
Much of that development would occur in the wake of the 1972 case of Branzburg v. 
Hayes,632 the principal focus of Chapter 6, so the difference in that regard between the 
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Pentagon Papers case in 1971 and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart633 in 1976 is 
striking.   
Ironically, it was the press that sought a blanket rule on prior restraints in 
Nebraska Press – a kind of mirror image of the blanket rule sought by the government in 
Pentagon Papers.  The Court did not oblige, but gave the press a powerful victory that 
remains in force to this day. 
The case began on Oct. 19, 1975, when a sociopath named Erwin Charles Simants 
killed six members of the Henry Kellie family in Sutherland, Neb., then confessed to 
anyone who would listen.634   The crimes, which included the rape of a ten-year-old girl, 
was widely publicized by the local media in Sutherland, a town of 840 people, as well a
statewide and national media.  Simants was arraigned in Lincoln County court in North 
Platte, population 24,000, and both the defense and prosecution asked the court to restrict 
what could be reported about the preliminary hearing in view of the intense coverage.635  
Judge Ronald Ruff called a hearing for the evening of Tuesday, Oct. 21, to consider the 
request and invited representatives of the local media to attend,636 without revealing the 
existence of the formal motion to restrict reporting.637 
Scherer recounts at some length how the local media mobilized in response to 
Ruff’s invitation and the suggestion that he might restrict their reporting.  Two of the 
media representatives contacted, G. Woodson Howe, executive assistant to the president 
of the Omaha World-Herald, and Joe R. Seacrest, editor of the Lincoln Journal, were 
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members of the Nebraska Joint Press/Bar Committee on Free Press/Fair Trial.  That 
group had been formed some years before by the Nebraska State Bar Association and the 
Nebraska Press Association.  Howe and Seacrest were also active in Media of Nebraska, 
a lobbying organization that represented print and broadcast outlets throughout the state.  
According to Scherer, Media of Nebraska would become the primary conduit for the 
collection and distribution of funding for the litigation that would ensue.638 The group’s 
first order of business was retaining North Platte attorney Harold Kay to represent the 
media at Ruff’s hearing that night.639 
Kay was instructed to oppose any sort of gag order on coverage of the preliminary 
hearing and, failing that, to seek more time to prepare a case against such an order.  In the 
meantime, he was to assure the judge that the press would voluntarily comply with the 
“Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines for Disclosure and Reporting of Informatin Relating to 
Imminent or Pending Criminal Litigation,” established in 1970 to deal with free press/fair 
trial issues.  Among other things, the guidelines provided that reporting the exist nce of a 
confession was inappropriate. 640  
The following morning, Wednesday, Oct. 22, just before the preliminary hearing 
was set to begin, Ruff issued his ruling:  the press would be prohibited from publishing 
any testimony or evidence adduced at the hearing or anything else about the case “other 
than as set forth in” the guidelines – effectively making the voluntary guidelines 
mandatory.641  
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Even as the preliminary hearing proceeded, the press was debating their options.  
On Thursday, Oct. 23, the Nebraska Press Association, along with the Nebraska 
Broadcasters Association, members of both organizations and the two wire servic s, 
Associated Press and United Press International, applied to be heard in Lincol County 
District Court, a higher court also in North Platte, regarding Ruff’s order.642  Judge Hugh 
Stuart, who had been assigned to preside over Simants’s trial, convened a hearing tat 
night, but Omaha attorney Stephen McGill, who joined in Kay in representing the press 
before Judge Stuart, made a tactical error in arguing that he would rather let a guilty 
defendant go free than “deny freedom of speech.”643       
Three days later, on Oct. 27, Stuart issued an opinion finding a clear and present 
danger to Simants’ right to a fair trial from pretrial publicity, that is, publicity about the 
proceedings before a jury could be empaneled.  He terminated the Ruff order and 
substituting his own, explicitly adopting the voluntary guidelines as a formal court order, 
and specifically barring the press from reporting essentially all of Simants’s inculpatory 
statements and any detail regarding the sexual assaults.  The press was permitted to report 
the existence of the gag order, but not its substance.644  For days later, on Oct. 31, the 
press filed notice of appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court and petitioned that court for a 
writ of mandamus rescinding the gag order.645  
The state supreme court, however, was in no rush to take the case and told the 
media lawyers that it would not even consider their documents until Dec. 1.  On Nov. 5, 
the lawyers filed an emergency application for a stay of Stuart’s orderto the U.S. 
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Supreme Court.646  Justice Blackmun was circuit justice for the Eighth Circuit, however, 
and he had famously dissented in  the Pentagon Papers case.  Following an unusually 
rancorous exchange of orders between Washington and Lincoln, Blackmun issued a 
partial stay of Stuart’s gag order on Nov. 20.647 Blackmun rejected the application of the 
press-bar guidelines, but retained Stuart’s prohibition on publishing Simants’s confessi  
and other inculpatory statements.648 The following day, the media lawyers asked the 
entire U.S. Supreme Court to vacate so much of Blackmun’s order as would prohibit 
publication of information learned in open court or from public records.649 
In Lincoln, meanwhile, the Nebraska Supreme Court heard arguments in the 
appeal on Nov. 25, and five days later, on Dec. 1, issued its own version of the gag order.  
Focusing on dicta in Branzburg v. Hayes to the effect that reporters “may be prohibited 
from attending or publishing information about trials” if necessary to ensure a fair trial, 
the court prohibited publication of Simants’s confessions to law enforcement, his 
“admissions against interest,” and “other information strongly implicative of the accused 
as the perpetrator of the slayings”650 – whatever that meant.   
As Blackmun’s order expired on its own terms as soon as the Nebraska Supreme Court 
acted, the media lawyers, McGill and James L. Koley, filed an application with the U.S. 
Supreme Court to stay the Nebraska gag order and asked the Court to treat all pr viously filed 
papers as a petition for certiorari.651  After a brief delay, the Court granted certiorari on Dec. 12, 
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although it denied the media’s request for a stay or expedited consideration.652  As a result, there 
would be no decision until Simants’s trial was over; the gag order would remain in effect until a 
jury was empanelled.653  
To present the case before the Supreme Court, the Nebraska Press Association had 
retained E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., an experienced Supreme Court litigator who was already 
involved in this case through amicus curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 
(RCFP).  Within days of Ruff’s original gag order, RCFP – now five years old – had sent a 
lawyer, Larry Simms, to Omaha to work with the media lawyers there.654  RCFP initially hired 
Prettyman to write its amicus brief to the high court, but it made more sense for him to serve as 
co-counsel with McGill and Koley.  Prettyman would present the oral arguments for the 
Nebraska press, with Floyd Abrams arguing for the National Broadcasting Co. and the 60 or so 
national media organizations that filed amicus briefs in the case.655  Although Abrams had 
worked on the Pentagon Papers case, this would be his first oral argument before the Supreme 
Court.656 Seven amicus briefs were filed, representing the ACLU and groups of media 
organizations led by ANPA, RCFP, The Tribune Co., The Washington Post Co., and the 
National Press Club.657  All of the amicus briefs supported the press, although Solicitor General 
Erwin Griswold joined the brief for the state of Nebraska. 
                                                
652 Id. at 101-102. 
653 Id. at 102. 
654 Id. at 94-95. 
655 Id. at 112. 
656 Id. at 125. 
657 Id. at 112.  See Brief of the National Press Club as Amicus Curiae, N braska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539 (1976)(No. 75-817), 1976 WL 181470 (Jan. 30, 1976);  Brief of the Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press Legal Def. and Research Fund as Amicus Curiae, Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539 (1976)(No. 75-817), 1976 WL 181469 (Jan. 26, 1976); Brief of the Wash. Post Co., Am. Broad. 
Cos., Inc., the Times Mirror Co., the Globe Newspaper Co., Newsday, Inc., the Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 
the Kansas City Star Co., the Houston Post Co., the Pulitzer Publ’g Co., Minneapolis Star and Trib. Co., 
Des Moines Register and Trib. Co., the Denver Publ’g Co., the Times Herald Printing Co., the Courier-
Journal and Louisville Times Co., the Copley Press, Inc., the A. S. Abell Co., Times Publ’g Co., 
Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., Kearns Trib. Corp., Press-Enterprise Co., Sun Newspapers of Omaha, Inc., 
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Notwithstanding the apparent unanimity of the press at this stage of the proceedings, 
RCFP was criticized for its aggressive role in the Nebraska Press case by none other than Fred 
Friendly, who would become the leading chronicler of Near v. Minnesota.658  Friendly, who had 
been with Edward R. Murrow at CBS and was then teaching at Columbia University and a 
consultant for the Ford Foundation, called for “reasonable people to work out differences” that 
had resulted in the gag order.659  With Ford support, Friendly had launched a series of television 
broadcasts about media cases that emphasized mediation and compromise, putting him a odds 
with the “absolutist” approach of RCFP Executive Director Jack Landau and others in the 
organization.  Floyd McKay points out that the conflict between Friendly’s neutrality and 
RCFP’s strident support for the press cost the organization Ford Foundation funding in the mid-
1970s.660  
There are several accounts of the Court’s deliberations in the Nebraska Press case,661 and 
they differ in several particulars.  Scherer says all of the justices thought the Nebraska gag order 
was unconstitutional;662 Woodward and Armstrong say Justice Rehnquist initially disagreed.663 
                                                                                                                                                 
Keystone Printing Serv., Inc., the Consol. Publ’g Co., the Free Lance-Star Pub’g Co. of Fredericksburg, 
Va., the Susquehana Publ’g Co., and Herald Register Pub’g Co., Amici Curiae, in Support of Reversal, 
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)(No. 75-817), 1976 WL 181471(Jan. 26, 1976); Brief 
for Trib. Co. as Amicus Curiae, Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)(No. 75-817), 1976 
WL 181473 (Jan. 23, 1976);  Brief of Nat’l Broad. Co., the New York Times Co., Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago Daily News, Dow Jones & Co., Inc., The Reader’s Digest 
Ass’n, Inc., Pub. Broad. Service, CBS Inc., Parade Publications, Inc., Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc., Am.
Soc. of Newspaper Editors, The Soc. of Prof. Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Associated Press Managing 
Editors Ass’n, Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, Radio Television News Dirs. Ass’n and Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n 
As Amici Curiae, Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)(No. 75-817), 1976 WL 181476 
(Jan. 15, 1976); Brief Amicus Curiae of Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 
427 U.S. 539 (1976)(No. 75-817),  1975 WL 173724 (Oct. Term 1975). 
658 See supra note 48. 
659 McKay, supra note 514, at  125.  
660 Id. at 124. 
661 SCHERER, supra note 58, at 145-149; WOODWARD &  ARMSTRONG, supra note 91, at 
499-503; SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, at 171-73.  Scherer had the benefit of all of these 
accounts as well as the notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell. 
662 SCHERER, supra note 58, at 146. 
663 WOODWARD &  ARMSTRONG, supra note 91, at 500. 
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At least three justices – Brennan, Stewart and Marshall – and perhaps five – Stevens and White – 
initially supported the press position that all gag orders restricting reports of criminal 
proceedings should be held impermissible under the First Amendment.664 But Chief Justice 
Burger was adamant that the Court should not issue a blanket declaration that all gag orders were 
per se unconstitutional.665  Blackmun, Rehnquist and Powell supported the Chief, who had 
assigned the opinion to himself.  Ultimately, White gave Burger the fifth vote, while Stevens 
concurred in the judgment only.666      
Even though the press did not get the blanket ruling they sought, the test that Burger’s 
opinion established for gag orders has proved to be adequate to prevent such a case from ever 
reaching the Supreme Court again.  To begin, Burger borrowed a formulation of the “clear and 
present danger” test applied by Judge Learned Hand in the Dennis v. United States:  “whether the 
gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is 
necessary to avoid the danger.”667 Then he translated that formula into a three-factor analysis that 
lower courts must follow before issuing a gag order.  Specifically, he said, a court must consider 
in express findings the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage; whether other measures 
would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and how effectively a 
restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger.668 While the prohibition was 
not absolute, no trial court has been able to meet that test.  
                                                
664 SCHERER, supra note 58, at 147. 
665 WOODWARD &  ARMSTRONG, supra note 91, at 501. 
666 427 U.S. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
667 Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
668 Id. at 562. 
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Simants, incidentally, was convicted, but his conviction was overturned because a sheriff 
improperly fraternized with the sequestered jury;669 on retrial, he was found not guilty by reason 
of insanity.670 
If Nebraska Press was the last “classic” prior restraint case involving the press to 
reach the Court, there have been others that arguably involved prior restraints. For 
example, the Court refused to prohibit a reporter from publishing his own secret grand 
jury testimony after the grand jury’s term had ended, despite a state law to the 
contrary.671  More recently, and much more significantly, the Court struck down Federal 
Election Commission regulations that restricted certain campaign expenditures on the 
ground that they essentially restricted free speech in the controversial Citizens United v. 
FEC.672 With the support of some press amici,673 particularly broadcasters, Justice 
Kennedy cited Near v. Minnesota to liken the rules to a prior restraint.   
This regulatory scheme may not be a prior restraint on 
speech in the strict sense of that term, for prospective speakers are 
not compelled by law to seek an advisory opinion from the FEC 
before the speech takes place. As a practical matter, however, 
given the complexity of the regulations and the deference courts 
show to administrative determinations, a speaker who wants to 
avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending 
against FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for 
prior permission to speak. These onerous restrictions thus function 
                                                
669 SCHERER, supra note 58, at 176. 
670 Id. at 181. 
671 Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990). 
672 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
673 See Supplemental Brief Amicus Curiae of The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the 
Press in Support of Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010)(No. 08-
205), 2009 WL 2219299, and Brief of Amici Curiae Cal. Broadcasters Ass’n, Ill. 
Broadcasters Ass’n, La. Ass’n of Broad., Me. Ass’n of Broadcasters, Mich. Ass’n of 
Broadcasters, Mo.Broadcasters Ass’n, Minn. Broadcasters Ass’n, Neb. Broadcasters 
Ass’n, N.Y. State Broadcasters Ass’n, And Tenn. Ass’n of Broadcasters iIn Support of 




as the equivalent of prior restraint by giving the FEC power 
analogous to licensing laws implemented in 16th- and 17th-century 
England, laws and governmental practices of the sort that the First 
Amendment was drawn to prohibit. Because the FEC's “business is 
to censor, there inheres the danger that [it] may well be less 
responsive than a court – part of an independent branch of 
government-to the constitutionally protected interests in free 
expression.” When the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit 
speech, “[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable 
burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through 
case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from 
protected speech-harming not only themselves but society as a 
whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” 
Consequently, “the censor's determination may in practice be 
final.” [citations omitted]674 
 
On the other hand, the Court prohibited a newspaper from publishing confidential 
information it received through the discovery process, although it conceded that the same 
information was fair game if acquired through conventional reporting.675  The Court also 
upheld the authority of Congress to prohibit the press from publishing color 
reproductions of U.S. currency,676 and it permitted a high school principal to censor 
                                                
674 130 S.Ct. at 895-96.  Lucy Dalglish, executive director of Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, points out that most of the mainstream media did not want to have 
anything to do with the Citizens United case and that the New York Times’s editorial 
position was “opposite ours.” Dalglish said she thought the Court would raise a very 
narrow issue in that case, expressing concern that the law as it stood could be problematic 
for a fairly mainstream documentary maker because of the election calendar and the 
technologically evolving nature of the media. The Chief Justice, however, capitalized on 
the brief’s argument that campaign finance laws could even limit publication of a book in 
the right circumstances.  “I was taking a lot of grief for that,” Dalglish said, as in “‘what 
do you think you’re doing?’ I was taking all sorts of crap from people like [campaign 
finance reform activist] Fred Werthheimer… They were organizing media organizations 
just to counter our brief.  I’d never seen anything like it.” Interview with Lucy Dalglish, 
June 15, 2010 [hereinafter Dalglish Interview] (on file with author).  
675 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
676 Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984). 
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articles on pregnancy and divorce, where the student newspaper involved was part of the 
journalism curriculum.677 
Prior restraint may also be implicated in so-called “compelled speech” cases.  For 
example, the Court struck down a state statute giving candidates a right of reply to 
adverse newspaper editorials at least partly because such “compelled speech” would 
constrain the paper from publishing what it wanted to publish.678  Broadcasting, however, 
was – and continues to be – treated differently.  The Court had previously upheld a 
federal regulation requiring the same kind of right of reply with respect to radio an  
television stations, and would later uphold a federal statute requiring broadcasters to sell 
airtime to candidates for federal office.679 However, the Court also held that broadcasters 
could not be required to accept paid issue advertising if they chose not to as a matter of 
policy,680 and it struck down an FCC rule prohibiting public broadcasting stations from 
editorializing.681   
The role of press amici in the “right of reply” cases is worth further examination 
here.  In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 682 the 
broadcast “right of reply” case, the Court reviewed and affirmed an FCC decision 
requiring a Pennsylvania broadcaster to give an author free airtime to respond to 
accusations of communist tendencies in a syndicated broadcast under a policy known as 
the “Fairness Doctrine.” At the same time, it heard a constitutional challenge to the rules 
by the Radio and Television News Directors Association (RTNDA), which had been 
                                                
677 Hazelwood School Dist. V. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
678 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
679 CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
680 CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
681 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
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successful in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.683  CBS and NBC filed 
separate briefs as joint respondents with the RTNDA, but the ACLU, the AFL-CIO, and a 
coalition of religious organizations filed amicus briefs supporting the right of reply.684  
There was no participation by the print media in either case.  When their ox was being 
gored in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 685 however, the print press came out 
in force to oppose Florida’s newspaper “right of reply” statute, supported by the 
broadcasters and the ACLU. 686   To be completely fair, the press’s inclination and ability 
                                                
683 400 F.2d 1002 (1968). 
684 See Brief of Am. Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 
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685 418 U.S. at 257 n. 22.   
686 See Brief of the Times Mirror Co., Amicus Curiae, Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)(No. 73-797), 1974 WL 185876 (Mar. 14, 1974); Brief of 
Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Publishers of the Following Fla. Newspapers: Today, 
Titusville Star Advocate, Melbourne Evening Times, Ft. Myers News-Press and 
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73-797), 1974 WL 185875; Brief for N.Y. News Inc., as Amicus Curiae, Miami Herald 
Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)(No. 73-797), 1974 WL 185864; Brief of 
Amicus Curiae, the Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n, in Support of Appellant, Miami Herald 
Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)(No. 73-797), 1974 WL 185865; Motion for 
Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae of the Nat’l Ass’n of 
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Publishers Ass’n, Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)(No. 73-
797), 1974 WL 185869; Brief of Dow Jones & Co., Inc. and the N.Y. Times Co., as 
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generally to mobilize for litigation had grown exponentially between 1969 and 1974, but 
there is no question that the print and broadcast industries did not always see their 
interests as identical.687   
In all of these cases, as in Near v. Minnesota, the government tried to prevent the 
press – directly or indirectly – from publishing.  That the press succeeded in defeating 
these efforts more often than not is a testament to the legacy of Near and the efforts of 
Col. McCormick and those journalists and lawyers who followed his example. But 
success in these cases also reflects the disfavor with which courts have viewed prior 
restraint cases since Blackstone.688  To see how the legacy of Near extended 
constitutional protection beyond prior restraints and into the realm of subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Amici Curiae, Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)(No. 73-797), 
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punishment – conceding that those categories are fluid at the margins – we have to return 
to the 1930s.    
B.  The Bridge to Subsequent Punishment:  
Grosjean v. American Press 
 
Louisiana Gov. Huey Long’s first attempt to stifle the newspapers that opposed 
his absolute control over Louisiana politics occurred two years after his election and one 
year before Near was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court.  In June 1930, Long had two 
bills introduced in state legislature: one, similar to the Minnesota “gag law,” permitted 
courts to enjoin the publication of any newspaper deemed “malicious, scandalous, or 
defamatory” by the government or private individuals; the other imposed a fifteen percent 
tax on the newspapers’ gross advertising revenues.689 With McCormick’s committee 
leading the national response,690 ANPA denounced the bills as “the boldest and most 
flagrant measures ever aimed at the freedom of American newspapers.”691 
Both bills died in committee;692 the gag law could never be resurrected after the 
Near decision, but the tax bill was not a classic prior restraint of the sort Near held 
unconstitutional and would resurface in 1934.  Long was then U.S. Senator, but his 
animosity toward the opposition press in Louisiana was undiminished, and he took the 
necessary steps to restore his power in the state legislature.693 The Long forces introduced 
a bill imposing a two percent  “license tax” on the gross advertising receipts of 
newspapers with 20,000 weekly circulation or greater, 694  affecting only the New Orleans 
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694 297 U.S. at 240. 
141
 
and Shreveport dailies that were most outspoken in their opposition to the Long 
machine.695  Final passage occurred on July 9, with Long standing inside the rail on the 
house floor exhorting his supporters to “Vote yes.”696        
Both the Louisiana Press Association and the ANPA condemned the tax, with 
Editor & Publisher calling for carrying the case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court if 
necessary.697 The affected dailies began coordinating their legal efforts as soon as the tax
became law, retaining a battery of prominent lawyers to plan strategy.698  Eberhard P. 
Deutch, who represented the New Orleans Item-Tribune crafted the First Amendment 
argument, relying heavily on Near as “the leading decision in the country, if not the 
world, on freedom of the press.” 
[I]ts general language is so enlightening on the general principle of the 
freedom of the press, that it cannot help but have an important bearing on 
the decision in the instant case, since it holds, in effect, that any slight 
infringement, direct or indirect, of the freedom of the press will invalidate 
legislation…. [There] can be no proper discussion of any point involving 
the freedom of the press without including the foregoing decision.699 
  
Although Deutsch overstated Near’s import somewhat, he correctly identified its 
indispensability to the First Amendment argument.  Perhaps even more important in the 
end was Deutsch’s historical analysis of the use of taxation as a mechanism for contr l, 
                                                
695 CORTNER, supra note 50, at 77 (discussing La. Act No. 23 (1934)). 
696 Id. at 88.  
697 Id. at 91-92.  The following year, Long completed his total takeover of the press in 
Louisiana by enacting legislation authorizing municipalities to impose a similar tax on 
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Relative to Validity of Act 23 of 1934 (Newspaper Advertising Tax) and Jurisdiction and 
Procedure to Set It Aside.”) 
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culminating in the quotation from Chief Justice Marshall that “the power to tax ishe
power to destroy.”700 But Deutsch was overruled by the legal strategists, who determined 
that their best hope of victory lay in a provision of the Louisiana constitution prohibiting 
discrimination in taxation, supported by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.701 The majority of lawyers felt Near was just not a 
strong enough precedent, but they agreed to let Deutsch develop his case further. 
Significantly, Deutsch enlisted the help of ANPA and its general counsel, Elisha 
Hanson, in addition to several ANPA members and schools of journalism.702  Hanson 
was originally retained as the Washington representative of the association in 1923 by the 
ANPA Committee on Federal Laws.703 Hanson had been a Washington correspondent for 
the Chicago Tribune from 1913 to 1917, and secretary to Sen. Medill McCormick from 
1917 to 1922, and, according to Emery, would come to “eclipse” Col. McCormick as “the 
leading exponent of freedom of the press” in his capacity as ANPA general counsel.704 
With the additional research and staff support, Deutsch persuaded his fellow Louisiana 
lawyers to pursue both the discrimination and press freedom issues in court.705 
Given the improbability of a fair shake in state court, the newspapers brought 
their lawsuit before a three-judge district court of the type established by Congress in 
1910 to hear constitutional challenges of state law.706 The suit was styled American Press 
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Co., a fairly neutral newspaper that Long said he would not have taxed if he could have 
found a way to avoid it,707 versus Alice Lee Grosjean, Louisiana Supervisor of Public 
Accounts and, supposedly, Long’s mistress.708 The court issued a temporary restraining 
order to prevent the collection of taxes before the case could be heard709 and scheduled a 
hearing for the fall.710  
The state had outlined its case in a motion to dismiss that focused on the court’s 
lack of jurisdiction and denied the tax was impermissibly discriminatory.  Cortner points 
out that Charles J. Rivet, serving as a special assistant attorney general for the case, failed 
to mention the press freedom issue because he was unaware that N ar had applied the 
First Amendment guarantees to strike down a state law.711 The newspapers had all 
submitted affidavits to the courts on the discrimination issue, while affidavits of ANPA 
president Howard Davis of the New York Herald Tribune and Dean Carl. W. Ackerman 
of Columbia University School of Journalism concentrated on the First Amendment 
issue.712 
At the Nov. 23 hearing, Rivet argued for the state; Deutsch and Esmond Phelps of 
the New Orleans Times-Picayune argued for the newspapers, with Hanson in attendance.   
On March 22, 1935, the court announced a decision that found for the newspapers on the 
discrimination issue alone.713 Fortunately for the newspapers, the state appealed the 
decision to the United States Supreme Court, rather than merely amending the statute to 
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remove the discriminatory effect.714 Long was assassinated on Sept. 8, 1935, before the 
Supreme Court could hear the case, but Rivet proceeded with the case for the state.715 
Hanson, rather than Deutsch, joined Phelps to argue for the newspapers.716   
The oral arguments proceeded along the same lines as those before the district 
court, and the justices were about to rule on the same ground.  Sutherland wrote a 
majority opinion, but, according to Cortner, a concurring opinion by Benjamin Cardozo 
on First Amendment grounds, was so persuasive that Sutherland redrafted his opinion to 
incorporate most of Cardozo’s language.  The decision was unanimous. 
After rejecting Rivet’s procedural arguments, Sutherland turned to the 
constitutional questions.717 Calling the First Amendment issue a “question of the utmost 
gravity and importance,” Sutherland reaffirmed Near’s holding on incorporation.718 He 
then went into a lengthy exegesis on the history of repression through licensing a d 
taxing the press, embodying much of Deutsch’s research on those subjects. 719  Based on 
the framers’ knowledge of that history, Sutherland said it was clear that that First and 
Fourteenth Amendments were meant to preclude government from adopting any form of 
previous restraint such as that “effected by these two well-known and odious 
methods.”720 
While the press is subject to ordinary forms of taxation, this was not an ordinary 
form of tax, “but one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the 
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freedom of the press.”  The Louisiana tax, he said, is a “deliberate and calculated device 
in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled 
by virtue of the constitutional guaranties.”721  Finding the tax thus unconstitutional 
because it abridged the freedom of the press, the Court saw no reason to consider the 
discrimination claim.722 
Sutherland’s opinion in Grosjean was a complete victory for the 
institutional press as constitutional litigator.  Its direct legacy was the 1983 case of 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,723 in 
which the Court held that a use tax on newsprint and ink violated the First 
Amendment simply because it singled out the press for special treatment.  Unlike
Grosjean, there was no hint of a “any impermissible or censorial motive on the 
part of the legislature” in the Minnesota case.724  Knight-Ridder Newspapers and 
ANPA supported the publisher with amicus briefs, as did the ACLU and local 
civil liberties groups.725   
The Court reached a similar conclusion four years later in A kansas 
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,726 striking down an Arkansas tax scheme that 
exempted some members of the press, but not others, based on their content.  
                                                
721 Id. at 250. 
722 Id. at 251. 
723 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
724 460 U.S. at 580. 
725 Brief of Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., and The Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n 
as Amici Curiae, Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575 (1983) (No.81-1839), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 485.  See also Brief of the Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, and the Minn. Coalition 
Against Censorship, Amici Curiae, Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of 
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (No.81-1839), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 488. 
726 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
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There were no amicus briefs supporting the petitioner, although a number of state 
governments filed briefs supporting Arkansas.727 In 1991, however, the cable 
television industry protested another Arkansas tax that discriminated among 
media, without reference to content, but the Supreme Court rejected cable’s 
arguments.728  
But Grosjean’s legacy is hardly limited to tax cases.  Grosjean boldly took 
First Amendment doctrine through the door that Near had left open when it 
defined liberty of the press as “principally although not exclusively, immunity 
from previous restraints or censorship.”729   
It is impossible to concede that by the words “freedom of the 
press” the framers of the amendment intended to adopt merely the narrow 
view then reflected by the law of England that such freedom consisted 
only in immunity from previous censorship; for this abuse had then 
permanently disappeared from English practice. …  
 
Judge Cooley has laid down the test to be applied – “The evils to 
be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of 
the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general 
discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the 
people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens…”730  
 
In the next two sections, we will see how the press’s constitutional litigators used 
that doctrine successfully to win the majority of contempt, libel and privacy cases that 
reached the United States Supreme Court.  
  
                                                
727 Brief of Amicus Curiae the State of Md., 1986 WL 727460 (Sept. 29, 1986), and Brief 
of the States of Am. Sam., Conn., Fla., Haw., Idaho, Iowa, La., Minn., Pa., Okla., S.C., 
S.D., Tex., Utah, and Vt. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee, Ark. Writers’ Project 
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)(No. 85-1370), 1986 WL 727461. 
728 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).  
729 Id. at 249 (quoting Near at 716)(emphasis added). 
730 Id. at 248-250. 
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C.  The Contempt Cases 
The earliest evidence of a dramatic change in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward 
the First Amendment guarantees in subsequent punishment cases can be found by 
examining the “contempt by publication” cases that reached the Court before and after 
Near.  Near itself was not the instrument of that change; indeed, Chief Justice Hughes 
acknowledged the validity of “contempt by publication” in his opinion.731 But Near’s 
conclusive recognition of incorporation and its assertion that freedom of the press is 
broader under the Constitution than under the common law732 certainly contributed to the 
philosophical swing.   
According to Blackstone, “the method, immemorially used by the superior courts 
of justice, of punishing contempts by attachment” included the power to punish 
“speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges acting in their judicial 
capacity.”733 Although, as Gleason points out, legal historians have found no sound basis 
for that assertion in earlier case law, contempt by publication was well estab ished by the 
19th Century.734  
 In simplest terms, contempt by publication is a crime that is committed by 
criticizing a judge in a pending judicial proceeding in a manner the judge finds to be 
calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice or 
otherwise reduce its authority or dignity. This use of the contempt power was called 
                                                
731 Near, 283 U.S. at 715. 
732 283 U.S. at 718. 
733 GLEASON, supra note 7, at 83. 
734 Id. at 83-84. 
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“constructive” or “consequential” contempt, rather than “direct” contempt, becaus the 
contemptible act took place outside of the courtroom.735 
In 1831, a striking abuse of the contempt power prompted Congress to enact a 
statute to remove the power of constructive contempt from federal judges by restricting 
the contempt power to acts “in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to 
obstruct the administration of justice.”736 Gleason notes that, in the first half of the 19th 
Century, judges’ use of the contempt power was also held in check by three factors:the 
tradition of freedom of the press, a widespread distrust of judges and lawyers, and the 
threat of the power of the press.737   
Most of the states also enacted statutes restricting contempt, with 23 of the 30 
states adopting such acts by 1860,738 and 34 of 45 by the end of the century.739 Judges, 
however,  often ignored those statutes as contrary to their inherent powers or interpreted 
them so narrowly as to be meaningless.  After the Civil War, judges used the contempt 
power with increasing frequency against newspapers; by the end of the century,  courts in 
17 states had reasserted the power to punish contempt by publication.740  
                                                
735 BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (4th ed. 1951). 
736 4 Stat. 487 (1831). “The Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73, 83) provided  that courts of the 
United States “shall have power . . . to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion 
of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.” 
Abuses arose, culminating in impeachment proceedings against James H. Peck, a federal 
district judge, who had imprisoned and disbarred one Lawless [a lawyer] for publishing a 
criticism of one of his opinions in a case which was on appeal. Judge Peck was 
acquitted.  But the history of that episode makes abundantly clear that it served as th  
occasion for a drastic delimitation by Congress of the broad undefined power of the 
inferior federal courts under the Act of 1789.” Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45 
(1941). 
737 GLEASON, supra note 7, at 82, 84. 
738 LOFTON, supra note 39, at 215.  
739 GLEASON, supra note 7, at 85. 
740 Id. at 85. 
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In 1907, the Supreme Court heard Patterson v.Colorado,741 the first contempt-by-
publication case to reach that court.  The alleged contempt was the publication of articles
and a cartoon that purportedly “reflected upon the motives and conduct of the Supreme 
Court of Colorado in cases still pending and were intended to embarrass the court in the 
impartial administration of justice.”742 Attorneys for the publisher raised the common law 
privilege of fair comment and charged the court with ignoring the state contempt 
statute.743 They also claimed a right under both the U.S. and Colorado constitutions to 
prove that the allegations in the articles were true.744  Attorneys for the state denied the 
authority of the legislature to limit the inherent power of the court and denied the 
authority of the U.S. Supreme Court even to review the decision.745   
The state also argued:  
 While freedom of the press, like that of freedom of speech, is 
necessary to the perpetuation of a republican form of government, this 
does not mean that either can be carried to such an extreme as to impede, 
embarrass, or unjustly influence the due and orderly administration of 
justice, or prejudice the rights of litigants in pending cases, for the latter 
would more surely impair the existence of our government than the 
former.746  
 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing the opinion of the court and dismissing 
the publisher’s writ of error for lack of jurisdiction, declined to decide whether the First 
Amendment had been incorporated through the Fourteenth, but indicated that it would 
make no difference in this case.  The main purpose of the constitutional provisions on 
freedom of speech and the press, he said, is “to prevent… previous restraints upon 
                                                
741 205 U.S. 454, 1907 U.S. LEXIS 1380.  
742 Id. at 458-59. 
743 1907 U.S. LEXIS 1380 at 2-5. 
744 205 U.S. at 13-14. 
745 1907 U.S. Lexis 1380 at 5-8. 
746 1907 U.S. Lexis 1380 at 7-8. 
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publication… and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be 
deemed contrary to the public welfare.”747  Moreover, Holmes said, freedom from prior 
restraint extends “as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may 
extend as well to the true as to the false.”748  Writing in dissent, Justice John Marshall 
Harlan reiterated the incorporation argument he had made in 1897;749 Justice Brewer 
would have found jurisdiction on other grounds and considered the merits.750  
More than a decade later, in 1918, the Court granted certiorari to review a 
contempt conviction against the Toledo Newspaper Co. and the editor of its Toledo 
News-Bee for criticizing a federal district court’s handling of a dispute involving street 
cars.751 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in turn.  Chief Justice Edward D. White 
wrote that the 1831 act’s requirement that the contemptuous behavior occur “so near” the 
court as to obstruct justice did not actually change the prevailing law and was thus 
satisfied by conduct having a tendency to obstruct the discharge of the court’s duty, 
wherever it occurred.752   
As to the publisher’s argument that the articles in question were immune from 
liability for contempt because, as matters of public concern, they were protected by 
freedom of the press, White wrote that the argument itself contains the  
contention that the freedom of the press is the freedom to do wrong with 
impunity and implies the right to frustrate and defeat the discharge of 
                                                
747 205 U.S. at 462 (citing Massachusetts v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313, 314 (Mass. 
1825), and Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dallas 319, 325 (Pa. 1788). 
748 205 U.S. at 462. 
749 Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  See supra note 276 and accompanying text.  
750 Id. U.S. at 465-66. 
751 247 U.S. 402, 411-14 (1918). 
752 Id. at 419. 
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those governmental duties upon the performance of which the freedom of 
all, including that of the press, depends. The safeguarding and 
fructification of free and constitutional institutions is the very basis and 
mainstay upon which the freedom of the press rests, and that freedom, 
therefore, does not and cannot be held to include the right virtually to 
destroy such institutions. It suffices to say that, however complete is the 
right of the press to state public things and discuss them, that right, as 
every other right enjoyed in human society, is subject to the restraints 
which separate right from wrong-doing.753 
   
Holmes dissented on factual grounds; Brandeis concurred in Holmes’s opinion.754 
Twenty-three years went by before the next contempt by publication case reach d 
the Supreme Court, and the Court’s approach to the First Amendment had changed 
utterly.  The change had begun with the World War I era sedition cases and the 
emergence of the “clear and present danger” standard in the great Holmes and Brandeis 
dissents.755  Gitlow and Near had conclusively settled the incorporation question,756 and 
Grosjean showed that the Court would no longer view freedom of the press as a mere 
prohibition of prior restraints.757  In addition, the press itself had become active in First 
Amendment litigation.  
In April 1941, the Court overruled White’s holding in Toledo Newspaper Co.; the 
language “so near thereto” in the federal contempt statute would henceforth mean what it 
said: criminally contemptuous acts had to be in or physically near the courtroom.758  
Although none of the contempt cases to reach the High Court after Nye involved the 
federal statute, the Court applied the principle to the state contempt cases that r ac ed the 
                                                
753 Id. at 419-20. 
754 Id. at 422, 426 (Holmes, J., dissenting; Brandeis, J., concurring in the dissenting 
opinion). 
755 See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
756 See supra Ch. 3, Pt. B. 
757 See supra Ch. 5, Pt. B. 
758 Nye, 313 U.S. 33. 
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Court.  On December 8, the day after Pearl Harbor was attacked, the Supreme Court 
announced its decision in Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court and Bridges v. 
California.759  With ANPA and the ACLU filing amicus briefs, the press would win that 
case and the next two, and contempt by publication would cease to be a threat to press 
freedom.     
In Bridges, as the consolidated opinion is best known, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reviewed two contempt convictions on certiorari to the California Supreme Court.  The 
Los Angeles Times had been held in contempt for three editorials about a case in 
progress; labor leader Harry Bridges was held in contempt for a telegram he sent to the 
Department of Labor regarding a pending case.  Both defendants argued that their free 
expression rights under the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments had been 
violated.  Borrowing now established doctrine from the sedition cases, Justice Black 
wrote for a 5-4 majority that contempt by publication could not be punished absent a 
“clear and present danger,” that is, “the substantive evil must be extremely serious and 
the degree of imminence extremely high.”760   
The worst of the editorials, Black said, merely threatened future adverse criticism 
if the court granted probation to two union members jailed for assaulting nonunion truck 
drivers.  The basis for punishing the publication as contempt was its “inherent tendency,” 
said the trial court, or its “reasonable tendency,” said the state supreme court, to interfere 
with the orderly administration of justice.  Even if that were the standard, rather than 
                                                
759 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
760 Id. at 263. 
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“clear and present danger,” Black said, it would be an exaggeration to apply it here.  
Given the Times’s hostility to labor unions, such criticism would be expected anyway. 761  
Four years later, in Pennekamp v. Florida,762 a unanimous court reversed the 
decision of the Florida Supreme Court affirming the contempt conviction of the Miami 
Herald and its associate editor for two editorials and a cartoon criticizing a trial court for 
being too lenient toward criminals and gambling establishments in three cases th t had 
already been dismissed, although a new indictment had been obtained in one of them and 
trial was pending.  Again, the ACLU filed an amicus brief.  This time, however, ANPA’s 
General Counsel, Elisha Hanson, argued the case for the Herald, and major newspapers 
throughout the country – although not The New York Times or The Washington Post – 
editorialized in support of the decision despite the crush of war news.763 
Justice Reed wrote the opinion of the court, which applied the “clear and present 
danger” standard;764 Justice Frankfurter, who had dissented in Bridges, now concurred in 
the opinion on factual grounds, while still resisting the standard.765  Justices Murphy, who 
accepted the standard, and Rutledge, who seemed to accept it, also wrote separate 
concurrences.766 There was no chief justice at the time P nnekamp was decided, and 
Justice Jackson did not participate.  But Jackson would render his opinion of the press in 
                                                
761 Id. at 272-73. 
762 328 U.S. 331 (1946). 
763 GLEASON, supra note 7, at 218-19.  
764 328 U.S. at 334. 
765 328 U.S. at 350. 
766 Id. at 369-72. 
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no uncertain terms in Craig v. Harney,767 the last of the press-related contempt by 
publication cases to reach a decision in the U.S. Supreme Court.768  
In Craig, the Court reversed the Texas courts’ conviction of the publisher, 
editorial writer, and reporter of the Corpus Christi Caller-Times for criticizing a Texas 
judge’s repeatedly rejecting the jury’s verdict in a civil case.  Justice W lliam O. Douglas 
wrote the 6-3 majority opinion, which closely tracked its predecessors, and Murphy’s 
concurrence averred that the First Amendment “outlawed” summary contempt.  
Frankfurter dissented again, this time joined by Chief Justice Vinson, but it was Justice 
Robert H Jackson’s separate dissent that revealed the growing recognition of the press as 
an interest group in its own right:   
It is doubtful if the press itself regards judges as so insulated from 
public opinion. In this very case the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association filed a brief amicus curiae on the merits after we granted 
certiorari. Of course, it does not cite a single authority that was not 
available to counsel for the publisher involved, and does not tell us a 
single new fact except this one: “This membership embraces more than 
700 newspaper publishers whose publications represent in excess of eighty 
per cent of the total daily and Sunday circulation of newspapers published 
in this country. The Association is vitally interested in the issue presented 
in this case, namely, the right of newspapers to publish news stories and 
editorials on cases pending in the courts.” 
 
 This might be a good occasion to demonstrate the fortitude of the 
judiciary.769     
 
Lofton suggests that, while the Court continued to express concern for unfair 
publicity, it was telling trial courts that the threat of contempt was the wrong remedy.  
                                                
767 331 U.S. 367 (1947). 
768 Kalven notes that, in 1962, the Court reversed a contempt citation issued by a Georgia 
court against a local sheriff for comments aimed at members of a grand jury, rather th n a 
judge, in the midst of an election campaign. KALVEN , supra note 44, at 31 (citing Wood 
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)). 
769 331 U.S. at 397. 
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“Not until the 1970s was the contempt citation to be significantly revived as judges again 
attempted to control the press by issuing restrictions against printing what they perc ived 
would interfere with the administration of justice.”770  
D. The Libel Cases, Part 1 
 No expansion of First Amendment protection into what had been the exclusive 
province of common law is more celebrated than the constitutionalization of libel law.  
And no constitutional libel case is more celebrated than the 1964 case of New York Times 
v. Sullivan.771  Part 1 briefly reviews the common law of libel and the first expansion of 
common law protections in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries.  Then it summarizes the 
Sullivan case, again focusing on the role of the press in moving the litigation forward, 
and concludes with a survey of constitutional libel cases between 1964 and 1974.  Part 2 
brings the survey up to date.   
 Only two civil libel cases involving the press reached the Supreme Court before 
Sullivan.  In 1909, the Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit that had affirmed a federal trial court’s refusal to award damages for a 
libelous newspaper advertisement.772  And 50 years later, the Court upheld the  
                                                
770 LOFTON, supra note 39, at 230.  Lofton was referring specifically to two important 
contempt cases – United States v. Dickenson, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 979 (1973)(declaring the contempt conviction of two Louisiana reporters for 
violating a judge’s gag order unconstitutional but ordering them to pay fines of $300 
nevertheless) and In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 
(1978)(New York Times and its reporter held in contempt for refusing to comply with a 
grand jury subpoena to turn over documents) – which the press lost.  The United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases, neither of which involved contempt by 
publication.  
771 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
772 Peck v. Trib. Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909). 
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decision of the South Dakota Supreme Court that Section 315 of the Federal 
Communications Act immunized broadcasters from libel suits for campaign speech th  
broadcaster was forbidden to censor.773  In neither case did the Court consider the 
constitutionality of state libel law under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 774    
While state libel law varied in its particulars from state to state, the typical state 
law required the plaintiff to prove three elements:  (1) that the defendant published the 
offending statement, (2) that the statement was “of and concerning” the plaintiff, nd (3) 
that the statement was defamatory, that is, tended harm a person’s reputation, to expose 
that person to distrust, hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or to injure that person in 
his office, occupation, business or employment.775  If a plaintiff could prove those three 
elements, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove that the statement was either tru  
or privileged.  Privileges accorded to the press – such as the privilege to accurately report 
government pronouncements or to criticize politicians and entertainers – were always
“qualified,” that is, could be defeated by a showing of malice.  No showing of fault was 
required; falsity and injury to reputation were presumed. 
                                                
773 Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959). 
774 In the WDAY case, both the ACLU and the National Association of Broadcasters filed 
amicus briefs in support of the broadcaster; neither argued the constitutionality f state 
libel law under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but the ACLU did assert the 
unconstitutionality of enforcing state libel law by requiring the broadcaster to suppress 
the political speech in question.  See Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, as Amicus 
Curiae, in Support of the Respondent, Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, 
Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (No. 248), 1959 WL 101286; Brief of Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, Amicus Curiae, at 7, Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 
U.S. 525 (1959) (No.248), 1959 WL 101285.   
775 The elements of libel law prior to 1964 remain elements of libel law today and thus 
are recounted in every media law textbook or casebook.  See supra note 132.  For a better 
sense of the law prior to 1964, see WILLIAM G. HALE, LAW OF THE PRESS 41-128 (1948). 
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It had never been seriously contended that this common law formulation violated 
the First Amendment, and this description essentially described the state of the law of 
Alabama before 1964.776 As noted earlier, Gleason’s study shows that the press’s 
principal efforts with respect to libel law in the 19th and early 20th Centuries were directed 
toward expanding the common law privileges.777  Two turn-of-the-century cases bear 
particular mention for their influence on the Sullivan decision:  Post Publishing Co. v. 
Hallam778 and Coleman v. MacLennan.779 In Hallam, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
6th Circuit had held that criticism of public officials was privileged only if the underlying 
facts were true.  In Coleman, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that facts relating to 
matters of public interest – honestly believed to be true – are privileged even if false, and 
that any comment based on those facts would also be privileged. These ideas, and the 
cases that followed one or the other model, would provide the inspiration for the 
revolution in First Amendment doctrine that Justice Brennan began in New York Times v. 
Sullivan.780  
 On March 29, 1960, The New York Times carried a full-page advertisement called 
entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices,” in support of African-American students at 
Alabama State College in Montgomery who were trying to integrate public facilities in 
the face of white violence.  The ad appeared over the names of sixty-four prominent 
persons.  Among other charges, the ad accused “Southern violators” of bombing the 
                                                
776 LEWIS, supra note 52, at 32-33. 
777 See supra note 215-17 and accompanying text. 
778 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893). 
779 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908). 
780 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
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home of Martin Luther King, arresting him for trivial offenses, and charging him with 
perjury.781 
Asserting that “violators” had to mean the police, attorneys for Gov. John 
Patterson and for City Commissioner L.B. Sullivan, who was responsible for the polic in 
Montgomery, wrote the Times demanding a retraction.  Alabama law required public 
officials to demand a retraction before seeking punitive damages.  The Times did print a 
retraction on the demand of Gov. John Patterson, but said it believed that nothing in the 
ad referred to Sullivan. When the Times asked for a clarification, Sullivan filed suit 
against the Times asking for $500,000 in damages.  He also sued the four Alabama 
ministers whose names appeared on the ad so the case could not be removed to federal 
court. Patterson and two others filed similar suits, so from this ad alone, the Times was 
potentially liable for $3 million.782  And these were not the only lawsuits filed against the 
Times and other members of the press; Lewis estimates that, by the time Sullivan was 
decided in 1964, “Southern officials had brought nearly $300 million in libel actions 
against the press.”783   
The Times was represented by Louis M. Loeb, a partner in the Wall Street firm of 
Lord, Day & Lord; for local counsel, the Times chose Birmingham lawyer T. Eric Embry. 
M. Roland Nachman, Jr., of Montgomery represented Sullivan.  Before the trial, the 
                                                
781 LEWIS, supra note 52, at 6-7.  A reproduction of the advertisement appears at 2-3. 
782 Id. at 11-14. 
783 Id. at 36.  Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff also discuss the use of libel suits as a 
weapon against the press during the civil rights era.  “The Times had been fighting more 
than a half-dozen libel suits, totaling more than $6 million, for four years… By early 
1964, public officials in three southern states had no fewer than seventeen libel lawsuits 
pending against newspapers, magazines, and a television station, seeking total damages 
that exceeded $288 million.”  GENE ROBERTS &  HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE 
PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 357 (2007).  
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Times tried to get off the hook by challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction over the 
newspaper because there was insufficient nexus between the paper and the state of 
Alabama.  It might have lost on this issue anyway, but it was facing a segregationist 
judge, Walter B. Jones, who was so determined to find jurisdiction that he overruled his 
own procedure treatise to do it.784   
During the three-day trial, much of the testimony focused on the element of 
identification.  Sullivan insisted that “Southern violators” implied the police, and as the 
elected city commissioner responsible for the police, further implicated him.  Witnesses 
were called who testified that they thought the ad was “of and concerning” Sullivan and 
that, if they believed the charges, it would have lowered him in their estimation.  Sullivan 
also put on testimony to show that the accusations the ad allegedly made against Sullivan 
were false, anticipating the Times’s truth defense.  Jones overruled the Times’s objections 
that the ad never said that Sullivan or the police had anything to do with those things.785   
There were mistakes in the ad, most of them as trivial as mistaking “The Star 
Spangled Banner” for “My Country Tis of Thee.”  The most serious mistake was the 
allegation that the dining hall of Alabama State University had been padlocked to starve 
the protesting students into submission.786  The Times’s advertising acceptability manager 
testified that he had not checked the facts because the ad was prepared by a reputable 
agency and the signatories were certified (apparently without authorization) by noted 
civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph.787 
                                                
784 LEWIS, supra note 52, at 14-17. 
785 Id. at 28-30. 
786 Id. at 30-31. 
787 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 287. 
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In his charge to the jury, Jones removed the issue of defamation on the ground 
that the challenged statements were libelous per se and thus did not require a jury 
decision.  He also refused to let the jury consider the defense of truth; the Times had 
conceded error with respect to the padlocking and thus failed to meet its burden as a 
matter of law.  Damages were also presumed, as was typical under the common law, so 
the case went to the jury with instructions that the ad was libelous, false and injurious.788 
The jury had to decide only whether the Times published the ad, whether it was 
“of and concerning” Sullivan, and, if so, how much to award.  The jury found that 
Sullivan had been libeled and awarded him $500,000.789  Significantly, the jury was not 
asked to specify whether the award represented compensatory or punitive damages.  The 
Times asked for a new trial, which Jones ultimately denied, but not before ordering the 
ministers’ property confiscated and sold at auction because they neglected to fil  a 
separate motion for a new trial.790 
After Jones denied the Times’s motion for a new trial, the Times appealed to the 
Alabama Supreme Court on a number of grounds, primarily the jurisdictional question, 
but also including a First Amendment argument.  The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, 
agreeing with Jones and the jury in every respect, and explicitly finding no First 
Amendment protection for libel.791     
The question at this point was whether the case could or should be appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court on constitutional grounds; to resolve it, the Tim s enlisted the 
support of Prof. Herbert Wechsler of Columbia University.  The imes’s legal team had 
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made a constitutional argument before the Alabama Supreme Court, but it had been 
summarily dismissed.  Now  Wechsler wanted to make the First Amendment argument 
the focus of his petition for certiorari, but, according to Lewis, the Times brass was 
hesitant.  “To my amazement,” Wechsler told Lewis, “the Madisonian and Jeffersonian 
doctrines had not penetrated to the upper reaches of The New York Times.”792  Publisher 
Orvil Dryfoos, however, apparently persuaded the Times executives to go along with 
Wechsler.793 It would not be the last time that the Times was less than fully supportive of 
constitutional litigation.794 
Once he had the green light, Wechsler took over the case and began preparing the 
petition for certiorari.  Lewis says it was actually Marvin Frankel, Wechsler’s former 
student and now colleague at Columbia, whose insight – that Alabama libel law, as used 
in this case, could be redefined as a sedition law – would carry the day.795  In his petition 
for certiorari, Wechsler wrote: 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama gives a scope and 
application to the law of libel so restrictive of the right to protest and to 
criticize official conduct that it abridges the freedom of the press, as that 
freedom has been defined by the decisions of this Court.  It transforms the 
action for defamation from a method of protecting private reputation to a 
device for insulating government against attack.  If the judgment stands, 
its impact will be grave – not only upon the press but also upon those 
whose welfare may depend on the ability and willingness of publications 
to give voice to grievances against the agencies of governmental power. 
                                                
792 Id. at 107. Wechsler continued, “People were asking why it wasn’t enough for the 
Times to ‘stick to our established position that we never settle libel cases, we publish the 
truth, if there’s an occasional error we lose and that’s one of the vicissitudes of lif ’ – that 
at a time when, I was told, the paper was barely making a profit and these judgments 
were mounting up.” Id. 
793 Id. 
794 See infra Ch. 6. 
795 Id. at 106. 
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The issues are momentous and call urgently for the consideration and 
determination of this Court.796 
 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.797 
 
There was little doubt that the Court would reverse; the only question was 
“how?”  Wechsler’s brief had advanced two possibilities:  that the Court require 
public officials to prove that they suffered a financial loss because of the libel, 
called “special damages”; or to prove that the defendant knew the statement was 
false at the time of publication, called “actual malice.”798  In one of the amicus 
briefs, The Washington Post endorsed the second alternative, urging the Court to 
protect otherwise defamatory statements where “honestly made in the belief that 
they are true.”799  The Chicago Tribune also filed an amicus brief, reinforcing 
Wechsler’s fundamental argument: that the Alabama libel applied to public 
officials amounted to a sedition law.800  The ACLU also filed an amicus brief in 
support of the Times.801 
Sullivan’s brief emphasized that the Constitution did not protect libelous 
statements, which was in accordance with every previous pronouncement by the 
Supreme Court, and accused “The Times and its powerful corporate newspaper 
                                                
796 Id. at 107-08. 
797 371 U.S. 946 (1963). 
798 LEWIS, supra note 52, at 119-20 (citing Brief for the Petitioner, N.Y. Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(No. 39), 1963 WL 66441). 
799 Id. at 125 (citing Motion of the Wash. Post Co. for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus 
Curiae and Brief of the Wash. Post Co. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, N.Y. 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(No. 39), 1963 WL 66441).   
800 Id. at 125 (citing Brief of Trib. Co. as Amicus Curiae, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964)(No. 39), 1963 WL 66444).  The Tribune brief was signed by the same 
Howard Ellis who represented Jay Near. 
801 Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties Union and the N.Y. Civil Liberties Union as Amici 
Curiae, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(No. 39), 1963 WL 66443. 
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friends” of claiming for themselves alone an “absolute privilege” to defame all 
public officials.802  While the briefs of the Times and amici focused on 
newspapers, Wechsler denied at oral argument that the constitutional protection 
he sought was limited to the press.  But he did not deny that the privilege he 
sought was absolute, although he argued that even a lesser privilege would require 
reversal.803  
In the end, the Court divided precisely along the fault line of absolute or 
qualified privilege.  Writing for the Court, Justice William O. Brennan fully 
accepted Wechsler’s sedition analogy, noting that the “court of history” had found 
the Sedition Act of 1798 unconstitutional and that Congress had remitted all fines 
paid in Sedition Act convictions.804  But instead of an absolute immunity, 
Brennan adopted one of Wechsler’s lesser arguments, one suggested by Coleman 
v. MacLennan:   
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a Federal 
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he 
proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ – that is, 
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.805  
 
Brennan also declared that this new fault standard must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence, a departure from the typical civil standard of proof: a 
                                                
802 LEWIS, supra note 52, at 124 (citing Brief for Respondent, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964)(No. 39), 1963 WL 105892).  The Court had refused to review 44 
libel cases in the past decade. Id. 
803 Id. at 131-32. 
804 376 U.S. at 276. 
805 Id. at 279-80. 
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preponderance of the evidence.806  In an even greater departure, Brennan applied 
the new standards to the evidence adduced in the trial court and, finding it 
wanting, declared the Times not liable, rather than remanding the case for a new 
trial.  There was no way the Court was going to allow this politically charged case 
to go back to Alabama.807   
Three justices – Black, Douglas, and Arthur Goldberg – wrote separately 
that the immunity extended to criticism of public officials, whether intentionally 
false or not, should be absolute.808   It is perhaps a great irony that, had these three 
great defenders of freedom of the press won the day, New York Times v. Sullivan 
might have been a brilliant repudiation of the doctrine of seditious libel – and 
nothing more.  It is inconceivable that the Court would have extended an absolute 
privilege for libelous speech in any other context, and there is no compelling 
reason for the wholesale change in libel law that followed Sullivan, except 
perhaps to require a showing of negligence or other culpable behavior rather than 
holding newspapers strictly liable, even without fault, as the common law had 
done. 
 The first libel case to follow Sullivan gave no hint of the revolution to come.  
Garrison v. Louisiana,809 which came eight months later, was a criminal libel case in 
which the flamboyant New Orleans district attorney, Jim Garrison, accused stat  judges 
of inefficiency and laziness.  He was convicted under a state criminal libel law that 
                                                
806 Id. at 285-86. 
807 Id. at 284-85.  See LEWIS, supra note 52, at 147-48. 
808 376 U.S. at 293, 297 (Black, J., and Goldberg, J., concurring).  Justice Douglas joined 
both concurring opinions. 
809 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
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permitted punishment of false or, if made with common law malice, that is, ill-will or 
spite, even truthful criticism of public officials.  There were no significant o stitutional 
issues raised by Garrison’s conviction that were not already raised by the Times verdict in 
Alabama, or, for that matter, any other sedition or contempt case.  The Supreme Court 
reversed, with Brennan applying the Sullivan rules to criminal libel.  Black and Douglas 
concurred, but again wrote that all seditious libel laws were unconstitutional.  Douglas 
suggested that, with the Garrison decision, the Court ought to overturn the 1952 case of 
Bauharnais v. Illinois,810 affirming a criminal libel statute that punished hate speech; 
otherwise, Garrison is of little consequence to the story of libel and no particular 
consequence for the press.811 
 The next case, Rosenblatt v. Baer,812 added little to the constitutional analysis 
except to help lower courts distinguish a public official, who was required to prove actual 
malice, from a mere public employee, who was not.  The Court held that the question 
turned on whether the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and 
performance of the plaintiff, beyond the interest it has in all public employees.813  The 
judge, not a jury, would decide that in every case,814 and states could not exempt their 
own officials from the burden of actual malice by defining public official as a matter of 
state law.815 
The case that began to change the common law libel doctrine significantly was 
not technically a libel case at all; the cause of action was, rather, a close relativ  called 
                                                
810 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
811 379 U.S. at 82 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
812 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
813 Id. at 86. 
814 Id. at 88. 
815 Id. at 84. 
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“false light,” which is usually grouped with privacy cases.  In Time, Inc. v. Hill,816 the 
plaintiff did not allege that he had been defamed by a Life magazine story, but that the 
coverage showed his family’s horrific story in a false light, which constituted an 
actionable invasion of privacy.  
 In 1952 the Hill family – husband, wife and five children – were held hostage in 
their suburban Philadelphia home by three escaped convicts.  The Hills were not harmed;  
in fact, they were treated reasonably well by their captors.  A year lat r, however, a book 
called Desperate Hours dramatized their experience, but added an episode of violence 
against the father and verbal abuse of a daughter.  The novel led to a Broadway play and 
ultimately a Hollywood movie starring Frederic March and Humphrey Bogart.817  To 
avoid the publicity, the Hills moved from Philadelphia to Connecticut, but to no avail.  
The last straw was an article in Life magazine featuring photos of  the cast of the play in 
the Hills’s old home.  One showed a convict roughing up a Hill son.  Another showed a 
daughter biting a convict’s hand to make him drop his gun.  And a third showed the 
father throwing the gun out of a window.  While none of these things actually happened 
to the Hills, the copy and photo captions made the connection apparent.818 
Hill sued for false light invasion of privacy under a broadly interpreted New York 
privacy statute and won a $75,000 judgment.  An appeals court held the award excessive 
and remanded for a new trial.  On retrial, the Hills won $30,000, which was affirmed on 
appeal.  Time, Inc., petitioned for certiorari on First Amendment grounds, and the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.  Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan said the
                                                
816 385 U.S. 374 (1966). 
817 THE DESPERATE HOURS (Paramount Pictures 1955).  The film was since remade with 
Mickey Rourke as the star. DESPERATE HOURS (Dino De Laurentiis Co. 1990). 
818 385 U.S. at 376-78. 
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“constitutional protections for speech and press precluded the application of [state 
privacy law] to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof 
that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth.”819  Only three members of the 6-3 majority signed onto the actual malice 
standard.  Two others would have held that the First Amendment rules out any false light 
action,820 while the sixth would have permitted the Hills to prevail on a showing of 
negligence.821  Three justices dissented.822 
How did Brennan justify the application of the actual malice standard to this case? 
“The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or 
comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government,” Brenan 
said, but – particularly  where nondefamatory material is concerned – to matters of public 
interest generally.823  This surgical separation of the actual malice standard and the 
sedition analogy opened the door for the Court to hold five months later – in two cases 
decided in the same opinion – that the actual malice standard applied to “public figure” 
libel plaintiffs as well as public official plaintiffs.   
 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,824 the well-known Georgia football coach, 
Wally Butts, was awarded $60,000 in compensatory and $400,000 in punitive damages in 
a libel action against the Saturday Evening Post, which accused him of fixing a game 
                                                
819 Id. at 387. 
820 Id. at 398, 401 (Black, J., and Douglas, J., concurring). 
821 Id. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
822 Id. at 411 (Fortas, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark joined 
Fortas’s dissent. 
823 Id. at 388. 
824 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
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between Alabama and Georgia.  Butts was technically employed by a private corporation 
and was not a public official. 
 In Associated Press v. Walker, a politically prominent retired general, Edwin 
Walker, was awarded $500,000 in compensatory and $300,000 in punitive damages in a 
suit against AP for accusing him of encouraging rioters at the University of Mississippi 
protesting the enrollment of a black student.  Butts won his case; Walker did not,825 but 
the effect of the two terribly divided opinions was to extend the Sullivan rule to public 
figures as well as public officials.   
Both Butts and Walker were very well known figures at the time, “household 
words” in some quarters, and few doubted that they were public figures.  Such celebrities 
have come to be called “all purpose public figures,” but the standard applies as wellto 
so-called “limited purpose public figures,” comprising those plaintiffs whose p ition or 
“purposeful activity amounted to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an 
important public controversy.”  The Court has justified the extension of the actual malice 
standard to public figures on several grounds:  public figures often play an influentia  role 
in ordering society, public figures have ready access to mass communications media, 
citizens have a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of public figures, and 
public figures assume the risk of exposure to criticism.826 
                                                
825 Id. at 133-45. 
826 Id. at 154.  Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan said he “would hold that a ‘public 
figure’ who is not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory f lsehood 
whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly 
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of 
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.” That 
standard did not command a majority of the Court; public officials and public figures are 
held to the same “actual malice” standard. 
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 Later that year, the Court heard a little remembered case alleging that the editor of 
the Beckley, W.Va., Post-Herald libeled a candidate for public office in three editorials 
regarding the controversial issue of drinking water fluoridation.  In a per curiam opinion 
in Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks,827 the Court held that lower courts had woefully 
misinterpreted its new standard and reversed a judgment against the newspaper.  The 
following year, the Court clarified the meaning of reckless disregard for the t uth in the 
non-press case of St. Amant v. Thompson.828 Reckless disregard can be found, the Court 
said, if the “defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication” 
but published anyway.829   
 The next libel case taken by the Supreme Court also added nothing to the new 
constitutional doctrine, but Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler830 
began to expose a fissure in the Court that would only grow worse as the decade wore on.  
In Bresler, the  weekly newspaper Greenbelt News Review accurately reported the use of 
the term “blackmail” at a public meeting to describe a developer’s negotiating position 
with the local government.   
The developer had argued that, because the paper knew he had committed no such 
crime, the paper should be held liable for knowingly publishing a false and defamatory 
statement.  The jury agreed, and the judgment on the verdict was affirmed by the 
Maryland Court of Appeals.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, again finding that the 
jury was improperly instructed as to malice, but adding that use of the term “blackmail” 
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829 Id. at 731. 
830 398 U.S. 6 (1970). 
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in that context was not actionable.831  Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for the 
Court; Black and Douglas, as usual, concurred in the judgment while continuing to 
oppose the “actual malice” standard.  But the most significant opinion was Justice Byron 
R. White’s.  Agreeing that the jury instructions were flawed, White concurred in the 
judgment, but he criticized the Court’s holding on “blackmail,” and, indirectly, the press
itself.  White took the Court to task for  
immuniz[ing] professional communicators from liability for their 
use of ambiguous language and their failure to guard against the 
possibility that words known to carry two meanings, one of which 
imputes commission of a crime, might seriously damage the object 
of their comment in the eyes of the average reader. I see no reason 
why the members of a skilled calling should not be held to the 
standard of their craft and assume the risk of being misunderstood 
– if they are – by the ordinary reader of their publications.832 
 
 This would be the first of a succession of increasingly hostile attacks on the press 
from White, which resumed early the following year with three libel decisions handed 
down the same day.  In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,833 the Supreme Court reversed a New 
Hampshire Supreme Court decision upholding a jury verdict finding the Concord 
Monitor liable for calling a candidate for office a “former small-time bootlegger.”  In 
Time, Inc., v. Pape,834  the Court reversed a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit holding that Time magazine’s failure to make clear that charges against a 
Chicago police official reported in the magazine were merely allegations, rather than 
official findings, raised a jury question as to actual malice.  And in Ocala Star-Banner 
                                                
831 Id. at 14. 
832 Id. U.S. at 23 (White, J., concurring). 
833 401 U.S. 265 (1971). Edward Bennett Williams represented the paper. 
834 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
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Co. v. Damron,835 the Court reversed a Florida decision finding the newspaper liable for 
falsely reporting that a mayor and candidate for office had been charged with perjury.   
In all three cases, Stewart wrote the majority decision, while Black and Douglas 
offered their usual absolutist concurrences. Harlan dissented in Pape, but White’s 
concurrence in Roy and Damron could only be read as another gratuitous slap at the 
press. 
The First Amendment is not so construed, however, to award merit badges 
for intrepid but mistaken or careless reporting.  Misinformation has no 
merit in itself; standing alone it is as antithetical to the purposes of the 
First Amendment as the calculated lie.  Its substance contributes nothing 
to intelligent decisionmaking by citizens or officials; it achieves nothing 
but gratuitous injury.836 
 
Notwithstanding White’s growing irritation, the Court’s most generous libel 
ruling came a few months later in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,837 in which a plurality of 
the Court applied the principle of Time, Inc. v. Hill to defamatory speech.  Rosenbloom 
was a Philadelphia distributor of nudist magazines who initiated a libel suit against a 
local radio station for falsely describing books seized from him as “obscene” when a 
criminal court had ruled otherwise.  Because Rosenbloom was neither a public official 
nor a public figure, the trial judge imposed a mere negligence standard and the jury 
awarded him $750,000.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, 
indicating that because the broadcast concerned matters of public interest and were mad  
under deadline pressure, the actual malice standard applied despite Rosenbloom's status 
as a private citizen.   
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The Supreme Court affirmed, 5-3, but only a plurality of three – Brennan, who 
wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Harry Blackmun – endorsed the 
Third Circuit’s reasoning.  Black offered his usual concurrence, although Douglas did not
participate in the case.  Dissenting, Marshall, Stewart, and Harlan rejected Brennan’s 
extension of the actual malice rule to matters of public interest, which they found to 
burdensome on judges, and argued that states should be free to set their own standards for 
private figure libels so long as they did not find liability without fault – essentially, a 
negligence standard.838  The dissenters differed from each other only on the issue of 
punitive damages.    
White’s concurrence in the judgment found all the opinions “displaced more state 
libel law than necessary,” and he would have affirmed solely on the ground that this case 
involved the “official actions of public servants.” Again, White had a word for the press: 
Some members of the Court seem haunted by fears of self-
censorship by the press and of damage judgments that will threaten 
its financial health. But technology has immeasurably increased 
the power of the press to do both good and evil. Vast 
communication combines have been built into profitable ventures. 
My interest is not in protecting the treasuries of communicators but 
in implementing the First Amendment by insuring that effective 
communication which is essential to the continued functioning of 
our free society.839  
 
 The Rosenbloom doctrine only lasted three years.  By 1974, the Court had taken a 
decided turn to the right.  Even before Rosenbloom, President Nixon had replaced Earl 
Warren with Warren Burger and Abe Fortas with Harry Blackmun (then considered 
conservative).  After Rosenbloom, Black and Harlan died, and Nixon appointed Lewis 
Powell and William Rehnquist to replace them.  That was the posture of the Court when 
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,840 was decided, and it quickly repudiated the Rosenbloom 
plurality opinion.  The press might have been forgiven for thinking the unbroken string of 
libel victories would go on forever, but it stopped at Gertz.  Even so, the Court only 
rolled the Rosenbloom standard back as far as the Marshall and Harlan dissents; most of 
the gains of the past decade were preserved. 
Elmer Gertz was a lawyer who was hired to sue the Chicago policeman who had 
killed his clients' son.  The right-wing John Birch Society magazine, American Opinion, 
charged Gertz with a Communist-inspired conspiracy to discredit the police and, among
other charges, falsely claimed Gertz had a police record.  The trial court originally found 
for Gertz as a matter of law, leaving only the amount of damages to the jury.  Then the 
judge changed his mind, deciding that the actual malice standard applied under the 
Rosenbloom plurality rule, and entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the 
magazine.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme 
Court reversed.841 
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Powell used a traditional tort law balancing a alysis 
to conclude that actual malice should not be applied in private plaintiff/public issue cases.   
Public people have more access to the press for rebuttal, so the state has a greater interest 
in protecting private people; public people must accept certain consequences of their 
involvement in public affairs that private people need not accept.  He also cited 
Marshall's dissent in Rosenbloom for the proposition that the Court should not be making 
content-based decisions on what information is relevant to self-government.  Instead, 
Powell said, states can define the appropriate standard of liability, as long as they do not 
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impose liability without fault, that is, any libel plaintiff must prove at least negligence on 
the part of the defendant.  Powell also said that no compensatory damages could be 
awarded without proof of injury, and no presumed or punitive damages could be awarded 
without proof of actual malice. “In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establi hes 
liability under a less demanding standard than [actual malice] may recove only such 
damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.”842   
Blackmun voted with Powell, although his sympathies were with Brennan, in 
order to create a 5-4 majority ruling and eliminate the uncertainty in the lower courts.  
Brennan and Douglas dissented; Brennan would have applied actual malice under the 
Rosenbloom doctrine, while Douglas would provide absolute immunity for matters of 
public interest.  Burger and White also dissented, but on the ground that states should be 
free to adopt their own standards for private libels; both said that the jury's verdict should 
be reinstated.  White was especially upset, and his hostility toward the press reached its 
zenith.  Likening the relationship between the public and the press to David and Goliath, 
White excoriated the Court for its “evisceration of the common-law libel remedy for the 
private citizen,” thus “remov[ing] from his legal arsenal the most effective weapon to 
combat assault on personal reputation by the press establishment.”843 
I fail to see how the quality or quantity of public debate will be 
promoted by further emasculation of state libel laws for the benefit 
of the news media. If anything, this trend may provoke a new and 
radical imbalance in the communications process. It is not at all 
inconceivable that virtually unrestrained defamatory remarks about 
private citizens will discourage them from speaking out and 
concerning themselves with social problems. This would turn the 
First Amendment on its head.844 
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Since Gertz was a private figure, a new trial was required.  On retrial, the jury 
found actual malice and awarded $100,000 in compensatory and $300,000 in punitive 
damages.   
 We pause for a moment in this discussion of the libel cases to take stock of the 
doctrinal changes made by the Court in the 1964-74 decade, all presumably commanded 
by the First Amendment, and the role of the press in shaping those changes.  When the 
decade began, the elements of libel were three: publication, identification (“of and 
concerning”), and defamation.  At the end of the decade, a fault requirement had been 
added: actual malice, by clear and convincing evidence, for public figures and anyone 
seeking punitive damages; and negligence or more for private citizens, at least wh re 
matters of public interest were concerned.  While the Court would not explicitly say so 
until 1986, the fault standard implied a fifth element: falsity.  If the burden was now o  
the plaintiff to prove fault, and no fault could be found with a true statement, the burden 
had already shifted to the plaintiff to prove that the statement was not true.845  Finally, the 
Court added injury to the plaintiff as a sixth element to be proved where only negligence 
was shown. 
 And what role did the press play in these dramatic changes, in the 
constitutionalization of libel law?  Apart from the seminal Su livan decision itself, there 
were no amicus briefs filed by the press on behalf of their colleagues (or by anyone on 
behalf of the plaintiffs) in any of the libel decisions.  Judging from the stature of th  
lawyers on both sides, these were not exactly low stakes cases.  Among the more 
prominent media representatives were Bernard G. Segal of Philadelphia, who represented 
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Metromedia in Rosenbloom, and also counted Bell Telephone, NBC, and RCA as clients;  
Don H. Reuben of Chicago, who represented Time, Inc., in Pape, and had been on the 
Tribune Co.’s brief in Sullivan, along with Howard Ellis; Edward Bennett Williams of 
Washington, D.C., who represented the Concord Monitor in Roy, and was for years the 
leading counsel for The Washington Post;  Thurman Arnold of Washington, D.C., who 
represented Beckley Newspapers against Hanks, and who had headed Roosevelt’s 
Antitrust Division, served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit  and founded 
the firm of Arnold & Porter; Herbert Wechsler of New York, who represented Curtis 
Publishing Co. against Butts soon after representing The New York Times in Sullivan; and 
William P. Rogers of New York, who represented the Associated Press against W lker, 
and served as Eisenhower’s Attorney General and Nixon’s Secretary of State.  Ther  
were some very well known attorneys on the other side of these cases as well, including 
Ramsey Clark, who represented Rosenbloom against Metromedia, and served as 
President Johnson’s Attorney General; Richard M. Nixon, who represented Hill against 
Time, Inc., and became President of the United States; and numerous locally prominent 
“superlawyers.” 
 When this series of cases began, the media defense bar was not well organized; by 
the end of the decade, that had changed dramatically, but Gertz did not directly involve 
the mainstream press and, in any event, the leading media organizations that might have 
filed briefs were far more concerned with another case that was announced the same day 
as Gertz: Miami Herald v. Tornillo, the “right of reply” case discussed in Part A of this 
chapter.846  Indeed, White’s “David and Goliath” analogy and his use of the term “press 
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establishment” may have been inspired by the sheer number and prominence of the 
amicus briefs filed in that case.  His concurring opinion in Tornillo suggested as much, 
even as he took another shot at Gertz.   
To me it is a near absurdity to so deprecate individual 
dignity, as the Court does in Gertz, and to leave the people at the 
complete mercy of the press, at least in this stage of our history 
when the press, as the majority in this case so well documents, is 
steadily becoming more powerful and much less likely to be 
deterred by threats of libel suits.847 
 
 We end this digression with a word about why we have focused so much on 
Justice White.  In all of the libel opinions discussed here, White’s opinions were either 
concurrences or dissents and of no legal significance.  As we will see in the next chapter, 
however, White became the Court’s point man on newsgathering, beginning with the 
1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes,848 and at least one reason why the press fared so poorly 
in those cases. 
E. The Libel Cases, Part 2 
 Following Gertz, the Court continued to adjust and clarify the doctrine and related 
procedural issues for another 17 years, with the institutional press playing a much more 
active role as amicus curiae, yet losing more than twice as many cases as it won. In Time, 
Inc. v. Firestone,849 Time magazine misidentified the grounds for divorce of a wealthy, 
publicity-seeking heiress; Time won the case because the Florida courts had failed to 
explicitly consider the publisher’s fault.  Doctrinally, however, the press lost some 
ground when the Court declared the plaintiff a private figure because her divorce was a 
private, not public, controversy – notwithstanding the press conferences she held during 
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the proceeding.  In Herbert v. Lando,850 CBS lost a bid to limit a public figure libel 
plaintiff’s ability to probe deeply into the editorial process and state of mind of the
journalists and editors during discovery.  The opinion, reversing the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, exposed the actual malice rule as a double-edged sword; 
if the plaintiff had to prove knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, Justice 
White wrote for the majority, he could not be deprived of the opportunity to gather that 
state-of-mind evidence.851  The importance of this case was not lost on the press 
generally, which turned out en masse in a futile attempt to limit the costly discovery 
process in libel cases.852     
In two 1979 cases decided the same day, ANPA and ASNE filed amicus briefs 
urging the Court to affirm lower court decisions declaring libel plaintiffs to be public 
figures and, in the absence of actual malice, granting summary judgment to the 
defendants; in both cases, the Court reversed.  In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,853 the Court 
held that the Speech and Debate Clause did not immunize a United States senator from 
liability for statements made off the Senate floor and that the senator’s ttack on the 
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853 443 U.S. 111 (1979).  See Brief of Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors and Am. 
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plaintiff’s scientific research did not make the plaintiff a public figure.  In Wolston v. 
Reader’s Digest Association,854 the Court held that the nephew of convicted Soviet spies 
was a private figure even though he had previously been convicted of contempt for 
failing to respond to a subpoena.  
In 1984, the Court decided two libel cases raising jurisdictional issues related to 
libel litigation; again, the press lost both cases.  In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,855 
the Court allowed a New York plaintiff to take advantage of New Hampshire’s unusually 
long, six-year statute of limitations to file a libel suit there against a nationally circulated 
magazine over the objection of press amici led by CBS, Inc.856 The same day, in Calder 
v. Jones,857 the Court agreed with Actress Shirley Jones that the California courts had 
jurisdiction to hear her libel case against the National Enquirer, which is published in 
Florida but also circulated nationally.  Contrary to the position advocated by amicus 
Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press,858 the Court affirmed a state court 
opinion that the First Amendment had no bearing on the jurisdictional question.  The 
following month, the press fared rather better in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,859 in 
which the Court affirmed a lower court ruling that appellate courts must conduct an 
independent review of the entire record to determine whether the actual malice st ndard 
was met with “convincing clarity,” rather than apply the “clearly erroneous” standard 
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usually prescribed by state law. The case involved a disparaging review of the plaintiff’s 
loudspeakers that appeared in Consumer Reports magazine.  Floyd Abrams wrote the 
amicus brief for the press, led by The New York Times; the ACLU also filed in support of 
Consumer Reports.860   
But the press lost a major case the following year when the Court held that 
Gertz’s prohibition against the award of presumed or punitive damages without a 
showing of actual malice does not apply to matters of private concern – in this case, an 
erroneous credit report.  In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,861 the Court 
rejected arguments to the contrary by The Washington Post as amicus; the Post had 
devoted most of its brief, however, to an even more futile argument that punitive 
damages should never be awarded in a libel case.862  Dow Jones, publisher of The Wall 
Street Journal, also filed an amicus brief in the case,863 fully agreeing with both the 
Post’s positions.  More significantly, Dow Jones, as well as the relatively new 
Information Industry Association, 864  argued that Dun & Bradstreet’s status as a “non-
media” actor whose speech was “of a commercial or economic” nature should not have a 
bearing on the Court’s decision.865  
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The Vermont Supreme Court had concluded that the Gertz rule did not apply to 
non-media defendants, and the U.S. Supreme Court asked the parties to address the 
question in that form.  Ultimately, however, the Court decided against making the 
distinction based on status, but rather on whether the information was public or private in 
nature.  Chief Justice Burger and Justice White concurred, although both asserted that 
Gertz should be over-ruled altogether; Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun 
dissented.  Powell’s decision for the Court was joined only by Justices Rehnquist and 
O’Connor.  What makes Dun & Bradstreet so problematic, however, is not merely its 
holding with respect to presumed and punitive damages, but the specter it raises that 
some future Court will hold, as at least one state court has suggested,866 that Gertz’s 
requirement that state courts impose a fault standard in all libel cases may be w ived 
where both the plaintiff and the matters at issue are deemed private.   
 Sure enough, the Court added to this concern in its very next libel case.  In 
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,867 the Court held that a private figure plaintiff bore 
the burden of proving the falsity of links to organized crime alleged in a series of five 
articles that ran in The Philadelphia Inquirer.  That plaintiffs carried such a burden had 
been widely taken for granted as long as a fault element was imposed, but the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that requiring proof of fault did not necessarily imply 
requiring proof of falsity and that Pennsylvania’s unusual statutory presumption of falsity 
did not offend the First Amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, giving the press 
an major victory.  But Justice O’Connor’s opinion revived the media/non-media 
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distinction and limited the scope of the holding to media defendants and matters of public 
concern.868   
 Press amici – and they were legion – argued that the Pennsylvania rule would 
force media defendants to calculate not whether what they print is true, but rather 
whether they will be able to prove in court that what they print is true.  They also argued 
that there is no rational justification for presuming the falsity of any defamatory speech, 
so any such presumption would violate due process;869  that a presumption of falsity 
effectively nullified the Gertz safeguards, particularly the fault element, since, as a 
practical matter, juries were inclined to find negligence in any inaccur te report;870 and 
that the problems raised by the Pennsylvania statute applied with even greater force to 
broadcasters, who were required to work under tighter deadline pressure.871  
 Two months later, the press won an important procedural decision holding that 
the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard for actual malice must be considered by 
trial courts in deciding whether to grant summary judgment in lieu of trial.  As press 
amici pointed out in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,872 the actual malice standard is a 
“purposefully difficult standard to meet” and its proper application – including the “clear 
                                                
868 Id. at 768-69. 
869 Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties Union, the Am. Civil Liberties Union of Pa., Am. 
Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, Ass’n of Am. Publishers, Dow Jones & Co., Inc., Gannett 
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and convincing” evidentiary standard – avoids much “burdensome, punitive litigation” 
through pretrial disposition.873 Ironically, Justice White wrote the opinion for the 
majority; Justice Brennan dissented, as did Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist 
separately, although for reasons having more to do with the practicalities of litigation 
than with First Amendment concerns.874 
 Two years later, in 1988, the Court imposed the actual malice standard in another 
non-libel case.  Like Time v. Hill, more than 20 years earlier, Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell875 did not come to the Court as a libel case, but rather sounded in a different tort, 
“intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  Televangelist Jerry Falwell had sued 
Hustler Magazine and its iconoclastic publisher, Larry Flynt, for a mock advertisement 
that appeared in the magazine.  The parody was modeled after a series of legitimat  ads 
for the liqueur Campari that were in wide circulation at the time; celebritis spoke of their 
“first time,” describing their first taste of Campari in terms that suggested their first 
sexual experience.  In the Hustler ad, Mr. Falwell was the celebrity and the “first time” 
he recounted described sex with his mother in an outhouse.  Falwell sued for libel and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; the jury rejected the libel claim, specifically 
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finding that the parody could not reasonably be construed as factual, but found Hustler
liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress.876 
 On appeal, the U.S. Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting 
Hustler’s argument that the First Amendment required a showing of actual malice, even 
where the tort is not technically libel.  As urged by two amicus briefs from the press,877 
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  Writing for a unanimous Court, at least as to the 
judgment, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the First Amendment precluded public 
figures from recovering damages under a theory of intentional infliction of emtional 
distress for a publication that does not contain a false statement of fact made with actual 
malice.878  Concurring in the judgment, Justice White wrote that the actual malice 
standard was irrelevant to the case, which could have been decided simply as a parody 
protected by the First Amendment.879  White’s reluctance to extend New York Times v. 
Sullivan any further than necessary, and his narrow view of the holding in Hustler, would 
be critical to the decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media,880 discussed in Chapter 7. 
 The press would not be so fortunate in the next case.  In Harte-Hanks 
Communications v. Connnaughton,881 decided the following year, the Court reviewed a 
finding of actual malice in a libel case brought in federal court by a disappointed office 
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seeker against the Hamilton, Ohio, J urnal News, for a story accusing the candidate of 
“dirty tricks” in the late election.  A properly instructed jury found the newspaper liable, 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.  Despite the protestation of 
the newspaper and press amici to the contrary,882 a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the appellate court had reviewed the trial record de novo as required by the Bose883 
case.  The best the press got out of Harte-Hanks was a declaration from the Court that 
“highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of 
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers” did not, in 
itself, constitute actual malice, but was merely evidence of actual malice.884  That 
formulation, taken from Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in Butts,885 had apparently 
confused the Sixth Circuit court.886 
 The following year, the press lost another libel case that turned on a 
misunderstood dictum from an earlier case; this time, the misleading phrase was Justice 
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Powell’s statement in Gertz that “there is no such thing as a false idea.”887  In Milkovich 
v. Lorain Journal,888 a columnist for the newspaper implied that a local wrestling coach 
had committed perjury at an administrative hearing.  Because the column was clearly 
styled as an opinion column, the lower courts dismissed the coach’s libel suit againstthe 
newspaper.  In a 6-2 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding the label 
“opinion” inadequate to insulate the newspaper from liability.  Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that libel doctrine already provided enough protection for 
opinion that was not susceptible of proof, one way or the other, or was mere rhetorical 
hyperbole.  However, Rehnquist wrote, a provable statement merely cast as opinion – 
such as, “In my opinion, Jones is a liar” – can support a libel action.889  The national 
press, as well as the ACLU, argued for the formal preservation of the fact/opinion 
dichotomy,890 while the Ohio press argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to reverse an 
Ohio Supreme Court’s contrary decision regarding an opinion privilege.891  Both 
arguments were futile. 
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 In the last libel case covered by this study, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 
Inc.,892 the journalism community was sharply divided, although the institutional press 
closed ranks behind The New Yorker. In an article for the magazine, journalist Janet 
Malcolm admittedly fabricated direct quotations purporting to have been uttered in the 
course of her interview with well-known psychiatrist Jeffrey Masson.  Masson sued on 
the ground that the alleged quotations were defamatory, but the trial court granted 
summary judgment for The New Yorker on the ground that the alleged quotations were 
either substantially true or rational interpretations of ambiguous conversations.  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded, holding that several of the fabricated quotes raised a jury question as to actual 
malice.  The press, however, could take heart from the Court’s conclusion that even  
a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate 
with knowledge of falsity for purposes of [finding actual malice] unless 
the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the 
statement. The use of quotations to attribute words not in fact spoken 
bears in a most important way on that inquiry, but it is not dispositive in 
every case.893 
 
 In this case, a number of journalists and journalism professors – incensed by the 
notion that fabricated quotations served any First Amendment interests – urged the Court 
to reverse.894  But the institutional press, arguing that journalistic standards or ethics had 
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10012723.  Signatories included free-lance writer Peter Collier, Prof. John DeMott of 
Memphis State University, Prof. Mark Fackler of Wheaton College, author Joseph C. 
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no place in the First Amendment analysis, urged the Court to affirm the decisions of the 
lower courts.895  In the end, the institutional press probably got more out of Masson than 
many conscientious journalists and academics thought was deserved. 
There were few dramatic changes in constitutional libel doctrine after Gertz; most of the 
cases involved clarification:  where was that elusive line between public and private 
figures, how deeply could libel plaintiffs probe the editorial process during discovery, 
where could libel suits be filed, what were the responsibilities of reviewing courts, and 
how false was false enough?  The one significant doctrinal question remaining after 
Gertz, and remaining today – the fault standard for private plaintiffs on matters of private 
concern – is irrelevant to the press as a practical matter, although the return of strict 
liability would be philosophically tragic.  The mobilization of the press as an interest 
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group was most impressive after Gertz, even if its success rate fell below fifty percent.  
As the next section demonstrates, the press did much better in the privacy arena. 
F. The Privacy Cases 
The genesis of the notion that plaintiffs ought to be able to recover for an invasion 
of their privacy was an 1890 Harvard Law Review article by Louis Brandeis and his law 
partner Samuel Warren.896  The concept did not  exist in English common law, and 
invasion of privacy is often called the only truly American tort.  Dean William L. 
Prosser’s classification scheme for the American common law privacy torts included the 
right of publicity or misappropriation, false light, intrusion on seclusion, and disclosure 
of private facts.897 The case of Time, Inc. v. Hill, discussed in Section D above, was 
substantively a false light case, although the lawsuit was brought under a New York 
statute that more properly concerned the right of publicity, that is, the right to control the 
use of one’s name or likeness for commercial purposes.898 Apart from five cases that 
substantively parallel the tort of disclosure of private facts – which are the cntral focus 
of this section – only two other privacy cases involving the press ever reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court.   
In the 1974 case of Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,899 the Court upheld a 
jury verdict finding that a Cleveland Plain Dealer reporter had knowingly placed the 
Cantrell family in a false light through numerous inaccuracies and false st tements in his 
article about them. And in the 1977 case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting 
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Co.,900 the Court held that an Ohio television station misappropriated the entire act of a 
circus “human cannonball” by filming and broadcasting his entire, 15-second act.  Other 
than the litigants, the mainstream press did not participate in either of these cases.   
Of far greater importance, however, was the series of five privacy-related c ses 
that reached the Court between 1975 and 1989.  None of these cases directly implicated 
the tort of public disclosure of private facts; the press rarely lost those cases in th  state 
courts because of an absolute “newsworthiness” defense that was said to have 
“swallowed” the tort itself.  The cases that did get to the Court, however, were all based, 
directly or indirectly, on statutes that criminalized the publication of truthful, but 
embarrassing, information.  Sometimes they were characterized as prior restraints, 
sometimes as subsequent punishment.  But as we will see in Chapter 8, the Court’s 
decisions in these cases had a profound effect on the Court’s early 21st Century 
jurisprudence and may, just may, improve prospects for better legal treatment of 
newsgathering cases in the future. 
On Aug. 18, 1971, Cynthia Leslie Cohn, 17, was raped and suffocated to death by 
six high school boys following a drinking party in Sandy Springs, Fulton County, 
Georgia.  In April 1972, when the six perpetrators were arraigned, five pled guilty to 
rape, murder charges against them having been dropped, and a date was set for the trial of 
the youth who pled not guilty.  A reporter covering the case for WSB-TV duly broadcast 
the story later that day, including, for the first time in any media, the name of th victim.  
The reporter had learned the name from personal observation of the proceedings and 
from the indictments, which were public records available to anyone who asked.  The 
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next month, Martin Cohn, Cynthia Cohn’s father, filed a lawsuit against the Cox 
Broadcasting Corp., the owner of WSB-TV, for invasion of privacy and for violating a 
Georgia statute that prohibited the publication or broadcasting of the name of any rape 
victim.    
The trial court held that the statute gave Cohn a private right of action against 
Cox, notwithstanding the broadcaster’s constitutional claims, and granted Cohn summary 
judgment as to liability, with damages to be considered at a later jury trial.  On appeal, 
the Georgia Supreme Court held that the statute did not give Cohn a private right of 
action, so summary judgment was inappropriate, but also that Cohn’s common law 
invasion of privacy claim was not precluded by the First Amendment.  On a motion for 
rehearing the state supreme court held that the statute was an authoritative declaration of 
state policy to the effect that the name of a rape victim was not a matter of public 
concern, so the right to disclose that information was not protected by the First 
Amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in Cox v. Cohn.901 
Writing for a nearly unanimous Court – only Justice Rehnquist dissented – Justice 
White got to the heart of the matter. “Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the 
publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is 
embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most 
directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.”902 Determined to 
approach the constitutional balance cautiously, White largely restricted his holding to the 
facts at hand. “We are convinced that the State may not ... impose sanctions on the 
accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records – more  
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902 420 U.S. at 489.  
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specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in connection with a public 
prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection.”903 If the state wanted to 
keep such information from the press, the Court said, it would have to find some way to 
avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information, possibly by sealing 
court records containing such facts.  Only Justice Douglas would have ruled on broader 
grounds:  that “there is no power on the part of government to suppress or penalize the 
publication of ‘news of the day.’” Rehnquist’s dissent turned on jurisdiction, not the 
merits.904  
  While only regional media companies participated in the Cox case, the next 
privacy case to reach the Court drew the attention of the ANPA.  Oklahoma Publishing 
Co. v. District Court in and for Oklahoma County905 was not a tort case at all, but rather 
challenged an injunction issued by the county court prohibiting the news media from 
“‘publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture’” of  an 
11-year-old boy alleged to have shot and killed a railroad switchman.  Reporters were 
able to learn his name and take his photograph during and after an open detention 
hearing, and they used both the in newspaper, radio, and television stories that followed.  
A few days later, when the boy appeared in court again for arraignment, the judge closed 
the proceeding and issued the injunction. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
affirmed the judge’s order, but the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the order.  It granted 
certiorari and, in the same per curiam opinion, reversed.906   
                                                
903 410 U.S. at 491. 
904 410 U.S. at 501. 
905 430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
906 430 U.S. at 309-10. 
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As if to illustrate the relationship between prior restraint and privacy cases, the 
Court relied on both Nebraska Press and Cox to hold that “the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments will not permit a state court to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated 
information obtained at court proceedings which were in fact open to the public.”907  The 
Court’s very brief opinion closely tracked the arguments made by ANPA in its am cus 
brief, but did not follow ANPA’s suggestion for a general rule to avoid “a constant 
stream of minor fact variations which will needlessly take up the time of this Court and of 
the press in preventing encroachments upon the First and Fourteenth Amendments by 
trial judges who do not yet believe or perhaps understand the teachings of this Court 
….”908 The Court continued to resist formulating a broad, general rule in the next 
privacy-related case the following year. 
On October 4, 1975, Landmark’s Virginian-Pilot  published an article that accurately 
reported on a pending inquiry by the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission and 
identified the state judge whose conduct was being investigated.  A month later, a grand jury 
indicted Landmark for violating a state statute by “unlawfully divulg[in ] the identification of a 
Judge of a Court not of record, which said Judge was the subject of an investigation and hearing” 
by the Commission.  Landmark was convicted of a misdemeanor in a bench trial and fined $500.  
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, citing the need to protect the judge’s 
reputation from the publicity that might attend frivolous claims; preserving public confidence in 
the judicial system; and protecting complainants and witnesses before the Commission.  
Landmark appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.  
                                                
907 430 U.S. at 311. 
908 Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n at 18, Okla. Publ’g Co. v. 
Dist. Ct. in and for Okla. County, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (No. 76-867) 1977 WL 189322. 
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In contrast to Cox and even Oklahoma Publishing, Landmark Communications, 
Inc. v. Virginia909 attracted the attention of a substantial number of media companies and 
press associations.910  The media companies argued that, under the Constitution, none of 
the purported interests cited by the Virginia Supreme Court could be protected by 
imposing criminal sanctions on the press, and called for a rule barring accurate reports of 
government affairs.  The press associations similarly argued that the Constitution barred 
states from imposing criminal sanctions for publishing information on the public dutiesof 
public officials.  As before, the Court shied away from any generalized pronounceme t.  
Writing for a nearly unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger found it “unnecessary to 
adopt this categorical approach to resolve the issue before us. … 
The narrow and limited question presented, then, is whether 
the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment of third 
persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including the news media, 
for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding 
confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission. We are not here concerned with the possible 
                                                
909 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
910 Brief Amicus Curiae of Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, Landmark Commc’n, In . 
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (No. 76-1450), 1977 WL 189715; Brief of the Nat’l 
Newspaper Ass’n, the Ariz. Newspapers Ass’n, the Louisiana Press Ass’n, the Maryland-
Delaware-D.C. Press Ass’n, the Michigan Press Ass’n, the Neb. Press Ass’n, the Ore. 
Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, the Pa. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, the Tex. Daily 
Newspaper Ass’n, the Tex. Press Ass’n, the Va. Press Ass’n as Amici Curiaein Support 
of Appellant, Landmark Commc’n, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (No. 76-1450), 
1977 WL 189717; Brief of the Wash. Post Co., CBS Inc., Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., Dow 
Jones & Co., Inc., the N.Y. Times Co., Field Enters., Inc., Newsday, Inc., the Globe 
Newspaper Co., Phila. Newspapers, Inc., the Miami Herald Publ’g Co., the Pulitzer 
Publ’g Co., Minneapolis Star and Trib. Co., Des Moines Reg. and Trib. Co., the Courier-
Journal and Louisville Times Co., the Copley Press, Inc., Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 
the Free Lance-Star Publ’g Co., and the Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors, Amici Curiae, 
in Support of Reversal, Landmark Commc’n, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (No. 
76-1450), 1977 WL 189719; Motion of the Am. Civil Liberties Union and the Am. Civil 
Liberties Union of Va. for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae, and Brief Amici Curiae, 




applicability of the statute to one who secures the information by 
illegal means and thereafter divulges it. * * * 
 
We conclude that the publication Virginia seeks to punish under its 
statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and the 
Commonwealth's interests advanced by the imposition of criminal 
sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual and potential 
encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press which follow 
therefrom. 911 
 
Even without propounding the general rule sought by the press, the Court had, in 
these three cases, begun to make clear that privacy interests – including the name of a 
rape victim, a juvenile offender, or even a judge merely accused of wrongdoing – would 
not be enough to overcome the presumptive right of the press to publish truthful 
information, lawfully acquired, on matters of public concern, even where the publication 
was otherwise prohibited by a state’s legislature or its courts.  In Smith v. Daily Mail,912 
the Court would make that rule explicit. 
That 1979 case, like Oklahoma Publishing, involved an indictment against two 
West Virginia newspapers for violating state law by publishing without a court’s 
permission the name of a 14-year-old who had shot and killed a high school classmate.  
In this case, however, the reporters did not obtain the name in open court, but by 
monitoring the police band radio frequency, going to the scene, and interviewing 
witnesses, police, and a prosecutor.  The papers sought and won a writ of prohibition 
against prosecution from the West Virginia Supreme Court, which held that prosecution 
would be unconstitutional under recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, but the attorney 
general of West Virginia filed a successful petition for certiorari on behalf of the trial 
judge, Robert K. Smith.  Once again, the press amici came out in force to support the 
                                                
911 435 U.S. at 838. 
912 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
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newspapers.  Once again, the ACLU added its voice to that of the press.913  Once again, 
Floyd Abrams, who had represented Landmark Communications, was representing the 
newspaper.  And once again, the Chief Justice wrote the opinion for a nearly unanimous 
Court.  
Because of the language of the statute requiring a court order before publishing 
the name of a juvenile offender, the press amici tended to characterize the statute as a 
prior restraint – even though the information had already been published and the case 
reached the Court through a criminal prosecution.  Burger agreed after a fashion: 
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a penal 
sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information is 
not dispositive because even the latter action requires the highest 
form of state interest to sustain its validity. Prior restraints have 
been accorded the most exacting scrutiny in previous cases. 
However, even when a state attempts to punish publication after 
the event it must nevertheless demonstrate that its punitive action 
was necessary to further the state interests asserted. Since we 
conclude that this statute cannot satisfy the constitutional standards 
defined in Landmark Communications, Inc., we need not decide 
whether, as argued by respondents, it operated as a prior 
restraint.914 
 
But Burger went further and gave the press the general rule it had been seeking.  
Burger pointed out that in the previous cases – Cox, Oklahoma Publishing, and 
                                                
913 Motion of the Am. Civil Liberties Union for Leave to File, and Brief Amicus Curiae, 
Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979)(No. 78-482), 1979 WL 213634; Motion of Chi. 
Trib. Co. for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae, Smith v. Daily 
Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979)(No. 78-482), 1979 WL 199841; Motion of Am. Newspaper 
Publishers Ass’n for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae, Smith 
v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979)(No. 78-482), 1979 WL 199845; Motion of Am. Soc’y 
of Newspaper Editors; Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n; Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n; 
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters; the Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi; Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press; Nat’l Press Club; Associated Press Managing Editors; 
W. Va. Press Ass’n; Ill. Press Ass’n; and Clarksburg Publ’g Co. for Leave to File Brief, 
Amici Curiae. In Support of Affirmance, and Brief Amici, Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 
97 (1979)(No. 78-482), 1979 WL 199839. 
914 443 U.S. at 101-102. 
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Landmark Communications – the press received the information from the government or 
government sources, so those cases did not directly control the outcome here, where the 
press gathered the information through routine reporting techniques.  Asserting tha  it 
made no difference – “A free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the sufferance of 
government to supply it with information” – Burger said those cases “suggested” the 
general rule:  “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the 
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”915 
  Articulation of a rule seemed to put an end to this kind of litigation, as Justice 
White had once predicted,916 but ten years later, another, similar case again reached the 
Court.  In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,917 a novice reporter picked up a police report that 
identified sexual assault victim B.J.F. by her full name from the Jacksonville polic  ress 
room.  The unedited report had been left there inadvertently.  When the paper ran a brief 
item using her full name, contrary to its own editorial policy and a Florida statute, B.J.F. 
sued on a theory of negligence per se.   The trial judge agreed that the newspaper’s 
violation of the statute gave rise to a negligence per se claim, and a jury awarded B.J.F. 
$75,000 in compensatory and $25,000 in punitive damages.  That was affirmed per 
curiam by an intermediate court; the Florida Supreme Court declined to review.  The 
newspaper petitioned successfully for certiorari. 
Perhaps the change in court personnel over the decade – Burger, Stewart, and 
Powell were gone; Scalia, O’Connor, and Kennedy had arrived – made this a much 
                                                
915 443 U.S. at 103-104. 
916 See Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 517 (White, J., concurring). 
917 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
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tougher decision.  Or perhaps it was the change in leadership from Burger to Rehnquist.  
On its facts, this case did not look all that different from the previous cases.  But Justice 
White, who dissented along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, declared 
that the 6-3 Florida Star decision was the “bottom of the slippery slope” created by the 
previous decisions – in each of which he had concurred.918   
Writing for the majority, Marshall said Cox did not control the case because a police 
report is not a court document and does not carry with it the constitutionally significant 
notions of open trials.  Daily Mail provided the proper rule, Marshall said, but he tweaked 
Burger’s formulation to add a “narrowly tailored” requirement:  “where a newspaper 
publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully 
be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest ord r.”  
And that was not the case here.919  In an opinion that reasonably tracked the substance of 
the press amici briefs, which were substantial, 920 Marshall pointed out that a rape 
victim’s privacy might be a state interest of the highest order under some circumstances, 
but not where the government itself provided the information, albeit inadvertently; tha 
the statute covered only the mass media, and not other forms of dissemination, including 
neighborhood gossip; and that liability would attach without showing fault, making the 
                                                
918 Id. at 553 (White, J., dissenting). 
919 491 U.S. at 541. 
920 Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, the N.Y. Times Co., the 
Miami Herald Publ’g Co., the Trib. Co., the Times Herald Printing Co., McClatchy 
Newspapers, Inc., and the Fla. First Amend. Found., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 
(1989)(No. 87-329),1988 WL 1026321; Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press, Associated Press, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., CBS Inc., Nat’l Ass’n 
of Broadcasters, Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n and Radio-Television 
News Dirs. Ass’n in Support of the Appellant, Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 
(1989)(No. 87-329), 1988 WL 1026323. 
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publication of truthful information even less protected than publication of a libelous 
falsehood.921 
 The Supreme Court has heard one more case in this line – Bartnicki v. Vopper922 –
with an outcome similarly favorable to the press.  Before that case was decided in 2001, 
however, it was not at all clear whether it would be controlled by and continue this line of
cases, or whether the Court would treat it more like a newsgathering case.  Bartnicki 
clearly had aspects of both and might very well have come out the other way. We explor  
that story at length in Chapter 8, but first turn to the newsgathering cases to se why 
treating Bartnicki as a newsgathering case would have been disastrous for the press’s 
constitutional litigators.  Chapter 7 will survey the newsgathering cases since the mid- 
1970s, but we begin with a case study of the seminal newsgathering case, United States v. 
Caldwell, one of three cases the Court consolidated in 1972 under the caption Branzburg 
v. Hayes.923  
                                                
921 491 U.S. at 538-41.  Ever since the Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323 (1974), all libel plaintiffs had to prove at least some degree of fault 
(typically negligence or actual malice) on the part of the defendant.  See supra note 725 
and accompanying text.  
922 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
923 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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Chapter 6 – Branzburg v. Hayes: A House Divided 
 
A.  Seeking a Testimonial Privilege    
1.  The Caldwell Case 
 Earl Caldwell was born in Clearfield, Pa., and attended the University of Buffalo 
as a business major until, as an African-American, he became disillusioned by racism in 
the insurance industry.  On returning to Clearfield, Caldwell landed a job on the local 
newspaper, The Progress, where he became sports editor.  From there, he moved on to 
the Lancaster Intelligencer-Journal, and then to the Rochester, N.Y., Democrat and 
Chronicle, where he first began writing on racial issues.  In 1965, he began reporting for 
the New York Herald Tribune, moving briefly to the New York Post when the Herald 
Tribune closed.  He joined The New York Times in 1967.924  
 Caldwell was one of a number of black reporters hired in the mid- to late 1960s 
by the mainstream press to cover race relations, particularly the urban rioting that was 
largely inaccessible to white reporters.925 Gene Roberts points out that, until then, only a 
handful of black reporters worked on white dailies – 31 in 1955, according to Ebony
magazine.926 Caldwell recalls the new influx of black reporters hired to cover, not only 
the riots, but also the dramatic changes occurring in the black community, led to the 
formation of the New York Association of Black Journalists, which would play a critical 
                                                
924 Biographical information on Earl Caldwell comes from the Robert C. Maynard 
Institute for Journalism Education, where Caldwell is a founding director. Available at 
Earl Caldwell Directory, http://www.maynardije.org/news/features/caldwell/Biography-
EarlCaldwell.  Additional information comes from the author’s interview with Earl
Caldwell on Feb. 11, 2009 [hereinafter Caldwell Interview](notes on file with author).   
925 ROBERTS &  KLIBANOFF, supra note 783 at 396. 
926 Id. at 365. 
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part in his story.927 
 In the fall of 1968, the Times assigned Caldwell to cover the Black Panther Party 
in the San Francisco Bay area, and he developed a confidential relationship with the 
Panthers that enabled him to write stories “that no one else in the country could have 
written.”928 Caldwell’s stories from the period point to access to Panther headquarters and 
personalities that could not help but attract official attention. 
In the black room of an apartment deep in the Fillmore slum a bearded 
youth in an Afro hair style uncovered a stack of rifles that was only partly 
hidden in a dark corner.  He said nothing but began wrapping the weapons 
in robes and old blankets, preparing to transport them to Oakland, where 
[Huey] Newton has been jailed for nearly a year.  Some were high-
powered lever action rifles.  Others appeared to be automatic weapons.  
“The verdict [in the Newton trial] is irrelevant,” the youth said. “The sky 
is the limit.929 
 
It is well past midnight and quiet out on Shattuck Avenue.  The liquor 
store on the corner is empty, and the lights are already out in the barbeque 
shop next door.  But up in the middle of the block, up there in the two-
story brownstone that the Black Panther party occupies, a dash of yellow 
light slips through an upstairs window.  They are still there, up there in 
those cluttered, noisy rooms behind windows covered with huge steel 
plates and walls lined with bulging, dusty sandbags.930 
 
In late 1969, the FBI began calling Caldwell every day, asking him to spy on his source .    
Caldwell refused to cooperate, and, on the advice of bureau chief Wallace Turner,  
eventually stopped answering the telephone.  “They were hounding me for over a 
month,” Caldwell says, warning “‘We’re not playing.  This is not a game.  If you won’t 
                                                
927 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924. 
928 MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS 37 (1979). 
929 Earl Caldwell, Angry Panthers Talk of War and Unwrap Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 
10, 1968, at 30. 
930 Earl Caldwell, Declining Black Panthers Gather New Support from Repeated Clashes 
with Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1969, at 64. 
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talk to us, you’ll tell it to the court.’”931 
 When the federal marshal initially came to the Times bureau with a subpoena, 
Caldwell was out.  Turner urged him to destroy his files, then do some reporting from 
Alaska until it all blew over.  Caldwell did destroy most of the files he had been saving to 
write a book, including information on Panthers he had not written about in the 
newpapers (“Panthers I keep in my pocket,” he called them).  But once the material was 
destroyed, he says,  he “didn’t have the heart” to go to Alaska.932   
 On February 2, 1970, Caldwell was served with a subpoena duces tecum ordering 
him to appear before a federal grand jury in the Northern District of California.933  He 
was told to bring his notes and recorded interviews with the Panther leadership and to 
testify as to the purposes and activities of the Party.934 Caldwell believes the FBI broke 
into the Times bureau, or tapped its telephones, or both, because some of the Panthers 
named in the subpoena had been “in his pocket” and never written about.935  In any event, 
he objected to the scope of the subpoena, and his scheduled appearance was postponed.936  
On March 16, however, he received a second subpoena, without the requirement that he 
produce documents.937  Caldwell and the Times moved to quash on the ground that 
requiring Caldwell to testify before the grand jury would “suppress vital First
                                                
931 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924.  See also VAN GERPEN, supra note 811, at 37-38. 
932 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924. 
933 Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, in Sup. Ct. App. of Records and Briefs for 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)[hereinafter Branzburg App.], United States v. 
Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)(No. 70-57) at 4.  A subpoena duces tecum requires the 
respondent to bring prescribed documents to the hearing.  
934 Id. 
935 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924. 
936 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1083 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1970). 
937 Subpoena to Testify Before the Grand Jury, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, 




  Caldwell was supported by a number of affidavits from New York Times and 
Newsweek reporters, as well as an amicus curiae brief from CBS News, with affidavits 
from its leading correspondents; 939 the government filed three memoranda in opposition 
to the motion to quash, each supported by affidavits.940   
 Behind the scenes, however, all was not nearly so harmonious.  According to 
Caldwell, the Times initially hired the San Francisco law firm Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro 
to defend him.941  When he met with John Bates, the attorney assigned to his case, 
Caldwell recalls that the lawyer told him, “We have a problem out here with law and 
order.  I’m sure that some of your material ought to be turned over to the FBI.” 942  Bates 
                                                
938 Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, supra note 933, at 4.  James Goodale, then 
General Counsel of The New York Times Company, says the company intervened as 
owner of the work product of its reporter. James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the 
Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 Hastings L. J. 709, 735 (1975). 
939 Affidavits Attached to Motion to Quash, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, 
Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-57), at 9-61.   
940 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, in Branzburg 
App., supra note 933, Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-57), at 62-79 (includes two 
supplemental memoranda).  
941 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924.   
942 Id. Publicly, the Times editorialized against the subpoenas, but its support for Caldwell 
was equivocal:  
 
 People whose jobs, associations, or reputations are at stake cannot 
be expected to speak freely on an off-the-record basis if they have reason 
to fear that both their identity and the totality of their remarks will be 
turned over to the police. 
 The attendant and even more serious danger is that the entire 
process will create the impression that the press operates as an 
investigative agency for government rather than as an independent force 
dedicated to the unfettered flow of information to the public… 
 …. 
 This newspaper and all the mass media have the same duties as 
other organizations or individuals to cooperate in the processes of justice.  
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told Caldwell to bring all of his material to the office, meet with Times Co. Executive 
Vice President Harding Bancroft, who was flying out to oversee the case, and together 
they would decide what should be turned over. 943 
 Determined to find his own lawyer, Caldwell sought help from the New York 
Association of Black Journalists.  That connection led him to the  NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund (LDF), who found the perfect lawyer for the case.  Anthony G. Amsterdam had 
done a number of death penalty cases for LDF and, in 1969, had helped in the appeal of 
Black Panther Bobby Seale.  He was teaching at Stanford Law School at the time, and 
agreed to hear Caldwell’s story.944 
 Caldwell was initially reluctant to talk with another white lawyer, but he had 
nowhere else to turn.  He called Amsterdam around midnight and drove to his home in 
Los Altos.  When Amsterdam told Caldwell he had a “legal right to refuse” to testify, 
Caldwell was thrilled.  Amsterdam took the case pro bono, and he, not Caldwell, attended 
the strategy meeting with Bancroft the next day.  When Caldwell arrived some h urs 
later, Bancroft indicated that he was delighted with Amsterdam and wanted to hire him.  
Amsterdam refused to accept money from the paper.945   
 On April 6, the District Court denied the motion to quash, but issued a protective 
order limiting the scope of Caldwell’s testimony to information given to him for 
                                                                                                                                                 
But neither justice nor democracy will benefit if the subpoena power is 
misused to abridge the independence and effectiveness of the press. 
 
Subpoenas on the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1970, at 42.  
943 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924. 
944 Id.   
945 Id.;  see also Nadya Labi, A Man Against the Machine, The Law School: The 
Magazine of the New York University School of Law, Autumn 2007, at 15. 
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publication.946 The court also stayed the effective date of its order pending appeal to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,947 but the appeal was dismissed by the Ninth 
Circuit “apparently on the ground that the District Court order was not appealable.” 948 
 Caldwell received yet a third subpoena on May 22, 1970, and the District Court 
again ordered attendance under the protective order.949  Fearing for his personal safety, 
Caldwell refused to appear before the grand jury in secret.950  The District Court found 
Caldwell in contempt, and he again appealed to the Ninth Circuit.951 
 According to Caldwell, the Times Company was furious at the appeal.  The 
company ordered him back to New York to discuss the matter with General Counsel 
James Goodale.  Caldwell remembers Goodale “wagging his finger in front of my face, 
saying ‘you keep pushing it and you’re going to get a bad law written.’”952  Goodale’s 
prediction would ultimately come true, but not in the Ninth Circuit.  Caldwell, who did 
not attend the argument, said Amsterdam persuaded the court that ruining Caldwell’s 
career and risking his life was too high a price for a grand jury appearance wher  no 
confidences would be revealed.953  
 The Ninth Circuit reversed on November 16, 1970, ordering the contempt 
                                                
946 In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (mem.). 
947 Id. at 362. 
948 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1083 n.2. 
949 Id. 
950 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924. 
951 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1083 n.2. 
952 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924. 
953 Id. Goodale says one of the reasons that Amsterdam decided to appeal the appearance 
issue after winning a qualified privilege in the district court was an apprehension that the 
government might possibly penetrate the privilege proposed there by Caldwell in some 
unknown respect, forcing testimony, albeit of an extremely limited nature, from 




judgment vacated and holding that “where it has been shown that the public’s First 
Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist to submit 
to secret Grand Jury interrogation, the Government must respond by demonstrating a 
compelling need for the witness’s presence before the judicial process properly can issue 
to require attendance.”954 The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted 
on May 3, 1971, along with petitions from Paul Branzburg and Paul Pappas, whose cases 
are discussed below.955   
2.  The Branzburg Case 
 In 1969, Paul Branzburg was a 27-year-old reporter for the Louisville Courier-
Journal, where he served as a member of a special assignment group doing investigati  
journalism.956 Branzburg had received an A.B. from Cornell University in 1963, a J.D. 
from Harvard Law School in 1966, and an M.S. Cum Laude from Columbia University 
Graduate School of Journalism in 1967.  His investigative work on the use of narcotics 
and other issues had been recognized on numerous occasions, and he was nominated 
twice for the Pulitzer Prize based on stories dealing with drugs and agricultural subsidies.  
 On November 15, 1969, the Courier-Journal carried a story by Branzburg 
describing his observations of two Louisville “hippies” synthesizing hashish from 
                                                
954 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1089. 
955 Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 
U.S. 942 (1971) and In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971). Caldwell opposed the petition for 
certiorari on several grounds, none of which was or is particularly compelling.  Indeed, 
the brief merely “suggests that this case presents an inopportune occasion for the exercise 
of the certiorari jurisdiction.”  Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Caldwell v. United States, 
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970) (No. 26025). 
956 Affidavit of Paul M. Branzburg, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 51-52.  
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marijuana in a makeshift lab.957 Branzburg wrote: “‘I don’t know why I’m letting you do 
this story,’ [Larry] said quietly. ‘To make the narcs (narcotics detectiv s) mad, I guess.  
That’s the main reason.’ However, Larry and his partner asked for and received a promise 
that their names would be changed.”958  The article also included a photograph of hands 
working with hashish.959 
 Branzburg was subpoenaed shortly thereafter by the Jefferson County grand jury; 
he appeared, but declined to identify the “Larry” and “Jack” of his story.960  Branzburg’s 
counsel, Edgar A. Zingman, argued that Kentucky’s shield law961 permitted Branzburg to 
protect his sources, but Judge J. Miles Pound rejected the argument and directed 
Branzburg to answer the question.962  Zingman objected, citing both the shield law and 
the press clause of the First Amendment, and petitioned the Court of Appeals for an 
injunction against enforcement of Pound’s order.963  The petition urged the Court to grant 
relief based on the state shield law, the state constitution, and the United States 
Constitution “as an interference with the exercise of freedom of the press [which] ould 
                                                
957 Paul M. Branzburg, The Hash They Make Isn’t To Eat, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 
15, 1969.   
958 Id. at 3-4. 
959 408 U.S. at 667. 
960 Id. at 668.  
961 The statute provides that “No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal 
proceeding or trial before any court, or before any grand or petit jury, or befre the 
presiding officer of any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, 
or any committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative body, or any committee 
thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or obtained by him, and 
published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is 
engaged or employed, or with which he is connected.” KY  REV. STAT. § 421.100 (2009).   
962 Order, In re: 141087 in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972) (No. 70-85), at 6.    
963 Petition for Petition for Temporary and Permanent Restraining Order and Writ of 
Mandamus, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 
70-85), at 8. 
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permit courts to destroy that confidential relationship which is essential to a free
press….”964  
 The Court of Appeals granted a temporary restraining order the same day,965 but a 
year later denied the petition over a single dissent.966 Branzburg filed a motion to 
reconsider967 based on the newly issued opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v. United States.968  In January 1971, the Court of Appeals 
issued a revised opinion without substantive change.969 The Court did not address the 
constitutional issue and Caldwell was never mentioned by name.970 A further motion to 
stay the order pending petition for certiorari971 was denied.972 
 Even before the revised opinion was issued, Branzburg had published two more 
controversial stories based on observations and interviews with Kentucky drug users.973 
                                                
964 Id. 
965 Order of the Court Granting Temporary Restraining Order, in Bra zburg App., supra 
note 816, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 21. 
966Opinion of the Court by Commissioner Vance Dismissing Petition for Writ of 
Prohibition and Writ of Mandamus, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 
U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 13.   
967 Motion to Reconsider, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972) (No. 70-85), at 21. 
968 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).  
969 Opinion of the Court by Commissioner Vance, supra note 966, at 22.    
970 Id. at 24 n. 1. In that footnote, the court held that Branzburg had abandoned the 
constitutional argument and so limited its consideration to the statutory interpretation of 
protected “sources” under the Kentucky shield law.  The United States Supreme Court 
would later reject that view, holding the constitutional question was properly preserved 
for appeal.  See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 671 n.6.  
971 Motion for an Order Staying the Effective Date of the Court’s Order, in Bra zburg 
App., supra note 816, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 29. 
972 Order (modified Jan. 22, 1971), in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 
U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 29. 
973 Paul M. Branzburg, Pot Problem Byproduct: Disrespect for the Law, THE COURIER-
JOURNAL &  TIMES (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 10, 1971; Paul M. Branzburg, Rope Turns To 
Pot: Once an Industry, Kentucky Hemp Has Become a Drug Problem, THE COURIER-
JOURNAL &  TIMES, Jan. 10, 1971.  
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Once again, he was subpoenaed, this time to appear before the Franklin County Grand 
Jury,974 and once again, he refused, submitting instead a motion to quash the subpoena.975 
At the same time, he filed another petition with the Kentucky Court of Appeals for 
injunctive relief.976 
 Judge Henry Meigs denied the motion subject to issuance of a protective order in 
accordance with Caldwell.977 After hearing arguments from Branzburg and the 
Commonwealth, Meigs issued the protective order, which limited the testimony 
Branzburg would be required to give to his personal observation of criminal activity.  
Specifically, he would not be required to reveal confidential sources or anything told him 
in confidence.978 
 That same day, the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied the petition for injunctive 
relief979 and issued its opinion three days later.980 The Court of Appeals went to great 
lengths to distinguish Branzburg’s case from the new Caldwell decision in the Ninth 
Circuit on their respective facts.  The court also expressed “misgivings” about the rule 
announced in Caldwell as a “drastic departure from the generally recognized rule” that 
                                                
974 Franklin Circuit Court Grand Jury Subpoena, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 42.  
975 Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 43. 
976 Petition for Temporary and Permanent Restraining Order and Writ of Prohibition, in 
Branzburg App., supra note 816, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 47. 
977 Order (Jan. 18, 1971), in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972) (No. 70-85), at 45. 
978 Protective Order (Jan. 22, 1971), in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 
U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 46. 
979 Order Denying Prohibition and Mandatory Relief, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 54. 
980 Opinion for the Court by Commissioner Vance Denying Petition for Order of 
Prohibition, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 
70-85), at 55.  
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journalists’ sources are not privileged under the First Amendment.981  Once again, 
Branzburg’s motion to stay the order982 was denied.983  Branzburg’s petition for certiorari 
was granted by the United States Supreme Court on May 3, 1971,984 along with petitions 
in the Caldwell and Pappas cases.   
3.  The Pappas Case 
 The Pappas case also involved reporting on the Black Panther movement of the 
early 1970s.  Paul Pappas was a television reporter and photographer  for WTEV-TV in 
New Bedford, Mass.,985 working out of the East Providence, R.I., office.986 On July 30, 
1970, he was called to New Bedford to cover civil disorders there from the Panther 
perspective.  He was given an address for the Party’s storefront headquarters, and, after 
one false start, finally threaded his way through the barricades and gained entry. There, at 
about 3 p.m., he recorded and photographed a prepared statement read by one of the 
Panther leaders.987  
 Pappas apparently took his story back to the station after receiving permission to 
return to Panther headquarters.  He returned around 9 p.m. and was allowed to enter and 
remain inside the headquarters on condition that he not to disclose anything he saw or 
heard there.  If, as the Panthers anticipated, the police raided the headquarters, P ppa  
would be free to report and photograph that as he wished.  The raid never occurred, and 
                                                
981 Id. at 57-59. 
982 Motion for an Order Staying the Effective Date of the Court’s Order and Motion for a 
Temporary Writ of Prohibition, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 
665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 61-62. 
983 Order, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-
85), at 63. 
984 Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (mem.). 
985 See VAN GERPEN, supra note 928, at 39.  




Pappas wrote nothing further about the three hours he spent at Panther headquarters that 
night.988 
 Two months later, Pappas was summoned to appear before the Bristol County 
Grand Jury, where he claimed a First Amendment privilege to decline to answer any 
questions about his observations and conversations at Panther headquarters that night.989  
When he was again directed to appear before the grand jury a few days later, he filed a 
motion to quash on First Amendment grounds and because he feared “that any future 
possibilities of obtaining information to be used in my work would be definitely 
jeopardized, inasmuch as I wouldn’t be trusted or couldn’t gain anyone’s confidence to 
acquire any information in reporting the news as it is.”990 Pappas also said he feared for 
his personal safety.991 
 The motion to quash was denied by the trial judge, who noted the absence of a 
shield law in Massachusetts and held there was no constitutional privilege.  “Pappas does 
not have any privilege and must respond to the subpoena and testify to such questions as 
may be put to him by the Grand Jury relating to what he saw and heard, and the identity 
of any persons he may have seen.”992 The case was reported by the superior court directly 
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for an interlocutory ruling.993   
Despite receiving “helpful and thorough briefs… filed by Massachusetts and New York 
attorneys in behalf of a number of broadcasting, television, and news gathering 
                                                
988 Id.; see also VAN GERPEN, supra note 928, at 39. 
989 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 673. 
990 Brief for Petitioner at 9, In re Paul Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971)(No. 70-94). 
991 VAN GERPEN, supra note 928, at 40. 
992 Report of Superior Court for Bristol County, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, In re 
Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-94), at 8.   
993 Id.   
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interests,”994 the Supreme Judicial Court on January 29, 1971, rejected Caldwell, on 
which Pappas and amici “seemed greatly to rely on.” 995  To follow that opinion, the court 
said, would be to engage in “judicial amendment of the Constitution or judicial 
legislation.”996  The court concluded that the Superior Court was correct in holding that 
Pappas had no privilege.997  As it did in Branzburg and Caldwell, the United States 
Supreme Court granted Pappas’s petition for certiorari on May 3, 1971.998   
4.  In the Supreme Court 
 The three cases were thoroughly briefed in the United States Supreme Court, and  
oral arguments were conducted on February 22, 1972, in Caldwell, and the very next day 
in Branzburg and Pappas.  On June 28, 1972, the Court issued its opinion, with Justice 
Byron R. White writing for the Court.999 The decision has been described and analyzed 
many times,1000 including this author’s own analysis.1001 We return to the opinion in Part 
D; for now, it will suffice to say that the Court reversed Caldwell and affirmed Branzburg 
and Pappas, finding no testimonial privilege for reporters in the First Amendment.  
While Justice White acknowledged that newsgathering qualifies for some measure of 
                                                
994 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 299 n. 2 (Mass. 1971). 
995 Id. at 301-02. 
996 Id. at 302. 
997 Id. at 304. 
998 In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942, 942 (1971). 
999 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 665 (1972). 
1000 See Fargo, supra note 57;Rex X. Heinke & Galit Avitan, Reconciling Branzburg and 
Daily Mail: A Proposal for a Qualified Reporter’s Privilege, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 503, 
503-07 (2006); Leila Wombacher Knox, Note, The Reporter’s Privilege: The Necessity of 
a Federal Shield Law Thirty Years After B anzburg, 28 HASTINGS COMM. &  ENT. L.J. 
125, 137-44 (2006); Kristina Spinneweber, Comment, Branzburg, Who? The Existence of 
a Reporter’s Privilege in Federal Courts, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 317, 318-22 (2006). 
1001 Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That 




First Amendment protection,1002 the Court was deeply divided as to the scope of that 
protection.   
 Writing in dissent, Justice Douglas would have found that journalists have “an 
absolute right not to appear before a grand jury.”1003 Also in dissent, Justice Stewart, 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, would have affirmed the balancing test in 
Caldwell.1004 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, interpreted Justice White’s opinion 
for the Court as requiring courts to strike “a proper balance between freedom of the press 
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal 
conduct.”1005   
 Although Powell’s concurring opinion is sometimes seen as a fifth vote for an 
undefined reporter’s privilege,1006 Justice White’s opinion1007 is more widely viewed as a 
stunning defeat for the press with lasting precedential consequences.  Yet mainstream 
media organizations initiated the litigation that led to the Branzburg decision.  
Mainstream media organizations made the decisions to appeal all of these cases to the 
United States Courts of Appeals and two of them to the United States Supreme Court.  
And mainstream media organizations provided the theoretical foundation for all the 
                                                
1002Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681(“We do not question the significance of free speech, 
press, or assembly to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gatherin  do s 
not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”). 
1003 Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
1004 Id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
1005 Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
1006 See, e.g., In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1315 (1980) (expressing the view that 
Branzburg stands for the proposition that the First Amendment provides some degree of 
protection for reporter’s confidences); ee also Goodale, supra note 938, at 709 
(discussing Justice Powell’s concurrence as supporting a “qualified newsman’s privilege” 
judged on a case-by-case basis). 




appeals through party and amicus briefs.  
   
B. Why Litigate? Journalistic Values at Stake 
 In each of the cases considered in this chapter, the reporters – Earl Caldwell, Paul 
Branzburg, and Paul Pappas – were confronted with three choices: (1) testify before th  
grand jury, breaking one or more promises of confidentiality; (2) refuse to testify and risk 
being jailed for contempt of court; or (3) litigate the issue to avoid either testifying or 
going to jail.  Assuming their employers would pay for litigation, the reporters’ choices 
were not surprising.  But litigation costs money, not only in attorney fees and court costs, 
but also in lost productivity and general distraction.  The logical economic choice for 
their employers would be to encourage the reporters to testify.  As noted above, the 
Times Company initially opposed Caldwell’s refusal to comply with the subpoena1008 and 
his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, but there is no indication that financial considerations 
played a role in that decision.  Moreover, the company ultimately joined Caldwell’s 
motion to quash the original subpoena.1009 
 In the end, all three cases were litigated, suggesting that personal and/or 
journalistic values were at stake here that transcended economics.  Caldwell’s fear for his 
personal safety certainly weighed heavily in his desire to litigate, rather than appear or 
testify, but he never believed that his employer shared that concern.1010  Nor was fear 
Caldwell’s sole motivation; appearing before the grand jury would, at minimum, deprive 
him of  the access he needed to fulfill his self-described “mission to tell the trut, to tell 
                                                
1008 See supra notes 952-53 and accompanying text. 
1009 See supra note 939 and accompanying text.  John Bates of Pillsbury, Madison & 
Sutro represented the Times.  
1010 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924. 
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the story.”1011  The briefs and oral arguments presented in the three cases suggest three 
core journalistic values that might be considered fundamental: 
 1.  Satisfying the public’s “right to know”  
 2.  Upholding the reporter’s ethical responsibility  
 3.  Preventing press entanglement with government1012 
 We turn to the filings to see how these three values were asserted as journalistic 
justifications for finding a reporter’s privilege in the First Amendment. 
1.  Right to Know 
 Much has been written, pro and con, about the public’s so-called “right to 
know.”1013  Often, the question is framed as whether the First Amendment’s press clause 
contemplates something more than the absence of governmental restriction on the right to 
publish the information one already knows, including an affirmative right to acquire 
information in the public interest.  Whatever the legal soundness of that proposition, it is 
axiomatic that the journalistic enterprise depends utterly upon the public’s right to know 
to justify, not only its “preferred position”1014 in our democratic society, but its very 
existence.1015     
                                                
1011 Id. 
1012 See, e.g., Brief of the N.Y. Times Co. et al. as Amici Curiae at 2-4, Caldwell v. 
United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57) (arguing in favor of a qualified 
privilege); Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85) (urging the Court to adopt an 
absolute privilege). 
1013 See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, Public Importance:  Balancing Proprietary Rights and the Right to Know, 21 
CARDOZO ARTS &  ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (2003) (arguing that “the First Amendment’s penumbral ‘right to 
know’ is the source of a ‘public importance test’”). 
1014 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943)(“Freedom of press, freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”).   
1015 BILL KOVACH &  TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 17(2001)( “The 
primary purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be 
free and self-governing.”). 
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 In each of the three Branzburg cases, the argument growing out of this value goes 
something like this:  requiring reporters to testify before grand juries would undermine 
any promise of confidentiality that a reporter might extend to sources of informati n, and 
thus have a chilling effect on sources’ willingness to provide information that the public 
has a right to know.  One or another version of this argument is not only present in each 
of the cases, it is central to all of them.  Paul Branzburg’s argument to the Supreme Court 
states the argument this way: 
 
 A. Newsgathering activities are essential to the effective 
functioning of a free press, and as such are protected by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A significant portion 
of such newsgathering activities is the development by individual 
reporters of confidential informants who give information to the reporter 
with the understanding that some or all of the information or the source of 
such information will not be revealed. 
 
 B. The courts below are attempting to force the Petitioner to appear 
before a grand jury to answer questions pertaining to the identities of such 
informants and unpublished information received from them. Such 
compelled testimony will inevitably discourage these and other informants 
from contacting and talking to reporters, as well as discourage the reporter 
from publishing information gathered from such sources. This inability of 
the press to be able to obtain such information, or its reluctance to use 
such information, is a severe abridgment of the freedom of the press 
protected by the First Amendment.1016 
 
 In his brief for The New York Times and other amici on Caldwell’s behalf, noted 
attorney and Yale law professor Alexander Bickel stated the case even more succinctly: 
 The people’s right to be informed by print and electronic news 
media is thus the central concern of the First Amendment’s Freedom of 
Speech and of the Press Clause.  [If] an obligation is imposed by law on a 
reporter of news to disclose the identity of confidential sources… the 
reporter’s access to news, and therefore the public’s access, will be 
severely constricted and in some circumstances shut off.  The reporter’s 
                                                




access is the public’s access…. (emphasis in original) The issue here is the 
public’s right to know.  That right is the reporter’s by virtue of the proxy 
which the Freedom of the Press Clause of the First Amendment gives to 
the press on behalf of the public.1017   
 
 In its brief supporting Branzburg, the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association (ANPA) argued similarly that “but for the assurance of confidence, many 
controversial issues presented in the daily newspapers of this country would otherwise 
never reach the typesetting stage.”1018  And at oral argument, Branzburg’s attorney, Edgar 
Zingman, insisted that “it is necessary to the functioning of the press, and it has been a 
part of the process of the press, that such confidences be given, and those confidences are 
the condition upon which information is available to the public.”1019 
 In Pappas and Caldwell, the argument is pressed, not only by the parties and 
amici, but through affidavits from prominent individual journalists.  Pappas’s petition for 
certiorari contains the following footnote: 
 
 In an amicus brief filed in this case by the Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc., before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
correspondents Walter Cronkite, Eric Sevareid, Mike Wallace, Dan Rather 
and Marvin Kalb submitted affidavits strongly asserting the necessity of 
preserving confidentiality in newsgathering and demonstrating that the 
betrayal of news sources and private communications would seriously 
diminish the effectiveness of reporting and the amount and nature of news 
available to the public.  Example after example was given, from talks with 
bartenders to discussions with the President of the United States, in which 
it was essential to preserve confidentiality.1020 
                                                
1017 Brief of the N.Y. Times Co., et al., supra note 1012, at 16.  
1018 Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, supra note 1012, at 8.  
1019 Transcript of Oral Argument, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), 
reprinted in 74 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 678 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. 
1975). 
1020 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth 





   These affidavits, which were originally submitted as part of the record in 
Caldwell, along with others from New York Times and Newsweek reporters,1021 prompted 
the Massachusetts court to remark upon the “substantial news media pressure for 
adoption” of a reporter’s privilege.1022 Indeed, amicus briefs supporting the three 
reporters in these cases were filed at one or another point in the proceedings by more than 
20 major news organizations1023 – each emphasizing the “right to know” value and the 
threat to that value by a chilling effect on sources or self-censorship by reporters.1024   
2.  Ethical Responsibility 
  If the “right to know” value provided the principal justification for finding a 
reporter’s privilege in the First Amendment, the “ethical responsibility” value might be 
seen as a normative supplement to the instrumentalism of “right to know.” As the current 
version of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) Code of Ethics makes clear, 
journalists are expected to keep their promises of confidentiality to sources.1025 Because 
                                                
1021 Affidavits Attached to Supplemental Memorandum of The New York Times and 
Newsweek, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Caldwell v. United States, 408 U.S. 775 
(1972) (No. 70-57) at 37-50  
1022 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 303 n. 11 (Mass. 1971).  
1023 The organizations were the American Broadcasting Co., American Newspaper Publishers Association, 
American Newspaper Guild, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Associated Press Broadcasters’ 
Association, Associated Press Managing Editors Associati n, Association of American Publishers, Authors 
League of America, Columbia Broadcasting System, Chicago Daily News, Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago 
Tribune Co., Dow Jones, National Press Photographers Association, National Broadcasting Co., 
Newsweek, New York Times, Radio Television News Directors Association, Sigma Delta Chi, Washington 
Post Co. and a coalition of religious broadcasters, as well as the American Civil Liberties Union. See infra 
notes 1118, 1120-23, 1125-29. 
1024 See, e.g., Brief of the N.Y. Times Co. et al., supra note 1012, at 35 (“[R]equiring a 
reporter to disclose information obtained in confidence would chill…a substantial flow of 
news to the public.”). 
1025 SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS (1996), 
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.pdf     (“Identify sources whenever feasible. The public is 
entitled to as much information as possible on sources’ reliability.  Always question 
sources’ motives before promising anonymity. Clarify conditions attached to any promise 
made in exchange for information. Keep promises.”). 
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the normative argument is far less compelling to a court, however, it is barely mentioned 
within the Branzburg advocacy documents. 
 The “ethical responsibility” notion does surface in the Radio Television News 
Directors Association (RTNDA) brief, at least in a footnote: 
 Until now reporters have often risked contempt convictions in 
challenging compulsory process for the disclosure of confidential 
information; they have been encouraged to do so by a belief that there is 
First Amendment underpinning for their position, as well as by moral 
commitments to informants.  In this manner confidential relationships have 
been supported by the reporter’s fulfillment of his promise not to betray 
confidences, even though several lower courts have refused to recognized 
a constitutional privilege.  If, however, the Supreme Court were to rule in 
such a way as to remove or seriously compromise the legal underpinning 
of the basic ethic of journalists, a reporter would not be so likely to 
guarantee confidentiality unconditionally.1026 
 
 Notwithstanding this decidedly minimal treatment in the Branzburg cases, the 
“ethical responsibility” rationale exists independently within the journalism co munity.  
Ironically, the evidence comes from the betrayal of a confidential source the l d to 
another Supreme Court opinion written by Justice White.  In Cohen v. Cowles Media,1027 
reporters for the Minneapolis Star Tribune and St. Paul Pioneer Press, among others, 
accepted an offer by Dan Cohen, a Republican campaign operative, for information 
concerning Marlene Johnson, the Democratic-Farmer-Laborite candidate for lieutenant 
governor of Minnesota, in exchange for a promise of confidentiality.1028  Cohen then 
provided the reporters with court records showing the candidate had two trivial arrests, 
leading to dismissed charges in one case and a vacated conviction in the other.  
                                                
1026 Brief for Radio Television News Dirs. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-57) at *7 n. 4 
(emphasis added). 
1027 Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
1028 Easton, supra note 884, at 1153-54. 
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 Editors at both papers independently decided to print the story, not of the 
candidate’s indiscretions, but of Cohen’s “dirty trick” and, over their reporters’ protests, 
to identify Cohen by name.1029 As the author has previously noted: 
While the Pioneer Press editors buried Dan Cohen's name deep in the 
story, the Star Tribune editors featured it, apparently reasoning that the 
value of the story, if any, lay in Cohen's conduct, not Johnson's. The Star 
Tribune also attacked Cohen in its editorial pages, but neither paper 
reported that it had broken a promise of confidentiality with Cohen.1030 
   
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court upheld Cohen’s claim for damages against
the newspapers for breaking their promise of confidentiality.1031 
 From the editors’ perspective, the public’s “right to know” trumped the reporters’ 
“ethical responsibility” to keep their promises.  From the protesting reporters’ 
perspective, the reverse was true.  Either way, this episode shows that these valu  are 
independent, if related, and both are fundamental; the Cohen case is still debated in 
newsrooms today.  Cohen is discussed at greater length in Chapter 7. 
3.  Government Entanglement 
 The third journalistic value found in the Branzburg documents is an aversion to 
serving as, or at least being perceived as, an agent of the government.  Again, this value 
is not unrelated to the “right to know,” but has implications beyond newsgathering to 
suggest an effect on reporting as well.  Indeed, two of Kovach and Rosenstiel’s nine 
“elements of journalism” stress independence: independence from faction and 
independence from power.1032    
 As discussed in ANPA’s amicus brief in Caldwell, “the subpoenas involved in 
                                                
1029 Id. 
1030 Id. 
1031 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670. 
1032 KOVACH &  ROSENSTEIL, supra note 1015, at 94, 112.  
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these appeals pierce the wall traditionally separating the press and the government.”1033 
ANPA quoted extensively on that point from the Ninth Circuit opinion: 
 If the Grand Jury may require appellant to make available to it 
information obtained by him in his capacity as news gatherer, then the 
Grand Jury and the Department of Justice have the power to appropriate 
appellant's investigative efforts to their own behalf – to convert him after 
the fact into an investigative agent of the Government.  The very concept 
of a free press requires that the news media be accorded a measure of 
autonomy; that they should be free to pursue their own investigations to 
their own ends without fear of governmental interference; and that they 
should be able to protect their investigative processes.1034      
 
 The Newspaper Guild’s brief in Caldwell and Pappas also quoted the Ninth 
Circuit passage, and further asserted that widespread use of the press as a government 
agency was responsible for increasing violence against reporters by police and 
participants during public demonstrations. 1035  “Not only does the prolific use of the 
subpoena impress a governmental function on the press; the practice, in addition to the 
destruction of communication with confidential news sources, significantly impairs the 
ability of the newsman to report public events of great significance.”1036  
 Still another danger of “government entanglement” caught the ACLU’s attention: 
abuse of the grand jury process to harass reporters.  Once conceived as a buffer between
the state and the people, the civil liberties group said, grand juries have increasingly 
become “rubber stamps” for prosecutors and instruments for police investigation.1037   
 The prosecutor simply sits back, waits for the reporter to 
                                                
1033 Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, supra note 1012, at 8-9. 
1034 Id. at 9 (citing Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1970).  
1035 Brief for the Am. Newspaper Guild et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 7, United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (70-57), and In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 
665 (1972) (70-94).  
1036 Id. 
1037 Brief for the Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 28-29,  United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (70-57). 
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investigate and then causes the grand jury to issue a sweeping subpoena, 
regardless of the effects on the journalist’s relationship to his confidential 
sources.  Equally dangerous is the possibility that overbroad grand jury 
subpoenas will be used to penalize reporters who write news stories which 
the government finds objectionable and to deter such stories in the 
future.1038 
  
 All of the foregoing demonstrates convincingly that the cases consolidated in 
Branzburg v. Hayes involved values the press considers fundamental to its constitutional 
role.  A successful outcome in the litigation would have yielded statutory and/or 
constitutional interpretations that would have vindicated those values and greatly 
facilitated the work of all journalists.  But that alone is not enough to justify the time and 
treasure the press put into this case.  Part C examines the relative costs, benefits, and 
likelihood of success of the Branzburg litigation. 
 
C. Why Litigate? Strategic Considerations 
 As noted above, the fact that these cases were litigated at all suggests that 
fundamental values were at stake; in this section, we posit that the decision to pursue 
these cases also depended on the parties’ assessment of the benefits of success, the ost  
of failure, and the probability of either outcome.  We begin by exploring the factors that 
may have led the media lawyers to think they could win.   
1.  Probability of Success 
 To reconstruct the participants’ perception as to the probability of success or 
failure in the Branzburg cases, we will first examine precedent and related doctrine, 
particularly in the lower courts, where prior decisions may be binding and where respect 
for precedent and other canons of jurisprudence are more compelling than in the highest 
                                                
1038 Id. at 29. 
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courts. Second, we will analyze judicial preferences, including political ideology, judicial 
philosophy, and attitude toward the press, from the litigants’ perspective.  Finally, we 
will look at public policy, as articulated in statutes and executive practices. 
a.  Precedent 
 As a general proposition, precedent and other jurisprudential considerations 
should have operated to discourage the litigants from pursuing these cases.  But the 
Caldwell decision in the Ninth Circuit may well have created the impression in the 
Branzburg and Pappas camps that the weight of precedent could be overcome.1039  
 The most widely cited judicial precedent rejecting the reporter’s testimonial 
privilege was Garland v. Torre,1040 an appeal from a criminal contempt holding.  In the 
underlying case, singer Judy Garland had filed a libel claim against the Columbia 
Broadcasting System based on allegedly defamatory statements about her that appeared 
in a New York Herald Tribune column.  The statements were attributed to an unnamed 
CBS executive, and columnist Marie Torres refused to identify the source of the 
statements when ordered to do so by the court.  In an opinion authored by then Judge 
(later Justice) Potter Stewart, a Second Circuit panel declined to find a constitutional 
privilege that would protect Torres’s source.1041 
 The court accepted the “hypothesis that compulsory disclosure of a journalist’s 
confidential sources of information entail an abridgment of press freedom by iposing 
                                                
1039 Pappas specifically told the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that he would 
file a petition for certiorari “[i]n view of the conflict between the decision of our court in 
the Matter of Paul Pappas and the decision of the Federal Court in the Matter of Caldwell 
vs. United States.” Application for Stay of the Order of the Supreme Judicial Court, in 
Branzburg App., supra note 933, In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-94), at 24. 
1040 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). 
1041 Id. at 547. 
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some limitation upon the availability of news.”1042  But the court pointed out that the 
freedom so abridged is not absolute. “What must be determined is whether the interest to 
be served by compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies some  
impairment of this First Amendment freedom.”1043 
 Quoting Chief Justice Hughes’s admonition that giving testimony is the duty of 
every citizen,1044 the court extended the principle to the press.  “If an additional First 
Amendment liberty – the freedom of the press – is here involved, we do not hesitate to 
conclude that it too must give place under the Constitution to a paramount public interest 
in the fair administration of justice.”1045 
 Although Garland was not binding on any of the courts involved in the 
Branzburg cases, Judge Stewart had noted that no previous court had found a reporter’s 
privilege in the absence of a statute.1046  While proponents of the privilege tried to 
distinguish Garland,1047 the precedents overwhelmingly favored compelling reporters’ 
testimony, and, of course, Judge Stewart had become Justice Stewart. 
 The Ninth Circuit opinion in Caldwell was issued eleven days before the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals denied Paul Branzburg’s motion to quash in Branzburg v. 
Pound.  Ten days later, Branzburg filed a motion to reconsider that decision in light of 
the Caldwell holding.1048 The court reissued its original opinion, adding only a footnote 
to assert that Branzburg had abandoned his constitutional argument, rendering Caldwell 
                                                
1042 Id. at 548. 
1043 Id. 
1044 Id. at 549 (quoting Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932)). 
1045 Id. 
1046 Id. at 550. 
1047 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1016, at 39 (distinguishing Garland). 
1048 Motion to Reconsider, in Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 655 
(1972) (No. 70-85), at 21-22. 
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irrelevant without mentioning it.1049 
 By the time Branzburg v. Meigs1050 reached the Kentucky Court of Appeals, 
Caldwell had been integrated into Branzburg’s case.  As noted above, the court both 
distinguished Branzburg from Caldwell on their facts and expressed “misgivings” about 
the rule announced in Caldwell.1051 Nevertheless, the Caldwell decision may well have 
given Branzburg’s team the confidence that, in taking the case up to the Supreme Court, 
the weight of precedent would now be a much closer call. 
 In Massachusetts, meanwhile, Pappas relied on the protective order granted by th  
District Court in Caldwell to support his motion to quash.1052 Superior Court Justice 
Frank E. Smith noted that reliance, but otherwise did not address the new case in ruling 
that Pappas had no privilege.  By the time the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed Smith’s
ruling, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Caldwell had been out for about six weeks.  Again, as 
discussed above, the precedent did not move the court,1053 but may well have encouraged 
Pappas to press on.    
 But if the favorable Caldwell decisions encouraged Branzburg and Pappas to 
appeal their cases to the Supreme Court, precedent provides no explanation for 
Caldwell’s decision to incur a contempt judgment by refusing to appear before the grand 
jury under the District Court’s protective order.  Indeed, we know that Times Co. General 
Counsel James Goodale and Caldwell attorney Anthony Amsterdam looked at the same 
precedents and reached different conclusions.  Amsterdam unequivocally told Caldwell 
                                                
1049 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 346 n. 1 (Ky.  1971). 
1050 Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Ky. 1971). 
1051 See supra note 981 and accompanying text. 
1052 Report of Superior Court for Bristol County, supra note 992, at 7.  
1053 See supra notes 995-96 and accompanying text. 
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that he had a “right” to refuse to testify,1054 while Goodale vigorously opposed Caldwell’s 
taking the appeal because he feared it would make “bad law.”1055  Goodale, the more 
experienced media lawyer, got the outcome right in the end, but Amsterdam was more in 
tune with his client’s wishes and the case moved ahead.   
b.  Judicial Preferences 
 One possible key to Amsterdam’s assertion may have been a sense that the federal 
courts in California would be as sympathetic as any, anywhere in the country.1056  Judge 
Zirpoli had been appointed by President John F. Kennedy and had served about ten years 
when the Caldwell case came up. 1057   For much of his career, however, he had been a 
                                                
1054 See supra note 945 and accompanying text. 
1055 See supra note 952 and accompanying text. 
1056 Caldwell is the focus of this discussion because it seems highly unlikely that either 
Branzburg or Pappas would have been motivated to pursue their cases by the ideology of 
their states’ appellate courts.  All seven justices who heard Pappas’s case before  the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court were appointed by Republican governors.  
Compare Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justices of the Supreme Judicial 
Court, http://www.massreports.com/justices/alljustices.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009)(listing the justices’ respective appointment dates), with Former Governors of 
Massachusetts from 1780, 
http://www.netstate.com/states/government/ma_formergov.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) 
(listing the Governors of Massachusetts).  Note, however, that according to the Justices of 
the Supreme Judicial Court Web site, Jacob Spiegel was appointed in 1960; however, his 
memorials state he was appointed in 1961, thereby making Governor Volpe the 
appointing governor.  Compare Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justices of the 
Supreme Judicial Court, http://www.massreports.com/justices /alljustices.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2009), with Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Memorials, 
http://www.massreports.com/memorials/394ma1115.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). The 
seven justices who heard Branzburg’s case before the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the 
state’s only appellate court at the time, were all elected. S e Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
Court of Justices, http://courts.ky.gov/ courtofappeals (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (noting 
that “fourteen judges, two elected from seven appellate court districts, serve on th  Court 
of Appeals”).  Having lost decisively at the trial court level, both Branzburg and Pppas 
were likely to pursue their appeals through the state courts regardless of actual or 
perceived ideological preferences.   
1057 Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/ home.nsf/hisj (search for Zirpoli) (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).  
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prosecutor, serving as assistant district attorney for the City and County of San Francisco 
from 1928-1932, and as assistant United States attorney in Northern California frm 
1933-1944.1058   
 On the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Republican appointees held an 8 to 5 edge 
over Democrats in 1970.1059  The three-judge panel that Caldwell ultimately drew 
included Eisenhower appointee Charles Merton Merrill1060 and Johnson appointee Walter 
Raleigh Ely, Jr.,1061 as well as William R. Jameson,1062 a U.S. District Judge for the 
District of Montana, sitting by designation, another Eisenhower appointee. So if the 
ideology of the judges was a motivating factor, it was not predictable by party affiliation. 
Yet the overwhelmingly favorable opinion issued by the Ninth Circuit panel made it all 
but inevitable that the government would seek and the Supreme Court would grant 
certiorari.1063 
 Presumably, both Amsterdam and Goodale considered the preferences of the 
Supreme Court justices at some point during the litigation.  But that consideration would 
have been strategically valuable only on or before June 4, 1970, when Caldwell incurred 
the contempt judgment that formed the basis for his appeal to the Ninth Circuit.  From 
that moment on, the decision to take the case to the Supreme Court was effectively ou  of 
his hands.  
 The Burger Court in 1970 was ideologically divided into three groups.  On the left 
                                                
1058 Id. 
1059 Id. 
1060 Federal Judicial Center, supra note 1057 (search for Merrill). 
1061 Id. (search for Ely). 
1062 Id. (search for Jameson). 
1063 See LEE EPSTEIN &  JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 85 (1998) 




were Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas, very nearly First Amendmt 
absolutists, and usually reliable liberals William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall.1064  On 
the right were Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun, then called “The 
Minnesota Twins” for their matched conservatism.1065  In the center were moderate 
Republicans John Marshall Harlan and Potter Stewart and conservative Democrat Byron 
White.1066  Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, who would ultimately hear the 
Branzburg case, had not yet replaced Black and Harlan. 
 The justices sitting in June 1970 had voted in 16 press-related cases over the 
years.  Of the 87 votes cast by these nine justices in those 16 cases, 61 votes or 70% of 
the total were cast in favor of the press’s position; only 26 votes or 30% were cast against 
the press’s position.1067  Amsterdam and Goodale were certainly aware that Black and 
Harlan were nearing retirement and that Richard Nixon was president, but the likeli ood 
of success must still have looked very strong based on ideological preferences in June 
1970.                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 Moreover, Justice White’s hostility toward the press had not begun to manifest 
itself before June 1970.  To be sure, he had written one opinion that could be interpreted 
                                                
1064 See CHARLES M. LAMB &  STEPHEN C. HALPERN, THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL 
AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 110, 133 (1991). 
1065 Id. at 68. 
1066 See id. at 8, 193, 376. 
1067 The identification of press-related cases was taken from Eric B. Easton, The Press as 
an Interest Group: Mainstream Media in the United States Supreme Court, 14 UCLA 
Ent. L. Rev. 247 (2007), Appendix.  See also Chapter 9 infra. The voting records came 
from Congressional Quarterly, Inc., CQ Press Electronic Library, Supreme Court
Collection, http://library.cqpress.com (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
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as denying broadcasters of their full First Amendment rights,1068 and two separate 
opinions1069 expressing reservations against broadly interpreting the standards in New 
York Times v. Sullivan.1070 But the Red Lion decision had been unanimous against the 
broadcasters, and White had supported the broadcasters in another important case, Estes 
v. Texas,1071 by dissenting from the opinion that cameras in the courtroom were per se 
unconstitutional.1072  White had also unequivocally supported Sullivan itself and most of 
its progeny through 1970.1073  Although White’s antipathy toward the press is said to date 
from his football days,1074 its clear expression would only come later.1075  The Court had 
                                                
1068 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969)(upholding the personal attack 
and editorial reply rules of the FCC’s “Fairness Doctrine” against challenge by 
broadcasters). 
1069Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 583 (1968)(White, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part)(refusing to follow the Court’s dictum suggesting that proof of harm 
would be required to fire a public school teacher who made intentionally or recklessly 
false statements about the school board), and Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 
398 U.S. 6, 22-23 (1970) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)(insisting that the press 
could be held liable for using words that might have both innocent and libelous 
meanings).  
1070 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(requiring public officials to prove actual malice to prevail in a 
libel suit). 
1071 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
1072 Id. at 615-16 (White, J., dissenting). 
1073 See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 173-74 (1967) (joining a dissent more favorable to the press than the 
majority opinion); Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-91(1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 
U.S. 75, 80-81 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). 
1074 DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 449-50 (1998). 
1075 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390-91 (1974) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“The communications industry has increasingly become concentrated in  
few powerful hands operating very lucrative businesses reaching across the Nation and 
into almost every home. Neither the industry as a whole nor its individual components 
are easily intimidated, and we are fortunate that they are not. Requiring them to pay for 
the occasional damage they do to private reputation will play no substantial part in their 
future performance or their existence.”); Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 263 
(1974)(White, J., concurring) (“To me it is a near absurdity to so deprecate individual 
dignity, as the Court does in Gertz, and to leave the people at the complete mercy of the 
230
 
not heard any newsgathering cases before 1970, and Caldwell’s legal team could not have 
anticipated the strength of White’s opposition to extending First Amendment protection 
to newsgathering activities.1076 
 Ironically, Amsterdam must have counted Justice Potter Stewart among the likely 
opponents of the privilege. After all, he had been the author of the oft-cited Garland v. 
Torre1077 decision when he served on the Second Circuit, and there was no reason to 
believe he would change his mind.1078  A reasonable head count of the then-current 
Supreme Court bench would have found Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall solidly 
in favor of the privilege; Harlan, Burger, Blackmun, and Stewart solidly against; and 
White very probably in favor. 
 In short, if Amsterdam had conducted an analysis of judicial preferences before
June 4, 1970, that analysis would have suggested that success was at least as likely as 
failure, if not more likely, and he would not have been dissuaded from taking the case 
further.  Of course, no one could have predicted the appointments of Powell and 
Rehnquist to the Supreme Court, much less the pivotal role that Powell would come to 
                                                                                                                                                 
press, at least in this stage of our history when the press, as the majority in this case so 
well documents, is steadily becoming more powerful and much less likely to be deterred 
by threats of libel suits.”). 
 
1076 In addition to Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), see White’s majority 
opinions in Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding promises of 
confidentiality from reporters to sources are enforceable against the press) , and Zurcher 
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)(holding neither First nor Fourth Amendment 
prohibited the government from using search warrants to recover evidence believed to be 
in newsrooms).White also joined majority opinions in Houchens v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 
(1978) (holding that the press has no greater right of access to government-held 
information than the general public), Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same), and 
Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (same).  
1077 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). 
1078 See supra notes 1041 and accompanying text. 
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play.1079  To Caldwell, however, it was Rehnquist’s appointment that was most 
problematic.  Caldwell says the late Fred Graham, legal reporter for the Times and later 
CBS News, told him that Rehnquist had been deeply involved in his case while serving in 
the Department of Justice.1080  And he deeply believes that the Times’s half-hearted 
support for his cause undermined Caldwell’s efforts to persuade Rehnquist to recuse 
himself.  Had he done so, the 4-4 decision would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit, 
although it would have no precedential value.1081    
c.  Public Policy 
 To this point, we have suggested that Caldwell may have been encouraged to try 
for a better First Amendment interpretation from the appellate courts based on the liberal 
reputation of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals generally and the still liberal-l aning 
United States Supreme Court, which had overwhelmingly supported the press in recent 
years.  We have further suggested that Branzburg and Pappas may well have been 
encouraged to seek Supreme Court review of their cases, despite the absence of 
compelling precedent, based on the new Caldwell decision in the Ninth Circuit. 
 To help determine how realistic those expectations might have been, we now turn 
to public policy considerations.  Public policy is broadly defined as the expression of the 
people’s will by the political branches of government through statutes and executive 
practice.1082  Here, identifying the prevailing public policy requires us to examine the 
prevalence of reporter’s shield laws and the policies of the Department of Justice on 
                                                
1079 See supra notes 1006 and accompanying text.  
1080 Caldwell Interview, supra note 924.  
1081 Id.  Caldwell points to a memo posted by Managing Editor Abe Rosenthal saying 
“‘We all feel bad for Earl Caldwell and the difficult position he finds himself in.’” Id. 
1082 See BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (8th ed. 2004). 
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issuing subpoenas commanding reporters to testify.  The analysis will show that, while 
only Branzburg had a legitimate expectation based on public policy of a better deal than 
he got from the courts, all three journalists might have been encouraged by new 
Department of Justice rules governing reporters’ testimony. 
  Perhaps the best place to begin a discussion of the relevant public policy is 
Wigmore’s hoary dictum that “the public… has a right to every man’s evidence,”1083 
quoted in one form or another throughout these cases.1084 All testimonial privileges, 
whether grounded in statute, common law, or the Constitution, are exceptions to this 
general rule and, according to traditional principles of interpretation, must therefore be 
narrowly construed.  
 Of the three jurisdictions involved in this case, only Kentucky had enacted a 
testimonial privilege for reporters, often called a reporter’s shield law.1085 That statute 
was the principal basis, along with constitutional arguments, for Branzburg’s initial 
request for injunctive relief and subsequent state court appeals.1086 Ultimately, the Court 
of Appeals ruled that the shield law was inapplicable because it protected only the 
“source” of Branzburg’s information and not his personal observations.1087 
  The court took great pains to distinguish the “source” of any information procured 
by a reporter, whose identity was privileged by the statute, from the “information” itself.  
                                                
1083 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192 (John T. McNaughton rev. 
1961). 
1084 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 
297, 299 (Mass. 1971). 
1085 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2006). To this day, neither 
Massachusetts nor the federal government has enacted a similar statute.
1086 Petition for Temporary and Permanent Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus, in 
Branzburg App., supra note 933, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)(No. 70-85), at 8-11. 
1087 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).  
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Here, Branzburg was not asked to reveal the identity of any informants he may have had, 
the court said, but rather the identity of persons he saw committing a crime.1088   
 In all likelihood the present case is complicated by the fact that the 
persons who committed the crime were probably the same persons who 
informed Branzburg that the crime would be, or was being, committed. If 
so, this is a rare case where informants actually informed against 
themselves. But in that event the privilege which would have protected 
disclosure of their identity as informants cannot be extended beyond their 
role as informants to protect their identity in the entirely different role as 
perpetrators of a crime (emphasis in original).1089  
 
 Otherwise, the court said, a reporter who witnessed the assassination of the 
president or governor, or a bank robbery in progress, or a forcible rape, might not be 
required to identify the perpetrator.1090  Chief Justice Edward P. Hill, writing in dissent, 
rejected that parade of horribles and called the majority view “a strained d 
unnecessarily narrow construction” of the term “source.”1091 Hill pointed out that the 
statute contained no such limitation and quoted extensively from a Pennsylvania case 
upholding that state’s shield law. 
[I]mportant information, tips and leads will dry up and the public will 
often be deprived of the knowledge of dereliction of public duty, bribery, 
corruption, conspiracy and other crimes committed or possibly committed 
by public officials or by powerful individuals or organizations, unless 
newsmen are able to fully and completely protect the sources of their 
information. It is vitally important that this public shield against 
governmental inefficiency, corruption and crime be preserved against 
piercing and erosion. 
 
* * * 
 
The [shield law] is a wise and salutary declaration of public policy whose 
spiritual father is the revered Constitutionally ordained freedom of the 
press. The Act must therefore, we repeat, be liberally and broadly 
                                                
1088 Id. at 347-48. 
1089 Id. at 348. 
1090 Id. 
1091 Id. (Hill, C.J., dissenting). 
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construed in order to carry out the clear objective and intent of the 
Legislature which has placed the gathering and the protection of the 
source of news as of greater importance to the public interest and of more 
value to the public welfare than the disclosure of the alleged crime or the 
alleged criminal (emphasis is Hill’s).1092 
  
 But Chief Justice Hill was the only state judge in all of these cases to support the 
privilege.  In the Pappas case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took pains to 
point out that, “unlike certain other states,” Massachusetts had created no reporter’s 
privilege.1093  The court cited opposition to the privilege in the American Law Institute’s 
Model Code of Evidence to support the rejection of both statutory and constitutional 
privileges.1094  And in the Ninth Circuit, District Judge Jameson’s concurring opinion 
also pointedly noted that Congress had not enacted a shield law as he expressed the view 
that Judge Zirpoli’s protective order might have satisfied Caldwell’s constitutional 
rights.1095  
 On the other hand, 17 states had enacted shield laws by 1970,1096 and several of 
those enactments had occurred only recently.1097  One could reasonably expect that the 
Supreme Court might be swayed by the trend in public policy in favor of the privilege.  
The lawyers would also have been aware of a dramatic development within the Justic 
                                                
1092 Id. at 349 (Hill, C.J., dissenting) (quoting In re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181, 185-86 (Pa. 
1963)). 
1093 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 299 (Mass. 1971). 
1094 Id. at 299-301. 
1095 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 1970) (Jameson, J., 
concurring). Jameson’s comment regarding Congress’s failure to enact a shield law was 
duly noted by Justice Cutter in his opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
in Pappas. 266 N.E.2d at 302. 
1096 For a list of state shield laws at the time, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 
n. 27.  




Department of President Richard Nixon. 
 During the oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit, counsel for the government 
submitted a press release from Attorney General John N. Mitchell outlining new 
guidelines for issuing subpoenas to the news media.  As summarized by Judge Jameson, 
the guidelines “expressly recognized that the ‘Department does not approve of utilizing 
the press as a spring board for investigations,’” and provided int r alia, that,  
There should be sufficient reason to believe that the information sought is 
essential to a successful investigation – particularly with reference to 
directly establishing guilt or innocence…. The government should have 
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the information from alternative non-
press sources….  [Subpoenas] should normally be limited to the 
verification of published information and to such surrounding 
circumstances as relate to the accuracy of the published information….  
[S]ubpoenas should, wherever possible, be directed at material 
information regarding a limited subject matter, should cover a reasonably 
limited period of time, and should avoid requiring production of a large 
volume of unpublished material.1098 
 
While the Justice Department’s announcement of the guidelines follows by two months 
Caldwell’s critical decision on June 4, 1970, to refuse to appear, work on the guidelines 
was well underway before then.  And although there is nothing in the record to indicate 
the extent of their knowledge, there is little doubt that Caldwell and Amsterdam would
have known about the guidelines at the time.  The guidelines were being drafted by 
William H. Rehnquist, who was appointed by President Nixon in 1969 to be assistant 
attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel,1099 and Jack C. Landau, former Supreme 
                                                
1098 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1091-92 n. 3 (Jameson, J., concurring) (quoting John N. Mitchell, Free Press and 
Fair Trial: The Subpoena Controversy, Address Before House of Delegates, American Bar Association. 
(Aug. 10, 1970)). The guidelines were formally published as United States Department of Justice 
Memorandum No. 692. 39 U.S.L.W. 2111 (Aug. 25, 1970).  A complete copy was also published in The 
New York Times, Aug. 11, 1970, p. 24, and attached as an appendix to Levin v. Marshall, 317 F.Supp. 169, 
173 (D. Md. 1970). 
1099 LII/Legal Information Institute, Cornell University, Supreme Court Collection, 
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/rehnquist.bio.html (visited Dec 1, 2009). 
236
 
Court reporter for the Newhouse News Service.1100  Landau joined the Nixon Justice 
Department in 1969, only to leave in April 1970 to return to Newhouse.1101  Landau had 
been a key figure in the early days of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 
which was formed specifically to deal with the Caldwell case, and became executive 
director of the organization not long after his return to Newhouse.1102   
 By the time briefs were filed in the United States Supreme Court, the guidelines 
were being held up by the journalists and amici as the government’s recognition that 
grand jury inquiries could pose First Amendment problems.1103 Perhaps the most 
extensive use the guidelines appears in Alexander Bickel’s amicus brief in Caldwell for 
The New York Times and other media companies.  Acknowledging that the guidelines do 
not have the force of law, Bickel said they nevertheless “evince most authoritatively  
developing consensus of what the law should be.”1104 
 Thus, taking three critical predictors of success – precedent, preferences, a d 
public policy – as a whole, the press had some reason to believe that it could win the fight 
for a testimonial privilege under the First Amendment. The Caldwell decision in the 
Ninth Circuit seemed likely to counterbalance older, adverse precedent;1105 there seemed 
                                                
1100 McKay, supra note 64, at 112.  
1101 Id. 
1102 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, About the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press:  A Short History, http://www.rcfp.org/about.html (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2009). 
1103 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 990, at 17; see also Brief for Nat’l Broad. Co. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10-11, In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-
94).   
1104 Brief of the N.Y. Times Co. et al., supra note 1012, at 12. 
1105 See Brief for Nat’l Broad. Co., supra note 1103, at 9-10 (citing several similar lower 
court decisions around the same time, including People v. Rios, No. 75129 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. July 15, 1970); People v. Dohrn, No. 69-3808 (Cook Cnty., Ill., Cir. Ct. May 20, 
1970); Transcript of April 6, 1970, at 18-24, 36, and Transcript of April 7, 1970, at 21, 
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to be five potentially favorable votes on the Supreme Court; and public policy as 
articulated by several state legislatures and the Department of Justice seemed to be 
moving in the right direction.  Additional factors, such as the strong support of amici1106 
– including the American Civil Liberties Union1107 – and some of the nation’s best legal 
talent, must have seemed sufficient to overcome the government’s opposition.1108  
 Even if some doubts remained about the likelihood of success, important forces 
within the media apparently concluded that the benefits of pursuing the cases to victory – 
an absolute or qualified First Amendment privilege – outweighed the costs of defeat.  W  
turn to that cost-benefit analysis now.  
2.  Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 It is hard to overstate how devastating the Branzburg precedent has been for 
newsgathering; the Supreme Court’s refusal to find a meaningful First Amendment 
privilege in that case has been the foundation for numerous decisions minimizing any 
                                                                                                                                                 
38-39, 149-51, Air Transp. Ass’n v. Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org.,  No. 70-C-400-
410 (E.D.N.Y.); and Transcript of Dec. 4, 1969, Alioto v. Cowles Comm., No. 52150 
(N.D. Cal.). 
1106 Some scholarship suggests that disproportionately strong amici support may be 
counter productive. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 89.  However, those findings are 
certainly counterintuitive and would probably have surprised the litigants here.  My own 
research on press cases suggests that support from press amici has been largely irrelevant 
to the outcome.  See Easton, supra note 1067, at 256. 
1107 My previous research shows that the press has been far more successful when 
supported by the ACLU than when opposed by the ACLU, winning 75% of its cases with 
the ACLU on board and losing 83% when opposed by the ACLU.  Easton, supra note 
1067, at 257.  
1108 The federal government, of course, was a party opponent in Caldwell, and amicus 
curiae in Branzburg and Pappas.  In either capacity, the government is unquestionably 
the most formidable opponent the press could face.  See Herbert M. Kritzer, The 
Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?, in 
Kritzer & Silbey eds., supra note 87; Easton, supra note 1067, at 257; Kearney & Merrill, 
supra note 89 at 829.   
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First Amendment right to gather news.1109  Moreover, the high cost of an adverse 
decision in Branzburg was obviously apparent to Times Co. General Counsel James 
Goodale, who warned Caldwell that his appeal to the Ninth Circuit could make “bad 
law.”1110  
 On the other hand, a victory in Branzburg must have seemed especially beneficial 
in light of the Nixon administration’s and local prosecutors’ unprecedented use of 
subpoenas for reporters’ sources, notes, pictures, and testimony that characterized th  late 
1960s.1111  Particularly after the 1968 Democratic convention, subpoenas targeting the 
coverage of anti-Vietnam War activists and Black Power militants like Caldwell’s 
Panthers proliferated.  McKay calls the rapid increase in the number of subpoenas 
“staggering,” citing research showing about 500 subpoenas served on reporters betwen 
1970 and 1976, compared to about a dozen between 1960 and 1968.1112 
 Of course, it is not possible to quantify and analyze the cost of a disastrous 
precedent in Branzburg versus the benefits of permanent relief from the threat of 
                                                
1109 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, Inc., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1993)(citing 
Branzburg for the proposition “that generally applicable laws do not offend the First 
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental eff cts on 
its ability to gather and report the news”);   
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1978) (citing Branzburg for the proposition 
that “there is no First Amendment right of access to information….”); Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978) (citing Branzburg for the proposition that “it 
does not make a constitutional difference” whether search warrants or subpoenas served 
on reporters will result in the disappearance of confidential sources or cause the pr ss to 
suppress the news); Pell v. Procurier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (citing Bra zburg for the 
proposition that “newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their 
inmates beyond that afforded the general public.”). 
1110 See supra note 952 and accompanying text. 
1111 McKay, supra note 64, at 111, 
1112 Id. at 112 (citing Curt Matthews, Journalism’s Full Court Press, WASH. JOURN. REV. 
(March 1982) at 40).  For a sense of the magnitude of the subpoena assault, see the list of 
120 subpoenas served on reporters from NBC, CBS, and their wholly owned stations 
included as an Appendix to Brief of the N.Y. Times Co. et al., supra note 1012.  
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subpoenas.  But it is entirely possible that a rough cost-benefit calculation, tempered by 
the probability of success, may have influenced the decision of most – but not all – media 
participants to ask the Supreme Court for a qualified, rather than absolute, testimonial 
privilege.  An absolute privilege, going beyond the ruling of the Ninth Circuit, beyond 
even the benefits of most state shield laws, would have been the most desirable, yet least 
likely outcome in the case.  Thus, prudence would have dictated a reasoned argument for 
a qualified privilege – a somewhat less desirable, but far more likely outcome – except 
for those participants who calculated that the benefits of an absolute shield outweighed 
the cost of losing the case altogether. 
 The initial response to the subpoenas by Caldwell and the Tim s– a plea in the 
alternative to quash the subpoenas or issue a protective order1113 – certainly  reflected a 
degree of caution.  Even after the split between Caldwell and the Times,  Caldwell’s 
opposition to the government’s petition for certiorari suggests they were reasonably 
satisfied with the Ninth Circuit opinion.  Caldwell’s Brief in Opposition suggested th  
Court could best confront “the vexing and difficult First Amendment problems presented 
by grand jury subpoenas addressed to newsmen…after more than one lower court has 
grappled with them.”1114 
 In his brief to the Supreme Court, Amsterdam argued for a qualified privilege, but 
with a strong presumption of confidentiality.1115  He insisted that a “compelling state 
interest” was required by the First Amendment in order to force a reporter t  appear 
                                                
1113 Caldwell v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 358,360 (N.D. Cal. 1970).  
1114 See Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Caldwell v.United 
States, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-57). 
1115 Id. at 3. 
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before a grand jury.1116 “The elements of such a showing are at least three,” he said: 
 (1) The “information sought” must be demonstrably relevant to a 
clearly defined, legitimate subject of governmental inquiry…. 
 
 (2) It must affirmatively appear that the inquiry is likely to turn up 
material information, that is: (a) that there is some factual basis for 
pursuing the investigation, and (b) that there is reasonable ground to 
conclude that the particular witness subpoenaed has information material 
to it…[and] 
 
 (3) The information sought must be unobtainable by means less 
destructive of First Amendment freedoms….1117  
 
 The New York Times also insisted on a “compelling interest” standard as amicus 
in the Supreme Court proceeding.  Joined by NBC, CBS and ABC, by the Chicago Sun-
Times and Daily News, by the Associated Press Managing Editors and Broadcasters’ 
Associations, and by the Association of American Publishers, the Tim surged the Court 
to require the government to “clearly demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in 
the information” before requiring a reporter to testify.1118   The Times went on to explain 
that such a standard would preclude requiring a reporter’s testimony “with respect to a 
category of crimes that cannot be deemed ‘major,’ as for example crimes variously 
categorized as ‘victimless,’ ‘regulatory,’ and ‘sumptuary.’”1119  
 Other amici urged a similar standard.  For example, the Chicago Tribune sought 
to limit testimony to evidence “so important that non-production thereof would cause a 
                                                
1116 See Brief for Respondent at 81, Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-57). 
1117 Id. at 82-84. 
1118 Brief of the N.Y. Times Co. et al., supra note 1012, at 8. 
1119 Id. By “sumptuary” crimes, the Times was presumably referring to the violation of 
prohibitions imposed for moral, health, or social welfare reasons, such as illegal 
gambling.  See, e.g., Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252, 256 (D.C. App. 1977).     
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miscarriage of justice.”1120 The Radio Television News Directors Association 
characterized the desired standard as “irreparable harm,” rather than “compelling 
interest,” and said “the Court should adopt a standard which in the normal situation 
would raise no more than the slightest possibility of later disclosure.”1121 A “compelling 
need” standard was urged by the Authors League of America1122 and a coalition of 
religious groups.1123 
 But even if one assumes that these groups advocated a balancing test, albeit with a 
very high standard, because they believed that the benefits of an absolute privilege wer  
outweighed by the cost of defeat,1124 other media organizations reached the opposite 
conclusion. The American Newspaper Publishers Association, for example, openly broke 
with the Times and joint amici as to the standard required:   
Nothing short of an absolute privilege, under the First Amendment, vested 
in professional newsmen to refuse to testify before any tribunal about any 
information or source of information derived as a result of their reportorial 
functions will create the certainty needed to generate confidence in their 
promises, whether express or implied, to preserve either a source’s 
anonymity or privacy, and thus guarantee the right of the public to be fully 
informed.1125 
 
                                                
1120 Brief for Chi. Trib. Co. as Amicus Curiae at 18, United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 
665 (1972) (No. 70-57). 
1121 Brief for Radio Television News Dirs. Ass’n, supra note 1026,  at 10.  
1122 Brief of the Authors League of Am., Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 7, Caldwell, 408 U.S. 
665 (1972) (No. 70-57).  
1123 Brief of Office of Commc’n of The United Church of Christ et al., as Amici Curiae at 
22, Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-57). 
1124 Of course, there may be other, non-strategic reasons for advocating a qualified 
privilege, including a sincere belief that reporters should have to testify under some 
circumstances. 
1125 Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, supra note 1012, at 4. 
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 ANPA was joined in that position by The Washington Post and Newsweek;1126 the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Dow Jones, and Sigma Delta Chi;1127 and the 
National Press Photographers Association.1128  Even the venerable ACLU suggested that 
because reporters should only be required to testify to their knowledge concerning a 
planned, future crime of violence, “it may be preferable for the Court to adopt somehing 
approximating an absolute privilege, leaving to another day the carving out of possible 
exceptions.”1129   
 Whether one believes that the media representatives’ advocacy of an absolute or 
qualified privilege was a reasonable proxy for their strategic cost-benefit a alyses, or 
sincere expressions of their views of the law, it is clear that the press was a “house 
divided” on the desired scope of the testimonial privilege they sought.  This failure to 
speak with one voice may have diluted the message being sent to the Court that such a 
privilege, whatever its scope, was commanded by the First Amendment.  It would
certainly have that effect in the legislative arena.1130  In the end, Branzburg v. Hayes was 
a stunning defeat,1131 with long-lasting implications for First Amendment doctrine.   
 
                                                
1126 Brief of the Wash. Post Co. and Newsweek, Inc., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 4, Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-57). 
1127 Brief of the Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors et al. as Amici Curiae at 24, Caldwell, 
408 U.S. 665 (1972)  (No. 70-57). 
1128 Brief of the Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 2, Caldwell, 408 
U.S. 665 (1972)  (No. 70-57). 
1129 Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 1037, at 23. 
1130 See infra Part D.2. 
1131 Caldwell believes to this day that lukewarm support from the New York Times was 
responsible for the defeat.  Caldwell Interview, supra note 924. He told the author that 
the late Fred Graham, then Supreme Court and Justice Department reporter for the Times, 
had evidence that William Rehnquist had prejudged his case while at Justice and that 
appropriate pressure from the Times would have forced Rehnquist to recuse himself from 
the case. Id. 
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D. Disaster in Court and Congress 
1.  The Branzburg Opinion 
 Paul Pappas’s Reply Brief before the Supreme Court quotes a then-new report by 
University of Michigan Law School Professor Vincent Blasi for a then-new organization 
called Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which had been organized in 
response to the Caldwell case:1132  
 Nothing, in the opinion of every reporter with whom I discussed 
the matter, would be more damaging to source relationships than a 
Supreme Court reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s Caldwell holding.  Several 
newsmen told me that initially they were extremely worried about the 
subpoena spate of two years ago, but that now their anxieties have greatly 
subsided as a result of the strong stand taken by the journalism profession 
and the tentative victories in court.  However, a Supreme Court 
declaration that the first amendment is in no wise abridged by the practice 
of subpoenaeing reporters would, these newsmen assert, set off a wave of 
anxiety among sources.  The publicity and imprimatur that would 
accompany such a Court holding would, in the opinion of these reporters, 
create an atmosphere even more uncongenial to source relationships than 
that which occurred two years ago, when the constitutional question 
remained in doubt.1133  
 
 Unfortunately, Blasi proved more prophetic than persuasive.  With lip service to 
“some” First Amendment protection for newsgathering,1134 Justice White proceeded to 
list all the First Amendment values that were not at issue in these three cases: 
                                                
1132 McKay, supra note 64, at 108.  As chronicled by McKay, a member of the 
organization’s steering committee from 1976 to 1986, the RCFP grew out of a 1970 
meeting of 35-40 reporters at Georgetown University who gathered specifically to 
discuss the Caldwell case. Caldwell was seen as the most visible example of a dramatic 
increase in the use of subpoenas served on reporters in an effort to tap into the radical 
movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s.  In the aftermath of Branzburg, the RCFP 
played a major role in advocating for an absolute federal shield law, and, in the view of 
some, its no-compromise stance was a major reason why no federal legislation was ever 
enacted.  See id. at 126. 
1133 Reply Brief at 13, In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-94).  Blasi’s study is 
treated at length in Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mich. 
L. Rev. 229 (1971-72). 
1134 See supra note 1002. 
244
 
[N]o intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction 
on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that 
the press publish what it prefers to withhold.  No exaction or tax for the 
privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the 
content of published material…. No attempt is made to require the press to 
publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose them on 
request. 
 
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand 
jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an 
investigation into the commission of a crime.1135 
 
Framing the issue thus told the entire story.   
 
 Emphasizing that “‘the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from 
the application of general laws,’”1136 a theme he would return to in other newsgathering 
cases,1137 White further minimized the protection accorded newsgathering by 
undermining the “right to know” value on which it is predicated: “[T]he First 
Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to 
information not available to the public generally.”1138  Citing the absence of a reporter’s 
privilege under either the common law or the “prevailing constitutional view,”1139 White 
noted that, while “a number of states” have provided a statutory privilege, “the majority 
have not done so, and none has been provided by federal statute.”1140 
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that the 
public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury 
proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, 
burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that 
reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in 
the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.1141  
                                                
1135 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972).  
1136 Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-133 (1937)). 
1137 See cases cited supra note 1076. 
1138 408 U.S. at 684. 
1139 Id. at 685-86. 
1140 Id. at 689. 




 White gave particularly short shrift to Branzburg’s claim of privilege.  “Insofar as 
any reporter in these cases undertook not to reveal or testify about the crime he 
witnessed, his claim of privilege under the First Amendment presents no substantial 
question. The crimes of news sources are no less reprehensible and threatening to the 
public interest when witnessed by a reporter than when they are not.”1142  For the others, 
White said, “the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant 
constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior commn-
law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen.”1143         
 Even assuming some informants will refuse to talk to reporters, White continued, 
“we cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news about 
crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the public interest
in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus 
deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.”1144 
 One by one, White rebutted and rejected each of the arguments raised by the 
reporters, returning finally to clarify the scope of First Amendment protecti n for 
newsgathering. “[G]rand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good 
faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment.  
Official harassment of the press undertaken not for the purposes of law enforcement but 
to disrupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources would have no justification.”1145 
 That was the extent of the concession won by the press in Branzburg v. Hayes – 
                                                
1142 Id. at 692. 
1143 Id. at 693. 
1144 Id. at 696. 
1145 Id. at 707-708. 
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far less than the Ninth Circuit opinion or even the original District Court’s protective 
order.  Even though numerous shield law bills have been introduced in Congress since 
Branzburg,1146 enactment has always been considered a long shot, and all First 
Amendment protections for newsgathering activities might well be stronger if Branzburg 
had never reached the United States Supreme Court. 
 But if Branzburg was a strategic miscalculation, one cannot say that pursuit of a 
testimonial privilege for journalists was irrational or irresponsible.  From the perspective 
of the key actors at the time, the odds favoring success were at least even, and important 
segments of the press saw prospective benefits of victory as greater than the downside 
costs.  Perhaps the best thing to come out of the case was the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, which is today the premier legal information clearing house and 
litigator representing working journalists. 
2.  The Legislative Fiasco 
 According to Floyd McKay, principal chronicler of the Reporters Committee’s 
early years, the Caldwell case was the precipitating factor in the formation of the 
Committee in 1970.1147  Thirty-five to 40 reporters attended a meeting at Georgetown 
University to discuss Caldwell and other cases.1148  Led by J. Anthony Lucas and Fred 
Graham of The New York Times, and Jack Nelson of the Los Angeles Times, the group 
took the name Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and created a steering 
committee of eleven colleagues.1149  
                                                
1146 See infra Part D.2.  
1147 McKay, supra note 64, at 108. 
1148 Id. at 109; see also Joe Holley, Obituary, Jack Landau; Founded Reporter Group, 
Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 2008, at C7 (describing the formation of RCFP). 
1149 McKay, supra note 64, at 109. 
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 What distinguished the Reporters Committee from other media organizations that 
became involved in Caldwell and its companion cases was its insistence that working 
reporters, not editors or publishers, would call the shots.1150  “Reporters needed their own 
advocacy group,” James Doyle of TheWashington Star told McKay in an interview, “and 
we could not be sure publishers would do the job.”1151 Indeed, the Times lawyers’ initial 
reaction to the Caldwell case seemed indicative of a philosophical difference between 
working journalists and their managers, although the split over absolute versus qualified 
privilege had not yet broken down along those lines – at least in the Supreme Court 
briefs.1152  
 Whatever the basis for that split, it was to prove fatal to enacting a statutory 
remedy for the Branzburg decision.  By the time that decision was handed down in 1972, 
the Reporters Committee was being led by Jack Landau, a reporter-lawyer for N whouse 
News Service, who had returned to his Supreme Court beat after a brief stint in the N xon 
Justice Department.1153  Landau’s aggressive advocacy for an absolute privilege in the 
years following the Branzburg decision, and his unwillingness to compromise with media 
organizations willing to accept some qualifications, must bear a fair portion of the blam  
– or credit – for Congress’s failure to enact a shield law in the early 1970s, when reaction 
to the Nixon administration’s contempt for the press and Branzburg made such enactment 
                                                
1150 See id. 
1151 Id. 
1152 Although the new Reporters Committee was “emerging as the leading advocate of the 
‘no compromise’ position on reporter confidentiality, McKay, supra note 64, at 112, both 
the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors also urged an absolute privilege.  See supra text accompanying notes 1007-1010.  
Later, however, ANPA would split with Reporters Committee to support compromise 
legislation.  See infra note 1171 and accompanying text.  
1153 See McKay, supra note 64, at 112-13; supra text accompanying notes 1100-02. 
248
 
most likely.1154    
 Reacting to what he called “the recent wave of broad and sweeping subpoenas 
which have issued from the Justice Department,” Sen. Thomas H. McIntyre (D-N.H.) 
introduced the first testimonial privilege bill of the decade on March 5, 1970.1155  
Although McIntyre’s bill died in committee, Sen. James Pearson (R-Kan.) introduced 
another shield bill, S.1311, in the beginning of the 92nd Congress in January 1971.1156 
According to Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.), the most authoritative reporter of this legislative 
process, the Pearson bill “met with less than urgent response,” with the press adopting a 
“‘wait and see’ attitude” toward the bill pending resolution of the Caldwell case.1157 
 Ervin’s Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights held hearings on the 
Pearson bill in September and October 1971.1158  Months earlier, the White House and 
Justice Department had begun taking a more conciliatory approach to the issuance of 
subpoenas against reporters,1159 and Ervin recalls that “most press spokesmen who 
                                                
1154 Although a number of states had already enacted shield laws, see upra notes 1096-
97 and accompanying text, and similar bills had been introduced unsuccessfully in nearly 
every Congress since 1929, VAN GERPEN, supra note 928, at 148, popular support for a 
shield law had never been higher than immediately after the Branzburg decision was 
handed down. McKay, supra note 64, at 115.  
1155 Ervin, supra note 120, at 251 (citing S.3552, 91st Cong. (1970)). 
1156 Id. at 253 (citing S.1311, 92nd Cong. (1971)).  
1157 Id. at 253-54. The government’s certiorari petition in Caldwell was pending at the 
time.  See supra text accompanying note 955. 
1158 Id. at 254. 
1159 In February, Attorney General John Mitchell issued a statement “regret[ting]” any 
misunderstanding arising from the issuance of subpoenas to the press and promising that, 
“in the future, no subpoenas will be issued to the press without a good faith attempt by 
the Department to reach a compromise acceptable to both parties.” Ervin, supra note 120, 
p. 251 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1970, at 40).  Mitchell’s press spokesman at the time 
was Jack Landau.  McKay, supra note 514, at 112.  At a press conference in May, 
President Nixon said he took a “very jaundiced view” of subpoenaing the notes of 
reporters or taking action requiring reporters to reveal their sources.  Ervin, supra note 
120, at 254 (citing The President’s News Conf., 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 703, 
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commented on the Pearson bill recommended that Congress proceed cautiously.  Most 
urged that a statutory privilege be enacted only if the Court refused to recognize a 
constitutional privilege.”1160 Indeed, Ervin says the subpoena problem “seemed to come 
last in the minds of most witnesses.”1161 The bill went nowhere in 1971.1162 
 When the Branzburg decision came down in June 1972, Sen. Alan Cranston (D-
Calif.) immediately introduced legislation providing an absolute shield for journalists in 
both federal and state proceedings.1163 But the press was irreparably divided.  The 
inactive Joint Media Committee was revived for the purpose of drafting new legislation 
 
embodying a qualified privilege. 1164  Their bill was introduced by Sen. Walter Mondale 
(D-Minn.) on Aug. 171165 and Rep. Charles Whalen (R-Ohio) on Sept. 5.1166  Ervin had 
introduced his own qualified privilege bill on Aug. 16.1167  No new hearings were held in 
the Senate, and although the House Judiciary Committee held a series of hearings in late 
                                                                                                                                                 
705 (May 1, 1971). Also in May, Mitchell told an interviewer he had no objection “to 
legislation protecting” reporters’ notes.  Id. at 252. Finally, in August, Mitchell’s Justice 
Department issued restrictive guidelines to U.S. Attorneys regarding subpoenas f r 
journalists.  See supra notes 1098-1100 and accompanying text.  As noted therein, the 
guidelines were originally drafted by Landau. Id.  
1160 Ervin, supra note 120, at 254-55. 
1161 Id. at 255. 
1162 See id. at 254-55. 
1163 Ervin, supra note 120, at 254-55 (citing S. 3796, 92nd Cong. (1972)).  
1164 Id. at 256. The Joint Media Committee was a group of organizations pressing for 
shield legislation, including the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Associated 
Press Managing Editors Association, Sigma Delta Chi, National Press Photographers 
Association, and Radio Television News Directors Association. Id. 
1165 Id. (citing S. 3932, 92d Cong. (1972)).   
1166 Id. (citing H.R. 16527, 92d Cong. (1972)).   
1167 Id. (citing S.3925, 92d Cong. (1972)).  
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September,1168 Congress adjourned without taking action.  
 Ervin notes that “public’s attention was not really drawn” to the issue until two 
reporters were jailed in the fall of 1972 for refusing to reveal their sources.1169  “The 
attitude of the press began to harden,” Ervin says, and more groups began urging an 
absolute privilege.1170  The American Newspaper Publishers Association, which 
supported an absolute privilege, spearheaded a new press alliance called the Ad Hoc 
Coordinating Committee, which tried to draft a bill acceptable to all factions.1171  The 
Joint Media Committee, finding that a qualified bill no longer commanded a majority of 
its members, issued a statement stressing the urgency of legislative relief.1172  
 In November 1972, President Nixon told American Society of Newspaper Editors 
that he did not think federal legislation was warranted at this time, further inflam g the 
situation, and in December, another reporter was briefly jailed for failing to produce 
unpublished tapes of a confidential interview.1173  When the 93rd  Congress convened in 
January, eight bills and one joint resolution were introduced in the Senate, and 56 bills 
were introduced in the House.1174 There was only one problem: “the great number of 
proposals demonstrated disagreement” among the legislators, and that, in turn, “only 
                                                
1168 Id. (citing Hearings on Newsman’s Privilege Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1972)).   
1169 Id. at 256-57.  Ervin is referring to Peter Bridge of the Newark News and William 
Farr of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, who served twenty and forty-six days, 
respectively, for refusing to reveal confidential sources. Id. 
1170 Id. at 258 (noting resolutions calling for enactment of an absolute privilege by 
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Sigma Delta Chi, Radio Television News
Directors Association, and American Newspaper Publishers Association). 
1171 Id. 
1172 Id. at 258-59.   
1173 Id.  
1174 Id. at 261. 
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reflected the divergence in the press.”1175 The Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, created 
to find common ground, produce six different bills, revealing differences not only in 
philosophy but also in estimates of what kind of legislation could pass.1176 Even Anthony 
Amsterdam complicated the picture by suggesting that a judicial hearing should be 
required before issuing a subpoena to reporters, an “interesting” concept, says Ervin, but 
one that “represented a new, complicated, and untested legal innovation, which reduced 
its political acceptability in Congress.”1177  
 Ervin admits to being conflicted himself; he introduced his own qualified 
privilege bill at the beginning of a new round of hearings, then found himself persuadd 
by Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, that any effective legislation would 
have to cover the states as well as the federal government.1178 His new bill, however, 
contained an exception for testimony regarding crimes committed in the reporter’s 
presence, which drew fire from both the Reporters Committee and the Joint Media 
Committee.1179  Even after a dozen subpoenas were issued during the hearings to news 
organizations in a libel action filed by the Committee to Re-Elect the President 
(CREEP),1180 the “fragmented press could not coalesce” behind one approach to 
legislation in either the Senate or the House.1181      
 “It did seem clear,” Ervin said, “that unless the press groups themselves could 
achieve some unanimity on the issue, it was likely to fail without any effort from its 
                                                
1175 Id. 
1176 Id. at 261-62. 
1177 Id. at 263. 
1178 Id. at 267-68. 
1179 Id. at 271 n. 132. 
1180 Id. at 269. 
1181 Id. at 270. 
252
 
opponents.”1182  And so it did.  The Eighth1183 and Second1184 Circuit Courts of Appeal 
had both declined to force reporters to reveal their confidential sources, notwithstanding 
Branzburg.1185  Now, in March 1973, Judge Charles Richey granted a motion to quash 
the dozen subpoenas issued to news organizations by CREEP in the Watergate matter,1186 
and prosecutors around the country had begun to show some restraint.1187  Ervin notes 
that Watergate itself demonstrated to some previous supporters that the press could do its 
job without a statutory privilege.1188  Despite Rep. Robert Kastenmeier’s success in 
forging a compromise bill in his House Judiciary subcommittee, he could not get a 
majority of the media representatives to support it.1189  The legislative effort crumbled. 
 In this chapter, we have examined Branzburg v. Hayes as part of a continuing  
exploration into the mobilization of the press to shape First Amendment doctrine through 
                                                
1182 Id.  
1183 Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1972) (“We are aware of the 
prior cases holding that the First Amendment does not grant to reporters a testimonial 
privilege to withhold news sources. But to routinely grant motions seeking compulsory 
disclosure of anonymous news sources without first inquiring into the substance of a libel 
allegation would utterly emasculate the fundamental principles that underlay the line of 
cases articulating the constitutional restrictions to be engrafted upon the e forcement of 
State libel laws. Such a course would also overlook the basic philosophy at the heart of 
the summary judgment doctrine.”) (citations omitted). 
1184 Baker v. F&F Investment Co., 470 F.2d 778, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1972) (“Manifestly, the 
Court’s concern with the integrity of the grand jury as an investigating arm of the 
criminal justice system distinguishes Branzburg from  the case presently before us. If, as 
Mr. Justice Powell noted in that case, instances will arise in which First Amend ent 
values outweigh the duty of a journalist to testify even in the context of a 
criminal investigation, surely in civil cases, courts must recognize that the public interest 
in non-disclosure of journalists’ confidential news sources will often be weightir t an 
the private interest in compelled disclosure.”) 
1185 Ervin, supra note 120, at 272. 
1186 See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1399 (D.D.C. 1973); 
see supra note 1178 and accompanying text. 
1187 Ervin, supra note 120, at 273. 
1188 Id. at 274.  
1189 Id. at 274-75. 
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constitutional litigation.  In Branzburg, the press failed, despite several favorable 
indicators, and that failure had grave implications for any First Amendment right to 
gather news.  While it is impossible to say conclusively why a Supreme Court decision 
goes this way or that, we can safely suggest that differences within the press, between 
Earl Caldwell and The New York Times, indeed, between reporters and their bosses 
generally,1190 and between advocates of an absolute versus a qualified privilege, did not 
help the press make its case.  The latter division proved to be even more significant when 
the issue moved to the legislative arena. 
 The tragedy of Branzburg v. Hayes was the failure of the Court to adopt Anthony 
Amsterdam’s argument that, for First Amendment purposes, the distinction between 
newsgathering and publishing is an artificial one, advanced by the government to divide 
and conquer.1191 The lesson of Branzburg v. Hayes and its aftermath is that a “house 
divided” is not likely to be effective in molding constitutional doctrine or winning a 
legislative privilege.  As the next chapter demonstrates, the failure to win constitutional 
recognition for newsgathering in Branzburg has been a persistent thorn in the side of 
media litigators ever since. 
                                                
1190 McKay recounts a story told by Jack Landau, when Landau solicited Marshall Field, 
publisher of the Chicago Sun-Times, for financial support for Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press.  After Landau’s pitch, Field replied, “Well, Mr. Landau, I’m not 
really very comfortable funding a group that calls itself the Reporters Committee.” 
McKay, supra note 64, at 122-23. 
1191 Brief for Respondent at 48-49, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-57).  
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Chapter 7 –Branzburg’s Legacy: The Newsgathering Cases 
 If Branzburg v. Hayes was the first bona fide newsgathering case to reach the 
U.S. Supreme Court, it was not the first time the Court expressed doubt that the 
Constitution provided much protection for gathering information.  That distinction 
belongs to Zemel v. Rusk.1192  Zemel had sought to have his passport validated for travel 
to Cuba as a tourist.   When his request was denied, he renewed it, this time asking for 
permission to travel "to satisfy my curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba and to make 
me a better informed citizen."1193   Refused again, Zemel challenged the Secretary of 
State's authority to take such action.   A three-judge district court granted the Secretary's 
motion for summary judgment,1194 and the United States Supreme Court affirmed.1195   
The Court rejected Zemel's contention that the refusal to validate his passport for Cuba 
infringed upon his First Amendment right to inform himself.    
For to the extent that the Secretary's refusal to validate passports for Cuba 
acts as an inhibition . . . it is an inhibition of action. There are few 
restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in 
the garb of decreased data flow. . . . The right to speak and publish does 
not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.1196    
 
 Ample reasons exist for considering Zemel as something other than a bona fide 
newsgathering case.  State Department policy at the time contemplated exemptions for 
bona fide journalists, among others,1197 and Zemel's desire to “inform himself” seems as 
disingenuous now as it obviously did to the Court then.  Still, the Court has repeatedly 
                                                
1192 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
1193 Id. at 4. 
1194 228 F.Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1964). 
1195 381 U.S. at 20. 
1196 Id. at 16-17. 
1197 See id. at 3. 
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held that the First Amendment rights of the press and public are coextensive;1198  Z mel 
did not have to attend journalism school to gather news and information. 
  More importantly, the Court recognized that the Secretary’s interferenc  with the 
flow of information about Cuba was “a factor to be considered in determining whether 
[Zemel] has been denied due process of law.”1199  As Justice Stewart would later point 
out in his Branzburg dissent, the rule at issue in Zemel was justified by the “weightiest 
considerations of national security.”1200  Justice Stewart also noted that the Court's use of 
the word “unrestrained” to characterize unprotected newsgathering necessarily implies 
that “some right to gather information does exist.”1201   In Branzburg, the Court begin to 
define the scope of that right. 
  Branzburg is appropriately characterized as a newsgathering case because the 
newspapers’ right to publish the information their reporters had obtained, without fear of
censorship or sanction, was never called into question.  At issue rather was the reporters’ 
ability to acquire the information in the first instance, and there is a dramatic difference 
between the Court’s attitude toward publishing and its attitude toward access to 
information.  The law can affect access to information both directly, by establishing the 
boundaries of secrecy within which government institutions and private actors are 
entitled to operate, and indirectly, by limiting the means by which reporters can gather 
the news without running afoul of the law.  In depriving Paul Branzburg, Earl Caldwell, 
                                                
1198 See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975), and the response of 
Chief Justice Burger in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797-802 (1978) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring). 
1199 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16. 
1200 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Zemel, 




and Paul Pappas of a constitutional privilege to protect their confidential sources from 
disclosure, Branzburg exemplifies the indirect effect of the law on access to information.  
 In each case, the reporter had already acquired and published the information in 
question, but did so through promises of confidentiality that they could not keep absent a 
legal privilege.   The Court’s refusal to recognize a constitutional privilege thus 
jeopardized the ability of these and other reporters to acquire more information from the 
same or different sources in the future.  More importantly, Branzburg also sounds a 
theme underlying all newsgathering cases:  that the First Amendment entitles the press as 
an institution only to that information available to the public generally.  If a member of 
the public has no constitutional privilege to protect the confidences of information 
sources from, say, a grand jury inquiry, then neither does a reporter.   
 This view of the First Amendment is reflected in the direct access cases as well.  
Two types of direct access cases have reached the Court with some frequency:  access to 
judicial proceedings and access to executive branch information.  As early as 1959, the 
Court began reversing criminal convictions on the ground that trial courts failed to 
properly manage and or account for press coverage before or during the trials.  In these
cases, unlike the contempt cases, the actual conduct of the press, while often deplorable, 
was not found to be illegal.  But the series of reversals certainly gave courts the incentive 
to restrict trial coverage by closing the courtrooms.  Part A of this chapter looks briefly at 
these press coverage cases, then more closely at those cases in which the Court ultimately 
established the ground rules for press access to judicial proceedings.  In PartB, we turn to 
the cases in which the press tried, and almost always failed, to use the courts to gain 
access to information held by the executive branch of government.  In Part C, we return 
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to the handful of newsgathering cases that, like Branzburg, did not involve direct access 
information, but rather threatened newsgathering indirectly, and in some cases, even 
more seriously.   In Chapter 9, after studying a contemporary case in depth, we 
summarize what the cases tell us about the ability of the press to shape First Amendment 
doctrine with respect to newsgathering. 
A. Access to Courtrooms 
 The contempt-by-publication cases discussed in Chapter 6 were not about 
newsgathering, of course, but the concern they expressed for the influence of news
reporting and editorializing on the judicial process certainly set the stage for restricting 
press coverage of the courts.  For example, in the contempt case of Patterson v. 
Colorado,1202 Justice Holmes took pains to point out that trial outcomes must be “induced 
only by evidence and argument in open court and not by any outside influence, whether 
of private talk or public print.”1203  Similarly, in Bridges v. California,1204 Justice Black 
wrote, “Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting hall, 
the radio, and the newspaper.”1205 
In 1910, the Court entertained, but ultimately rejected, a claim that a murder 
conviction should be overturned because, among other things, a juror had read newspaper 
accounts of the case before the trial and had formed opinions as to the defendant’s guilt 
and other jurors had read accounts of the case in the Seattle newspapers during the 
trial.1206 Half a century later, however, the Court was prepared to take such claims more 
                                                
1202 205 U.S. 454 (1907); see supra notes 741-54 and accompanying text.  
1203 205 U.S. at 462; see also C. THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE &  ROBERT C. LIND, NEWSGATHERING AND 
THE LAW 23 n. 12 (3d ed. 2005). 
1204 314 U.S. 252 (1941); see supra notes 759-61 and accompanying text. 
1205 314 U.S. at 281; see also DIENES, et al., supra note 1203, at 23 n. 12. 
1206 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248-51 (1910). 
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seriously.  In Marshall v. U.S.,1207 the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for 
illegally distributing amphetamines on the ground that the jurors had been improperly 
influenced by reading newspaper stories about Marshall’s two prior convictions, one for 
practicing medicine without a license, which the trial judge had excluded from evidence.   
 Two years later, in Irvin v. Dowd,1208 the Court the court granted Leslie “Mad 
Dog” Irvin a new murder trial on the ground that nine of twelve jurors had been 
prejudiced by pretrial publicity, including the nickname bestowed on Irvin by the press.  
Irvin established as a principle of federal constitutional law that decisions reached by 
jurors who have been influenced by pretrial publicity violate the sixth amendment 
guarantee of trial by an impartial jury.  Although Irvin put the burden on the defense to 
show specific instances of prejudice, that test was soon softened.   
In Rideau v. Louisiana,1209 the defendant’s confession to robbery, kidnapping, and 
murder charges was broadcast three times on local television prior to jury selection, yet 
the trial court denied Rideau’s motion for a change of venue.  Three members of the jury 
saw the broadcast, but Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the 7-2 majority, held that no 
particularized showing of prejudice was required, that drawing a jury from such a 
contaminated jury pool was, in itself, a deprivation of due process.  That rule was applied 
in the next two cases as well.  In Estes v. Texas,1210 a sharply divided Court reversed the 
fraud conviction of the notorious financier Billie Sol Estes.  In his opinion for the Court, 
Justice Clark held that the massive pre-trial publicity – including two days of televised 
pre-trial hearings and televised portions of the trial itself – had deprived Estes of due 
                                                
1207 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959). 
1208 366 U.S. 717 (1961). 
1209 373 U.S. 723 (1968). 
1210 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
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process.  And in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1211 the Court reversed the conviction of Sam 
Sheppard for allegedly murdering his wife, with Justice Clark citing the “carnival 
atmosphere”1212 of the trial and the utter failure of the trial judge to control media 
coverage.     
 These cases were highly publicized and attracted substantial national press 
attention.  Sheppard, in particular, would exert considerable influence on the press’s 
ability to cover the courts, with Justice Clark issuing guidance to trial judges as to how 
they were to protect the defendant’s right to an impartial jury before and during the 
trial.1213  Yet only in Estes was the press involved as amicus curiae before the Supreme 
Court, and then only to plead the special case of televised trial coverage.  That would 
change dramatically once trial judges began to slam courtroom doors shut in order to 
implement Justice Clark’s admonition that “the presence of the press at judicial 
proceedings must be limited when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be 
prejudiced or disadvantaged.”1214   
 At first, the Supreme Court seemed to endorse that practice.  In Gan ett v. 
DePasquale,1215 attorneys for both the prosecution and defense asked the trial judge, 
                                                
1211 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
1212 384 U.S. at 358. 
1213 384 U.S. at  357-63. Specifically, Justice Clark called for trial judges to counteract 
the prejudicial effects of press coverage by adopting stricter rules governing the use of 
the courtroom by newsmen; insulating witnesses from the reporters;  controlling the 
release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the 
counsel for both sides; proscribing extra-judicial statements by any lawyer, party, 
witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters; requesting city and county 
officials to regulate dissemination of information by their employees; warning reporters 
as to the impropriety of publishing information not introduced at trial; and, if necessary, 
sequestering the jury. 
1214 384 U.S. at 358. 
1215 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
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Daniel DePasquale, to close a pretrial suppression hearing that would determin  whether 
certain statements and physical evidence, including a gun, were admissible in a murder 
trial.1216  Concerned that information about inadmissible evidence might reach 
prospective jurors, DePasquale agreed to close the hearing.  The evidence was suppressed 
and the defendants pleaded guilty to a lesser charge.  A Gannett reporter who had left t e 
courtroom wrote a letter to the judge asking to see a transcript of the proceedings, and 
Gannett followed up with a formal motion.  Ultimately, DePasquale denied the motion, 
balancing Gannett’s First Amendment rights against the right of the defendants to a fair 
trial.1217  He was reversed by the intermediate appellate court, but affirmed by the Court 
of Appeals.1218 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed 5-4.1219 
 Justice Stewart wrote for the Court and one other justice that the defendant could 
waive his right to an open proceeding and the Sixth Amendment gave the press no 
grounds for objection.1220  If the First Amendment provided any such ground, it was 
limited, and Judge DePasquale fulfilled his obligation by giving the press a hearing.1221  
Chief Justice Burger limited his concurrence to pretrial proceedings,1222 while Justice 
Powell suggested formal guidelines for weighing the press’s First Amendment interests 
in such cases.1223  Only Justice Rehnquist, among the majority, held that there was no 
First Amendment interest in open proceedings at all.1224  The dissenters, led by Justice 
                                                
1216 Id. at 374-75. 
1217 Id. at 376. 
1218 Id. at 376-77. 
1219 Id. at 394. 
1220 Id. at 391. 
1221 Id. at 392. 
1222 Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
1223 Id. at 400-401 (Powell, J., concurring). 
1224 Id. at 404-405 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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Blackmun, would have held that the Sixth Amendment requires at least a hearing before 
any proceeding is closed, giving “full and fair consideration” to “the public's interest... in 
open trials.”1225  In other words, the dissent would have found that the Sixth Amendment 
right to an open trial belongs not only to the defendant, but also to the public.  They 
would have put the burden on defendant to show sufficient potential prejudice to 
overcome the qualified right of the public.1226   
 Press support for Gannett was substantial, both with respect to the firm’s petition 
for certiorari1227 and on the merits of the case.1228  Gannett had argued the case first on 
First Amendment grounds,1229 as did ANPA and ASNE, 1230 and then on Sixth 
Amendment grounds,1231 as did RCFP and NAB.1232 The New York Times Co. 
emphasized the importance of pre-trial proceedings,1233 while SPJ/SDX urged the Court 
                                                
1225 Id. at 433 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
1226 Id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
1227 See Brief of the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n and the Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No. 77-1301), 1978 WL 207247. 
1228 See Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press [and] the 
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters in Support of Petitioner, Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368 (1979) (No. 77-1301), 1978 WL 207259; Brief Amici Curiae of Am. Newspaper 
Publishers Ass’n and Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors, Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368 (1979) (No. 77-1301), 1978 WL 207258; Brief of the N.Y. Times Co. as Amicus 
Curiae, Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No. 77-1301), 1978 WL 207257; 
Brief of Amici Curiae the Deadline Club, the N.Y.C. Chapter of the Soc’y of Prof’l 
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi; and the Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, Sigma Delt Chi, 
Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No. 77-1301), 1978 WL 207256. 
1229 Brief of Petitioner, Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No. 77-1301), 1978 
WL 207249. 
1230 Brief Amici Curiae of Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n and Am. Soc’y of 
Newspaper Editors, supra note 1111. 
1231 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1229. 
1232 Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press [and] the Na ’l 
Ass’n of Broadcasters In Support of Petitioner, supra note 1228. 
1233 Brief of the New York Times Co. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1228. 
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to adopt a Nebraska Press-like test for closing courtrooms.1234  The ACLU, which had 
tended to favor reversing convictions in the pretrial publicity cases, argued here in 
support of Gannett on both First and Sixth Amendment grounds.1235  Ultimately, the 
Court would accept the argument that the right of the public to attend judicial 
proceedings controlled the question, but it would set that right squarely in the First 
Amendment, rather than the Sixth. 
That was the analytical approach adopted in Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia,1236 in which the trial court had granted defendant’s motion to close a criminal 
trial to the press and public.  John Paul Stevenson’s first conviction had been reversed, 
and the next two attempts to try him ended in mistrials.1237  On the fourth attempt, the 
court granted the motion to close the trial, without a hearing, under a state law allowing a 
trial judge to exclude anyone whose presence might impair the conduct of a fair trial. 1238 
Richmond Newspapers filed a motion claiming the constitutional right of the public to 
attend trials, arguing the judge erred by not first determining whether al ernative 
measures could not guarantee a fair trial.1239  The Virginia Supreme Court denied the 
papers’ motion, citing Gannett v. DePasquale, as had many other courts since that 
decision, and Stevenson was acquitted in a closed trial.  Again, the press strongly 
                                                
1234 Brief of Amici Curiae the Deadline Club, the N.Y.C. Chapter of the Soc’y of Prof’l 
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi; and the Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, Sigma Delt Chi, supra 
note 1228. 
1235 Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties Union and the N.Y. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus 
Curiae, Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No. 77-1301), 1978 WL 207254. 
1236 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
1237 Id. at 559. 




supported Richmond Newspapers,1240 but this time the outcome in the U.S. Supreme 
Court was much more favorable. 
In his opinion for the 7-1 majority, Chief Justice Berger traced the history of open 
trials from before the Norman conquest, and cited its “community therapeutic value” in 
earning “public acceptance of both the process and its results.”1241  Today, he said, the 
media acts as surrogates for the public.  “We are bound to conclude that a presumption of 
openness inheres in the very nature of the criminal trial under our system of justice.”1242  
Burger said that the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to 
attend trials so as to give meaning to the explicit guarantees of speech, press, ass mbly 
                                                
1240 See Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, The Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, The Associated Press Managing Editors, The Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 
The Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n, The Nat’l Press Club, The Radio-Television News Dirs. 
Ass’n, The Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, The Va. Press Association, 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (No. 79-243), 1979 WL 199921; 
Brief Amici Curiae of Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n and Am. Soc’y of Newspaper 
Editors in Support of Appellants, Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 
(1980) (No. 79-243),1979 WL 199915; Brief of the Wash. Post, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 
CBS Inc., Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., the N.Y. Daily News, the Wall Street J., the L.A. Times, 
The Chi. Sun-Times, The Detroit News, the S.F. Chron., Newsday, the Boston Globe, the 
Phila. Inquirer, the Kansas City Times, the Kansas City Star, the Hous. Post, Buffalo 
Evening News, the Minneapolis Star. Minneapolis Trib., the Des Moines Reg., Des 
Moines Trib., the Atlanta J., the Atlanta Const., the (Louisville) Courier-J., the Louisville 
Times, the San Diego Union, the (San Diego) Evening Trib., the Sacramento Bee, the 
(Baltimore) Sun, the (Baltimore) Evening Sun, the (Jacksonville) Fla. Times Union, 
Jacksonville Journal, Wichita Eagle, Wichita Beacon, the Salt Lake Trib., the 
(Allentown, Pa.) Morning Call, (Allentown, Pa.) Evening Chron., the Albany Times-
Union, the (Albany, N.Y.) Knickerbocker News, the Wis. State J., the (Madison, Wis.) 
Capitol Times, the (Riverside, Cal.) Press, the (Riverside, Cal.) Enterprise, St. Joseph 
(Mo.) Gazette, St. Joseph (Mo.) News-Press, the Decatur (Ill.) Herald, Decatur (Ill.) 
Daily Review, Jackson (Tenn.) Sun, the Anniston (Ala.) Star, Anchorage (Alaska) Daily 
News, the (Fredericksburg, Va.) Free Lance-Star, Waukesha (Wis.) Freeman, the (Bend, 
Ore.) Bull., Chippewa Herald-Telegram (Chippewa Falls, Wis.), the Greenwood (Miss.) 
Commonwealth, Omaha Sun, the (Havre De Grace, Md.) Record, Grinnell (Iowa) 
Herald-Register, Homer (Alaska) News, Amici Curiae, In Support of Reversal, 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (No. 79-243),1979 WL 199918. 
1241 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-72. 
1242 Id. at 573. 
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and petition.  “Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen,” he said.1243  The 
amendment prohibits government from limiting the stock of information available to the 
public, Burger said, and prohibits the government from summarily closing doors which 
had long been open to the public at the time that amendment was adopted.1244  Noting 
that the trial judge had made no findings to support closure, no inquiry as to whether 
alternative solutions would have met the need to ensure fairness, and no recognition of 
any First Amendment right for the press and public to attend trials,  Burger said that, 
absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be 
open to the public.1245 
Six different opinions were written in the case.  Justices White1246 and 
Blackmun,1247 concurring, continued to express the belief that the public’s right to an 
open trial was grounded in the Sixth Amendment, and Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, 
continued to believe that neither the First nor the Sixth Amendment provided any such 
right.1248  Justice Stewart, concurring, cautioned that the right of the press and public to 
attend trials was not absolute,1249 and the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, joined 
by Justice Marshall, noted that, in determining whether a particular proceeding should be 
open, the courts needed to take into account both the history of that proceeding and the 
                                                
1243 Id. at 575-76. 
1244 Id. at 576. 
1245 Id. at 580-81. 
1246 Id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring). 
1247 Id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
1248 Id. at 605 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
1249 Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment.) 
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function that it serves.1250 These points would ultimately be incorporated into the rule that 
was fine-tuned over the next four cases and now governs all closed courtroom situations. 
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk,1251  the Court held 
that a Massachusetts law requiring the closing of courtrooms during the testimony of 
certain sex crime victims violated the First Amendment.  Despite the lack of history of 
openness in this kind of trial, the Court found that the state interests asserted to support
the restriction would be best served by case-by-case consideration.1252  Once again, the 
press amici were out in force.1253  Two years later, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, Riverside County (Press-Enterprise I),1254 the Court held that the 
examination of prospective jurors known as voir dire must be conducted in the open 
unless convincing evidence shows closure is needed to ensure a fair trial.  Chief Justic  
                                                
1250 Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
1251 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
1252 Id. at 609. 
1253 See Brief of Amici Curiae The Miami Herald Publ’g Co., Neb. Press Ass’n and 
Media of Neb., Okla. Publ’g Co., Landmark Commc’ns., Inc., Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 
Daily Gazette Co., Gannett Co., Inc., Richmond Newspapers, Inc., Dow Jones & Co’, 
Inc., The L.A. Times, Advance Publications, Inc., Chi. Sun-Times, Detroit Free Press, 
Newsday, Phila. Inquirer, Des Moines Reg. and Trib. Co., Indianapolis Star and 
Indianapolis News, Courier-J. and Louisville Times Co., Ariz. Republic and Phx. 
Gazette, Seattle Times Co., Trib. Co., Bergen Evening Rec. Corp., San Jose Mercury and 
San Jose News, News and Sun-Sentinel Co., Chesapeake Publ’g Corp., Associated Press, 
Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors, Soc’y of Prof’l
Journalists, Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n, New England Newspaper Ass’n, S. Newspaper 
Publishers Ass’n, Ala. Press Ass’n, and Mass. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, Globe 
Newspapers v. Super. Ct. for the Cnty. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (No. 81-611), 
1982 WL 608564; Brief of the Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. as Amicus Curiae, Globe 
Newspapers v. Super. Ct. for the Cnty. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (No. 81-611), 
1981 WL 389685; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press 
In Support of Appellant, Globe Newspapers v. Super. Ct. for the Cnty. of Norfolk, 457 
U.S. 596 (1982) (No. 81-611), 1981 WL 389686; Brief of Amici Curiae, Am. Broad. 
Cos., Inc.; CBS Inc.; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters; Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n; 
and the Wash. Post, Globe Newspapers v. Super. Ct. for the Cnty. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 
596 (1982) (No. 81-611), 1981 WL 389684. 
1254 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
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Burger, writing for the majority, wrote that “the presumption of openness may be 
overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”1255  Here, too, the 
press amici were well represented.1256  The same year, in Waller v. Georgia, 1257 the Court 
held that pre-trial suppression hearings can be closed over the defendant’s objec ions only 
if there are compelling reasons to do so and only after considering alternative 
remedies.1258  This was considered a purely Sixth Amendment case, and the press did not 
participate.  These two cases were held to be controlling in a 2010 case reversing a 
                                                
1255 Id. at 510. 
1256 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Cal. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, Press-Enter. Co. v
Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (No. 82-556), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 14; Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner Filed on Behalf of USA 
Today and Oakland Trib. published by Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc.; Salinas 
Californian, Stockton Rec., and Visalis Times-Delta published by Speidel Newspaper  
Inc.; The Sun published by The Sun Co. of San Bernardino, Cal.; San Rafael Indep. J. 
published by Cal. Newspapers, Inc.; The Copley Press Inc., publisher of The San Diego 
Union and The (San Diego) Evening Trib.; McClatchy Newspapers, publishers of The 
Sacramento Bee, The Modesto Bee, and The Fresno Bee; The S.F. Examiner Div. of 
Hearst Corp., publisher of the S.F. Examiner; The Press-Telegram, published in Long 
Beach by Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.; The Reg. (Santa Ana); San Jose Mercury 
News; Gannett News Serv., Inc.; Cal. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n; and the Cal. Freedom 
of Info. Comm., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501 
(1984) (No. 82-556), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 28; and Brief Amici Curiae of The 
Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi; Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n; Am. 
Soc’y of Newspaper Editors; Associated Press; Associated Press Managing Editors 
Ass’n; The L.A. Times; The Miami Herald Publishing Co.; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters; 
Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n; The New York Times Co.; Radio-Television News Directors 
Ass’n; Reporters Comm. for Freedom of The Press; The S.F. Chron.; and The Wash. 
Post, Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (No. 
82-556),1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 30 (April 9, 1983). 
1257 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
1258 Id. at 47. 
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criminal conviction because the press and public were excluded from voir dire, a position 
supported in an amicus brief filed by Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.1259 
The last case in this line to refine the doctrine regarding assess to courtrooms, a 
second Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County (Press-
Enterprise II),1260 pulled together all of the rules established in the preceding cases and, 
without explicitly over-ruling Gannett v. DePasquale, consigned it to a jurisprudential 
footnote.  In Press-Enterprise II, Defendant Robert Diaz was charged with 12 counts of 
murder for administering overdoses of lidocaine in his capacity as a nurse.  Diaz moved 
to exclude the public from the preliminary hearing, and the prosecutor, who was seeking 
the death penalty, did not oppose the motion.  The magistrate judge granted the motion 
on the ground that the case had attracted national publicity and “only one side may get 
reported in the media.”1261  The hearing lasted forty-one days; Diaz was bound over for 
trial and the record was sealed.  Both the state and the Press-Enterprise petitioned for 
release of the transcript, but Diaz opposed release and the Superior Court denied he 
motion based on a “reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice” to Diaz’s fair trial.1262  
Although Diaz ultimately waived his right to a jury and transcripts of the preliminary 
hearing were released, the state appellate courts essentially affirmed the decision below, 
holding that there was no generalized First Amendment right of access to preliminary 
                                                
1259 Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721 (2010).  SeeBrief Amicus Curiae of the Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press in Support of Petitioner, Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 
721 (2010) (No. 09-5270), 2009 WL 2481343. 
1260 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
1261 Id. at 4. 
1262 Id. at 5. 
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hearings and that the burden was on the press to prove no reasonable likelihood of 
prejudice.1263  Again, there was no lack of advice from the press.1264 
Over a dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Rehnquist, 1265 Chief Justice 
Burger established a two-part rule for judges to follow whenever the issue of closure 
arises.  Borrowing from Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Burger 
posited a “qualified First Amendment right of access” to any judicial proceeding that has 
historically been open to the public and where access contributes positively to its proper 
functioning.1266  Once that test is met, he said, Press-Enterprise Idictates that the 
presumption of openness can be rebutted only by findings that closure is essential to an 
overriding governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.1267  As to 
this particular case, Burger held that the California preliminary hearing – which is often 
as dispositive as a trial – meets both the history and function prongs of the preliminary 
                                                
1263 Id. at 6. 
1264 Brief Amici Curiae of Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n; the Soc’y of Prof’l 
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi; Am’ Broad. Cos., Inc.; Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors; 
CBS Inc.; Chi. Trib. Co.; Chron. Publ’g Co.; the Concord Monitor; Dow Jones & Co., 
Inc.; Gannett Co., Inc.; Globe Newspaper Co.; the Hearst Corp.; the Miami Herald Publ’g 
Co.; Minneapolis Star and Trib. Co.; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters; Nat’l Newspaper 
Ass’n; Nat’l Pub. Radio; the Phila. Inquirer; Phx. Newspapers, Inc.; Pub. Broad. Serv.; 
Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n; Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press; 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc.; Scripps Howard; Seattle Times Co.; and the Wash. Post, 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (No. 84-
1560), 1985 WL 669954; Brief Amici Curiae of Cal. News Orgs. in Support of Petitioner 
Filed on behalf of The Copley Press, Inc.; The Associated Press; L.A. Times; Nat’l 
Broad. Co., Inc. (NBC); McClatchy Newspapers; S.F. Chron.; Freedom Newspaper ; The 
John P. Scripps Newspaper Group; Trib. Co.; The Press Democrat; Santa Barbara News 
Press; Sparks Newspapers; McGraw-Hill, Inc.; The Sun Co.; Marin Indep. J.; Visalia 
Times-Delta; Cal. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n; California Freedom of Info. Comm.; The 
Radio and Television News Ass’n of S. Cal.; Cal. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors; The East 
Bay Press Club; and Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n NorCal, Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (No. 84-1560),1985 WL 669961. 
1265 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
1266 Id. at 9. 
1267 Id. at 13-14. 
269
 
test.  He also held that the “reasonable likelihood” test applied in the lower court was 
inadequate.  Where the asserted interest is the defendant’s fair trial, Burger said closure is 
permissible only where there is a “substantial probability” that the defendant's right to a 
fair trial will be prejudiced and that reasonable alternatives to closure cannot dequately 
protect the defendant's fair trial rights.1268  The Court some years later applied that rule to 
preliminary hearings in Puerto Rico in response to a newspaper’s lawsuit,1269 but no other 
general closure cases have reached the Supreme Court. 
 On the issue of televising judicial proceedings, moreover, the Court reversed itself 
since Estes was decided in 1965.  In Estes,1270 Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices 
Douglas and Goldberg,1271 and Justice Harlan,1272 concurring separately, agreed with 
Justice Clark’s majority opinion that Estes’s conviction had to be reversed,1273 but 
Harlan’s concurring opinion was at least equivocal as to whether televising a criminal 
trial would forever be an inherent deprivation of due process.1274  Justices White, Stewart, 
Black, and Brennan dissented, writing that televising trials was neither inherently 
prejudicial nor specifically prejudicial in this case.1275  Brennan took pains to point out 
that, given Harlan’s equivocation, the decision in Estes fell short of a constitutional rule 
                                                
1268 Id. at 14. 
1269 El Vocero v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993). 
1270 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); see supra note 1093 and accompanying text. 
1271 Id. at 552 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
1272 Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
1273 Id. at 552. 
1274 Id. at 588-89 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The Estes trial was a heavily publicized and 
highly sensational affair. I therefore put aside all other types of cases. . . . The resolution 
of  those further questions should await an appropriate case; the Court should proceed 
only step by step in this unplowed field. The opinion of the Court necessarily goes no 
farther, for only the four members of the majority who unreservedly join the Court’s 
opinion would resolve those questions now.”). 
1275 Id. at 614 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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against televising trials.1276  That may have been some comfort to the NAB and the 
RTNDA, who argued as amici that courtroom reporting by broadcast media – properly 
controlled by the court – does not deprive a defendant of due process of law.1277  In that 
assertion, they were joined only by the State Bar Association of Texas; the ACLU and 
American Bar Association supported the majority.1278 
 The constitutional issue – although not the lingering question of desirability – was
resolved in Chandler v. Florida.1279  In that case, the Court upheld a Florida program that 
allowed trial courts, under controlled conditions, to televise portions of a burglary trial in 
which the defendants were convicted and their convictions affirmed on appeal.  Writing 
for a unanimous Court, at least with regard to the outcome, Chief Justice Burger referr d 
specifically to Justice Harlan’s equivocal concurring opinion in Estes and declared that 
Estes created no per se constitutional rule against televising criminal trials.1280  He further 
held that nothing in the Florida rule or its application in this particular case deprived the 
defendants of their due process rights.1281  The decision vindicated the earlier arguments 
of  the NAB and RTNDA, who were joined this time by a broad array of press amici.1282   
                                                
1276 Id. at 617 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Harlan’s concurrence, supra note 1272). 
1277 Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters and The Radio Television News Dirs. Ass’n 
as Amici Curiae, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (No. 256), 1965 WL 130164 at 
*12. 
1278 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Texas Civil Liberties Union, Amici Curiae, Estes 
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (No. 256),1965 WL 115508 at *3; Brief of the American Bar Association as 
Amicus Curiae, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (No. 256),1965 WL 115507 at *10. 
1279 449 U.S. 560 (1981). 
1280 Id. at 573-74. 
1281 Id. at 582. 
1282 See Brief of Cmty. Television Found. of S. Fla., Inc., the Pub. Broad. Serv., the Fla. 
Public Broad. Serv., Inc., and the Educ. Broad. Corp. as Amici Curiae, Chandler v. 
Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (No. 79-1260), 1980 WL 339586; Brief of Amici Curiae, 
Fla. News Interests on Dev. and Operation of Fla. Rule, Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 
560 (1981) (No. 79-1260), 1980 WL 339604; Joint Brief for Amici Curiae Radio 
Television News Dirs. Ass’n, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., Am. Fed’n of Television and Radio 
271
 
 Although lower courts continue to close hearings and even portions of trials from 
time to time, today’s constitutional doctrine clearly favors access to judicial proceedings 
for the press and the public.  Most of the decisions that created this very favorable 
doctrine resulted from cases that were instigated by the press in the first instance and, in 
most cases, the media plaintiffs were strongly supported by the rest of the industry 
through the filing of amicus briefs at the certiorari phase and on the merits. 
Unfortunately, as we will see in the next section, the result was exactly the opposite when 
the press tried to gain access to executive branch information.   
 
B.  Access to Executive Branch Information 
The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in government. 
But the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it 
will succeed. There is no constitutional right to have access to particular 
government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. The 
public’s interest in knowing about its government is protected by the 
guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution 
itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Ac .  
 
 The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its 
resolution. Congress may provide a resolution, at least in some instances, 
through carefully drawn legislation. For the rest, we must rely, as so often 
in our system we must, on the tug and pull of the political forces in 
American society. 1283 
 
 Justice Potter Stewart’s assessment of the constitutional status of newsgathering 
vis a vis the executive branch of government is as accurate today as it was in November 
                                                                                                                                                 
Artists (AFL-CIO), Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors, Associated Press Broad., Inc. , 
Associated Press Managing Editors, Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, Nat’l Broad. Editorial 
Ass’n, Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n, Nat’l Press Club, Nat’l Press 
Photographers Ass’n, Nat’l Public Radio, the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 
and Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 
(1981) (No. 79-1260), 1980 WL 339605. 
1283 Stewart, supra note 1198, at 709-10. 
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1974 when he included those words in an address to the Yale Law School 
Sesquicentennial Convocation.  Only two years earlier, the Court had offered as dictum 
in Branzburg v. Hayes the proposition that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the 
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public 
generally.”1284 And less than six months earlier, the Supreme Court had issued its first 
opinion directly on point, with Justice Stewart writing for the 5-4 majority.   
 Pell v. Procunier1285 was the first of three Supreme Court decisions involving 
access to prisons, and that trio has been remarkably influential ever since.  The second 
case, Saxbe v. Washington Post,1286 was decided the same day and, for all practical 
purposes, the same way.  Both cases involved regulations – state regulations in Pell, 
federal regulations in Saxbe – that prohibited reporters from interviewing specific 
prisoners.  The institutional press strongly supported the individual journalists who, along 
with the prisoners they wished to interview, brought suit against the California 
Department of Corrections in Pell.  In three amicus briefs, they argued that the public had 
a right to know what went on the prisons, that the prisoners’ own First Amendment rights 
could only be vindicated by granting press access, and that allowing the press to 
interview specific inmates would not cause any particular problems for the system.1287  A 
three-judge U.S. District Court found the rules violated the prisoners’ rights, alt ough not 
                                                
1284 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972). 
1285 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
1286 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
1287 Brief Amicus Curiae for Chi. Trib. Co., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (No. 
73-918), 1974 WL 185822; Brief of Hous. Chron. Publ’g Co., Amicus Curiae, Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (No. 73-918), 1974 WL 185929;  Brief of the Wash. Post 
Co., the Miami Herald Publ’g Co., the Minneapolis Star and Trib. Company, N.Y. News, 
Inc., and the Times Mirror Co., Amici Curiae, in Support of Reversal, Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U.S. 817 (1974) (No. 73-918),1974 WL 185930. 
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the media’s,1288 but the U.S. Supreme Court found no First Amendment violation at all.  
The fact that the press could tour the facilities, along with the general public, and 
interview inmates at random, was enough to satisfy the First Amendment; th  regulations 
were merely reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, a category long he d to pass 
constitutional muster.1289  Justices Powell, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented; in 
Pell, Powell agreed with the Court that the California rules did not violate the prisoners’ 
First Amendment rights, but agreed with press and the other dissenters in both cases that 
the California regulations “impermissibly restrain[ed] the ability of the press to perform 
its constitutionally established function of informing the people on the conduct of their 
government.”1290 
 In his extensive dissenting opinion in Saxbe, Powell pointed out that working 
reporters and academic journalists testified as experts at the trial level.1291 Unlike the 
experience in Pell, the press was successful at trial in Saxbe, and that favorable opinion 
was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  The only additional 
                                                
1288 364 F.Supp 196 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
1289 417 U.S. at 826-27. 
1290 417 U.S. at 835 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
1291 417 U.S. at 854 n. 4 (Powell, J., dissenting) (The court received testimony from three 
experienced reporters, two academic journalists, and an attorney with special expertis  in 
this area. The reporters were respondent Ben H. Bagdikian, a Washington Post reporter
experienced in covering prisons and interviewing inmates; Timothy Leland, a Pulitzer 
prize winner who is Assistant Managing Editor of the Boston Globe and head of its 
investigative reporting team; and John W. Machacek, a reporter for the Rochester Times-
Union, who won a Pulitzer prize for his coverage of the Attica Prison riot. The academic 
journalists were Elie Abel, Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism of Columbia 
University, and Roy M. Fisher, Dean of the School of Journalism of the University of 
Missouri and former editor of the Chicago Daily News. The sixth witness was Arthur L. 
Liman, an attorney who served as general counsel to the New York State Special 
Commission on Attica. In that capacity he supervised an investigation involving 1,600 
inmate interviews, at least 75 of which he conducted personally.) 
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amicus brief filed in Saxbe came from Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,1292 
but it hardly mattered.  The majority saw Saxbe as a carbon copy of Pell and ruled 
accordingly. 
 The third case in the prison access trio, H uchins v. KQED,1293 involved media 
access to portions of the Alameda County, Calif., jail and the prisoners it housed, beyond 
the limited public tours that were offered after the case was filed.  A federal district court  
had enjoined the sheriff from denying the press reasonable access to the faciliti s nd 
inmates, including the use of cameras and sound equipment; the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.1294  On a 4-3 vote, the Supreme Court reversed, without a 
majority opinion.  Writing for the Court and joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, 
Chief Justice Burger held it was the province of the political branches to determine the 
extent to which the jail should be open to the press and public.1295  Justice Stewart wrote 
separately, concurring in the judgment, to assert that, once the doors of the jail had been 
opened to the public, reasonable and “effective” access to the press was required.1296  
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, and supported by press amici,1297 
                                                
1292 Brief for the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press Legal Defense and Research 
Fund as Amicus Curiae, Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (No. 73-1265), 
1974 WL 186234.  Amicus briefs for the Trib. Co. and the Hous. Chron., supranote 
1287, were filed for both cases. 
1293 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
1294 Id. at 7. 
1295 Id. at 16. 
1296 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
1297 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press Legal Defense and Research Fund, Am. Soc’y of 
Newspaper Editors and Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n, Houchins v. KQED, 438 
U.S. 1 (1978) (No. 76-1310), 1977 WL 205226; Brief for Kearns-Trib. Corp. as Amicus 
Curiae, Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (No. 76-1310), 1977 WL 189697; and 
Brief of the Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n, the Ariz. Newspapers Ass’n, the Pa. Newspaper 
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wrote in dissent that the press and public could not be excluded from meaningful access 
to the jail without violating the First Amendment.1298  There have been no Supreme Court 
decisions regarding newsgathering in prisons since Houchins, and Dienes points out that 
these three cases continue to control the disposition of prison cases in the lower 
courts.1299 
 The Watergate scandal provided another opportunity for the press and the 
government to square off in the U.S. Supreme Court over access to government-held 
information.  The first Watergate-related case to reach the High Court was a rare victory 
for the press’s position, but principally because the press and the Congress found 
themselves on the same side.  In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,1300 the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act,1301 which vested control over former President Nixon’s presidential 
records – including the infamous Watergate tapes – with the General Services 
Administration, abrogating an agreement Nixon had made with GSA that would likely 
have led to the destruction of the most incriminating of those materials.  Ironically, the 
only First Amendment argument raised in the case was Nixon’s assertion that the Ac
violated his freedom of speech and association.1302  Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press, which was allowed to intervene at the District Court level, pointed out that the 
First Amendment “was conceived in ‘the struggle . . . to establish and preserve the righ  
                                                                                                                                                 
Publishers Ass’n, the S.D. Press Ass’n As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (No. 76-1310), 1977 WL 189696. 
1298 438 U.S. at 19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
1299 DIENES ET AL., supra note 1203, at 413. 
1300 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
1301 Pub. L. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695, note following 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1970 ed., Supp. V). 
1302 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 466. 
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of the English people to full information in respect to the doings and misdoings of their 
government,’” 1303 but did not frame that as a First Amendment “right-to-know” 
argument.   
 The GSA decision had no effect on First Amendment doctrine, but the second 
Watergate-related case was argued and decided, in part, on First Amendment grounds.  
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,1304 is often classified as a case involving access 
to judicial proceedings, rather than access to executive information.1305 However it is 
framed, the decision was a clear defeat for the broadcast media specifically and for the 
press in general.  
 When the Watergate tapes were played in open court at the obstruction of justice 
trial of former Nixon advisers, including former Attorney General John Mitchell, t  
jury, press and public received printed transcripts.  But the Court refused requests to copy 
the tapes and broadcast and sell the copies submitted by ABC, CBS, NBC, PBS, 
RTNDA, and, separately, Warner Communications, even after the trial had ended.  
Noting that the defendants planned to appeal, Judge John Sirica held that the public’s 
“right to know” did not outweigh the possible prejudice to the defendants’ appeals from 
                                                
1303 Brief of Appellees the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Am. Historical 
Ass’n, Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, et al., at 75, Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 
(1977) (No. 75-1605), 1977 WL 189798 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co, 297 U.S. 
233, 247 (1936)). 
1304 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
1305 See, e.g., DIENES ET AL., supra note 1203, at 244.  We include it here because access 
to the tapes in the hands of the President was an issue well before the criminal trial which 
brought the case to the Supreme Court’s attention, because of the deference to the 
executive shown by the courts throughout this proceeding, and by the Supreme Court’s 
holding that the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, whih dealt 
explicitly with executive branch materials, was all but dispositive in this case. 
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commercial exploitation of the tapes. 1306  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia reversed Sirica’s decision, stressing the importance of the public’s common 
law right of access to the tapes and First Amendment limits on the use of the tapes once 
released to the press and public.1307  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 
 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell held that the common law right of access 
to judicial records was trumped by the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act, which established a procedure for releasing the tapes to the public.1308  
Any First Amendment right of access or Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was 
satisfied by the fact that reporters could attend the trial, listen to the tapes, and report 
what they heard.  “The contents of the tapes were given wide publicity by all elements of 
the media,” Powell wrote. “There is no question of a truncated flow of information to the 
public.”1309 Justices White and Brennan dissented in part, but only on a technical point 
regarding the reach of the statute;1310 Justices Marshall1311 and Stevens1312 dissented on 
the merits, but neither raised a constitutional issue.  Interestingly, there was no press 
participation in this case outside the broadcast and cable industry respondents, who, 
nevertheless, were well represented by Floyd Abrams and Edward Bennett Williams, 
superlawyers generally associated with TheNew York Times and The Washington Post, 
respectively.  
                                                
1306 Id. at 595. 
1307 Id. at 596. 
1308 Id. at 603. 
1309 435 U.S. at 609. 
1310 Id. at 611 (White, J., dissenting). 
1311 Id. at 612 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
1312 Id. at 614 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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 The last Watergate-related newsgathering case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, 
FBI v. Abramson,1313 was decided on purely statutory grounds.  Because the statute 
construed in that case was the federal Freedom of Information Act,1314 it bears some 
mention here.  The Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, as it is often called, was 
enacted in 1966 as an amendment to the public information section of the then-20-year-
old Administrative Procedure Act.1315  By its terms, it provides for public access to all 
records created or obtained by a federal agency that do not fall within one of nine
discretionary exemptions, which are to be narrowly construed by the courts.  Over the 
years, different administrations have offered varying guidance to executiv  officers over 
how FOIA should be applied, but the press has lost almost every case in which it fought 
for access all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Even though the focus of this 
dissertation is constitutional litigation, that fact alone warrants a very brief description of 
the FOIA cases in order to give a more complete picture of the Court’s treatment of 
newsgathering. 
 In the first FOIA newsgathering case to reach the Supreme Court, Kissinger v. 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,1316 the Court refused to order production 
of notes and transcripts of telephone conversations of Henry Kissinger while National 
Security Adviser and Secretary of State – requested by journalist William Safire, RCFP, 
and others – finding those documents were not agency records governed by FOIA.1317   In 
the Watergate-related case, Abramson, journalist Howard Abramson sought information 
                                                
1313 456 U.S. 615 (1982). 
1314 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2010). 
1315 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2010). 
1316 445 U.S. 136 (1980). 
1317 Id. at 155 (1980). 
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on the extent to which the Nixon White House used FBI files to collect derogatory 
information about political opponents beginning in 1969.1318  Reversing the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, and disregarding press amici,1319 the Court held 5-4 
that the records fell under the law enforcement exemption, even though the only records
sought were being used for other purposes.1320 
 The same day that Abramson was decided, the press lost another FOIA case, 
Department of State v. Washington Post,1321 in which the Post sought documents 
indicating whether two Iranian nationals, prominent figures in the revolutionary 
government, were American citizens.  Despite the objections of press amici,1322 the Court 
reversed both courts below to hold unanimously that the records represented a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of privacy and were thus exempt from FOIA.1323  In Department of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,1324 the court again rejected 
press amici1325 and the D.C. Circuit to hold unanimously that FBI criminal histories (rap 
                                                
1318 Abramson, 456 U.S. at 618-19. 
1319 See Brief Amici Curiae of The Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi; T e Am. 
Soc’y of Newspaper Editors; The Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters; The Nat’l ewspaper 
Ass’n; The Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n; and The Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press in Support of Respondent, FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982) (No. 80-
1735), 1981 WL 390061. 
1320 Abramson, 456 U.S. at 631-32. 
1321 456 U.S. 595 (1982). 
1322 See Brief Amici Curiae of the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n; the Am. Soc’y of 
Newspaper Editors; the Nat’l Ass’n of Broad.; the Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n; the Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press; and the Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi in 
Support of Respondent, U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post, 456 U.S. 595 (1982) (No. 81-
535), 1982 WL 608533. 
1323 Id. at 602-603. 
1324 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
1325 See Brief of Amici Curiae the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, the Am. Soc’y of 
Newspaper Editors, Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, the Miami Herald Publ’g Co., the Wash. 
Post and McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. fr 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (No. 87-1379), 1988 WL 1026013. 
280
 
sheets) were protected under the law enforcement exemption, even though individual 
arrest records were publicly available documents.1326  Finally, in 2004, the Court ruled 
against press amici in one FOIA and one closely related case.  In the FOIA case, National 
Archives and Records Administration v. Favish,1327 the press amici found themselves on 
the same side as one of their harshest critics, the former associate counselfor Accuracy in 
Media, Allan J. Favish. The Court rejected Favish’s FOIA request, in his own name, for 
release of copies of photographs showing the condition of Clinton White House aide 
Vince Foster’s body at the scene of his apparent suicide over the objections of Foster’s 
family. 1328 In the non-FOIA access case, Cheney v. U.S. District Court,1329 the Court 
declined to apply the disclosure requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Ac  to 
proceedings of the Vice President’s National Energy Policy Development Group.1330   
 The Court also declined to force the Federal Open Market Committee to release 
its Domestic Policy Directives without the customary delay;1331 refused to force the Air 
                                                
1326 Id. at 780. 
1327 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
1328 Brief of Amici Curiae Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Am. Soc’y of 
Newspaper Editors, Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n, Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 
Ass’n of Alternative Newsweeklies, Nat’l Press Club, Investigative Reporters and 
Editors, Inc., and Nat’l Freedom of Info. Coalition in Support of Respondent, Nat’l 
Archives and Rec. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-954), 2003 WL 
22038397, and Brief of Amicus Curiae Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and 
Law in Support of Respondent Allan J. Favish, Nat’l Archives and Rec. Admin. v. 
Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-954), 2003 WL 22019552 (Aug. 21, 2003). 
1329 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
1330 See Brief Amici Curiae of The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Am. 
Soc’y of Newspaper Editors and Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists in support of Respondents, 
Chaney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (No. 03-475), 2004 WL 522595. 
1331 Fed. Open Market Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 (1979).  SeeBrief for Amici 
Curiae Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Information 
Clearinghouse, Fed. Open Market Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 (1979) (No. 77-1387), 
1978 WL 207107. 
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Force to disclose statements made during an aircraft accident investigation;1332 upheld 
Los Angles Police Department rules restricting dissemination of arrestee addresses;1333 
and upheld federal legislation limiting states’ right to disseminate driver’s license 
information without the driver’s consent.1334  
 While the press lost all of these cases, press involvement in FOIA and other 
access litigation has not been futile.  In its most recent effort, John Doe #1 v. Reed,1335 
press amici helped to persuade the Court to affirm a decision allowing Washington state 
to release petitions filed in a gay marriage referendum under its Public Records Act.  
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and others have also filed amicus briefs 
on the winning side in many Supreme Court cases that involved access to information 
where the newsgathering interests were not immediately obvious.  For exampl, the Court 
                                                
1332 U.S. v. Webber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792 (1984).  See Brief of the Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, et al. (FOI Service Center and the Texas Daily 
Newspaper Ass’n), as Amici Curiae, U.S. v. Webber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792 (1984) 
(No. 82-1616), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 610. 
1333 L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).  See Brief 
Amici Curiae of the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Am. Court and 
Commercial Newspapers, Inc., Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors, and the Nat’l 
Newspaper Ass’n in Support of Respondent, L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting 
Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (No. 98-678), 1999 WL 513826, and Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc., in Support of Respondent, L.A. Police 
Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (No. 98-678), 1999 WL 
516060 (July 20, 1999). 
1334 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).  SeeBrief Amici Curiae of the Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, the Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors and the Soc’y of 
Professional Journalists in Support of Respondents, Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 
(2000) (No. 98-1464), 1999 WL 688443. 
1335 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).  See Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, Gannett Co., Inc., Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n, Newspaper Ass’n of Am., The 
Radio-Television Digital News Ass’n, and Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, in Support of 
Respondents, John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559), 2010 WL 
1256466; Brief Amici Curiae of Nat’l and Wash. State News Publishers, News Broad. 
and News Media Prof’l Ass’ns in Support of Respondents, John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. 
Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559), 2010 WL 1362079.   
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has held that federal district court orders and opinions received by the Departmnt of 
Justice in litigating tax cases could all be obtained through FOIA, greatly easing the cost 
and effort of the nonprofit magazine that sought them;1336 that FOIA’s inter- and intra-
agency memorandum exemption did not apply to documents submitted by Indian tribes to 
the Department of Interior;1337  that having students grade each others’ papers did not 
violate the Federal Educational Records Privacy Act (FERPA),1338 and, separately, that 
FERPA violations did not create a private cause of action1339 that the information 
dissemination requirements of sex offender notification statutes were not unconstituti al 
ex post facto laws,1340 and, separately, that they did not violate due process;1341 that actual 
                                                
1336 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989).  See Brief Amicus Curiae 
of the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press in Support of the Respondent, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (No. 88-782), 1989 WL 1127764. 
1337 Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001).  See 
Brief Amici Curiae of The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Am. Soc’y of 
Newspaper Editors, and the Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists in support of Respondent, Dep’t 
of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 99-1871), 
2000 WL 1845932. 
1338 Owasso Independent School Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002).  See Brief 
Amici Curiae of The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press and The Student Press 
Law Ctr. Urging Reversal, Owasso Independent School Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo, 534 
U.S. 426 (2002) (No. 00-1073), 2001 WL 967496. 
1339 Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).  SeeBrief Amici Curiae of The 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, The Student Press Law Ctr., Soc’y of Prof’l
Journalists, and Security on Campus, Inc., in support of Petitioners, Gonzaga University 
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (No. 01-679), 2002 WL 312502. 
1340 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).  See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus 
Curiae, and Brief Amicus Curiae of The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, in 
Support of Petitioners, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01-729), 2002 WL 
1269892. 
1341 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).  See Motion for Leave to File 
Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae of The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
the Press in support of Petitioners, Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) 
(No. 01-1231), 2002 WL 1728586. 
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injury must be shown to collect damages for a Privacy Act violation;1342  and that 
litigation by one FOIA requester does not necessarily preclude claims by another for the 
same documents.1343  RCFP has also been successful in many cases filed in state courts 
and lower federal courts.1344      
 Thus far, we have seen that the Court has generally been responsive to press 
demands for access to judicial proceedings, but far less responsive to demands for acces 
to executive branch information.  Why the discrepancy?  If we analyze the question using 
the “history-function” test of Justice Brennan’s Richmond Newspapers concurrence, we 
can readily see that the courts traditionally have been more open to the public than have 
executive agencies.  Likewise, we can acknowledge that the degree of secrecy r quired 
for the executive to function properly is far greater overall than that required by the 
judiciary.  We can also understand that the Court is more comfortable setting the 
boundaries of secrecy for the judiciary than for another, co-equal branch of government.  
This appears to be so even where the Court’s function involves setting boundaries for 
state courts, over which it exercises no supervisory authority, or interpreting the 
boundaries set by the legislature in the Freedom of Information Act and other statute .  
What is not apparent is any particular difference in the support of the institutional press 
for constitutional litigation to enhance access to judicial and executive informati n.  In 
                                                
1342 Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004).  See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of the Press in Support of Respondent, Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004) 
(No. 02-1377), 2003 WL 22304854. 
1343 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). See Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Security 
Archive, the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, OpenTheGovernment.org, the 
Nat’l Whistleblower Ctr., and the Electronic Frontier Found. in support of Petitioner, 
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (No. 07-371), 2008 WL 563433. 




both spheres, the press has pursued access as party litigants and amici with the same 
resources and talent that it put into the publishing cases.  
  
C.  Indirect Impact Cases 
 The preceding sections have explored in some detail those cases applying the 
principle, firmly established in Branzburg, that the First Amendment rights of the press 
regarding direct access to information are co-extensive with the rights of the general 
public.  We now focus on those cases, of which Branzburg was the exemplar, which have 
inhibited newsgathering by indirectly curtailing access to information.  These cases all 
sound a similar theme, phrased somewhat differently, but to the same effect:  that the 
press, like the public at large, is bound to comply with laws of general applicability that 
do not single out the press for special treatment or are otherwise aimed at suppressing 
freedom of speech. 
 After Branzburg itself, the first of these cases was Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.1345  
Following a student demonstration to protest the firing of a black janitor by the Stanford 
University Hospital, which included a sit-in and, later, a violent confrontation with local 
police, the Santa Clara County District Attorney obtained a search warrant to search the 
offices of the Stanford Daily, which had published a special edition of the student 
newspaper containing articles about and photographs of the demonstration.1346  The stated 
purpose of the warrant was to find photographs of students who may have assaulted 
police officers and committed other felonies during the confrontation.  The warrant was 
served by four officers in the presence of the Daily staff; they found nothing that had not 
                                                
1345 436 U.S. 547 (1978).  
1346 Id. at 551. 
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already been published and left empty-handed.1347  The Daily and various members of its 
staff subsequently sued officials responsible for the search claiming ther rig ts under the 
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated.  The U.S. District Court 
held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “forbade the issuance of a warrantto 
search for materials in possession of one not suspected of crime unless there is probable
cause to believe, based on facts presented in a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena duces 
tecum would be impracticable.”1348 The court also held that where the object of the search 
is a newspaper, the First Amendment allowed such a search “only in the rare 
circumstance where there is a clear showing that (1) important materials will be 
destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; a d (2) a restraining order would be 
futile.”1349  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed per curiam, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 1350 
 Although 1971 was still relatively early for the massive mobilization of press 
amici that became more common by the end of the decade, there was respectable support 
for the Daily in the form of an amicus brief filed by Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press and others.1351 The press’s brief focused on the First Amendment issue, 
                                                
1347 Id.  
1348 Id. at 442. A subpoena duces tecum commands a witness to produce a specified 
tangible item at trial or deposition.  BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed. 
2010). 
1349 Id. 
1350 Id. at 553. 
1351 See Brief for Amici Curiae the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, the Am. 
Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, the Nat’l Newspaper Ass’n, the Nat’l Ass’n of 
Broadcasters, the Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors, the Associated Press Managing 
Editors, the Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n, the Student Press Law Ctr., the Soc’y of 
Prof’l Journalists (Sigma Delta Chi), the Newspaper Guild (AFL-CIO), the Am. Fed’n of 
Television and Radio Artists (AFL-CIO), the Cal. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, Zurcher 
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (No. 76-1484), 1977 WL 189749. 
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supporting the position of the District Court, including its ruling that $47,000 in legal fees 
was appropriate in this case.  Arrayed against the press were briefs filed by the United 
States, several individual states, and organizations representing district atto neys and 
police departments.1352 Only the criminal defense attorneys supported the lower court’s 
holding,1353 and then only on the Fourth Amendment issue.  No matter; the Supreme 
Court reversed both prongs of the decision.   
 On the First Amendment question, Justice White, writing for the 5-3 majority, 
rejected all five arguments offered by the press in support of the First Amend ent rule 
propounded by the District Court: 
First, searches will be physically disruptive to such an extent that 
timely publication will be impeded. Second, confidential sources 
of information  will dry up, and the press will also lose 
opportunities to cover various events because of fears of the 
participants that press files will be readily available to the 
authorities. Third, reporters  will be deterred from recording and 
preserving their recollections for future use if such information is 
subject to seizure. Fourth, the processing of news and its 
dissemination will be chilled by the prospects that searches will 
disclose internal editorial deliberations. Fifth, the press will resort 
to self-censorship to conceal its possession of information of 
potential interest to the police.1354 
                                                
1352 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 
547 (1978) (No. 76-1484), 1978 WL 206910; Brief Amici Curiae Submitted by the States 
of Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Utah and Virginia, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (No. 
76-1484),1977 WL 189747; Brief of Amici Curiae, the Nat’l Dist. Att’ys Ass’n and the 
Cal. Dist. Att’ys Ass’n, in Support of Petitioners, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 
547 (1978) (No. 76-1484),1977 WL 189746; and Brief, Amici Curiae, of Ams. for 
Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. and the Intern’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Inc., in 
Support of the Petitioners, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (No. 76-1484), 
1977 WL 189745. 
1353 See Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc., Amicus Curiae, in 
Support of the Position of Respondents, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) 
(No. 76-1484),1977 WL 189748. 




Pointing out that the framers of the Fourth Amendment did not see fit to provide any 
special consideration for the press, White wrote, “[p]roperly administered, th  
preconditions for a warrant – probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be 
searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness – should afford sufficient
protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching 
newspaper offices.”1355  White cited his own opinion in Branzburg to support his 
assertion that newsroom searches would neither dry up  sources nor result in self-
censorship.  
 Concurring, Justice Powell took the opportunity to clarify his concurring opinion 
in Branzburg, noting that it did not “support the view that the Fourth Amendment 
contains an implied exception for the press, through the operation of the First 
Amendment. That opinion noted only that in considering a motion to quash a subpoena 
directed to a newsman, the court should balance the competing values of a free press and 
the societal interest in detecting and prosecuting crime.”1356  Dissenting, Justice Stewart, 
joined by Justice Marshall, sought to distinguish Branzburg.  In that case, Stewart wrote, 
the Court was concerned that important evidence might be lost by extending the 
privilege; here,  the Court is only concerned with “whether any significat societal 
interest would be impaired if the police were generally required to obtain evidence from 
the press by means of a subpoena rather than a search.”1357  Stevens also dissented,1358 on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, and Brennan took no part in the case. 
                                                
1355 Id. at 565. 
1356 Id. at 570 (Powell, J., concurring). 
1357 436 U.S. at 574 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
1358 Id. at 577. 
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 Toward the end of his majority opinion, White echoed his Branzburg decision by 
inviting Congress to enact statutory protection if appropriate.  “Of course,” he wrot , “the 
Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise against legislative or executive efforts to 
establish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses of the search warrant 
procedure.”1359  This time, Congress took White up on his offer, enacting the Privacy 
Protection Act of 1980.1360  The act, which applies to federal, state and local law 
enforcement agencies, protects the work product and documentary materials of persons 
engaged in First Amendment activities from search warrants unless there is probable 
cause to believe that a journalist is using them to commit a crime or seizure is necessary 
to prevent death or serious injury.  Even then, seizure is only permissible if there is 
reason to believe they would be destroyed in response to a subpoena or have not been 
handed over in response to a court order.1361   
 If the press was united behind the Stanford Daily, it was splintered again by the 
next case in this line, Cohen v. Cowles Media,1362 perhaps even more than it had been in 
Branzburg.  Dan Cohen was a Minneapolis public relations executive associated with the 
1982 gubernatorial campaign of Independent-Republican Wheelock Whitney.1363  In late 
October 1982, just six days before the general election, Cohen contacted a number of 
journalists in the St. Paul- Minneapolis area, offering to give them information 
concerning a Democratic-Farmer-Laborite (DFL) candidate in exchange for a promise of 
                                                
1359 436 U.S. at 567. 
1360 42 U.S.C. 2000aa (2010). 
1361 Id. 
1362 501 U.S. 663 (1991).  This case is discussed briefly, supra, notes 1027-31 and 
accompanying text. 
1363 Id. at 665.  See also Bill Salisbury, Burning the Source, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., 
Sept. 1991, at 18. Much of this history and analysis is adapted from Easton, supra note 
1001.   
289
 
confidentiality.1364  Among the journalists accepting the offer were reporters for the St. 
Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star Tribune.1365   
 Cohen provided the reporters with public court records showing that Marlene 
Johnson, the DFL candidate for Lieutenant Governor, had previously been arrested for 
unlawful assembly and petit theft.  The unlawful assembly charges, which grew out of a 
civil rights demonstration, were ultimately dismissed.   The candidate had been convicted 
on the theft charge, which involved a minor shoplifting offense while she had been 
emotionally distraught, but the conviction was later vacated.1366 
 Editors at both the Pioneer Press and the Star Tribune independently decided to 
print the story and, over their reporters’ protests, to include the name of the source.   
While the Pioneer Press editors buried Dan Cohen's name deep in the story, the Star 
Tribune editors featured it, apparently reasoning that the value of the story, if any, lay in 
Cohen’s conduct, not Johnson’s.  The Star Tribune also attacked Cohen in its editorial 
pages,  but neither paper reported that it had broken a promise of confidentiality with 
Cohen. 1367  
 When the story broke, Cohen lost his job1368 and later sued the newspapers’ 
publishers alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.  Overcoming the 
                                                
1364 Salisbury, supra note 1363, at 19-20.  According to Salisbury, the Pioneer Press 
reporter involved, Cohen refused even to describe the information until he received a 
promise of confidentiality. 
1365 Id. Associated Press reporter Gary Nelson and WCCO-TV reporter Dave Nimmer 
also received the information.  Nelson’s stories did not name Cohen, while Nimmer 
decided the story was not newsworthy.  Id
1366 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665-66. 
1367 Salisbury, supra note 1363, at 21-22. 
1368 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 666.  Cohen said he was fired, and that position was adopted by 
the Supreme Court.  According to Salisbury, his supervisor said he resigned.  Salisbury, 
supra note 1363, at 22. 
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publishers’ First Amendment claims, Cohen won $200,000 in compensatory damages and 
$500,000 in punitive damages at trial.1369  The Minnesota Court of Appeals struck down 
the punitive damage award after finding that Cohen had failed to establish a fraud 
claim.1370   The Minnesota Supreme Court struck down the compensatory damage award, 
holding a contract action "inappropriate" under the circumstances.1371    
 During oral argument before the Minnesota Supreme Court, one of the justices 
had asked a question about “estoppel,” a cause of action in equity that might serve as an 
alternative to Cohen’s contract claim in enforcing the reporters’ promises.1372   
Addressing that issue in its opinion, the court found it necessary to “balance the 
constitutional rights of a free press against the common law interest in protecting a 
promise of anonymity.”1373  In this case, the court said, enforcing the promise would 
violate the newspapers’ First Amendment rights.  The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari “to consider the First Amendment implications of this case.”1374 
 Writing for a five to four majority,1375 Justice White rejected the newspapers’ 
argument that this case was controlled by the line of cases holding that “if a newspaper 
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to 
                                                
1369 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 666. 
1370 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
1371 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990). 
1372 In a successful promissory estoppel action, one who makes, then breaks, a promise is 
prevented from denying the existence of contract, despite the absence of a contract 
formality.  See Cohen, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
1373 Id. at 205. 
1374 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 667. 
1375 Dissenting opinions were written by Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall 
and Souter, and Justice Souter, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor.  
Id. at 672, 676. 
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further a state interest of the highest order.”1376 Instead, Justice White said, the case was 
controlled “by the equally well-established line of decisions holding that generally 
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement 
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”1377    
Justice White proceeded to list a number of cases – starting with Branzburg v. Hayes – 
purporting to demonstrate that enforcement of general laws against the press is not 
subject to any stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other 
persons or organizations.  Finding Minnesota’s  doctrine of promissory estoppel just such 
a  “law of general applicability,” Justice White had no problem applying it to the press.   
He even suggested that the newspapers’ breaking their promises might serve as a 
predicate for finding their conduct unlawful, thus arguably negating First Amendment 
protection for the information itself.    
 Justice White further distinguished Cohen’s situation from that of a plaintiff 
seeking to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel claim by stating an 
alternative cause of action.  Specifically citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, where 
the Court denied a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress without a showing 
of actual malice,1378 Justice White pointed out that Cohen had not sought damages for 
injury to his reputation or state of mind, but rather for the loss of his job and his lowered 
earning capacity.    
 Finally, Justice White tackled the argument that allowing the promissory etoppel 
claim would inhibit the press from disclosing the identity of a confidential source when, 
as in Cohen, that information is newsworthy.  If true, he said, the “chilling effect” would 
                                                
1376 Id. at 668-69 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g, 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). 
1377 Id. at 669. 
1378 See supra notes 875-80 and accompanying text.  
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be “no more than the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of 
applying to the press a generally applicable law that requires those who make certain 
kinds of promises to keep them.”1379   
 Writing for Justices Marshall and Souter in dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that 
Hustler should have controlled the outcome in this case, that First Amendment protection 
applies to published speech regardless of the cause of action asserted.  Blackmun saw no 
meaningful distinction between the types of damages sought by Jerry Falwell and those 
sought by Daniel Cohen.1380  Justice Souter also filed a separate dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor, that rejected White’s relianc  on 
the doctrine of “generally applicable laws,” denying any “talismanic quality” in such 
laws.  Souter would have found the state’s interest in protecting the promise of 
confidentiality insufficient to outweigh the value of the information revealed in this 
case.1381  Nevertheless, the case was remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which 
reversed its previous position and held the newspapers liable for Cohen’s damages on a 
theory of promissory estoppel.1382  
 In his account of this case, Cohen’s lawyer, Elliot Rothenberg, called the decision 
“the worst defeat the media had ever suffered in the Supreme Court.”1383 Even allowing 
for some self-indulgent boasting, Rothenberg was not far off the mark. How had the 
press, as constitutional litigator, blown such a big one?  Clearly, there was no lack of
                                                
1379 501 U.S. at 671-72. 
1380 501 U.S. at 672-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
1381 501 U.S. at 676-679 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
1382 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992). 
1383 ROTHENBERG, supra note 60, at 218. In the interest of full disclosure, Rothenberg 
cites my own (“A pro-media law professor”) appraisal of this case as “cut[ting] short the 
natural evolution of First Amendment protection for newsgathering and set[ting] the 
stage for many wrongheaded opinions coming out of the lower courts today.” I . at 254 
(quoting  Easton, supra note 1001, at 1153.   
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legal talent applied to the case.  Both newspapers brought in new legal teams for the 
Supreme Court contest – “heavy artillery,” Rothenberg called them.  Supreme Court 
specialist Stephen M. Shapiro became lead counsel for the Pion er Press, and eight 
lawyers signed its brief.  Minneapolis lawyer John French – Harvard Law School and 
clerk for Justice Felix Frankfurter – took over the Star Tribune campaign, and four 
lawyers signed its brief.  Rothenberg’s description of the press amici is particularly apt: 
Shapiro and French were not the only blue-ribbon lawyers joining the case 
on the other side.  In fact, a battalion of the nation’s leading lawyers and 
most prominent media organizations entered the Supreme Court appeal 
supporting the Star Tribune and Pioneer Press.  Nineteen attorneys from 
leading law firms in New York, Washington, and Los Angeles filed a third 
brief opposing mine.  Their amicus curiae brief represented the big leagues 
of American media….1384  
 
Nor were the press’s arguments off track.  Indeed, they paralleled, if not 
influenced, the arguments of the four dissenting justices.   Apart from Rothenberg 
himself, there was no outstanding opposition to the press’s position; heavy hitters 
like the United States and the ACLU did not have a dog in the hunt, and even 
those in or involved with the media who thoroughly disapproved of the 
newspapers’ conduct stayed out of the Supreme Court action.   
 Nevertheless, it is not difficult to identify reasons why the press lost this case.  
Arguably, the case should have ended with the first state supreme court opinion; the state 
court rejected Cohen’s contract claim, and Cohen had not raised promissory estoppel.  
The First Amendment question, essential to getting the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
                                                
1384 ROTHENBERG, supra note 60, at 180.  See also Brief of Amici Curiae Advance 
Publications, Inc., Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors, 
Associated Press, The Copley Press, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., Newsletter Ass’n, the N.Y. 
Times Co., and the Times Mirror Co., in Support of Respondents, Cohen v. Cowles 
Media, 501 U.S. 663 (No. 90-634), 1991 WL 11007832. 
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need never have been reached.  Timing, too, was a problem for the press.  Justice 
Brennan retired just before the case was heard, and although his successor, Justice So ter, 
also supported the press’s position, Brennan’s voice would have been a far more 
powerful counterweight to Justice White’s hostility.  But perhaps the most seriou  
problem of all was the nature of the case itself and the dissension it engendered within the 
media establishment. 
 In Cohen, the press was forced to argue that promises of confidentiality to sources 
were not serious enough to be considered contracts – without weakening the central 
argument in Branzburg that such promises deserved constitutional protection.  If not 
altogether untenable, the press’s position was at best precarious.  It was also high y 
contentious.  Rothenberg quotes University of Minnesota journalism professor Ted 
Glasser as characterizing the trial as more “between reporters and editors” than between 
plaintiff and defendants,1385 and urged reporters to oppose the newspapers in any appeal. 
To claim to have a First Amendment right to renege on a reporter’s 
promise not only places the press above the law but denies reporters the 
very freedom they need to operate in the day-to-day world of journalism.  
Reporters have every reason to file a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of 
Cohen.1386 
 
There was no reporters’ brief at any level, and the Reporters Committee for Fr edom of 
the Press did not sign on to the press’s amicus brief.  The Washington Post also declined 
to join, as did a number of other media companies who might otherwise have been 
expected to participate.  Rothenberg’s petition for certiorari had capitalized on that 
dissension by quoting star media lawyer Floyd Abrams calling the newspaper ’ conduct 
                                                
1385 ROTHENBERG, supra note 60, at 180. 
1386 Id. at 134 (quoting Theodore L. Glasser, Reporters Seen as Winners in Cohen 
Verdict, MINN. J., Oct. 4, 1988, at 1). 
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in breaking their reporters’ promises of confidentiality “reprehensible and damaging to 
all journalists.”1387  Shortly before the decision came down, Abrams again spoke out 
publicly in a speech and op-ed column, charging that the newspapers 
acted in a fashion contrary to core principles of journalistic ethics.  They 
also invited the lawsuit now awaiting decision by the Supreme Court, one 
that offers enemies of the press a particularly inviting target.  What the 
Minnesota newspapers did was wrong; they should have said so.  Why is 
any defender of the press unwilling to say as much.1388 
 
 There is no direct evidence that the division within the press over the Co n case 
had a significant or even marginal influence on the outcome.  Nor was there any direct 
evidence that differences among media organizations played a significant role i  the 
Court’s rejection of constitutional protection for confidential sources in Branzburg v. 
Hayes, although those differences certainly weakened the campaign for federal shi ld 
legislation.  There is no doubt, however, that the two most important newsgathering cases 
ever to reach the U.S. Supreme Court did not show the press in the best light as a 
constitutional litigator. 
 The last two cases of indirect influence on newsgathering were reported the same 
day in 1998.  Both Wilson v. Layne1389 and Hanlon v. Berger1390 were Fourth Amendment 
cases, and while both restricted that newsgathering technique known as “ride-alongs,” 
neither had any influence on First Amendment doctrine.   In Wilson, a Washington Post 
reporter and photographer accompanied federal and local law enforcement officers in 
serving an arrest warrant at the Maryland home of a fugitive; in Hanlon, a CNN crew 
                                                
1387 Id. at 166. 
1388 Id. at 214 (quoting Floyd Abrams, Battles Not Worth Fighting, WASH. POST, June 13, 
1991, A21). 
1389 526 U.S. 603(1998). 
1390 526 U.S. 808 (1998). 
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accompanied federal agents serving a search warrant at the Berger ranch in Montana, 
where the owner was suspected of illegally killing protected eagles.  The Wilsons did not 
sue The Washington Post, which never published the photographs;1391 the Supreme Court 
denied CNN’s petition for certiorari,1392 so only the cases against the officers reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  A unanimous Court held that, by inviting the press along to cover 
the events, the officers involved violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the Wilson and 
Berger families against unreasonable searches and seizures.1393 
 The principal interest of the institutional press in both cases was to reverse the 
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hanlon that such “ride-
alongs” were per se unconstitutional, that they always and necessarily violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  In a brief filed in both cases, the press amici argued that the Court should 
affirm the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Wilson that 
declined to reach the Fourth Amendment issue because the officers were immune fro  
liability.1394  CNN argued separately in Hanlon that its conduct did amount to a search or 
seizure, but that even if the Fourth Amendment applied, the Bergers’ privacy interests 
were outweighed by the public interest in coverage, specifically “enabling public 
                                                
1391 Linda Greenhouse, Police Violate Privacy in Home Raids with Journalists, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 25, 1999, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E1D81231F936A15756C0A96F95
8260 &sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
1392 Cable News Network, Inc. v. Berger, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999) (denying certiorari). 
1393 Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810. 
1394 Brief Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc., et al. in Support of Petitioners in No. 97-1927 and Respondents in 
No. 98-83. A.H. Belo Corp.; Allied Daily Newspapers of Wash., Inc.; Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors; 
The Associated Press; Cal. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n; CBS Broad. Inc.; The Copley Press, Inc.; Dow 
Jones & Co., Inc.; Fox Television Stations, Inc.; Gannett Co., Inc.; The Hearst Corp.; King World Prods., 
Inc.; The L.A. Times; Mag. Publishers of Am., Inc.; The McClatchy Co.; Nat’l Ass’n Of Broadcasters; 
Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc.; Newspaper Ass’n of Am., Inc.; The N.Y. Times Co.; The Orange County Reg., A 
Div. of Freedom Commc’ns, Inc.; The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press; Trib. Co.; Univision 
Communications, Inc.; The Wash. Post; and Washington S ate Ass’n of Broad., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 
603 (No. 98-83), Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (No. 97-1927), 1998 WL 901781 (Dec. 28, 1988). 
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oversight of law enforcement, deterring crime, and curbing potential police misonduct 
and danger to police.”1395 
 Writing for the Court in Wilson, Chief Justice Rehnquist gave short shrift to the 
press arguments. 
Surely the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply not 
enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into a private 
home. And even the need for accurate reporting on police issues in general 
bears no direct relation to the constitutional justification for the police 
intrusion into a home in order to execute a felony arrest warrant... [And 
w]hile it might be reasonable for police officers to themselves videotape 
home entries … such a situation is significantly different from the media 
presence in this case.  
 
The Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons’ home were working on a 
story for their own purposes. They were not present for the purpose of 
protecting the officers, much less the Wilsons. A private photographer was 
acting for private purposes, as evidenced in part by the fact that the 
newspaper and not the police retained the photographs. Thus, although the 
presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant may in some 
circumstances be constitutionally permissible, the presence of these third 
parties was not.1396  
 
Rehnquist may not have articulated a per se rule, but it was just about as close a 
he could have come.  “We hold that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for 
police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the 
execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not 
in aid of the execution of the warrant.”1397      
 Whatever the reason or combination of reasons for the disparity between 
publishing and newsgathering cases, the third and final extended case study in this 
                                                
1395 Brief for Respondents Cable News Network, Inc., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., Robert 
Rainey, Donald Hooper, and Jack Hamann in Support of Petitioners, Hanlon v. Berger, 
526 U.S. 808 (No. 97-1927), 1998 WL 901783. 
1396 526 U.S. at 613. 
1397 526 U.S. at 614. 
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exploration puts the Court’s jurisprudence in these two areas on a dramatic collison 
course.  Although it was decided a decade ago, Bartnicki v. Vopper1398 is still the most 
recent case to significantly alter First Amendment doctrine as it pertains to the press.  The 
next chapter examines Bartnicki in detail, not only for its doctrinal development, but for 
what it can tell us about the press today in its role as constitutional litigator. 
                                                
1398 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
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Chapter 8 – Bartnicki  v. Vopper: Pulling It All Together 
 
 How many different ways can one approach a First Amendment press clause 
analysis?  What influences a court to select one analytical approach over another?  And 
what is the long-term effect of choosing one over another?  In Bartnicki v. Vopper,1399 a 
case in which the United States Supreme Court considered federal and state statutes
prohibiting the disclosure of illegally intercepted telephone conversations,1400 we are 
privileged to have a small laboratory through which to study the first two questions.  
And, of course, we can always make some speculative predictions as to the third.   
 In Bartnicki, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment 
gave the news media a right to publish truthful information on matters of public concern, 
even if unlawfully acquired, provided the publisher did not participate in the unlawful 
conduct.1401  How the Court ultimately reached that conclusion is one principal focus of 
this chapter, precisely because the story of this litigation reveals so much about 
                                                
1399 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
1400 Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 
2511(1)(2010)(“Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person 
who (c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents 
of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that 
the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication in violation of this subsection; … shall be punished….”); Pennsylvania 
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (2010) 
(“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree if he (2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the 
contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, 
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication….”). 
1401 Id. at 535 (“…a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First 
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”). 
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alternative First Amendment analyses and the process of influencing the courts’ hoices 
among those analyses.   
 In this one case, the district court framed the issue as a battle between conflicting 
and potentially controlling precedents.1402  The circuit court selected a doctrinal formula 
called “intermediate scrutiny,” and applied it in textbook fashion to reach a 
conclusion.1403  And the United States Supreme Court resorted to an “ad hoc balancing” 
of interests in personal privacy versus publicly significant information, ultimately ruling 
in favor of the latter.1404  
 Even more interesting are the reasons why the courts made the decisions they did.  
Did they track the arguments of the party litigants?  How influential was the Unit d 
States government’s intervention to defend the federal statute at issue?  And what role did 
the press itself play?  Bartnicki provides an excellent opportunity to study the press’s 
increasing sophistication in helping to shape First Amendment doctrine through litigation 
in the Supreme Court.  
 Some 70 years earlier, the press’s first serious effort in Near v. Minnesota1405 
established the supremacy of the right to publish.1406  Forty years later, the disastrous 
decision in Branzburg v. Hayes1407 stunted any First Amendment right to gather news and 
revealed the need for coordinated media attention to doctrinal litigation.1408  Now, after 
another 30 years, the Bartnicki case brought publishing and newsgathering issues 
together, and this time the press proved to be up to the challenge. 
                                                
1402 See infra Part B. 
1403 See infra Part C. 
1404 See infra Part D. 
1405 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
1406 See supra Chapter 4. 
1407 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
1408 See supra Chapter 6. 
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 As interesting as this case may be from analytical and strategic perspectives, the 
implications of Bartnicki’s contribution to First Amendment doctrine are difficult to 
discern.  The Court allowed a law-abiding press to publish with impunity truthful, 
important information, regardless of its initial unlawful acquisition, but did it 
significantly expand the public’s right to receive newsworthy information?   
 The question actually presented by this case was whether the broadcaster could, 
consistent with the First Amendment, be punished for his dissemination of publicly 
significant information initially acquired from an unknown person who had illegally 
intercepted a private telephone conversation.1409  Both federal and state statutes provided 
a civil cause of action for, not only the interception, but also the further disclosure of the 
intercepted conversation.1410 
 In declaring the disclosure provision unconstitutional as applied, however, the 
Court declined to abstract its holding to a legal principle. The ambiguity of the decision 
suggests that a different balance could be struck if the subject matter of the disclosure 
were, say, national security rather than labor relations matters.  The conclusi  of this 
chapter looks to the contemporary WikiLeaks.com controversy to illuminate this issue.  
 Part A of this chapter recounts the underlying facts of the Bartnicki case and its 
procedural posture up to certiorari.  Part B examines the two contending precedents 
                                                
1409 Id. at 525. 
1410 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)(2010)(“… any person whose wire, oral, or electronic 
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter 
may in a civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United States, 
which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.”); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
5725(a)(2010)(“Any person whose wire, electronic or oral communication is intercep d, 
disclosed or used in violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action against ny 
person who intercepts, discloses or uses or procures any other person to intercept, 
disclose or use, such communication….”). 
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initially asserted by the parties and accepted as the basis for analysis in the d strict court.  
Part C looks at the shift to doctrinal analysis in the Court of Appeals, prompted at least in
part by the federal government’s entry into the case.  Part D studies the proce dings 
before the United States Supreme Court, with emphasis on the participation and 
analytical approach of prominent media lawyers.  Part E dissects the opinion and the shift 
to an ad hoc balancing approach, particularly in light of the press arguments, while Part F 
ventures some predictions about the significance of the decision with the WikiLeaks.com 
controversy as a backdrop. 
A.  “Blow Off Their Front Porches” 
 The Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania encompasses the cities of Scranton, 
Pittston, and Wilkes-Barre,1411 and numerous smaller towns, including the boroughs of 
Courtdale, Edwardsville, Forty Fort, Larksville, Luzerne, Plymouth, Pringle, Kingston, 
and Swoyersville. These towns, all hard by Interstate Highway 81 and just a little 
northwest of Wilkes-Barre, are served by the Wyoming Valley West School District.1412  
The district boasts seven elementary schools, a middle school, and a high school, with 
about 5,000 students altogether.1413   
 From mid-1992 until November 1993, the district was torn by a contract dispute 
between the Wyoming Valley West School Board and the Wyoming Valley West 
Education Association, the union representing the district’s 341 teachers.  Five monthsof 
hard bargaining for a new teachers’ contract turned nasty in October 1992, when the 
board decided to warn teachers that they might be subject to furlough a week before the 
                                                
1411 Wyoming Valley, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wyoming_Valley. 




next scheduled bargaining session.1414  By March 1993, the teachers had halted all 
volunteer work, including chaperoning school activities,1415 and in May the union 
threatened to strike in early June unless its salary demands were met.1416 
 The union was asking for six percent increases each year for the next three years, 
raising the average salary from $40,000 to $47,640 in 1994.1417  The board was standing 
firm at three percent per year for three years.1418  The teachers’ health insurance plan was 
also in dispute.1419  At 10:30 p.m. on May 27, 1993, the union delivered a strike notice to 
Superintendent Dr. Norman Namey,1420 and, on June 4, the teachers launched their first 
strike in the 27-year history of the district.1421      
                                                
1414Union Head: Furlough Slips Add Tension to WVW Contract Talks; Teachers and 
Board Directors in the Wyoming Valley West School District Returning to Bargaining 
Table This Week, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Oct. 19, 1992, available at 
http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html. 
1415 Volunteer Work Halted by Teachers at WVW; Activities and Chaperoning are Falling 
Victim to a Contract Dispute Between Teachers and the School District, TIMES LEADER 
(Wilkes-Barre), March 19, 1993, available at 
http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html. 
1416 Teachers at WVW Threaten to Strike; The Situation Appears ‘Bleak,’ A School 
Director Concedes, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), May 22, 1993, available at 
http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html. 
1417 Id. 
1418 Contract Offer Best We Can Do, Says WVW Board Member; Under the Proposal, 
Teachers would receive a 3-Percent Raise Each Year for the Next Three Years, TIMES 
LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), June 7, 1993, available at 
http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html. 
1419  WVW Could See Strike in Exam Week; Salary Increases and a Health Insurance 
Plan are the Two Chief Points of Contention, the Head of the Teachers’ Union Says, 
TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), May 29, 1993, available at 
http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html. 
1420 Id. 
1421 Striking Wyoming Valley West Teachers Picket the High School Friday in Plymouth 
While Seniors File into the Cafeteria; Economics Lesson; Valley West Strike to End 
Tuesday, But Battle Over Contract Will Continue, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), June 6, 
1993, available at http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html.  The teachers 
picketed on Friday and Monday, then  went back to school on Tuesday in compliance 
with a state statute.  Id.  
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 The timing of that strike was the subject of one particular cellular telephon 
conversation between Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane, Jr., sometime in May.1422  
Bartnicki was employed by the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) and 
assigned as a negotiator in the Wyoming Valley West School District contra t dispute.1423  
Kane was a teacher at Wyoming Valley West High School and president of the PSEA 
local, the Wyoming Valley West Education Association.1424   
 But it was another remark by Kane that captured the attention of the public – and 
the legal system – when the conversation was broadcast several months later:  “If th y’re 
not going to move for three percent, we’re gonna have to go to their, their homes … to 
blow off their front porches, we’ll have to do some work on some of those guys….”1425  
How the public came to know of this conversation forms the factual predicate of this 
case. 
 The contentious contract negotiations prompted the formation of a citizens’ group 
called the Wyoming Valley West Taxpayers’ Association to oppose the teachers’ union 
proposals.1426  Sometime after the conversation took place, still during the spring of 1993, 
the president of that organization, Jack Yocum, allegedly found a five-minute tape of the 
conversation in his mailbox.1427  Yocum claimed not to know who made the tape or 
                                                
1422 A transcript of the conversation between Bartnicki and Kane was prepared by WILK 
Radio, one of the defendant’s in Bartnicki v. Vopper, and a copy of the transcript is 
attached to the Media Defendants’ Answer (29a-30a) and their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, as Exhibit “A” (315a-326a).  Amended Brief of Appellants, Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 34082380 at *8.  The 
exact date of the conversation is not in the record.   
1423 Id. at *3. 
1424 Id. 
1425 Id. at *8. 
1426 Id. at *6. 
1427 Id. at *7 (citing Yocum’s deposition). 
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why,1428 but he listened to it, identified the voices, played it for some school board 
members, and gave copies of the tape to Frederick W. Vopper. 1429  Vopper had a news 
and public affairs talk show under the name “Fred Williams” that was broadcast on 
WILK Radio and simulcast on WGBI-AM.1430  
 By all accounts, Vopper did nothing with the tape until late September.1431  By 
then, contract negotiations had completely broken down, the dispute had been submitted 
to non-binding arbitration, the arbitrator had sided with the teachers’ union, and the 
school board had rejected the arbitrator’s decision.1432  About the same time, Vopper, 
who  had been critical of the teachers’ union in the past.1433 began airing the tape 
repeatedly, while adding bomb-like sound effects.1434  Intended or not, the tapes had the 
effect of further inflaming the contract dispute,1435 and the Luzerne County District 
                                                
1428 Id. 
1429 Id.  Yocum also gave copies to Rob Neyhard at WARM Radio, and Kane’s 
deposition states that copies were given to the Times Leader and Citizens’ Voice 
newspapers, as well as television stations WNEP-TV and WBRE-TV.  Only Yocum, 
Vopper, and the two radio stations that carried Vopper’s program were named as 
defendants in the subsequent lawsuit. Id. at *7-8. 
1430 Id. 
1431 Id. at *8. 
1432  Arbitrator Suggests Raises at WVW; The Negotiator Says Teachers Should Receive 
their Requested Salary Increase, but Directors Seem Unwilling to Sway from their Offer, 
TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Sept. 28, 1993, available at 
http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html.  The Supreme Court opinion says the 
parties accepted the arbitrator’s proposal, 512 U.S. at 519, but the contemporaneous news 
reports seem more reliable on this point. 
1433 512 U.S. at 519.  
1434 Brief of Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999), 1998 WL 
34083465 at 5.  Indeed, the District Attorney for Wilkes-Barre testified that Vopper and 
WILK were so irresponsible that his office refuses to send press releases to WILK. Brief 
of Pennsylvania State Education Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d. Cir.1999) (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 
34083460 at *3. 
1435 Alleged Threat by Union Heightens WVW Friction; Those Who Have Heard the Tape 
Allege Someone Says School Directors Could Suffer Property Damage At Their Homes if 
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Attorney launched an investigation at the behest of the school board.1436 In the end, 
neither his investigation nor another undertaken by the PSEA could determine who 
actually made the tape.1437  According to Vopper’s first attorney, Donald Brobst, the 
question remains unanswered to this day.1438 
 The contract dispute was ultimately settled in November after the school board 
offered salary increases of 4% per year over four years,1439 but the controversy over 
Vopper’s broadcasts continued; in August 1994, Bartnicki and Kane filed a complaint in 
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Vopper and the 
parent companies of the stations that carried his show (the “media defendants”) under 
                                                                                                                                                 
They Do Not Make Contract Concessions, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Oct. 3, 1993, 
available at http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html. 
1436 Jim Van Nostrand, DA Will Probe Alleged Threats Upon WVW; Several Directors 
Say They Will Ask Fellow Board Members to Formally Request an Investigation, Perhaps 
at Tonight’s Meeting, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Oct. 2, 1993, available at 
http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html. 
1437 Amended Brief of Appellants, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 
98-7156), 1998 WL 34082380 at *7. 
1438 Interview with Donald Brobst of Rosenn, Jenkins & Greewald, L.L.P., June 25, 2010 
[hereinafter Brobst Interview] (on file with author). 
1439  The Battle Ends; Valley West Board OKs Pact on 5-4 Vote, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-
Barre), Nov. 4, 1993, available at http://www.timesleader.com/archive/6865272.html. 
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civil suit provisions of Federal and state wiretap laws.1440  The unknown persons who 
intercepted the conversation were also named as John Doe and Jane Doe.1441 
 The media defendants retained Donald H. Brobst of the Wilkes-Barre law firm 
Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., to represent them in district court.  Brobst had  
long represented WILK and its then-parent company, Keymarket of NEPA (Northeastern 
Pennsylvania), Inc., and this was neither the first nor the last case he had involving Fred 
Vopper.  In addition to his defamation and other media law work, Brobst specialized in 
employment law cases, and he both initiated and defended cases brought under Section 
1983 of the U.S. Code, which gives plaintiffs a federal cause of action when deprived of 
a constitutional right under color of state law.    
 The media defendants filed their answer in September.1442  The following 
February, they consented to Plaintiffs’ amending their complaint to add Yocum as a 
defendant.1443  Yocum answered on June 30, 1995.1444  After extensive discovery, 
plaintiffs and defendants moved for summary judgment, with both defendants asserting a 
                                                
1440 One section of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
provides that “any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercept d, 
disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action rec ver 
from the person or entity which engaged in the violation such relief as may be 
appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)(2009).  Similarly, one section of the Pennsylvania 
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act provides that “Any person wh se 
wire, electronic, or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed or used in violation of 
this chapter shall have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses 
or uses or procures any other person to intercept, disclose or use, such communication…. 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5725(a)(2009).   
1441 Amended Brief of Appellants, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.1999) (No. 
98-7156), 1998 WL 34082380 at *3. 
1442  Id. 
1443 Id. at *4. 
1444 Id. 
 308
First Amendment right to disclose the conversation.1445 By Memorandum and Order 
dated June 17, 1996, the District Court denied both motions, ruling that the circumstances 
of the interception and the defendants’ knowledge of them represented genuine issues of 
material fact, but that imposing liability on the defendants would not violate the First 
Amendment.1446 
 The court denied defendants’ subsequent motion to reconsider in November, and 
in January 1998 certified that its orders were appealable.1447  On Jan. 14, the Media 
Defendants filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit with the 
concurrence of the other parties to the litigation.1448  The Third Circuit granted the 
petition on Feb. 26,1449 and after receiving briefs from the parties1450 and the PSEA as 
                                                
1445 Id. 
1446 Memorandum & Order, Bartnicki v. Vopper, Civ. No. 3:CV-94-1201 (M.D. Pa. 
1996), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517 at *12. 
1447 Amended Brief of Appellants, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 
98-7156), 1998 WL 34082380 at *5. The court ruled that the orders denying summary 
judgment involved “controlling questions of law as to which there is substantial ground 
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal… will materially advance the 
ultimate determination of this litigation.” Id.  As articulated by the Third Circuit, those 
questions were: 
 
(1) whether the imposition of liability on the media Defendants under the 
[wiretapping statutes] solely for broadcasting the newsworthy tape on the 
Defendant Fred Williams’ radio news/public affairs program, when the tape was 
illegally intercepted and recorded by unknown persons who were not agents of the 
Defendants, violates the First Amendment; and (2) whether imposition of liability 
under the aforesaid [wiretapping statutes] on Defendant Jack Yocum solely for 
providing the anonymously intercepted and recorded tape to the media 
Defendants violates the First Amendment. 
 
200 F.3d at 113-114. 
1448 Amended Brief of Appellants, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 
98-7156), 1998 WL 34082380 at *2. 
1449 Id. 
1450 See Brief of Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.  1999) (No. 98-
7156), 1998 WL 34083465 and Addendum, 1998 WL 34082372; Brief on Behalf of 
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amicus curiae,1451 heard arguments on Oct. 5. The United States, which intervened as of 
right and at the invitation of the court to defend the constitutionality of the federal 
statute,1452 filed a brief on Nov. 17, 1998, but to no avail. On Dec. 27, 1999, the Third 
Circuit reversed the District Court,1453 and the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on June 26, 2000.1454 
B. In the District Court 
 In his motion for summary judgment, Brobst had argued for the media defendants 
that Bartnicki and Kane could not prove that their telephone conversation had been 
illegally, that is, intentionally and not inadvertently, intercepted, or that Vopper knew or 
had reason to know that the telephone conversation was illegally intercepted.1455  He also 
argued that Bartnicki had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation, which 
took place on a cellular telephone that she acknowledged was susceptible of 
interception.1456  Brobst later conceded that neither of these factual arguments was 
persuasive, and that he staked everything on the First Amendment argument from the 
beginning.1457 Brobst’s First Amendment argument relied almost exclusively on 
Landmark Communications v. Virginia and the line of constitutional privacy cases 
                                                                                                                                                 
Appellant Jack Yocum, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-7156), 
1998 WL 34082376; and Amended Brief of Appellants, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 
109 (3d Cir.1999) (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 34082380.  
1451 See Brief of Pennsylvania State Education Association as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d. Cir.1999) (No. 98-7156), 
1998 WL 34083460. 
1452 Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.1999) (No. 98-
7156), 1998 WL 34082480 at *1. 
1453 200 F.3d at 129. 
1454 530 U.S. 1260 (2000). 
1455 Brief in Support of Media Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, Civ. No. 3:CV-94-1201 (M.D. Pa. 1996), 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517, at *18. 
1456 Id. at 22. 
1457 Brobst Interview, supra note 1438. 
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beginning with Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn and ending with Florida Star v. BJF.1458  
Those cases held that “where the media lawfully obtains truthful information about  
matter of public significance or concern, government officials may not constitutionally 
punish the publication of that information absent the need to further a government 
interest of the highest order.”1459  Brobst later said he focused on Landmark in particular 
because the governmental interests there – maintaining the reputation of the judges an  
the institutional integrity of the courts – were far greater than the privacy nterests 
protected in this case.1460   
 To United States District Court Judge Edwin M. Kosik, however, the Bartnicki 
case essentially countered Brobst’s Landmark rule with another well established First 
Amendment principle:  that “generally applicable laws ‘do not offend the First 
Amendment, simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental eff cts on 
its ability to gather and report the news.’”  Kosik referred to this principle as the Cohen 
doctrine, after Cohen v. Cowles Media, the only case cited for that proposition in his 
opinion,1461 despite much earlier origins.1462   
 For the District Court, the conflict between Landmark and Cohen was easily 
resolved.  According to the court, which completely misread the precedent cases, 
                                                
1458 Brief in Support of Media Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
1455, at *12-18.  For a discussion of this line of cases, see supraChapter 5, Part F. 
1459 Memorandum & Order, Bartnicki v. Vopper, Civ. No. 3:CV-94-1201 (M.D. Pa. 
1996), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517 at *10. 
1460 Brobst Interview, supra note 1438. 
1461 Memorandum & Order, Bartnicki v. Vopper, Civ. No. 3:CV-94-1201 (M.D. Pa. 
1996), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517 at 11 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 
U.S. 663, 669 (1991).   
1462 As applied to First Amendment claims, the doctrine goes back at least as far as 
Grosjean, which contained Justice Sutherland’s dictum that owners of newspapers are not 
“immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for the support of government.” 
Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).  
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Landmark only applies where “a state actor attempted to place a prior restraint on 
specified speech or where the intentional interception was legal but the disclosure wa  
illegal.”1463 Here, the court said without further explanation, “there exist no statutory 
provisions specifically designed to chill free speech.”1464   
 One could try to supply the logical steps left out of the court’s conclusory 
analysis.  If by “prior restraint on specified speech” the court meant suppression of 
speech because of its message, rather than merely its source, there is no classic prior 
restraint here.  To be sure, it is easier to regulate speech selected because of its ource, 
rather than its message, but one expects rather more scrutiny than this court applied.1465  
 And if “interception was legal” means no laws were broken in the newsgathering 
process, then this case is certainly different from the cases relied upon by the media 
defendants.1466 One might question, however, where the distinction comes from; the 
precedent cases explicitly avoid addressing the issue of illegally acquired information.1467  
                                                
1463 Memorandum & Order, Bartnicki v. Vopper, Civ. No. 3:CV-94-1201 (M.D. Pa. 
1996), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517 at *10. 
1464 Id. 
1465 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 520 U.S. 180, 185 
(1997)(upholding legislation requiring cable television operators to carry local bro dcast 
signals…) & Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 
(1994)(but only after imposing “the intermediate scrutiny applicable to content-neutral 
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech.”). 
1466 See supra Chapter 5, Part F. 
1467 Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524, 535 n. 8 (1989): 
 
The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue of whether, in cases 
where information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a 
source, government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but 
the ensuing publication as well. This issue was raised but not definitively 
resolved in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), 
and reserved in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 
(1978).  We have no occasion to address it here. 
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 In any event, the District Court found Landmark inapplicable and Cohen 
controlling.  “In reviewing both the federal and the state electronic surveillance l ws, we 
conclude that both acts are matters of general applicability.”1468  In his motion for 
reconsideration, Brobst argued that the court’s reliance on Cohen was misplaced and that 
Landmark did not involve a prior restraint.1469 The Virginia statute at issue in Landmark 
was “generally applicable” and did not “single out the press,” yet the Supreme Court 
reversed the newspaper owner’s conviction on First Amendment grounds.  This case, 
Brobst argued, is indistinguishable.  Moreover, he said, by breaking its promise t Cohen, 
the press arguably obtained its information unlawfully; here, there was no question that 
the press obtained its information lawfully from Yocum, whatever might have happened 
earlier.1470  Perhaps recognizing that engaging in a serious analysis of the issue before it 
on a motion for summary judgment was probably a waste of time and effort, the District 
Court denied Brobst’s motion and kicked the can down the road.  Brobst asked Judge 
Kosik to certify the case up to the Third Circuit and he agreed. 
 While Brobst might have taken the case to trial instead of appealing Kosik’s 
denial of his motion, he acknowledges that there would have been no point in going that 
route.  Apart from the constitutional claim, Brobst says, “We didn’t have much [in the 
way of another] defense in this case.  They had us dead to rights on what we did.  We 
clearly had broadcast the tape many times.  There was no doubt about that.  It was pretty 
hard for us to claim that we didn’t know that it had been a surreptitiously recorded tape.”  
                                                
1468 Memorandum & Order, Bartnicki v. Vopper, Civ. No. 3:CV-94-1201 (M.D. Pa. 
1996), 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517 at *12. 
1469 Media Defendants’ Brief in Support of Their Motion for Reconsideration, 
Memorandum & Order, Bartnicki v. Vopper, Civ. No. 3:CV-94-1201 (M.D. Pa. 1996), 
July 1996, at 6 (on file with author). 
1470 Id. at 7. 
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In fact, Brobst says, “we had a settlement agreement with the other side that the outcome 
of the appeal would decide the outcome of the case because there was no sense going to 
trial…. If we win [on the constitutional issue], we don’t have to pay them anything, 
obviously, and if they win, it was a fixed amount of money that we would pay them.” 
While the agreement reserved the right of either party to petition the Supreme Court for 
review, Brobst said neither side really expected the case to go that far.1471  
C. In the Third Circuit 
 On appeal, the parties agreed that no factual issues barred the Third Circuit from 
resolving the legal issues,1472 which boiled down to one:  Does the First Amendment bar 
the imposition of liability for publishing truthful information of public significance, 
where both the acquisition and publication of that information are prohibited by statute 
and where the publisher was not involved in the unlawful acquisition? 
 As might be expected, Appellants continued to rely on the Landmark doctrine and 
related cases, asserting that the government’s interest in the privacy of cellular telephone 
communications is “significantly less[]” than the interest at stake in Landmark.1473   In 
that case, the interest at issue was the confidentiality of state judicial review commission 
proceedings, the disclosure of which were prohibited by the state constitution and 
statutes.1474  
                                                
1471 Brobst Interview, supra note 1438. 
1472 Amended Brief of Appellants, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.1999) (No. 
98-7156), 1998 WL 34082380 at *10. 
1473 Id. at *19. 
1474 Id. at *20. One could argue the opposite position, of course: that the government’s 
interest in protecting government speech is lower than its interest in protecting private 
speech, albeit private speech on a public matter.  But see Boettger v. Loverro, 597 A.2d 
712, 720-21 (Pa. 1991)(“Thus, the legislature intended for the public interest in a free 
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 Appellants also cited a remarkably similar case in which the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Texas ruled that the First Amendment protected the press 
from civil liability for reporting the contents of an illegally recorded telephone 
conversation of a school board trustee, where the tape had been recorded anonymously, 
delivered to certain school board members, and played at a public school board 
meeting.1475 
 Perhaps even more interesting was Appellants’ attempt to distinguish Cohenby 
reciting many of the arguments used against the media companies in that case:  that the 
newspapers determined the scope of their own legal obligations by contract, that any 
restriction on publication was thus self-imposed, and that the newspapers may not have 
acted lawfully in acquiring the information by reneging on a promise of 
confidentiality.1476 Appellants also argued that the impact of enforcing the disclosure 
provisions of the wiretapping statutes would be far greater than “incidental,” as required 
to impose the Cohen doctrine.1477 
 Appellees also framed the case as a contest between the Landmark and Cohen 
principles, although of course they asserted that Cohen applies to this case.1478 Appellees 
                                                                                                                                                 
press to supersede the interests of an individual whose private conversation regardi g his 
illegal activities had been lawfully intercepted and lawfully obtained by a newspaper.”).  
1475 Amended Brief of Appellants, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.1999) (No. 
98-7156), 1998 WL 34082380 at *22 (citing Peavy v. New Times, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 532 
(N.D. Tex. 1997)).  The following year, however, the Peavy decision would be reversed 
in pertinent part by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which 
applied an intermediate scrutiny test. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158,193 
(1999). 
1476 Amended Brief of Appellants, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.1999) (No. 
98-7156), 1998 WL 34082380 at *25. 
1477 Id. at *25-26. 
1478 Brief of Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.  1999) (No. 98-7156), 
1998 WL 34083465 at *11. 
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also found a similar case in which a state trial court had distinguished the Landmark line 
on two grounds: (1) that the information in those cases had been properly part of the 
public record, albeit protected by statutory confidentiality; and (2) that the information in 
this case had been a private conversation, rather than governmental records. 1479 That case 
never mentioned the Cohen doctrine at all, but the Appellees devoted a section to 
amplifying the District Court’s assertions.1480  
 Appellees added some new arguments as well.  First, they asserted that the 
Landmark-related holdings were very narrow and limited to their specific facts.1481  
Specifically, Appellees pointed to the famous footnote 8 in Florida Star in which the 
Court declined to address the question of “unlawfully” acquired information,1482 
suggesting the Appellants’ reliance on those cases was therefore “misplaced.”1483  
Appellants, of course, would find that footnote irrelevant, since they committed no 
unlawful act in acquiring the information. 
 But even if the strict scrutiny of Landmark controlled, Appellees argued, the 
wiretapping statutes would pass muster because they were narrowly tailored to protect 
privacy rights of the highest order.1484  Drawing on legislative history, the Appellees 
asserted that Congress was aware of and increasingly concerned about the impact of 
                                                
1479 Id. at *11-12 (citing Natoli v. Sullivan, 606 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), aff’d, 
616 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. App. 1994)). 
1480 Brief of Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.  1999) (No. 98-7156), 
1998 WL 34083465 at *17. 
1481 Id. at *20. 
1482 See supra note 1467. 
1483 Brief of Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.  1999) (No. 98-7156), 
1998 WL 34083465 at*21. 
1484 Id. at *13. 
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modern communications technology on personal privacy and the law’s failure to keep up 
with that technology.1485   
 Appellant Yocum had claimed the status of news gatherer in his less-than- 
coherent brief to the Third Circuit, citing Branzburg v. Hayes for the proposition that he 
was therefore entitled to First Amendment protection.1486  Appellees pointed out that, if 
anything, Branzburg stands for the proposition that news gatherers enjoy very limited 
protection, supporting their argument based on the Cohen principle, and that in any case 
Yocum’s case would succeed or fail on the same grounds as the other Appellants’ 
case.1487  
 The only amicus brief in the Third Circuit was filed by the PSEA on behalf of 
Appellees, and that brief largely echoed the appellees’ analysis.  It raised – and criticized 
– another new decision based on similar facts,1488 and it added another rather spurious 
argument analogizing the imposition of civil liability for violation of copyright law and 
for violation of the wiretap law’s disclosure provisions.1489 Two aspects of the PSEA 
brief, however, bear mention because of their emphasis in the government’s brief and the 
Third Circuit opinion.  Unlike either the district court opinion or the appellees’ brief, th  
                                                
1485 Id. at *15. 
1486 Brief on Behalf of Appellant Jack Yocum, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.  
1999) (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 34082376 at *15 (citing 408 U.S. 665 (1972)). 
1487 Brief of Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.  1999) (No. 98-7156), 
1998 WL 34083465 at *28-29. 
1488 Brief of Pennsylvania State Education Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d. Cir.1999) (No. 98-7156), 
1998 WL 34083460 at *15 n. 7 (discussing Boehner v. McDermott, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11509 (D.D.C. July 27, 1998), which held that “protecting the privacy of 
electronic communications is not of sufficiently ‘high order’ to justify punishing 
publication of such communications.”).   
1489 Brief of Pennsylvania State Education Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.1999) (No. 98-7156), 
1998 WL 34083460 at *7-8. 
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PSEA brief put particular emphasis on the wiretap statute’s prohibition of “uses” of the 
intercepted materials other than disclosure to show its more general applicability1490 and 
characterized the Landmark line as involving “heightened scrutiny” dependent upon the 
lawfulness of information’s initial acquisition.1491  Both of these arguments would be 
substantially amplified in the federal government’s brief and addressed, alb it negatively 
for the most part, in the Third Circuit opinion. 
 There were no amicus briefs supporting Vopper’s position.  Brobst  does not 
know why there was no support from other media organizations at this stage – “they 
certainly would have been aware of the case” – but he acknowledges that he did not 
solicit any amicus briefs from those organizations.  Given the outcome in the Third 
Circuit, there was no apparent need for such support.    
 Following oral argument before the Third Circuit, the United States filed a brief – 
signed by the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Civil Division, the 
U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and two staff appellate attorneys – 
defending the constitutionality of the wiretap statute’s disclosure provision agai st 
Appellants’ as-applied challenge.1492  Under federal law, the United States has the right to 
defend the constitutionality of any federal statute challenged on constitutional 
grounds.1493 Although Brobst argued that his “as-applied” challenge did not rise to that 
level,1494 the Third Circuit saw the case otherwise, and immediately after the argument, 
duly issued a letter inviting the government to file a post-argument brief in this case.  The 
                                                
1490 Id. at *14, *18-19. 
1491 Id. at *16. 
1492 Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
7156), 1999 WL 34082480. 
1493 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (a). 
1494 Brobst Interview, supra note 1438. 
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government’s brief points out that its filing was both “at the invitation of the Court” and 
pursuant to its motion to intervene as of right under the law to defend the constitutionality 
of the wiretap statute.1495 
 As previously discussed, the United States can be something of an 800-pound 
gorilla when it litigates or intervenes in a constitutional challenge.  In this case, the 
United States framed the issue, less in terms of competing precedents, as the p rties had 
done, than in terms of levels of First Amendment scrutiny to be applied.  The Third 
Circuit’s opinion would track the government’s approach. 
 Following a focused description of the wiretap statute allegedly violated by 
Vopper, and a synopsis of the proceeding thus far, the government summarized its 
argument:  the First Amendment does not prohibit the application of the wiretap statute’  
“use prohibitions” to the defendants in this case.  As applied, those provisions are 
“subject only to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, rather than strict 
scrutiny, and the statute readily satisfies the requirements of intermediate scrutiny.”1496 
Thus, one argument among others suggested in the PSEA brief had become the 
foundation for the government’s position. 
  The government argued that the statute’s ban on disclosure had to be read as part 
of a comprehensive ban on all uses of intercepted material; thus, the prohibition did not 
single out speech for any special burden.  Where that is so, where any burden on speech 
is merely incidental to the purpose of the law, First Amendment precedent dictates the 
application of intermediate, rather than strict scrutiny in determining its constitutionality.  
                                                
1495 Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
7156), 1999 WL 34082480 at *10. 
1496 Id. at *11. 
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A statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny if it furthers an “important” or “substantial” 
governmental interest (in contrast to strict scrutiny’s “compelling” interest); if that 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction 
on speech is not unnecessarily great (in contrast to strict scrutiny’s “no less restrictive 
alternative available”).1497  
 Intermediate scrutiny is also appropriate, the government said, where the 
prohibitions on the use of illegally intercepted communications are not related to the 
content of the communications.  Pointing out that the appellants would be free to 
broadcast the very same tape if acquired lawfully, the government noted that such 
content-neutral restrictions on speech also require courts to apply intermediate, rather 
than strict, scrutiny in evaluating their constitutionality.  The restrictions at issue in the 
Landmark line of cases asserted by the appellants required strict scrutiny because they 
singled out speech for special burdens and restricted speech because of its conten , among 
other reasons.1498 
 Having established the appropriateness of intermediate scrutiny, the government 
then proceeded to show how the wiretap statute satisfied that standard.  The privacy 
interest to be protected is “manifestly substantial.  Moreover, by protecting the 
confidentiality of communications, the regulations encourage, rather than suppress, free 
expression.  And, finally, the regulations are tailored carefully enough that they would 
even satisfy a strict scrutiny standard.1499 
 It was a powerful argument, invoking not merely competing analogies, but basic 
                                                
1497 Id. at *10. 
1498 Id. at *11. 
1499 Id. at *11-12. 
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principles of First Amendment analysis; indeed, the Third Circuit adopted just such an 
approach.  Writing for herself and Judge Robert Cowan, Judge Dolores Sloviter rejected 
appellants’ argument that Landmark was controlling, noting that the question before this 
court had been expressly reserved by the Supreme Court.  “[W]e will resolve the present 
controversy not by mechanically applying a test gleaned from C x and its progeny, but 
by reviewing First Amendment principles in light of the unique facts and circumstances 
of this case.”1500  But Sloviter also rejected the District Court’s application of C hen.  
Expressing some doubt that the wiretap statute’s disclosure provision was a law of 
general applicability, she pointed out that, even if it were, Cohen did not stand for the 
proposition that laws of general applicability are not subject to First Amendt 
scrutiny.  Rather, the Supreme Court held only that “‘enforcement of such general laws 
against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement 
against other persons or organizations.’”1501 
 As if to emphasize the importance of the United States as a party in this case, 
Sloviter’s analysis all but ignores the original parties and addresses the government’s 
brief directly.  Briefly summarizing its argument for intermediate scrutiny, Sloviter 
proceeded to mock the government’s assertion that the statute’s ban on “disclosure” is 
merely an aspect of its ban on “use,” that is, conduct, rather than speech, and thus 
meriting intermediate scrutiny.  “A statute that prohibited the ‘use’ of ev lution theory 
would surely violate the First Amendment if applied to prohibit the disclosure of Charles 
Darwin’s writings.”1502   
                                                
1500 200 F.3d at 117. 
1501 Id. at 118 (quoting Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669). 
1502 200 F.3d at 121. 
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 On the other hand, the court found the content-neutrality argument more 
persuasive, based on the Supreme Court’s definition of content-neutral restrictions on 
speech as restrictions that “‘are justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech.’”1503  Had the act’s only purpose been to prevent the disclosure of private facts, 
Sloviter suggested, its content-neutrality might be doubted.  But the government did no
rely on that justification; rather, she said, insofar as the act’s purpose was to deny the 
illegal interceptor a market for the “fruits of his labor,” it was properly treated as content-
neutral and intermediate scrutiny applied.1504     
 After reviewing various interpretations of the intermediate scrutiny standard, 
Sloviter formulated the question before the court as “whether the government has shown 
that its proffered interest” – eliminating the demand for intercepted communicatio s – is  
sufficiently furthered by imposing liability on the defendants in this caseto justify the 
restrictions on their First Amendment interests.1505  Finding the connection “indirect at 
best,” the court concluded that “it would be a long stretch indeed” to conclude that 
imposing damages here would even peripherally promote the government’s effort to deter 
interception. Since the wiretap act already provides punishment for illegal interception, it 
would be more effective to enforce those provisions than to impose liability here. 1506   
 Writing in dissent, District Judge Louis Pollack agreed with the majority’s 
analytical approach to the case, but not with its application.  Pollack took issue with the 
court’s assertion that the connection between prohibiting disclosure and preventing 
interception was “indirect at best,” citing a recent decision, Boehner v. McDermott, from 
                                                
1503 Id. at 122 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1985). 
1504 Id. at 123. 
1505 Id. at 125. 
1506 Id. at 126. 
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to the contrary.  In that 
case, the court opined that, “[u]nless disclosure is prohibited, there will be an incentive 
for illegal interceptions… and the damage caused… will be compounded.”1507  The 
majority distinguished Boehner on the ground that the newspapers reporting the 
intercepted conversation were not defendants in that case, and that defendant McDermott, 
who provided the tape to the newspapers, knew who had intercepted the conversation and 
had a political interest in its disclosure.1508   
 Following the judgment, Bartnicki and Kane moved for a rehearing by the entir
Third Circuit court.  According to Brobst, the motion failed by only one vote, suggestin 
the case was much closer than the panel decision would indicate.1509   
D.  Before the Supreme Court 
1.  New Counsel  
 On April 19, 2000, Bartnicki and Kane filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, 
asking the United States Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit decision.1510  Their 
original lawyer, Wilkes-Barre attorney Raymond P. Wendolowski, was still li ed on the 
brief supporting their petition, but with the stakes now that much higher and the venue 
shifting to Washington, Wendolowski was no longer listed as counsel of record.  That 
responsibility was assumed by Robert H. Chanin and Jeremiah A. Collins of the 
Washington, D.C., firm of Bredhoff & Kaiser, a 33-lawyer firm that specialized in 
representing unions.  Collins had been part of the team that wrote the Pennsylvania State 
                                                
1507 Id. at 133 (Pollock, J., dissenting)(quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 470 
(D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
1508 Id. at 128. 
1509 Brobst Interview, supra note 1438. 
1510 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-
1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059. 
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Education Association’s amicus brief for the Third Circuit.1511  The Bredhoff firm was far 
more experienced in Supreme Court litigation and styles itself “the voice of labor.”1512 
 Taking a cue from the dissent below, Bartnicki argued that the Supreme Court 
should review the case because the Third Circuit’s decision conflicted with Boe ner, 
setting up a conflict between two circuits that the Supreme Court ought to resolve.1513  
That kind of argument is considered one of the most effective at this stage of the process.  
According to Perry, “Without doubt, the single most important generalizable factor in 
assessing certworthiness is the existence of a conflict of ‘split’ in the circuits.”1514  
Bartnicki also argued that the decision below not only struck down an important 
provision of a federal statute, but also called into question similar statutes enacted by a 
majority of the states.1515  The Third Circuit majority had disparaged that argument as 
hyperbole when raised by the dissent, pointing out that its “as applied” decision was 
expressly limited to the facts of this case.1516   
 Finally, Bartnicki asserted that the Third Circuit opinion was just wrong as to n
important question of constitutional law that had been reserved by the Supreme Court in 
prior decisions.  The petition asserts that this case provides “an ideal vehicle” for 
determining whether “a statute that protects privacy interests by making it unlawful for a 
person to disclose information unlawfully obtained by another violates the First 
                                                
1511 See supra note 1451. 
1512 See http://www.bredhoff.com. 
1513 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-
1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059 at *20. 
1514 PERRY, supra note 94, at 127-28. 
1515 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-
1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059 at *24. 
1516 200 F.3d at 128. 
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Amendment.”1517 The following week, the United States weighed in, seeking certiorari on 
its own behalf as an intervenor in the case, with Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman listed 
as counsel of record.1518  The government’s argument closely paralleled Bartnicki’s. 
 When Vopper’s brief in opposition to certiorari was filed on May 30, the radio 
host was also represented by new counsel.  According to Donald Brobst, Vopper’s 
employer, Keymarket of NEPA, the owner of  radio station WILK, had been acquired by 
Sinclair Broadcast Group sometime during the pendancy of the case. While Sinclair 
initially kept Brobst on as outside counsel, he had what he describes as a “falling out with 
in-house counsel for Sinclair that had nothing to do with this case”1519 although part of 
the problem involved Fred Vopper.   
 In one case, Brobst said, Sinclair wanted him to defend Vopper in a case brought 
by a district attorney who also happened to be running for judicial office.  One of the 
Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald partners was campaign treasurer, raising a potenti l 
conflict of interest for any lawyer in the firm.  Another case involved Vopper’s 
challenging the integrity of two judges before whom RJG had other cases pending.  
Sinclair’s in-house counsel was “not happy about that,” Brobst said, and the relationship 
started to go downhill.  After another, unrelated dispute arose, “we decided to have a 
parting of the ways on all cases,”1520 and Brobst lost the chance to take Bartnicki v. 
Vopper to the U.S. Supreme Court.   
 Instead, that honor went to Lee Levine, even then a major star in the media law 
                                                
1517 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-
1687), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059 at *25-26 (emphasis in the original). 
1518 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-
1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1063. 
1519 Brobst Interview, supra note 1438. 
1520 Id. 
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firmament, having founded his own Washington law firm – Levine, Sullivan & Koch, 
L.L.P. – only three years earlier.1521  This would be Levine’s second argument before the 
Supreme Court; he had previously represented the newspaper defendant in H rte-Hanks 
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton.1522  Levine also taught media law at Georgetown 
University Law Center and had co-authored a major treatise on newsgathering.1523 Brobst 
recalls that he had some initial contact with the new litigation team – “we sent them 
everything they wanted”1524 – then bowed out of the case.  
 Levine’s brief in opposition to certiorari rejected all of the reasons for judicial 
review raised in the Bartnicki and United States petitions.  The Third Circuit decision 
“constitutes an unremarkable assessment of whether the imposition of civil liability” on 
the media defendants under the Wiretap Acts “survives intermediate scrutiny.  In making 
this fact-bound assessment,” the brief asserted, “the Third Circuit expressly d clined to 
address the ‘important question of constitutional law’ referenced by Petitioners, ‘struck 
down’ no provision of either statute, and applied the same standard of First Amendment 
                                                
1521 Levine’s biography shows just how plugged into the media defense bar he is: 
 
Mr. Levine has served as Chair of the American Bar Association’s Forum 
on Communications Law, as President of the Defense Counsel Section of 
the Media Law Resource Center, as Chair of both the Media Law 
Committee and the Publications Committee of the District of Columbia 
Bar, … and as an ABA Advisor to the Uniform Defamation Act Drafting 
Committee of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  
He currently serves as co-chair of the Practising Law Institute’s annual 
Communications Law conference, as a member of the Board of Directors 
of Fred Friendly Seminars, Inc., … and as a member of the Advisory 
Board of the Bureau of National Affairs’ Media Law Reporter.  
 
 Levine, Sullivan, Koch & Schultz, L.L.P., http://www.lskslaw.com/bios/llevine.htm  
1522 491 U.S. 657 (1989).  See supra text accompanying notes 881-86. 
1523 DIENES, ET AL., supra note 1203. 
1524 Brobst Interview, supra note 1438. 
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scrutiny embraced by the majority of the District of Columbia Circuit in Boehner.”1525 
 Those arguments were echoed in respondent Yocum’s brief in opposition,1526 but 
successfully rebutted in reply briefs from Bartnicki1527 and the United States.1528  On June 
26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari.1529 
 In contrast to the Third Circuit proceeding, amicus briefs began flowing into the 
Court in September; three of them were filed by litigants in cases representing nearly 
identical issues.  Representative John Boehner (R-Ohio), whose victory in the D.C. 
Circuit had prompted Bartnicki’s “split in the circuits” argument, argued for petitioners 
that “there is no First Amendment right to distribute someone else’s pilfered speech.”1530  
Boehner’s opponent, Representative James McDermott (D-Wash.), whose petition for 
certiori was still pending at the time, argued that disclosure provisions of the wiretap 
statute should be subject to strict scrutiny.1531 WFAA-TV of Dallas, Tex., which was 
poised to file its own petition seeking review of an adverse Fifth Circuit decision,1532 
sought to push the Court to the ultimate rule – further than any other participant: 
This case should be decided according to a simple, bright line rule: if a 
                                                
1525 Brief in Opposition, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -
1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1060 at *7-8. 
1526 Brief in Opposition, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -
1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1061. 
1527 Reply Brief for Petitioners, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 
& -1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1062. 
1528 Reply Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-
1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1064. 
1529 530 U.S. 1260 (2000). 
1530 Brief for Amicus Curiae Representative John A. Boehner in Support of Petitioners, 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S.  S.Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 492 at *4. 
1531 Brief Amicus Curiae of Rep. James A. McDermott in Support of Respondents, 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 548 at *6. 
1532 Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000).  
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journalist breaks the law to obtain information, she is subject to whatever 
generally applicable legal penalties may be triggered by the act of 
misappropriation.  However the journalist has obtained information, she 
may be punished only for any impropriety in obtaining it, and not for 
publishing it, absent a countervailing governmental interest of the highest 
order.1533  
 
 Only one other amicus brief was filed on behalf of Bartnicki and Kane; the 
cellular telephone industry argued that ensuring the privacy of wireless communications 
would further federal policies favoring the free speech of cell phone subscriber and 
encouraging the industry’s growth.1534 In addition to McDermott’s and WFAA-TV’s 
briefs, four briefs were filed on behalf of the media defendants.  Both the American C vil 
Liberties Union and the Liberty Project argued that strict scrutiny, rathe  than 
intermediate scrutiny, was the appropriate standard to apply.1535  And Wall Street Journal 
owner Dow Jones, with a brief signed by Supreme Court veteran Theodore Olson, called 
for “straightforward application of the Daily Mail test” – essentially Brobst’s argument in 
the district and circuit courts.1536 
 But the media’s principal amicus brief, with Floyd Abrams as counsel of record, 
was filed on behalf of more than 20 “media entities and organizations,” including 
                                                
1533 Brief of Amici Curiae WFAA-TV and Robert Riggs in Support of Respondents, 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 578 at *6. 
1534 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Associati n in 
Support of Petitioners, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 
2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 493. 
1535 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of 
Pennsylvania in Support of Respondents, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 
99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 577 at *10; Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
Liberty Project in Support of Respondents, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) 
(No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 547 at *8-9.  
1536 Brief Amicus Curiae of Dow Jones & Co., Inc., in Support of Respondents, Bartnicki 
v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
546 at *11. 
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newspaper and magazine publishers, television and cable networks, and journalism trade 
and professional associations.1537 The list of attorneys representing the amici read like a 
“Who’s Who” of media law.  It is impossible to say with any certainty how much 
influence any brief may have had on the Court, but the similarity between the media 
entities’ brief and the Court’s majority opinion is striking. 
 2.  Today’s Media Defense Bar 
 Before discussing the content of the various briefs filed with the Court, a brief 
digression is warranted to explore the process through which the media bar participates as 
amici curiae in Supreme Court litigation today.    According to Lucy Dalglish, executive 
director of Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press, the process is an informal 
one.1538  For example, RCFP first got involved in the Bartnicki case in June 2000.  Legal 
defense director, Gregg Leslie, had put out an email message to a number of prominent 
media lawyers, among them Laura Handman of Davis Wright Tremaine, Bruce Sanford 
of Baker Hostetler, and Lee Levine, asking, “Does anyone know of an amicus effort 
underway in Bartnicki?  We’ve always been available to write one, or at least coordinate 
efforts, but I assume that there will be big companies willing to pay a firm for a brief now 
that it’s before the high court.  If you have any information that you’re able to share, I’d 
be happy to hear it.”1539 
 Soon after, Adam Liptak, then in-house counsel for The New York Times, now its 
Supreme Court reporter, replied, “Gregg, yes, there is an amicus effort.  The Times and 
                                                
1537 Brief Amici Curiae of Media Entities and Organizations in Support of Respondents, 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 579. 
1538 Dalglish Interview, supra note 674.   
1539 Id. 
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others have asked Floyd Abrams to prepare a brief and I’m sure the Reporters C mmittee 
will be welcome [to join the brief] on the usual terms.”  By “usual terms,” Liptak w s 
referring to the informal arrangement through which signatories to the brief help the lead 
organization (here, the Times) pay for it.  RCFP and other nonprofits usually ride along 
for free, and when RCFP lawyers write the brief, all others in the media world are invited 
to join at no charge.  Typically, however, the private entities pay for the privilege.  
According to Dalglish, the cost can vary.1540 
 “It depends on how much time it’s going to take, how many people [the lawyers] 
think they need to do it.  They’ve been cutting their rates a little bit lately.  In the 
summertime, they want to do it more because they can use their summer associates if 
they have them.  I’d say anywhere from $10,000 to $30,000 these days is what it would 
cost.”  Once the cost is established, the lead organization would begin “trolling” for 
signers.  If, for example, the sign-on price is $1,500, Dalglish said, “if you get a whole 
pile of people to sign on, you’re doing OK, but if you only get five, you’ve rolled the dice 
and you’ve lost.”1541 
 As to the content of the briefs, Dalglish said amici first figure out what the party 
they are supporting has already argued, then identify other issues that the party did not 
have room for.  “Usually, what we try to do is present a national perspective, do some 
public policy stuff, or brief an issue that the parties would have loved to have briefed if 
they had time or space.  Sometimes they will ask you specifically, could you do this 
issue.”  Other times, amici will suggest the focus of the brief.  In either event, amici will 
try to avoid simply repeating the party’s arguments.  “No court wants to put up with 




that,” Dalglish said.  “I just have no interest in parroting back the party’s brief.” 1542 
 The relationship between amici and the parties varies somewhat depending upon 
the court hearing the case.  Under Supreme Court rules,1543 and throughout the federal 
system,1544 all parties must consent to the filing of an amicus brief; where consent is 
withheld, amici may petition the court to receive the brief anyway.  So there is always 
some communication between the amici and the party they are supporting.  Dalglish 
described the typical process: “You let them know you’re going to do it, and they say… 
that would be great… we’ll sign the letter and give it to you.”1545  On the other hand, 
Supreme Court rules require amici to disclose whether counsel for a party had a han  in 
writing the brief or paying for it.1546  
 Still, the parties often ignite the amicus process.  If the case gets to the Supreme 
Court, it has already been percolating through the media defense bar.  By the time they 
have won or lost in the appellate courts, the parties will have talked about it in one of 
several forums where members of the media defense bar get together.  Among these are 
the  Practising Law Institute’s annual Communications Law Conference, founded and 
managed for some 35 years by James Goodale, now conducted by Lee Levine as 
Communications Law in the Digital Age;1547 the biennial conference and other meetings 
of the Media Law Resource Center, formerly the Libel Defense Resource Cent r, also 
                                                
1542 Id. 
1543 SUP. CT. R. 37.2. 
1544 FED. R. CIV . P. 29. 
1545 Dalglish Interview, supra note 674. 
1546 SUP. CT. R. 37.6. 
1547 Floyd Abrams, James Goodale Passes the Torch at PLI Communications Law 
Conference, MLRC MEDIA LAW LETTER, Nov. 2007, p. 6.  See also 
http://www.pli.edu/Content.aspx?dsNav= Rpp:1,N:4294963947-167&ID=60604. 
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based in New York;1548 the annual conference and various workshops of the American 
Bar Association’s Forum on Communications Law;1549 and the annual Media and the 
Law Seminar at the University of Kansas.1550 
 One of the most important of these forums is the District of Columbia Bar 
Association’s Media Law Committee, which meets informally once a month for lunch at 
the offices of one of the participating law firms.  The meetings were start d by Davis 
Wright’s Handman, who chaired them for two years.  Lee Levine has also chaired the 
meetings, as have RCFP’s Gregg Leslie, Covington & Burling’s Kurt Wimmer, and 
Holland & Knight’s Chuck Tobin.  Lawyers from Washington and often New York come 
to talk about their strategy in cases that have been argued or to preview upcoming cases.  
They are not, Dalglish said, strategy sessions to plan how the bar might get involved.1551 
 That happens more informally, Dalglish said.  Frequently, The New York Times 
takes the lead, or The Washington Post, or the Associated Press.  “They tend to sort of 
rotate.  Sometimes it’s the individual lawyer [who is interested in a particulr ase]… 
Sometimes it’s geographic.  Sometimes they have a similar case percolating and they 
want to jump on it…. Sometimes it’s driven by who’s interested in covering a story.”  
Dalglish says the informal system works so well because the bar is so small. “It’s a very 
small group of people.  Very tight knit. … So you’re seeing these people frequently, and 
you’re staying on top of things frequently. … Everybody knows everybody else.”1552  
 As for the Reporters Committee itself, Dalglish noted that she has former fellows 
                                                
1548 See http://www.medialaw.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home. 
1549 See http://new.abanet.org/forums/communication/Pages/default.aspx. 
1550 See http://www.continuinged.ku.edu/programs/media_law/. 
1551 Dalglish Interview, supra note 674. 
1552 Id. 
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working all over the country.  “I will hire a fellow [who] will spend a year working here.  
I will work [at] getting him a job at one of the firms.  And then some of  those folks end 
up going in house because they don’t like the law firm atmosphere.  Right now, I’ve got 
former fellows in house at The Washington Post [and] National Public Radio…. [In] the 
last couple of years, my folks have been snatched up by the government… as FOIA 
officers.”1553 
 Dalglish said RCFP used to be a lot more involved in direct litigation, pointing 
out that “the last time we were actually involved as a party was … when we went in with 
the Center for National Security Studies… to get a list of the 1,500 or so foreign natio als 
who were snatched off the streets and put in detention centers” after Sept. 11, 2001.  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ultimately reversed an initially 
favorable decision by the district court.1554  During the past decade or so, since Dalglish 
has been executive director, RCFP has been doing more amicus briefs.1555 
 “We look for cases that will have potential to have an impact on what journalists 
are able to do, either in their home state or on the federal level, and that can be in regards 
to an open meetings or open records violation… it can be getting involved in a libel case, 
or certainly in a reporter’s privilege case.  We tend not to get involved at the trial l vel,” 
Dalglish said, citing lack of need, cost, and the potential to irritate trial judges.  “That’s 
not to say we haven’t done it, but at the trial level we usually get involved if it is an issue 
that can be of great relevance to the media, but neither of the parties is a media entity…. 
We may look at some of the pleadings and decide that it may be of benefit to having a 
                                                
1553 Id. 
1554 Ctr. for Nat’l Security Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (2003). 
1555 Dalglish Interview, supra note 674. 
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media lawyer write the brief and raise some issues that perhaps [another lawyer would 
see differently].”1556 
 Dalglish said she also tries “not to get involved at the cert. petition stage at the 
U.S. Supreme Court, unless there’s a compelling reason to, like if it’s a case we really, 
really want them to take, or if a case that we know they’re going to take and we want to 
get the issue teed up right away.  And, quite honestly, there’s one other very important 
factor, and that has to do with journalism politics.  We want to stake our territory.  We 
want to do a brief and show that the Reporters Committee is on top of it.”1557   
 “If [the case is] at the intermediate court level at the federal level, we’re almost 
certainly going to get involved if it involves anything to do with the media.  Sometimes, 
they slip by us.”  In Bartnicki, where no media amicus briefs were filed in the Third 
Circuit proceeding, Dalglish recalls that other, similar cases were being “t ed up” at 
about the same time.1558  “Hopefully, we’ve gotten a little better at spotting them on the 
circuit level, but that doesn’t mean we always catch them…. Certainly, when the 
Supreme Court took [Bartnicki], we got involved in force.”1559   
3. The Arguments 
 In the Bartnicki case, most of the arguments in the parties’ briefs had been 
auditioned in the courts below.  Bartnicki and Kane began their argument for reversing 
                                                
1556 Id. 
1557 Id. 
1558 Referring to Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding the 
disclosure provisions of the wiretap act where the defendant congressman allegedly knew 
the interceptors and promised them immunity for their illegal conduct) and Peavy v. 
WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding the disclosure provisions where 
the defendant television station not only knew the interceptions were illegal, but 
participated in their acquisition). 
1559 Dalglish Interview, supra note 674. 
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the Third Circuit opinion by urging the Court to adopt an intermediate scrutiny standard – 
a point on which the Third Circuit agreed.  It next walked the Court through an 
unremarkable analysis to show that the statutes, as applied, satisfy that stand rd.1560  The 
federal government’s brief made essentially the same case.1561 For Vopper and the other 
media defendants, Levine argued that the case required application of the Daily Mail 
principle, another way of arguing for strict scrutiny, but he added that the statute  in 
question would not even satisfy intermediate scrutiny.1562  Yocum, who had by now 
retained his own Supreme Court specialist, Thomas C. Goldstein, made the same 
arguments in reverse order.1563 The petitioners’ reply briefs broke little new ground.1564  
 Floyd Abrams’s amicus brief for the “media entities” also argued that the Third 
Circuit opinion should be affirmed on a Florida Star (i.e., Landmark or Daily Mail) 
analysis, 1565 noting only in a footnote that the statute would fail intermediate scrutiny as 
well.1566  But Abrams prefaced his legal argument with a much broader policy appeal: 
 From the time individuals first consider becoming journalists, two 
                                                
1560 Brief for Petitioners Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony F. Kane, Jr., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 
532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 494 at *25-
32. 
1561 Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & 
-1728), 2000 U. S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 491at *22-31. 
1562 Brief for Respondents Frederick W. Vopper, Keymarket of NEPA, Inc., and 
Lackazerne, Inc., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 
U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 581 at *29-39. 
1563 Brief for Respondent Jack Yocum, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 
99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 580 at *15-23. 
1564 Reply Brief for Petitioners Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony F. Kane, Jr., Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 659 
and Reply Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-
1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 658. 
1565 Brief Amici Curiae of Media Entities and Organizations in Support of Respondents, 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 2000 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 579 at *15-19. 
1566 Id. at *48 n.34.  
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principles are drilled into them.     
 
 The first is that telling the truth about matters of public interest is 
what journalism, at its best, is all about. … [J]ournalists who read opinions 
of this Court find unsurprising this Court’s repeated reference to “the 
overarching public interest, secured by the Constitution in the 
dissemination of truth.”  That public interest is directly imperiled in this 
case.  
  
 So is the journalistic norm that in the course of gathering news, 
journalists should affirmatively seek the truth from those who have it….  
For journalists, then, the notion that liability may be imposed upon them 
for doing nothing more or less than reporting truthfully about newsworthy 
events is deeply disturbing.1567  
 
Although the Third Circuit had viewed the government’s interest in deterring 
unlawful interceptions as the most, albeit insufficiently, compelling justifica on for the 
statute’s non-disclosure provisions, Abrams focused on the privacy interest.  The privacy
interests held insufficient in the Florida Star line of cases, he said, were no less powerful 
than the privacy interests in this case.  “[W]hy, after all, is the right of a rape victim not to 
have her name disclosed less significant than that of a union official not to have a 
telephone call disclosed in which he threatened to engage in criminal conduct?”1568 
 Abrams moved on to reject the notion, advanced by Bartnicki, that the Florida 
Star line of cases was limited to content-based restrictions on speech and, thus, not 
applicable to the content-neutral disclosure restrictions of the wiretap laws.  Rather, he 
said, that line of authority is firmly grounded in the public interest in truth-telling.  
Abrams also made the seemingly unnecessary argument that the media defendants acted 
lawfully in obtaining the tape, then returned to balance of privacy and truth-telling 
interests.  In the very last paragraph of the argument, almost as an afterthought, Abrams 
                                                
1567 Id. at *8-14. 
1568 Id. at *29. 
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struck the precise theme that would dominate the Supreme Court’s opinion: 
 We offer the final thought that there is, in the end, a certain lack of 
equivalence between the First Amendment interests at stake here and the 
privacy interests that underlie the wiretapping statute.  Both are important 
but only one is in the written Constitution.  It should not be too late to 
assert that when the First Amendment’s protection of truth-telling is pitted 
against an interest that was only first identified just over a century ago, 
some deference should be given to the Framer’s expressed intentions.1569     
 
Oral arguments were held on Dec. 5, 2000.  Collins led off for petitioners 
Bartnicki and Kane, and his responses to the Court’s questions emphasized the content-
neutrality of the anti-disclosure statutes.  When a content-neutral statutory regime 
protects important governmental interests that would be harmed by disclosure, he said, 
“we believe and we have argued that that in essence exhausts the First Amendment 
concerns….”1570 Solicitor General Waxman, who argued next, contradicted Collins’s 
“suggestion” that no heightened scrutiny is required here.  “That’s not our position,” he 
said; “we submit that the appropriate level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny.”1571   
Justice Anthony Kennedy  and others expressed concern that the statutes created a 
class of speech that was forever tainted and could not be repeated by anyone.  Waxman
countered that, once the speech became publicly known, the statutes would no longer 
apply.  Thus a newspaper was free to comment on the conversation once Vopper 
broadcast it.1572  Waxman also argued that enforcing the anti-disclosure statutes would 
deter unlawful interceptions.1573    
 Levine began his oral argument by calling attention to the threat contained in the 
                                                
1569 Id. at *30. 
1570 Oral Argument, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687 & -1728), 
2000 WL 1801619 at *11. 
1571 Id. at *16-17. 
1572 Id. at *21-23. 
1573 Id. at *22. 
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intercepted conversation, which led to a distracting colloquy with Justice John Paul 
Stevens and others about whether he wanted to win his case on that narrow ground or on 
principle.  Insisting, as he was bound to do, that he would take the win “any way I can get 
it,” Levine focused on the Daily Mail principle as the proper basis for decision.1574  
Levine denied that the statutes’ content neutrality would require an intermediate scrutiny 
analysis, but asserted that the anti-disclosure provisions would not survive even that 
modest test.1575   
 The balance of Levine’s time was taken up with an inconclusive discussion of the 
statutes’ deterrence value, and that was where Yocum’s counsel, Thomas Goldstein, 
began his appearance before the Court.  “Even if [the anti-disclosure provisions] add 
some deterrent, that prohibition is too crude a weapon, effectively a thermonuclear bomb 
of sorts, to be sustained in the sensitive area of… free speech.”1576  Goldstein endorsed 
the Third Circuit’s intermediate scrutiny approach, 1577 and took issue with Waxman’s 
assertion that the statutes’ effectively immunized down-stream commentary o  the 
intercepted conversation.1578  Waxman, in a brief rebuttal, defended the deterrence 
argument and distinguished the Daily Mail line of cases.1579  At 12:03 p.m., Chief Justice 
Rehnquist declared the case submitted.1580 
E.  Victory in the Balance 
In his opinion for the Court, delivered May 21, 2001, Justice Stevens adopted the 
                                                
1574 Id. at *26-27. 
1575 Id. at *30. 
1576 Id. at *39. 
1577 Id.  
1578 Id. at *42. 
1579 Id. at *52-55. 
1580 Id. at *55. 
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frame that Abrams had urged – a conflict between the “full and free dissemination of 
information concerning public issues” and “individual privacy.”  Stevens’s formulation 
of the issue, however, labeled both interests “of the highest order,” and he appeared to 
accept the idea, advanced by petitioners, that the disclosure provisions of the statute 
would “foster[] private speech.”1581  Nevertheless, Stevens promptly  declared that the 
disclosures made in this case were protected by the First Amendment.1582  
The opinion that followed was unusually disjointed, shifting from doctrinal 
analysis, to interrogation of precedents, and ultimately to ad hoc balancing.  Stevens 
began by accepting petitioners’ characterization of the disclosure provisions a “content-
neutral law of general applicability.”1583  Unlike the trial court, however, he did not find 
that dispositive.  “On the other hand,” he said, the “naked prohibition against 
disclosure… is a regulation of pure speech,”1584 as if that somehow negated or 
counterbalanced the general applicability doctrine as applied in Cohen v. Cowles 
Media.1585   
Seeming to reach a dead end with this doctrinal inquiry, Stevens shifted abruptly 
to interrogating precedent.  Here, too, the analysis ended without resolution, with Stevens 
pointing out that neither the Pentagon Papers case,1586 nor the Landmark-Daily Mail-
Florida Star line of cases,1587 resolved the question presented here.  The only lesson 
Stevens seemed to take from these precedents was the need to balance, on the facts of this 
                                                
1581 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001). 
1582 Id. 
1583 Id. at 526. 
1584 Id. 
1585 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See supra notes 604-631 and accompanying text. 
1586 See supra  notes 901-21 and accompanying text. 
1587 See supra note 1504 and accompanying text. 
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case, the interests served by the law against its restrictions on speech. 
Like the Third Circuit, Stevens ultimately rejected the government’s asserted 
interest in deterring interception of private conversations as a bona fide interest of the 
“highest order.”1588  Unlike the Third Circuit, Stevens found the privacy interest 
compromised here to be a “valid independent justification for prohibiting such 
disclosures.…”1589  Nevertheless, those privacy interests had to “give way when balanced 
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”1590  Drawing principally 
on libel cases for support, Stevens held that a “stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice 
to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”1591 
In a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Stephen 
Breyer emphasized the narrowness of the Court’s holding.1592  Breyer, well known for his 
ad hoc balancing approach to First Amendment cases,1593 cautioned that this case was 
decided on the facts that the broadcasters acted lawfully in obtaining the information and 
the information involved the threat of physical harm to others.  It did not signal a 
“significantly broader constitutional immunity for the media,” Breyer warned.1594 
Breyer asserted that concepts like “strict scrutiny” are inappropriate to resolve 
competing interests.1595  Breyer also seemed to put far more value in the deterrent effect 
                                                
1588 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 532. 
1589 Id. at 533. 
1590 Id. at 534. 
1591 Id. at 535. 
1592 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
1593 See, e.g., James C. Goodale, Caught in Breyer’s Patch, N.Y. L.J. , July 23, 1996, at 
1; Bruce Ennis, Courtside, COMM. LAWYER, Fall 1999, at 14, available at A.B.A. FORUM 
ON COMM. L., http://www.abanet.org/forums/communication/ 
comlawyer/fall99/courtside.html. 
1594 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536. 
1595 Id. 
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of the anti-disclosure provisions than either the majority or Third Circuit opinion.1596  But 
on these facts, Breyer said, the speakers had no “legitimate” interest in the privacy of a 
threat to harm others – even where the danger had passed.1597  Breyer also emphasized 
that Bartnicki and Kane were “limited public figures” with a “lesser” interest in 
privacy.1598   
Breyer concluded that the Court did “not create a ‘public interest’ exception that 
swallows up the statutes’ privacy-protecting general rule.”  Rather, he said, these 
speakers’ privacy expectations were unusually low, while the public interest in “defeating 
those expectations” was unusually high.1599  “I would not extend that holding beyond 
these present circumstances.”1600 
Of course, the dissenters would not have gone even that far.  Writing for Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, Chief Justice William Rehnquist correctly 
identified the contradiction in Justice Stevens’s acknowledgment that the anti-disclosure 
provisions were “content-neutral laws of general applicability” and the outcome that 
Stevens ultimately reached.1601  But he inexplicably mischaracterizes Stevens’s analytical 
approach as a kind of strict scrutiny derived from “the Daily Mail string of newspaper 
cases,” which he proceeds to read as narrowly as possible.1602  As noted above, Stevens 
paid very little attention to that line of cases, and barely mentioned strict scrutiny 
doctrine.  Breyer’s characterization of a fact-bound balancing came far closer to the 
                                                
1596 Id. at 537. 
1597 Id. at 539. 
1598 Id. 
1599 Id. at 540. 
1600 Id. at 541. 
1601 Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
1602 Id. at 545-49. 
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essence of the majority opinion.  
Rehnquist also took issue with Stevens’s rejection of the government’s deterrence 
argument, calling “[r]eliance upon the ‘dry up the market’ theory …both logical and 
eminently reasonable.…”1603  And he emphasized the First Amendment right of Bartnicki 
and Kane to keep their conversation from the public domain.1604  Finally, he castigated 
the Court for relying on the Pentagon Papers case and “other inapposite cases” to 
subordinate the right to communications privacy “to the claims of those who wish to 
publish the intercepted conversations of others.”1605 
F.  Ten Years After 
In assessing the impact of Bartnicki on future development of First Amendment 
doctrine, one may choose to adopt the expansive reading that the dissenters ascribed to 
the majority opinion or the narrow reading suggested by the concurring opinion.  
Ironically, the press would surely favor the former; indeed, they argued all along for strict 
scrutiny and the invocation of the constitutional privacy cases.  The concurring opinion is 
far more problematic:  can one broadcast an intercepted conversation that does not 
threaten physical harm?  Stevens’s opinion is so poorly crafted as to leave in doubt, not 
merely the answer, but even the proper analytical approach.1606 
To take one hypothetical “ripped from the headlines” as this chapter was being 
drafted, consider the prospective case against WikiLeaks.com for publishing hundreds of 
                                                
1603 Id. at 552-53. 
1604 Id. at 553. 
1605 Id. at 555-56. 
1606 See Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and 
Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1118 (2002) 
(“Astonishingly, at no point in Justice Stevens's opinion does the Court come right out 
and say what standard of review or doctrinal test it is applying to the laws before it.”) 
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thousands of classified military and diplomatic documents allegedly downloaded from a
government database by a disaffected soldier.1607 As of this writing, no indictment had 
been handed up by a grand jury, but assuming arguendo that no one associated with 
WikiLeaks participated in the unlawful leaking except as beneficiary, there is only one 
difference between the case against WikiLeaks and the case against Fred Vopper:  
national security replaces personal privacy as the counterweight to disclosure of p blicly 
important information.1608       
Thus, if one reads Bartnicki as imposing strict scrutiny when reviewing any 
restriction on the dissemination of unlawfully obtained, but publicly important 
information, where the disseminator did not participate in the unlawful acquisition, then 
WikiLeaks is home free.  On the other had, if one reads Bartnicki as a case of ad hoc 
balancing, then the Court will ultimately have to decide whether freedom to publish 
without fear of sanction is outweighed in this case by national security, as opposed to 
personal privacy, considerations. 
So far, the lower courts’ application of Bartnicki have not been particularly 
helpful in that regard.  Several cases have distinguished Bartnicki on the ground that the 
disclosures were not a matter of public concern.1609  Others have distinguished Bartnicki 
                                                
1607 See Charles Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but Legal 
Scholars Warn of Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010. 
1608 There are no legally meaningful differences between the web site and the radio 
station as platforms or between Assange and Vopper as communicators, absent Assange’s 
complicity in the unlawful leaking of the information.   
1609 See, e.g., Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing 
Bartnicki where intercepted conversations regarding one family’s anti-Semitic remarks 
about another family in the neighborhood were not matters of public concern); Trans 
Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (distinguishing Bartnicki 
where speech at issue – target marketing lists comprising names, addresses, and financial 
information – involved only matters of private concern); Doe v. Luster, 2007 Cal. App. 
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on the ground that the disseminator participated in the illegal conduct that led to 
disclosure.1610  Still others have distinguished Bartnicki where the disclosures involved 
trade secrets,1611 copyrights,1612 or data mining.1613  In no case reported to date has the 
holding in Bartnicki been applied to reach a similar conclusion in an analogous case.1614  
The scholarly literature has been rather more enlightening.  In his article on 
Information as Contraband, published shortly after the Court issued its opinion in 
Bartnicki, and clearly inspired by that case, Rodney Smolla saw Bartnicki as an 
immediate victory for the press, but a longer term victory for privacy interests.1615  With a 
majority of justices (two concurring and three dissenting) accepting an effective 
                                                                                                                                                 
Unpub. LEXIS 6042 at *16 (2007) (distinguishing Bartnicki where speech at issue – a 
videotape of woman being raped – is not a matter of public concern); M. G. v. Time 
Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing Bartnicki 
where speech at issue – photo of team coached by child molester – was not a matter of 
public concern).  
1610 See, e.g., Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010, 1017 (2006), aff’d en banc, 484 
F.3d 583 (2007) (defendant’s actual knowledge of the circumstances of the illegal 
interception made this case distinguishable from Bartnicki); Bowens v. Ary, 2009 Mich. 
App. LEXIS 2000 at *20-21 (2009) (distinguishing Bartnicki where the defendant 
directed the recording of a private conversation without consent); Wisconsin v. Baron, 
769 N.W.2d 34, 48 (2009) (distinguishing Bartnicki where the defendant illegally 
accessed the email account of a public official to disseminate truthful informati n about 
him).  
1611 See DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 15 (Cal. 2003) (Bartnicki 
inapplicable, by its own terms, where disclosure in question involved trade secrets). 
1612 See Barclay’s Capital, Inc. v. Thyeflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 354 n. 15 
(2010) (distinguishing Bartnicki where cause of action is copyright infringement and 
misappropriation of hot news).  
1613 See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (Bartnicki inapplicable 
where disclosure and use of personally identifiable information by a data mining 
company was found to be conduct, not speech).  
1614 Indeed, in SEC v. Rajaratnam, the court quoted Bartnicki for the proposition that 
“‘disclosure of the contents of a private conversation ca be an even greater intrusion on 
privacy than the interception itself.’” 622 F.3d 159, 169 (2010) (quoting Bartnicki, 532 
U.S. at 533 (emphasis added)). 
1615 Smolla, supra note 1606, at 1149-50. 
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intermediate scrutiny standard,1616 albeit with a “newsworthiness” safety-valve,1617 
Smolla saw the case as elevating personal privacy to an interest of constituti al 
dimension on a par with freedom of speech and press.1618   
Nevertheless, Smolla drew exactly the opposite conclusion with respect to 
classified information.  Hypothesizing a new “Official Secrets Act” of the kind enacted 
by Congress to punish journalists for disclosing leaked classified informatin, nd vetoed 
by President Clinton,1619 Smolla drew a sharp distinction between the “steal” considered 
in Bartnicki and the “leak” contemplated by the new law. Quoting both Laurence 
Tribe1620 and Potter Stewart,1621 Smolla asserted that “[r]espect for the structural 
independence of the media contemplated by the Constitution prohibits courts from 
conscripting journalists as leak-police.” Thus, to Smolla, even the narrowest reading of 
Bartnicki poses no danger for a Julian Assange – assuming his hands are otherwise clean 
and WikiLeaks is found to share that “structural independence.”1622  
Of course, the Court has changed since Smolla wrote in 2002, and so has the 
temper of the times.  It may be that the best that can be said for the Bartnicki decision is 
that, absent participation in the unlawful acquisition of newsworthy information, the 
press is as free to publish it as changing societal values will allow.  At thevery least, the 
                                                
1616 Id. at 1119. 
1617 Id. at 1170. 
1618 Id. at 1150. 
1619 Id. at 1166-67. 
1620 Id. at 1167 (“There may be some rough ‘law of the jungle’ notion at work here: even 
if no sweeping right to know will be recognized as a limit on government's power to try 
to keep matters bottled up, an outsider who manages to obtain otherwise confidential 
information cannot then be prevented from disseminating it - or punished for having done 
so.” LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 965 (2d ed. 1988)). 
1621 Id. at 1168 (“So far as the Constitution goes the autonomous press may publish what 
it knows, and may seek to learn what it can.” Stewart, supra note 1198, at 636.  
1622 Id. at 1168. 
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“content-neutral law of general applicability” no longer presents the insurmountable 
obstacle to First Amendment protection that it was under Cohen v. Cowles Media.  The 
Landmark-Daily Mail-Florida Star line of cases has emerged none the worse for wear – 
Justice Rehnquist’s crabbed reading garners only three votes. And, most importantly, 
Fred Vopper and his media allies got the outcome they wanted, if not the mandate, taking 
the press a small step closer to the ultimate goal of protection for all truthful information 
of public importance. 
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Chapter 9 – Analysis and Conclusions 
 The purpose of this final chapter is to analyze and draw some tentative 
conclusions as to what the foregoing narrative tells us about the answers to the research 
questions posed at the outset.  For the sake of convenience, those questions are repeated 
here:   
 1.  How, when, and why did the press emerge as a constitutional litigator? 
 2.  How has the press’s approach to constitutional litigation evolved from 
emergence to the present? 
 3.  How successful has the press been in persuading the Court to its own view of 
the First Amendment? 
 4.  What accounts for the disparity between publishing and newsgathering cases 
in terms of outcomes favorable to the press? 
 A statistical summary has been included where appropriate to help the reader 
visualize some of the conclusions drawn here.   
  
A.  Emergence of the Press as Constitutional Litigator 
 This dissertation argues, and the historical record shows, that the press did not 
emerge as a constitutional litigator until the second quarter of the 20th Century, 
notwithstanding the occasional reliance on First Amendment arguments in earlier 
political or business-related cases.  The conditions necessary for that emergence included 
the transformation of the economic foundation of the press from partisan to commercial 
after the Civil War, the subsequent self-identification of the press with public serv e 
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under the unifying principle of objectivity, and most importantly, the incorporation of the 
First Amendment that enabled constitutional litigation against state laws. 
 The story of Col. McCormick’s vision and leading role in mobilizing the press to 
litigate what must have seemed then a remote, insignificant, and probably distasteful case 
out of Minnesota fully explains how and why the press took up constitutional litigation.   
It is entirely possible, however, that even without the example and precedent of Near v. 
Minnesota, the American Newspaper Publishers Association would have arrived at the 
same point with the case of Grosjean v. American Press that followed immediately after 
Near.  Indeed, Grosjean would have been a much easier starting point, since the press 
had an immediate business interest in the outcome and the facts so clearly favored the 
press’s constitutional position. 
 
B.  Evolution of the Press’s Approach to Litigation 
 The narrative shows two distinct phases in the evolution of the press’s approach 
to constitutional litigation.  The first phase begins in 1931 and includes the reluctant and 
parsimonious participation in Near, as well as the slightly more organized and 
enthusiastic involvement in Grojean.  It also encompasses the contempt cases of the 
1940s, the landmark libel cases of the 1960s, and the Pentagon Papers case in 1971.  A 
handful of broadcast regulation and other business cases rounds out the first phase, which 
comprises 24 cases altogether. 
 In this phase, press participation in the litigation – aside from the litigants 
themselves – was minimal.  The American Newspaper Publishers Association was the 
most active early on; in addition to giving moral support to McCormick’s lawyers in 
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Near, ANPA filed briefs in Grosjean, all three contempt case and, later, in one antitrust 
case.  Radio-Television News Directors Association, a party in one broadcast regula ion 
case, filed an amicus brief in another case raising the same issue, along with NBC and 
CBS.  The National Association of Broadcasters also filed one amicus brief in a 
broadcast regulation case, and the Magazine Publishers Association filed one in a 
subscription sales case.  The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune filed amicus briefs in 
New York Times v. Sullivan, and the Tribune filed one in Butts/Walker.  Otherwise, there 
were no press amici in any of the libel cases that followed Sullivan in the 1960s or in the 
Pentagon Papers case. 
 There is no doubt that the Caldwell case represented a wake-up call to the media 
bar.  As the narrative shows, that case – which reached the Supreme Court as Branzburg 
v. Hayes – prompted the formation of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 
in 1970 as a powerful new litigation “engine.”  Soon after that case was decided in 1972, 
James Goodale launched the Communications Law Conference under the auspices of the 
Practising Law Institute as an unifying forum for the media defense bar.  As a 
consequence of these and other developments, press participation in constitutional 
litigation entered a second phase characterized by a steady increase in direct litigation 
and amici filings. 
 For example, the number of press-related First Amendment cases that reached 
decision in the Supreme Court in the 30 years after Branzburg totaled three times  
the number of cases in the 40 years between Nearand Branzburg.  There is a striking 
difference between press participation in the 1971 Pentagon Papers case, with no amicus 
briefs, and the next prior restraint case, N braska Press Association, i  which roughly 60 
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media organizations filed or signed on to amicus briefs.  That pattern of massive pres 
participation has continued to this day, as illustrated in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 –  Timeline of Cases 
 
 
            Outcome Press Amicus 
Caption   Citation  Year Type     For Press Briefs/Signers 
 
Patterson v. Colorado            205 U.S. 454    1907 Publishing Lost  0 
Peck v. Tribune Co.              214 U.S. 185    1909 Publishing Lost  0 
Toledo Newspaper v. U.S.      247 U.S. 402    1918 Publishing Lost  0 
Near v. Minnesota                283 U.S. 697    1931 Publishing Won  0a 
Grosjean v. Amer. Press         297 U.S. 233    1936 Business Won  0a 
Times-Mirror v. Sup. Ct.        314 U.S. 252    1941 Publishing  Won  1/1 
Pennekamp v. Florida             328 U.S. 331    1946 Publishing  Won  0a 
Craig v. Harney                  331 U.S. 367    1947 Publishing  Won  1/1  
Breard v. Alexandria             341 U.S. 622    1951 Business Lost  1/1  
Farmers Union v. WDAY       360 U.S. 525    1959 Publishing  Won  1/1 
NYT v. Sullivan                  376 U.S. 254    1964 Publishing  Won  2/2 
Estes v. Texas                   381 U.S. 532    1965 Newsgath. Lost  1/2  
Rosenblatt v. Baer               383 U.S. 75      1966 Publishing  Won  0 
Time, Inc. v. Hill               385 U.S. 374    1967 Publishing  Won  0 
Curtis Publish. v. Butts         388 U.S. 130    1967 Publishing  Lost  0  
AP v. Walker                     388 U.S. 130    1967 Publishing  Won  0 
Beckley Newsp. v. Hanks       389 U.S. 81      1967 Publishing    Won  0 
Citizen Publish. v. U.S.         394 U.S. 131    1969 Business  Lost  2/25  
Red Lion Bcast. v. FCC          395 U.S. 367    1969 Publishing  Lost  0  
U.S. v. RTNDA                    395 U.S. 367    1969 Publishing  Lost   0b 
Greenbelt Pub. v. Bresler        398 U.S. 6        1970 Publishing  Won  0 
Monitor Pub. v. Roy              401 U.S. 265    1971 Publishing  Won  0 
Ocala Str-Bnnr v. Damron      401 U.S. 295    1971 Publishing  Won  0 
Time, Inc. v. Pape               401 U.S. 279    1971 Publishing  Won  0 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia    403 U.S. 29      1971 Publishing  Won  0 
NYT v. U.S.                      403 U.S. 713    1971 Publishing  Won  0 
U.S. v. Washington Post         403 U.S. 713    1971 Publishing  Won  0 
Branzburg v. Hayes               408 U.S. 665    1972 Newsgath. Lost   8/20 
In re Pappas                     408 U.S. 665    1972 Newsgath. Lost  8/20  
U.S. v. Caldwell                 408 U.S. 665    1972 Newsgath. Lost   8/20 
CBS v. DNC                       412 U.S. 94      1973 Publishing  Won  1/1c  
Pittsburgh Press v. PCHR       413 U.S. 376    1973 Publishing  Lost  1/1  
Pell v. Procunier                417 U.S. 817    1974 Newsgath. Lost  3/7  
Saxbe v. Washington Post      417 U.S. 843    1974 Newsgath. Lost  3/3  
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Miami Herald v. Tornillo        418 U.S. 241    1974 Publishing  Won           14/32 
Cantrell v. Forest City P        419 U.S. 245    1974 Publishing  Lost  0  
Cox Bcast. v. Cohn               420 U.S. 469    1975 Publishing  Won  1/1 
Bigelow v. Virginia              421 U.S. 809    1975 Publishing  Won  0 
Time Inc. v. Firestone           424 U.S. 448    1976 Publishing  Won  0 
Nebraska PA v. Stuart            427 U.S. 539    1976 Publishing  Won  7/47 
Okla. Pub. v. Dist. Ct.          430 U.S. 308    1977 Publishing  Won  1/1 
Nixon v. GSA                     433 U.S. 425    1977 Newsgath. Won  0 
Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward     433 U.S. 562    1977 Publishing  Lost  0  
Nixon v. Warner Comm.         435 U.S. 589    1978 Newsgath. Lost  0d  
Landmark Com. v. Virginia    435 U.S. 829    1978 Publishing  Won  3/30 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily       436 U.S. 547    1978 Newsgath. Lost  1/11  
Houchins v. KQED                 438 U.S. 1        1978 Newsgath. Lost   3/8 
FCC v. Pacifica Found.           438 U.S. 726    1978 Publishing  Lost  1/8  
Herbert v. Lando                 441 U.S. 153    1979 Publishing  Lost  3/20  
Smith v. Daily Mail              443 U.S. 97      1979 Publishing  Won  3/13 
Hutchinson v. Proxmire          443 U.S. 111    1979 Publishing  Lost  1/2  
Wolston v. Readers Digest      443 U.S. 157    1979 Publishing  Lost  1/2  
Gannett v. DePasquale            443 U.S. 368    1979 Newsgath. Lost  5/10  
Snepp v. U.S.                    444 U.S. 507    1980 Publishing  Lost  1/1  
Kissinger v. RCFP                445 U.S. 136    1980 Newsgath. Lost  0  
Richmond News. v. Va.          448 U.S. 555    1980 Newsgath. Won  3/69 
Chandler v. Florida  449 U.S. 560    1981   Newsgath.       Won  4/21  
CBS v. FCC                       453 U.S. 367    1981 Publishing  Lost  0 
State Dept. v. Wash. Post        456 U.S. 595    1982 Newsgath. Lost  1/6  
Globe Newsp. v. Sup. Ct.        457 U.S. 596    1982 Newsgath. Won  4/42 
Minn. Star v. Minnesota         460 U.S. 575    1983 Business  Won  1/1 
Press-Ent. v. Sup. Ct. I         464 U.S. 501    1984 Newsgath. Won  3/30 
Calder v. Jones                  465 U.S. 783    1984 Publishing  Lost  1/1  
Keeton v. Hustler                465 U.S. 770    1984 Publishing  Lost  1/1  
Bose v. Consumers Union      466 U.S. 485    1984 Publishing  Won  1/11 
SeattleTimes v. Rhinehart       467 U.S. 20      1984 Publishing  Lost  1/10  
FCC v. L. of Women Voters   468 U.S. 364    1984 Publishing  Won  3/7 
Regan v. Time, Inc.              468 U.S. 641    1984 Publishing  Lost  0  
D&B v. Greenmoss Bldrs.      472 U.S. 749    1985 Publishing  Lost   1/1 
Phil. Newspapers v. Hepps     475 U.S. 767    1986 Publishing  Won  3/59 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby     477 U.S. 242    1986 Publishing  Won  1/16 
Press-Ent. v. Sup. Ct. II        478 U.S. 1        1986 Newsgath. Won  2/48  
Ark. Writers v. Ragland          481 U.S. 221    1987 Business  Won  0 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier        484 U.S. 260    1988 Publishing  Lost  2/16  
Hustler v. Falwell               485 U.S. 46      1988 Publishing  Won  4/16 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer       486 U.S. 750    1988 Business  Won  1/17 
U.S. DOJ v. RCFP                 489 U.S. 749    1989 Newsgath. Lost  1/6  
Florida Star v. BJF              491 U.S. 524    1989 Publishing  Won  2/14 
HarteHanks v. Connaughton   491 U.S. 657    1989 Publishing  Lost  1/28  
Sable Comm. v. FCC              492 U.S. 115    1989 Publishing  Won  1/12 
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Butterworth v. Smith             494 U.S. 624    1990 Publishing  Won  2/15 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journ      497 U.S. 1        1990 Publishing  Lost  2/32  
Masson v. New Yorker           501 U.S. 496    1991 Publishing  Lost  3/14  
Cohen v. Cowles Media          501 U.S. 663    1991 Newsgath. Lost  1/9  
Cincinnati v. Discovery          507 U.S. 410    1993 Publishing  Won  1/11 
El Vocero v. Puerto Rico        508 U.S. 147    1993 Newsgath. Won  0 
U.S. v. Edge B’casting            509 U.S. 418    1993 Publishing  Lost  0  
44 Liquormart v. R.I.            517 U.S. 484    1996 Publishing  Won  1/12 
Reno v. ACLU                     521 U.S. 844    1997 Publishing  Won  3/7 
Ark. Ed. TV v. Forbes            523 U.S. 666    1998 Publishing  Won  1/4 
Wilson v. Layne                  526 U.S. 603    1998 Newsgath. Lost  1/25  
Hanlon v. Berger                 526 U.S. 808    1998 Newsgath. Lost  1/25  
Greater NO Bcast. v. U.S.       527 U.S. 173    1999 Publishing  Won  2/7 
LAPD v. United Rptg. Pub.    528 U.S. 32     1999 Newsgath. Lost  3/6  
Reno v. Condon                   528 U.S. 141    2000 Newsgath. Lost  1/3  
Bartnicki v. Vopper              532 U.S. 514    2001 Publishing  Won  1/23 
Lorillard v. Reilly              533 U.S. 525    2001 Publishing  Won  1/5 
Ashcroft v. FreeSpeech C.      535 U.S. 234    2002 Publishing  Won  2/4 
Ashcroft v. ACLU I               535 U.S. 564    2002 Publishing  Lost  2/6  
U.S. v. Am. Library Assn.      539 U.S. 194    2003 Publishing  Lost  1/5  
Ashcroft v. ACLU II              542 U.S. 656    2004 Publishing  Won  2/5 
________________________ 
 
a Although no amicus briefs were filed, ANPA was directly involved in these cases. 
b Respondents NBC and CBS each wrote a brief; respondent RTNDA wrote for eight 
other broadcasters.  
c NBC filed the only amicus brief, but CBS, ABC, and Post-Newsweek broadcasters filed 
petitioners briefs. 
d Respondents included NBC, CBS, ABC, and PBS. 
 Overall, the number of amicus briefs submitted by the press or urging the same 
position taken by the press was more than twice the number of amicus briefs taking the 
opposing position, 267 to 118.  Of the major press participants, the Newspaper 
Association of America (formerly the American Newspaper Publishers Association) was 
the most active, with 35 amicus briefs submitted or signed, followed closely by the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, with 30 briefs and three appearances s 
named party.  
 Why have these organizations dedicated so much time, talent, energy, and, 
frankly, money, to the pursuit of favorable constitutional rulings before the United States 
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Supreme Court?  The introduction to this dissertation asserts that the opinions of the 
Supreme Court on First Amendment issues are, with respect to the press, analogous to the 
laws and regulations that govern any other enterprise in this society.  That view shines 
through the “Statements of Interest” that routinely appear in media amicus br efs.  Floyd 
Abrams’s brief in Bartnicki is typical: 
 Amici are vitally interested in and deeply concerned about any 
ruling that could result in the imposition of sanctions against journalists 
for reporting truthful matters of public significance about which they 
become aware as a result of entirely lawful and wholly routine 
newsgathering efforts.  This case raises that spectre and amici submitthis 
brief to set forth their views as to why the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit should be affirmed.1623 
 
The press litigates because the decisions coming out of these cases directly affect the 
ability to gather and report the news.   
 
C.  Success of the Press in Persuading the Court 
 
 Of course, it is impossible to ascribe the outcome of a Supreme Court argument to 
any single factor, including the volume and quality of amicus briefs.  The very best 
Supreme Court advocates take their share of losses, failing for any number of reasons to 
persuade a majority of justices that their arguments are better than their adv rsaries’.  The 
statistics that follow show correlations, not causation, but they are instructive 
nevertheless. 
 Overall, the facts suggest the press has done pretty well for itself in constitutional 
litigation.  In this analysis of 101 Supreme Court decisions involving the institutional 
                                                
1623 Brief Amici Curiae of Media Entities and Organizations in Support of Respondents, 
supra note 1537, at *3. 
 353
press, the press has been successful more often than not, although by a relatively small 
margin.   Of the 101 cases analyzed, the press won 54 and lost 47.   
 However, the press has been considerably more successful in dealing with content 
regulation/publishing cases than with newsgathering cases.  Of the 70 publishing cases, 
the press won 43 and lost 27, while in the 25 newsgathering cases, the press won only 7 
and lost 18.  This certainly comports with the findings of Blanchard and Helle, although, 
alone, it says nothing about the reasons why this would be true.1624   
 
Table 4 – Outcome by Type of Case 
 
    Won   Lost   Total 
 
Publishing   43 61.4%  27 38.6%  70 69.3% 
Newsgathering    7 28.0%  18 72.0%  25 24.7% 
Business Regulation     4 66.7%     2 33.3%     6   5.9%  
 
Total    54 53.5%   47 46.5%            101        100% 
 
  
 As noted in Chapter 1, some member of the institutional press was either a party 
to the litigation, participated as a friend of the court, or both, in all 101 cases analyzed.  
The press was significantly more successful when it was a named party, winning 43 or 
56.6% of the 76 cases in which it was a named party, compared to only 11 or 44% of the 
25 cases in which the press was represented only through amicus briefs.   
 It did not seem to matter at all whether the press as party litigant was supported by 
additional press amici or not, although it was more common for press party litigants to 
have press amicus support than not, especially after Branzburg. While this in no way 
                                                
1624 See infra notes 1633-35 and accompanying text. 
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detracts from Kearney and Merrill’s findings on the importance of amicus briefs,1625 it 
does suggest some advantage to party status for which amicus briefs cannot compensate. 
 
Table 5 – Outcome by Party Status of Press 
 
   Won    Lost   Total 
 
Party+Amici  25 56.8%   19 43.2%  44 100% 
Party Only  18 56.3%   14 43.7%  32 100% 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Party  43 56.6%   33 43.4%  76 75.2% 
Amicus Only  11 44.0%   14 56.0%  25 24.8% 
 
Total   54 53.0%   47 47.0%            101        100% 
 
 The media were also far more successful as or supporting petitioners than aor 
supporting respondents, winning 38 of 54 cases or 70.4% as petitioner, compared to 10 
out of 36 cases or 27.8% as respondent, probably for reasons having less to do with 
characteristics of the press than with the theory that the Supreme Court is morelikely to 
review decisions it wishes to reverse.1626 That notion finds some support in the fact that, 
in the 11 cases that reached the Court on direct appeal, the press won 6 of 8 cases as or 
supporting appellees and lost all 3 cases as or supporting appellants.  In other words, the 
Court affirmed 9 of 11 cases on direct appeal when it did not have the discretion to deny 
certiorari. 
Table 6 – Outcome by Press as Petitioner/Respondent 
 
   Won    Lost   Total 
 
Petitioner  38 70.4%   16 29.6%  54 100% 
Respondent  10 27.8%   26 72.2%  36 100% 
 
Total   48 100%   42 100%  90 100% 
                                                
1625 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 




 Much has been written about the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus,1627 
and its presence in cases involving the institutional press certainly appears to have
affected the outcome. The press significantly improved its winning percentage when the 
ACLU lined up on the same side, winning 75.8% of the time. Moreover the press lost 5 
of the 6 cases in which the ACLU argued against the press position.  
 Ironically, press amici and the ACLU are rarely found on the same brief today.  
According to Reporters Committee’s Dalglish, the ACLU requires other amici to yield all 
decision-making authority.  “I’ve virtually gotten out of signing on [to ACLU briefs] 
except in extreme circumstances,” Dalglish said, “because you basically ign over 
everything to them.  They make all the decisions.”1628 
 
Table 7 – Outcome by ACLU Participation 
 
ACLU Position Won   Lost   Total 
 
Pro Press  25 75.8%  8 24.2%  33 84.6% 
Anti Press     1 16.7%  5 83.3%     6 15.4% 
 
Total   26 66.7%           13 33.3%  39        100% 
 
 
 Looking at the opposition, the press did much better against state and local 
agencies, including trial courts, winning 23 of 34 cases or 67.6%, than against the federal 
government, winning only 8 of 24 or 33.3%.  This certainly comports with Kritzer’s 
findings that the federal government is, indeed, the proverbial 800-pound gorilla, but it 
                                                
1627 See, e.g., Charles Epp, External Pressure and the Supreme Court’s Agenda, in 
CLAYTON &  GILLMAN , supra note 110, at 265; SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF 
AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990). 
1628 Dalglish Interview, supra note 674. 
 356
does not reflect the considerably smaller advantage he attributes to state and local 
government entities.  The explanation may lie in the “linkage” Kritzer found between th  
success rate of state and local government entities and the resources of their 
opponents.1629 
 Even most state attorneys general do not command the legal talent that the 
institutional press can assemble. The lawyers mobilized on behalf of the press, such a 
Floyd Abrams, James Goodale, Jane Kirtley, Bruce Sanford, Lee Levine, and others 
encountered in this study are among the best that the country has to offer.  The press 




Table 8 – Outcome by Type of Opponent 
 
    Won   Lost   Total 
 
Federal Government    8 33.3%  16 66.7%  24 24% 
Other Government     23 67.6%  11 32.4%  34 34% 
Other Repeaters    4   66.7%     2 33.3%      6  6%  
One-Shotters       19 51.4%  18 48.6%      37   36% 
 
Totals        54 53.5%  47 46.5%     101    100% 
 
 
 Perhaps the greatest surprise was the finding that the institutional press did only 
slightly better than even against 37 so-called “one-shotters,” that is, parties who do not 
regularly appear in court, that it faced in Court.  This flies in the face of all the variations 
on the Galanter theme. Looking more closely at the individual cases, however, suggest  
                                                
1629 Kritzer, supra note 1108. 
 357
two possible explanations. One explanation involves the five newsgathering cases,1630 
where the losing record might be expected in light of this study.    
 The second is more complicated.  The press won 11 libel cases against one-
shotters and lost 11, won 3 privacy cases and lost 2, won 2 prior restraint cases and lost 1, 
won 2 other content-related cases, and lost 3 of 4 newsgathering cases. Most of the libel 
cases were decided after 1964 when the Court revolutionized libel law in New York Times 
v. Sullivan. Nearly all of the cases that followed made important doctrinal refinements to 
answer constitutional questions raised by the Sullivan prescription: what is “actual 
malice”? who is a “public figure”? etc.  
 Thus, one suspects these cases, which account for 22 of the 36 one-shot cases, 
were accepted and resolved almost without regard to the litigants as the Court wrestled 
with very technical questions of pure law.  Two of the non-libel cases, which sounded in 
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, could also be explained as 
refinements of the Sullivan doctrine. 
 Yet another unexpected finding from this study was the relatively little diff rence 
in press case outcomes among the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts – the only 
Courts with enough press cases for comparison – despite the marked conservative trend 
from 1953 to 2005. Indeed, the press was most successful in the Rehnquist Court, 
winning 16 of 29 cases or 55.2%, and least successful in the Burger Court, before which 
the press won 27 of 52 cases or 51.9%.  
                                                
1630 The cases were Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (cameras in courtrooms); 
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1986) (cameras in courtrooms; the only victory of the 
five); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (broken promise of confidentiality); 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1998) and Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1998) (police 
ride-alongs ). 
 358
Table 9 – Outcome by Court (Chief Justice) 
 
   Won   Lost   Total 
 
Fuller         0     2     2 
White    0     1     1 
Hughes  2     0     2 
Stone    2     0     2 
Vinson    1     1     2 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Warren   6 54.5%      5 45.5%   11 100% 
Burger            27 51.9%   25 48.4%   52 100% 
Rehnquist           16 55.2%   13 44.8%   29 100% 
 
 
D.  Disparity between Publishing and Newsgathering Cases 
 
 Why has the press fared so poorly in constitutional litigation involving 
newsgathering – other than access to courtrooms – despite striking successes in 
publishing cases?  This study has already explored at some length the reasons for failure 
in access to government information cases, as well as the overwhelming influence of 
“generally applicable law” doctrine in Branzburg, Zurcher, Cohen, Wilson, and Hanlon.  
But there are some broader factors that separate newsgathering from publishing and 
operate to disfavor newsgathering; a few of these bear mention here.   
 At the most concrete level, it might be said that newsgathering cases affected 
working reporters more directly than editors and publishers; perhaps publishers put fewer 
resources into newsgathering litigation.  Differences between reporters and their bosses 
were apparent in Branzburg and Cohen, not to mention in the formation of RCFP, but 
there is little evidence that the differences adversely affected the resourc  available for 
newsgathering litigation.  Doctrinally, the difference is more striking.  At the most 
abstract level, publishing cases turn on the right to speak – a right explicitly guaranteed 
by the constitution – while newsgathering cases turn on the right to receive information, 
 359
the right of the public to know, a far more attenuated, derivative, and, to some minds, 
completely imaginary right.1631 While the Court has recognized a “right to know” from 
time to time, it is a much weaker platform from which to mount constitutional litigation. 
 Gleason’s study of 19th Century contempt and libel cases links the failure of the 
press to gain expansive newsgathering privileges to a rejection of the “watchdog concept” 
of the press clause by the common law courts of that era.  Gleason points out that the 
watchdog concept postulated that the duty of the institutional press “to gather the news in 
the public interest outweighed the harm caused by newspapers’ transgressions.”1632  
Although Gleason uses the term “newsgathering” in a broader sense than has been used 
here, focusing on the recognition of practical problems inherent in newsgathering to 
mitigate culpability in libel cases, there is no reason why the analysis could not be 
extended to grant special privileges to reporters engaged in the newsgathering process.  
For a variety of reasons, however, “most courts continued to reject the watchdog claims 
of publishers.”1633  A case like Bartnicki suggests that, had the concept been entrenched 
in constitutional thinking in the 19th Century, instead of the mid-20th Century, it might by 
now have evolved to protect newsgathering.  
 Blanchard attributes the disparity to the Court’s refusal to extend any special 
privilege to the institutional press that is not available to the general public, a posture 
deriving from the historic idea that the press is merely an extension of speech.1634  
Alternatively, Helle argues that the answer lies in the struggle between th  press and the 
                                                
1631 See Easton, supra note 1013, at 154-58.  
1632 GLEASON, supra note 7, at 69. 
1633 Id. at 65. 
1634 Blanchard, supra note 81, at 226. 
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government for, respectively, access to and control of information.1635  Helle’s reading of 
the cases appears to be most compatible with interest group theory, with the government 
in these cases acting as an offsetting interest group.1636  
 This dissertation has also raised two additional contributors to the disparity in 
outcomes between publishing and newsgathering cases that do not generally apper in the 
literature.  One of those, discussed at some length in connection with Branzburg and the 
legacy cases, is Justice White’s personal disillusionment with the institutional press.  
White was assigned to write the majority opinion in both Branzburg and Cohen, arguably 
the two most influential newsgathering cases.  
 Yet another reason for the disparity may lie in the press’s history of claiming First 
Amendment protection for business practices that the Court did not tolerate in other 
industries.  Such overreaching can be found in the labor-management, antitrust, tax, and 
copyright cases that are largely beyond the scope of this study.  There is no doubt that 
some of the pre-Near litigation conducted by the ANPA employed First Amendment 
arguments which, in hindsight, we would find inappropriate today, and that practice 
continued well into the modern era.  Two examples, pre- and post-Near, illustrate the 
point. 
 In August 1912, Congress enacted the Newspaper Publicity Law as a rider 
attached to the Post Office Appropriation Act.1637 Among other matters, the law required 
newspapers that availed themselves of second-class mailing privileges to fil  and publish 
a sworn statement listing average daily circulation, as well as the names of key editors, 
                                                
1635 Helle, supra note 82, at 1. 
1636 See Kritzer, supra note 1108, at 257. 
1637 37 Stat. 539, c. 389, § 2 (Aug. 24, 1912). 
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executives, and owners.  It also required that all editorial matter published for money to 
be labeled “advertisement.” 1638  In September, the ANPA announced that “at the request 
of a great majority of our members our counsel are arranging to test the constituti ality 
of the law.”1639 In October, ANPA Counsel Robert Morris and Guthrie B. Plante filed a 
law suit on behalf of the Lewis Publishing Co., publisher of the New York Morning 
Telegraph, the Journal of Commerce, and the Commercial Bulletin.   They lost in district 
court, but were allowed to appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court on First and Fifth 
Amendment grounds.1640     
 In his opinion for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Edward D. White all but 
mocked the press’s argument that the law abridged the freedom of speech guaranteed by 
the First Amendment.   
[I]t was and is in the power of Congress in “the interest of the 
dissemination of current intelligence” to so legislate as to the mails, by 
classification or otherwise, as to favor the widespread circulation of 
newspapers, periodicals, etc., even although the legislation on the subject, 
when considered intrinsically, apparently seriously discriminates against 
the public and in favor of newspapers, periodicals, etc., and their 
publishers. Although in the form in which the contentions here made by 
the publishers … seem to challenge this proposition by suggesting that the 
power of Congress to classify is controlled and limited by conditions 
intrinsically inhering in the carriage of the mails, we assume that such 
apparent contention was merely the result of an unguarded form of 
statement, since we cannot bring our minds to the conclusion that it was 
intended on behalf of the publishers to generally assail as an infringement 
 of the constitutional prohibition against the invasion of the freedom of the 
press the legislation which for a long series of years has favored the press 
by discriminating so as to secure to it great pecuniary and other 
concessions  and a wider circulation and consequently a greater sphere of 
                                                
1638 Id.   
1639 EMERY, supra note 62, at 115 (quoting Don Seitz, chairman of ANPA’s committee 
on second-class postage, in Bulletin 2753, Sept. 27, 1912). 
1640 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 297 (1913). 
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influence. If, however, we are mistaken in this view, then, we think, it 
suffices to say that the contention is obviously without merit.1641 
 
White went on to hold that the specific provisions of the act were merely incidental to the 
second-class privilege, and in no way infringed upon any right of the press.1642  As 
Emory wrote, “Thus the American Newspaper Publishers Association lost in it first 
appearance before the Supreme Court.” 
 If the Lewis Publishing decision discouraged the ANPA from pursuing the 
publishers’ business objectives through First Amendment litigation,1643 victories in Near 
and especially Grosjean – a tax case at bottom – seemed to restore its confidence.1644  
Indeed, Emery points out that, by the mid-1930s, “the association leadership increasingly 
advanced the argument that business activities of newspapers either were exempted under 
the First Amendment from government regulation, or should be protected against any 
adverse effects of federal general business laws.”1645  
 With the advent of the New Deal, that argument was manifest in ANPA’s 
insistence on an expansive “press freedom” exemptions in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act code of fair competition for daily newspapers and in the association’s 
hostility toward unionization. 1646  The NIRA and its industrial codes were ultimately 
                                                
1641 Id. at 313-14. 
1642 Id. at 315-16. 
1643 CORTNER, supra note 50, at 130 (“The ANPA had been largely oblivious to free-press 
issues prior to the 1920s and had concentrated its energies instead on the economic 
problems facing newspapers across the country.”).   
1644 Id. at 132 (“A victory for the press in the Grosjean case was apparently perceived as 
important to strengthening the hand of publishers in resisting the unionization of editorial 
employees.”). 
1645 EMERY, supra note 62, at 223. 
1646 Id. at 224. 
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struck down by the Supreme Court in 1935,1647 but  the unionization issue did not reach 
the Court until after the conservative block had been broken in the aftermath of President 
Roosevelt’s “court-packing” scheme.1648 
 ANPA had initially welcomed the formation of the American Newspaper Guild in 
1933; as publishers began resisting the Guild’s collective bargaining efforts,  however, 
the association began to formulate a First Amendment argument against unionization.1649 
In 1935, an Associated Press staffer named Morris Watson was discharged for what he 
claimed were Guild-related activities.1650  Watson appealed to the new National Labor 
Relations Board, which ruled against AP the following year and ordered Watson’s 
reinstatement.  AP refused to comply with the order, and the NLRB won an enforcement 
order from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.1651  With the support of 
ANPA,1652 the AP successfully petitioned for certiorari on First Amendment and 
Commerce Clause grounds.     
 But the balance of power on the Court had shifted, and, in a 5-4 decision, the 
Court declared the National Labor Relations Act constitutional and upheld the NLRB’s 
finding.  Writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts declared: 
The business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation 
because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no 
special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special 
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for 
                                                
1647 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
1648 See generally JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE 
SUPREME COURT (2010). 
1649 CORTNER, supra note 50, at 132.  
1650 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 123 (1937). 
1651 Id. at 124. 
1652 EMERY, supra note 62, at 234-35.  ANPA Counsel Elisha Hanson filed an amicus 
brief in support of AP asserting that unionization of editorial employees under 
government compulsion destroyed freedom of the press. Id. 
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libel. He may be punished for contempt of court.  He is subject to the anti-
trust laws. Like others he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes 
on his business. The regulation here in question has no relation whatever 
to the impartial distribution of news. The order of the Board in nowise 
circumscribes the full freedom and liberty of the petitioner to publish the 
news as it desires it published or to enforce policies of its own choosing 
with respect to the editing and rewriting of news for publication, and the 
petitioner is free at any time to discharge Watson or any editorial 
employee who fails to comply with the policies it may adopt.1653 
 
The so-called “Four Horsemen” of the old conservative block – Justices Sutherland, Van 
Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler – dissented,1654 but the idea that the First Amendment 
afforded the press no immunity from generally applicable laws was reinfo ced and, to this 
day, remains the greatest single obstacle to constitutional protection for newsgathering. 
   
E.  Recommendations for Future Study 
 
 This study has only scratched the surface of what promises to be a goldmine of 
information that is as deep as it is wide. Vertically, the study should be expanded to 
include certiorari decisions, as well as decided cases, and federal and state courts at every 
level.  Horizontally, further study might compare pure speech and non-mainstream pr ss 
cases to see how the results might vary in the absence of a coherent interest group.   
 But there can be little doubt that the institutional press is an interest group to be 
reckoned with in the Supreme Court, any aversion to such a designation notwithstanding.  
Over the past century, and especially since 1964, the press has secured for itselfthe 
greatest legal protection available anywhere in the world. And while some of that
                                                
1653 Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132-33.  Following the decision, Time Magazine wrote: 
“Exultant in his private office which one enters through the anteroom t  the men’s toilet 
in Manhattan’s Ritz Theatre, Morris Watson made plans to return, at least long enough to 
collect the accumulated back pay due him under the Labor Board’s ruling that the AP 
must compensate him for the difference between his WPA pay, $200 monthly, and his 
$295 AP salary. Pleased at his victory and at receiving $1,710, Morris ("Gandhi") 
Watson was not sure that he wished to abandon what has begun to be a successful 
theatrical career as director of the WPA’s ‘Living Newspaper’ project.”  The Press: Guilded Age, 
TIME, April 19, 1937. 
1654 Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 133 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
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protection has come from Congress, by far the greatest share has come from the Supreme 
Court’s expansive interpretation of the First Amendment’s Press Clause.   
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